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Savior, Slayer, Travailer: The Image of the Knight in English Renaissance Religious Verse¹

Karley Adney

During the Middle Ages knights enjoyed their greatest popularity, and while knights were still visible in Renaissance literary works,² their appearance was severely diminished in English Renaissance religious verse. This is especially striking since countless knights of the Middle Ages, whether real or of literary construction, became synonymous with religious causes. Consider, for instance, the Knights Templar and their involvement in the Holy Wars or Gawain, Percival, and Lancelot questing after the Holy Grail. Three of the only Renaissance writers to mention the figure of the knight in their religious poetry include Anne Askew, Edmund Spenser, and John Donne. Each of these writers was of the Protestant faith, so one might assume that they employ the knight in similar ways, but this is not the case—their references serve completely different purposes. For Askew, the knight is an honorable figure and a symbol of protection; for Spenser, the knight represents one's quest for holiness while overcoming both literal and figurative serpents; and for Donne, the knight represents a mythic past and symbolizes the quest one must make to find faith and the true church.

First, it is necessary to put chivalry and the image of the knight in context. In this respect, Askew's, Spenser's, and Donne's knights can be examined accurately within the existing chivalric and knightly traditions:

Chivalry is an evocative word, conjuring up images in the mind—of the knight fully armed, perhaps with the crusaders' red cross sewn upon his surcoat; of martial adventures and strange lands; of castles with tall towers and of the fair women who dwelt in them [...] it denotes a man of aristocratic standing and probably of noble ancestry, who is capable, if called upon, of equipping himself with a war horse and the arms of a heavy cavalryman, and who has been through certain rituals that make him what he is—who he has been 'dubbed' to knighthood [...] from the middle of the twelfth century on it very frequently carries ethical or religious overtones. (Keen 1-2)

Middle English romance writers like Chretien de Troyes, the Pearl Poet, and even Sir Thomas Malory refined the general characteristics of knights such as Tristan, Gawain, and Lancelot, respectively, who appeared in their literature:

¹ I would like to thank Professor Alexandra Bennett, Northern Illinois University, for her guidance and support for this project; Professor William Johnson, Northern Illinois University, for his time and consideration; and my parents, for their unwavering support and willingness to discuss Renaissance literature with me. With the help of these people, this project was finally realized.

² Consider, for instance, Ludvico Ariosto's epic *Orlando Furioso*, Miguel de Cervantes's *Don Quixote*, Lope de Vega's *El caballero de Olmedo*, and even Samuel Butler's *Hudibras*, among others as works that prominently incorporate the figure of the knight.

From a very early stage we find the romantic authors habitually associating together certain qualities which they clearly regarded as the classic virtues of good knighthood: *prouesse*, *loyaute*, *largesse* (generosity), *courtoisie*, and *franchise* (the free and frank bearing that is visible testimony to the combination of good birth with virtue). The association of these qualities in chivalry is already established in the romances [...] and [...] to the end of the middle ages their combination remains the stereotype of chivalrous distinction. (Keen 2)³

It will be useful to study the way in which Maurice Keen's observations apply to the knight figures of Askew, Spenser, and Donne; this study will proceed chronologically since each of these writers amplifies different aspects of the knight, partially to reflect the religious attitude of the time in which they wrote.

Although born Catholic in 1521, Anne Askew later converted to the Protestant faith and desired a divorce from her Catholic husband; Askew was eventually discovered by Henry VIII's bishops and was persecuted for heresy in 1546 (Beilin xv). Primarily because of her commitment to her faith, "references to Askew are common enough to suggest she was in fact one of the better known English martyrs" (Beilin xxxix). She is most known for her *Examinations*, in which she "creates her own record of her interrogations for heresy, representing herself as the worthy opponent of numerous officials of church, city, and state" (Beilin xv).

The first edition of the *Examinations* was published in 1546 with commentary by John Bale, who, as Theresa Kemp observes, "happily situates [Askew] within a history of true Christian saints, including John the Baptist, James the Apostle, John Fisher, and Thomas More, all martyrs who boldly opposed the tyranny of God's enemies" (1030). In his commentary, Bale employs rhetorical devices to emphasize Askew's dire situation by including phrases that "[c]haracteriz[e] Askew as 'daynty'e,' 'yonge,' and 'tender,'" all of which "[enable] him to intensify by contrast the atrocity of her torture at the hands of her strong male inquisitors, and thus the atrocity of their assault on God" (Kemp 1031).

Askew unabashedly states her opinions and beliefs in her examinations; she repeats the phrases "lynes whych I have written" (116), "[q]uoth Anne Askewe" (137), "[w]ritten by me Anne Askew" (106), and "[b]y me Anne Askewe" (148) countless times. Her continued and aggressive employment of a first person perspective makes it clear that she is responsible for the text, and enables readers to be fully aware of her unwavering devotion. Askew's devotion is also clearly illustrated in passages from her *Examinations* like the following:

Then was I brought to an howse, and layed in bed with as werye and payneful bones, as ever had pacyent Job, I thanke my lorde God therof. Then my lorde Chauncellour sent me worde if I wolde leave my opynyon, I shuld want nothyng. If I wolde not, I shuld fourth to Newgate, and so be burned. I sent hym agayne worde, that I wuld rather dye, than to breake my faythe. (Beilin 132)

³ For a general overview of chivalry, see Keen's *Chivalry*, specifically "The Idea of Chivalry," pages 1-17.

Adhering to the tenets of the Protestant faith for which Askew knew she would be executed, she sought comfort from God, especially during her harsh examinations. She composed a few poems while imprisoned, one of which, “The Balade which Anne Askewe made and sange whan she was in Newgate,” uses the image of the knight. One might say that Askew’s faith is evident in the title of her poem, simply due to the use of the words “whan” and “was.” This choice in diction suggests that either Askew thought she would be released from her charges, or more likely, that she knew if she remained devoted to her beliefs, she would be freed from her prison and be welcomed to a new and better place—perhaps even into the company of God.

In response to the harsh treatment she suffered at the hands of “all the devils” (“The Balade” 12), she emphasizes the savior aspect of the knight in her poem. Amplifying the savior aspect of the knight here is fitting since during Askew’s time, many people were being prosecuted for their religious beliefs and sought protection or help from God, and thought that they would receive it by being faithful and good Christians. Askew uses the image of the knight only once in her *Examinations*; it is not an image she uses loosely. More than that, however, is the fact that the knight appears in one of the few poems she wrote while she was in Newgate. It is significant that the image appears in a poem rather than in her own examinations because the genre of poetry was a far more reserved form of composition for Askew; she has over thirty pages worth of responses to her examiners, but only two poems that total roughly five pages; she also admits in “The Balade whych Anne Askewe made and sange whan she was in Newgate,” that “Not oft use I to wryght/In prose nor yet in ryme” (37-8). She saved her single use of the knight image for one of those poems, and in turn it deserves special attention.

The knight appears in the very first line of her poem:

Lyke as the armed knight
Appoynted to the field
With thys world wyll I fight
And faith shall be my shield.
Faythe is that weapon stronge
Whych wyll not fayle at need
My foes therfor amonge
Therwith wyll I procede. (1-8)

Not only is the image in the first sentence, but it is in the first line of the poem. This implies that Askew feels that the image is powerful, so much so, in fact, that she wants it to be the first image that readers encounter. Her knight is not just a wandering or questing knight, either: Askew’s knight is “armed” and ready for battle. And with the help of that first knightly image, “[t]he ballad explicitly invokes the Christian knight topos, aligning the martyr’s performance with reformist emphasis on faith. Contemporary audiences, aware of Askew’s torture in the tower [...] would notice the understatement in the opening lines” (Linton 143). What is more is that Askew is not merely mentioning a knight: she is, in fact, calling herself one. It is significant that Askew uses no pronouns in reference to the knight, suggesting that the knight could be either male or female. Quite possibly, then, she could be picturing herself as that knight on the battlefield. If this is the case, it implies that she has complete faith in her own

strength, both religious and physical, as she ventures, as a knight, to take on the world. Askew specifically compares herself to the knight here because she wants her readers to liken her to a brave and noble warrior on a battlefield, which is exactly what Askew was when persecuted for her own beliefs; thus, her knight exhibits *prouesse*, one of Keen's required knightly characteristics. And even more importantly, Askew's knight demonstrates *loyaute*, as she personally did: According to Andrew Hadfield, Askew was a "Protestant heroine" who "was anything but silent and obedient as she stood up to her bullying male prosecutors, and in her refusal to submit to an authority and a creed she could not accept, she served as an inspiration to male and female Protestants alike" (248-9).

Obviously, by means of the image of the knight, Askew desires her readers to assume that just as a knight is loyal to his king, she is loyal to her own—Christ. And as a knight, Askew's weapon of choice is not a sword, but her faith. This is a bold statement, suggesting she needs little more than a strong commitment to God and she will then be victorious on the battlefield. Joan Pong Linton, in her "The Plural Voices of Anne Askew," reexamines Askew's persona in the poem:

In this generalized portrait, what comes through is the martyr's unequal fight with worldly evil. Even the simile 'lyke as the armed knight,' distances the audience from the martyr's suffering, foregrounding the knight as an idealized figure through which the readers and listeners may individually participate in a collective making of faith. (Linton 144)

Linton also claims that Askew continues to use "the voice of the Christian knight as she addresses her own perilous situation" in lines 25-32 (145). Askew manipulates the knight figure into a genderless character with which she can armor herself; even as a woman, she can become a warrior. She is, indeed, partaking in her own Holy War and finds victory as a knight whose most powerful weapon is her faith.

Now let us shift to one of the most well-known Christian knights, one accompanied by a cautious dwarf and a beautiful woman. Edmund Spenser's knight is noble in that he is not simply a personal savior and protector, but rather, a crusader and slayer. He is a crusader because he is assigned tasks that must be completed, and a slayer since this knight, Red Crosse, slays both literal and figurative serpents. Like Askew's knight, Spenser's knight reflects the religious attitude of the people of the time. Elizabeth Heale provides readers with a wealth of helpful details that allow them to see the story in its accurate historical context. Heale states that during Spenser's lifetime, "[m]any English people wished to see England resume the role of champion of godly Protestantism against what they saw as a grand Catholic plot to destroy the true faith" (4-5); these worries were amplified by "anxieties about Catholic treachery in England" (5). The people, then, were eagerly searching for someone to continue the crusade against the Catholic Church, and to destroy any remnants of that church so that the True Church could thrive in all its holy glory.

Spenser was a devout Protestant, and his commitment to his beliefs is demonstrated clearly in his written work: his "first published work [...] was a series of translations for a strongly anti-Catholic work by a Protestant exile from the Netherlands" (Heale 6), and this first published work was the start of a long tradition of anti-Catholic literature by Spenser. Heale has suggested that the poem *Prothalamion*

situates Spenser's loyalties as "ardently Protestant and retaining a vision of England as champion of the godly faith against Catholic Spain" (6). But the work of Spenser's that deserves special attention here is *The Faerie Queene*, in which the starring characters are mainly knights. In this epic poem, "Spenser's brand of Protestantism and the vision it entails of a special, providential role for England are profoundly important for Spenser's whole conception of his epic poem, but particularly for the allegories of Holiness and Justice in Books 1 and 5" (Heale 6).

In writing this epic, Spenser not only prescribes a "providential role for England," but also aims to persuade his readers about how to behave and what to believe since *The Faerie Queene* is, in part, meant to function as a teaching manual for readers. In his "Letter of the Authors expounding his whole intention in the course of this worke: which for that it giveth great light to the Reader, for the better understanding is hereunto annexed," Spenser specifically states that "The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or noble person in virtuous and gentle discipline" (Spenser, Letter to Raleigh 714). The first of the six books follows the story of the knight of the Red Crosse. It is quite useful to recall Keen's definition of chivalry and the depiction of the knight figure here, in which he describes a "knight fully armed, perhaps with the crusaders' red cross sewn upon his surcoat," and "a man of aristocratic standing and probably of noble ancestry" (1-2). Red Crosse's name alone is the embodiment of one of the most familiar crusader-knight symbols; he immediately conjures images of knights walking in long trains, each step on their pilgrimage a demonstration of their commitment to their faith.

Red Crosse has a specific emphasized characteristic in that he is the knight of holiness, who is "on a pilgrimage from error to salvation" (Hamilton 9). According to A. C. Hamilton, "[a]s a Protestant poet writing in the virtues during the Reformation, Spenser had no choice but to begin with holiness, for that virtue distinguishes our unfallen state created in the image of God" (Hamilton 8). But Red Crosse does not start out holy; he must go on a personal quest, all the while slaying the demons that interfere with him and block his path, to become holy. On this journey, he makes mistakes. He ventures into the Den of Error against the advice of Una, partly because he desires to impress her:

Be well aware, quoth then that Ladie milde,
Least suddaine mischiefe ye too rash prouoke:
The danger hid, the place vnknowne and wilde,
Breedes dreadfull doubts: Oft fire is without smoke,
And peril without show: therefore your stroke
Sir knight with-hold, till further tryall made.
Ah Ladie (sayd he) shame were to reuoke,
The forward footing for an hidden shade:
Vertue giues her selfe light, through darknesse for to wade. (I.ii.12)

Red Crosse's mistakes truly liken him to "everyman." It is his ability to overcome these mistakes (such as defeating Error in her den) that makes him representative of each person trying to achieve balance and find holiness, and Red Crosse is only able to find holiness through experience: "Instead of being directly instructed in the nature of holiness, readers see that virtue realized in what he does and what happens to him. The

virtue is shown as a way of living, [...] generally compatible with the teaching of the Reformed church” (Hamilton 9).

Spenser definitely participates in the Middle English Romance tradition of having his knight partake in adventures that transpire in “realms unfamiliar to history,” as Keen has suggested, where people and events are “incredible” (3). Red Crosse meets and travels with a wise dwarf; he is outwitted by a shape-shifting man named Archimago; he encounters and defeats a dragon that, after exploding, has her filthy remains eaten by her own children; he is imprisoned by a ruthless giant; and he eventually slays a massive dragon that has decided to make its home in a family garden. Beyond following the tradition of the Middle English romance knight, Spenser also emphasizes the classic virtues of the “good” Middle English romance knight as mentioned by Keen, since Red Crosse undoubtedly embodies *prouesse*, *loyaute*, and *franchise* (Keen 2). He exhibits prowess in his battles with Error, Orgoglio, and most notably, the dragon of Una’s garden. He remains loyal throughout his quest. One might suggest that he wavers in his devotion to Una after Archimago makes it appear as if she has been intimate with another man, but Red Crosse is always loyal to the woman whom he serves: Queen Gloriana. And he has franchise, because of both his suspected good birth and his virtuosity (which is definitely acquired and refined during his journey).

However, in complement to these classic virtues noted by Keen, Spenser adds some unique characteristics to Red Crosse. Significantly, Red Crosse fights in used armor: “Ycladd in mightie armes and siluer shielde, / Wherein old dints of deepe woundes did remaine” (I.i.1). Adorning used armor symbolizes that others have been on a similar, if not the exact same, mission before him. Most likely the dents were not acquired by Red Crosse himself since he is a relatively young knight on his first major mission. While on this mission, Red Crosse comes to find that, while on the Hill of Contemplation looking at the New Jerusalem, his real name is St. George: “[T]hou Saint George shalt called bee, / Saint George of mery England, the signe of victory” (I.x.61). That Red Crosse’s actual name is St. George is incredibly significant for several reasons. First, most well-known images of St. George depict him atop his horse⁴; this is significant since the first images readers get of Red Crosse involves him seated upon his horse. What is more, however is that one of the most popular stories associated with St. George is one in which he saves a princess from being eaten by a dragon by killing the beast while riding his horse. The slaying of this dragon to save a woman closely mirrors Red Crosse’s journey to help Una, which will be discussed in further detail below. Red Crosse’s true name is also significant because St. George is the patron saint of England; undoubtedly one can appreciate Spenser’s brilliance here in that his knight is actually named after the patron of England who will strive to protect the English people. If the patron saint is fighting—even allegorically—against Catholicism, surely that is what all people of England should do. As discussed earlier, *The Faerie Queene* is meant to

⁴ Raphael has two well-known oil-on-wood depictions of St. George’s battle with the dragon; Tintoretto’s chosen medium for the scene involved oil and canvas; Paolo Uccello did two versions of the scene; Rogier van der Weyden also found artistic inspiration in the tale. But the most visually-stunning representation, by far, is Bernat Martorell’s “Saint George Killing the Dragon,” originally situated as the central panel of an altarpiece in a church devoted to the saint in Catalonia, Spain.

function as a model for behavior, so the ways in which Red Crosse/St. George behaves should impart lessons to readers that they behave in a similar manner: uphold Protestantism.

Red Crosse's mission as assigned by Queen Gloriana is to fight and kill the dragon that has taken over the lovely Una's family garden; scholars widely agree that the dragon plaguing Una's garden is meant to represent Rome and the Catholic Church. Red Crosse naturally becomes attracted to Una and part of his mission becomes to win her affection. Eventually, Red Crosse is successful and completes his mission: he slays literal serpents (the dragon of the garden); he slays figurative serpents (overcoming his own mistakes); and at the end of the book, he is finally betrothed to Una, and will be able to marry her after six more years of service to the Queen.

Red Crosse's preoccupation and concern with Una's affection and his relationship with her clearly likens him to a knight from a typical Middle English romance. Spenser's knights (for the most part) are like Red Crosse, and are not only concerned with the quest set to them by Queen Gloriana, but are also concerned with the quest of love. In turn, critics like Richard Levin have suggested that Book I "contributes to the developing Protestant tradition that sets a high value on chaste courtship and marriage [...]. The Book is both a love story and a story charting the Christian path to salvation; Red Crosse is both a wavering lover and an erring Christian" (Levin 1). One is reminded of the character Lancelot at this description, who wavers in his love for Guinevere when he attempts to forget her and instead shows complete loyalty to his king and very close friend Arthur, and who is denied the Holy Grail because of his preoccupation with Guinevere. Heale has also brilliantly noted that the bulk of the structure of Book I is based on the book of Revelation, which A. C. Hamilton claims "allowed [Spenser] to fashion holiness by telling the legend of the Red Cross Knight as a romance" (8).

Heale, however, argues that Book I is less like a typical romance than an allegory for the True Church's "sufferings." She comments more in depth on Spenser's exquisite use of the book of Revelation as source material:

Revelation thus provided Spenser with vivid images to describe the conflict of good and evil. But the images bring with them a tradition of historical allegory, so that at times episodes in Book I refer not only to the individual's fight with the forces of Satan, but also to the fight of God's elect through history and to the sufferings of the True Church. At times, Spenser's imagery is so specific as to suggest that he is dealing with the history of the English Church and its fight with the forces of Satan in recent times. (23)

She goes on to assert that St. George represents the elect Christian, and that with Grace, St. George is "enabled to overthrow Satan to achieve the righteousness he lost at the fall. On another level St. George overthrows the forces of Satan in England and restores the True Church" (44). Similarly, C. S. Lewis, in his *Spenser's Images of Life*, suggests that *The Faerie Queene* is a moral allegory in which "St. George defeats error, falls into pride, is dominated by despair, purged by penance, raised by contemplation, and finally defeats the devil" (2). Yet another interesting suggestion for the allegory in Book I is made by Frank Kermode:

[T]he historical allegory of Book I treats the history of the true church from its beginnings to the Last Judgement in its conflict with the Church of Rome. According to this reading, the Red Cross Knight's subjection to Orgoglio in canto vii refers to the popish captivity of England from Gregory VII to Wyclif [...] and the six years that the Red Cross Knight must serve the Faerie Queene before he may return to Eden refers to the six years of Mary Tudor's reign when England was subject to the Church of Rome. (Hamilton 9)

Regardless in the choice of allegory one chooses to read in Book I of *The Faerie Queene*, it is clear that Spenser's knight is a slayer who quests for holiness. But Red Crosse's quest to help the distressed damsel Una directly parallels and emphasizes his quest to save the distressed church. Spenser's likening of Red Crosse to a knight of a Middle English romance is positive, because the knight is on a quest to rescue what is endangered, whether it is a woman or his faith.

John Donne, on the other hand, satirically emphasizes the stereotypical knight of the Middle English romances, the travailer, in his Holy Sonnet XVIII, "Show me deare Christ, thy spouse, so bright and cleare." Depicting the knight as a travailer accurately reflects the religious attitude of early seventeenth-century England, which was a time "in which God and Satan, heaven and hell, were radiant or lurid realities" (Bush 294), and when people were still struggling, still "travailing," to find the True Church. Like Askew, Donne was born Catholic. He converted to the Protestant faith, and "towards the end of the first decade of the [seventeenth] century he was interesting himself in the work of the Dean of Gloucester, Thomas Morton, who was writing anti-Catholic propaganda" (Rudrum et al 102). Because of writing like that of Spenser's mentioned earlier, a tradition existed for Donne in which he could compose work that was not only anti-Catholic, but work that questioned and even attacked various branches of Christianity. Donne later became dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, and went on to become "the most famous preacher of his age" (102).

Donne is extremely well known for secular love poems like "The Flea," poems in which he expresses love through elaborate metaphysical conceits. Similarly, in his religious poetry, Donne expresses religion by means other than religious terminology: Anthony Low quotes Winfried Schleiner that it is a "widely publicized observation that Donne expresses religion through human love" (201). It is important to note the way in which Donne portrays human love in his religious poetry, especially since the knight of Donne's Holy Sonnet XVIII under examination is, in part, questing after the love of a woman. Low goes on to demonstrate where Donne himself "indicates why he found the language of sexual love appropriate in speaking about divine matter" by citing Donne's own sermon given at Whitehall in late February of 1625 or 1626: "GOD is *Love*, and the *Holy Ghost* is amorous in his *Metaphors*; everie where his *Scriptures* abound with the notions of *Love*, of *Spouse*, and *Husband*, and *Marriadge Songs*, and *Marriadge Supper*, and *Marriadge-Bedde*" (Low 201). This is a noteworthy observation because the very index line of the holy sonnet "Show me deare Christ, thy spouse, so bright and cleare" is inquiring about Christ's spouse, and reinforces the assumption that "[t]he strongest emotion in his divine poems, especially the Holy Sonnets, is probably that between man and woman, husband and wife" (Low 207).

According to Low, then, the image of the knight questing after the True Church (which in Holy Sonnet XVIII should be viewed as the female presence), is of the utmost

importance. Low himself writes that Donne openly “incorporates additional imagery from the courtly love romance tradition,” where “the soul becomes a questing, masculine knight; the object of its love is a maiden, who must first be actively sought and courted before she can be loved” (Low 215). This assumption is also clearly supported by Elizabeth Hodgson in *Gender and the Sacred Self in John Donne*, in which she asserts that

Throughout the poem, the speaker figures the Church of this sonnet according to traditionally female social idealizations. She is a courtly beloved, pursued by “adventuring knights” whose desire is to “make love” to her (9-10). Donne’s disbelieving questions, “Is she selfe truth and errs? now new, now outwore?” (6) also invoke images of the “errant Ecclesia,” the Church as Rahab, wandering the wilderness until Christ’s return (like Una in the *Faerie Queene*). (Hodgson 106)

Donne does not use the image of the knight in order to create as positive an association as both Askew and Spenser. Donne uses the knight to represent one’s laboring quest to find faith and the “true” church, since, as Frank Warnke notes, “even after his ordination, Donne was in some doubt whether the true Church was Rome, Canterbury, or Geneva” (110). Donne’s constant sense of doubt and anxiety concerning the various factions of Christianity and which one has the “right” beliefs is also obvious in “Satyre III,” in which he asks

Foole and wretch, wilt thou let thy Soule be tyed
To mans lawes, by which she shall not be tryed
At the last day? Will it then boot thee
To say a Philip, or a Gregory,
A Harry, or a Martin taught thee this? (93-7)

Similarly, Low argues that “[t]here is no need to point out how anxious and disturbed Donne is about the life-and-death question of identifying the true Church, the Bride of Christ, and of discriminating it from false, harlot churches, whether Catholic or Puritan” (214). Donne’s struggle is clearly illustrated in the following lines:

Is [Christ’s spouse] selfe truth and errs? Now new, now outwore?
Doth she, and did she, and shall she evermore
On one, on seaven, or on no hill appeare?
Dwells she with us, or like adventuring knights
First travaile we to seeke and then make love? (9-10).

The continuous use of interrogatives in this selected passage clearly demonstrates that the narrator is unclear of what the “true” faith is, or where he is able to find it. Most importantly, however, is the use of the interrogative concerning the knight; it implies that the knight is unsure of what he should be doing or just exactly what his mission is. Donne’s knight does not encounter anything incredible, as Keen suggests seems typical for a knight. In fact, it seems as if all Donne’s knight is concerned with is finding the lady not for her own sake, but rather just so he can make love to her. This is Donne’s cutting satire at work; perhaps he is suggesting that for some people, claiming to have

found faith is all that is necessary. Once they have conquered that task, just like the knight who has found and conquered the maiden, it is not necessary to practice their faith devoutly and continuously.

Donne's nameless knight is not like the Red Crosse knight who knows he must slay the dragon in Una's garden, or like Lancelot on a quest for the Holy Grail. Since his knight is unsure of his duty, Donne implies, then, that only after laboring to find Christ's spouse (which here can be equated to one's faith or the True Church) can one become intimate with her. Donne's image of the knight winning the lady he has rescued is a negative one here, since Donne makes it painfully clear that finding Truth can never be that simple. He writes the Truth rests at the peak of a towering mountain: "On a huge hill, / Cragg'd and steep, Truth stands" (Satyre 79-80). It is essential that one draw the link between "Show me dear Christ, thy spouse, so bright and cleare" and "Satyre III" because, as Hodgson notes, the two poems can and should be read as parallel pieces (105).

In comparing these two pieces, it is clear that Donne suggests that he alone cannot rescue faith, but he can search for it and be rescued by remaining faithful. Clearly the knight in his poem cannot find Truth, then, since he is familiar with the pattern of the quest in which he rescues a woman and then makes love to her: this pattern would demonstrate Donne's anxiety of the Church appearing as a whore. So Donne, unlike the knight in his poem, knows what he is searching for, and once he finds it, will be made better by it. His knight, however, will have to keep questing and clinging to the women he rescues—he may find brief joy in the arms of these women, but it is unlikely he will find the everlasting joy of Truth.

Donne's knight is a stark contrast to that of Askew's. Her knight is a symbol of faith and protection. Askew's knight acts as a shield between herself and her persecutors—he is a grand figure that helps to defend her as she battles to preserve her faith. Askew implicitly refers to herself as a knight as well, and therefore, clearly considers the knight as a positive figure. Red Crosse, the embodiment of holiness, amplifies the classic traits of the Middle English romance knight as well, and these traits are a positive construction for Spenser, whose knight is set on a quest that involves both distressed women and distressed churches; all the while Red Crosse encounters extraordinary things and in the end, he is successful. For Donne, however, the knight is unclear of his exact quest, and as such, the typical knight of the Middle English romances functions as a satire on those who cling to and love a faith that in Donne's eyes, is not the True or right faith.

Obviously Askew, Spenser, and Donne highlight different aspects of the knight figure to suit each one's purpose, and over the course of nearly 100 years, the image of the knight shifts radically. Each of these poets recognizes the importance of the figure of the knight and because of these three poets, the popular medieval figure of the knight is not absent from Renaissance religious verse, but the way in which the knight is used and just what it is meant to symbolize varies drastically. This variety is made quite clear in comparing poetry by Anne Askew, Edmund Spenser, and John Donne, who although they were Protestants writing about their religion, did not use the image to achieve the same ends. However, even though the purpose of the figure of the knight may change from work to work, one element remains constant: each author's attitude about religion, and that is an attitude of unwavering devotion.

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Özet**Kurtarıcı, Vahşi Katil, Seyyah:
İngiliz Rönesans Dönemi Dini Şiirinde Şövalye İmgesi**

İngiliz Rönesans dönemi dini şiirinde şövalyelerin birden bire ortadan kalkan görüntüsü, daha önceki dönemlerin edebiyatında şövalyelerin zengin varlığını düşününce şaşırtıcı bir seyir gösterir. Bu durum, Rönesans öncesi dönemde, şövalyelerin dini davalarla neredeyse özdeş olması sebebi ile daha da dikkat çekici bir durum arz eder. Dini şiirlerinde şövalye figürünü konu edinen Rönesans şairlerinden üçü “The Balade which Anne Askewe made and sange whan she was in Newgate” şiiri ile Anne Askew, *The Faerie Queene* isimli önemli eseri ile Edmund Spenser ve Holly Sonnet XVIII “Show me deare Christ, thy spouse, so bright and cleare” ile John Donne’dır. Benzer inançları taşıyıcılar da, bu yazarlar şövalyeleri aynı şekilde kullanmazlar, şövalyelere dönük göndermeleri farklı amaçlara hizmet eder. Askew için, şövalye saygı değer bir figür ve korumanın simgesidir; Spenser için şövalye hem gerçek hem de sembolik yılanları (iblisleri) alt etmek için bir tür kutsallık yolculuğuna çıkışı temsil eder ve Donne için şövalye mitsel geçmişi ve inancı ve gerçek dini bulmak için yapılması gereken yolculuğu temsil eder. Rönesans dönemi yazınının yüzyılı aşkın süresi boyunca dini şiirde şövalye figürünün amacı son derece temel bir değişim gösterir.

**Tracing George Orwell's Anti-Colonial Spirit in William Boyd's
A Good Man in Africa: A Comparative Study¹**

Juan Francisco Elices Agudo

A critical approach to George Orwell does not only mean to deal with his literary production but also with his personal, political and philosophical ideas. It seems, however, that the examinations of his life and work are so prolific that new attempts to explore his narrative, essayist and journalistic contributions may somehow sound repetitive or unoriginal. In this sense, Orwell has been studied as a satirist, social commentator and political dissident, factors that have encumbered him as a literary landmark for both coetaneous and contemporary writers. Besides his literary quality, it should also be argued that the significance of his work allowed Orwell to trespass the literary boundaries to become a socio-cultural icon in a period of convulsion and uncertainty. The worlds, characters and jargon created in *Animal Farm* (1945) and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1948) are now part of the British idiosyncrasy, which has gradually normalised the use of such Orwellian terms as 'Newspeak', 'Thought Police' or 'Doublespeak', among others. It is no wonder that the literary influence exerted by the novelist and the critical spirit his work conveys have inspired a remarkable number of authors in the construction of their narrative universe.² Also, it is my contention that it can be through the comparison with these writers that the themes and motifs of Orwell's oeuvre can be further explored and re-examined. This is precisely the aim of this paper, that is, to delineate a comparative study between Orwell's *Burmese Days* (1934) and William Boyd's *A Good Man in Africa* (1981), focusing particularly on the way the anti-colonial stance of the former can be traced in the latter and how both authors draw on satire in order to unmask the evils of British imperialism in Asia and Africa, respectively. This comparison will concentrate, first, on inferring the parallelisms that exist with regard to the use of settings, characterisation and interrelationships, and, secondly, on detecting the satiric strategies Orwell and Boyd employ to elaborate their critique.

Apart from the literary connections that can be established between the two novelists, it can be observed that their lives show significant similarities as well. Orwell was born in Bengal, where his father worked as a supervisor in the Opium Department in charge of controlling the production and commercialisation of the drug. Orwell spent the first year of his life in Bengal, moving to England with his mother and sister Marjorie in 1904. In Boyd's case, he was born in Ghana, where his parents were working as local practitioners, and, similarly to Orwell, he also left Africa at the age of

*All references are to George Orwell's *Burmese Days*, (San Diego 1934) and William Boyd's *A Good Man in Africa*, (London 1981).

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² Many authors –among whom we could refer to Julian Barnes, Ben Elton, Robert Harris, James Lovgrove or Zoë Fairbairns– have declared their indebtedness to George Orwell's genius.

nine to receive school education at Glasgow. Curiously, both Orwell and Boyd –after receiving their university degrees– took up jobs they eventually quitted, for they did not live up to their real professional expectations. On the one hand, Orwell joined the Indian Imperial Police dispatched in Burma when he was just nineteen years old, a period that coincided with the beginning of Britain’s colonial decline. On the other, Boyd became a lecturer on literary theory at Oxford University, which, according to the author, proved to be a rather disheartening experience.³

Orwell repeatedly commented that he applied for this post due to familial pressures and to his decision of not continuing with his education at Oxford or Cambridge. However, as Michael Shelden points out: “The dry routine of social life in Mandalay’s polite society bored him, especially the tiresome ceremony that he had been obliged to perform shortly after his arrival” (90). Among the many reasons that could explain this sense of professional dislocation, it seems to be the clash between their desire to become writers and their respective realities what strengthens their literary closeness. Most critics, especially Abrahams and Stansky, agree that Orwell silently looked forward to writing and that this aspiration collided with his father’s reactionary mentality. This explains why he never dared to confess that his real motivation was well beyond the colonial venture.⁴ Like Orwell, who after five years at India decided to return to England to set out his career as a writer, Boyd eventually gave up his lectureship at Oxford to complete some of the works he had initiated during his teaching years. It is also noteworthy that, before *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa*⁵ came out, Orwell and Boyd had already written two early novels that remained unpublished because, according to the authors, they lacked the necessary literary quality.⁶ It is worth noting that *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* are Orwell and Boyd’s *opera prima* and, curiously enough, both of them are conceived of as denunciation of the British colonial performance.

Their exploration of African and Indian colonisation also point to significant concomitances since both processes revealed the intricacies that underlay British imperialism. The situation of colonial Africa does not differ much from the exploitative

³ In this respect, Boyd argues: “It’s a nice place to live, but it is small, rather inward-looking provincial town, whatever its reputation mythology surrounds it. Having dinner at High Table in an Oxford college, which reputed to be one of the greatest intellectual treats of all time, is for me a nightmare, because it’s very, very boring. A lifetime of that seemed to be a terrible sentence” (*Publisher’s* 56).

⁴ Abrahams and Stansky allude to the fact that Orwell always tried to dissimulate his devotion for writing, although there were phases in which he planned to abandon his post in Burma to become a full-time writer: “There he states that he left Burma because, among other reasons he ‘had the vague idea of writing books’. But in 1946, in ‘Why I Write’, he tells us that the years between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four were those when he ‘tried to abandon’ the idea of becoming a writer” (171).

⁵ Boyd situates the action of *A Good Man in Africa* in a little African region, Nkongsamba, where he is going to describe the turbulent existence of Morgan Leafy, Secretary of the British High Commissioner. The novel is framed within a climate of political upheavals and social tension that result from the administrative inefficiency of the British officials dispatched in Africa.

⁶ With respect to Orwell, J. R. Hammond points out that: ‘When living in Paris in 1928-9 it is known that he wrote two novels but later destroyed them when they were rejected’ (90).

practices carried out in India, which eventually became Britain's most important colonial outpost and one of the Empire's crucial economic centres. Although there were also noticeable commercial interests, the colonisation of Africa also pursued the introduction of a series of values that reflected the Eurocentric *ethos*. Behind the façade of a pretended civilising and reforming spirit, British colonisation of Africa sought to annihilate all the cultural vestiges of the continent as a way to facilitate the introduction of its own moral and ethical codes. Through all means possible –including literature–, the imperial force sought to perpetuate the dichotomies 'I-Other'; 'black-white'; 'savage-civilised' in an attempt to undermine the African identity. With the arrival of such critics and theorists as Frantz Fanon, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Chinua Achebe or Albert Memmi, the appreciation of imperial Africa began to undergo a gradual transformation, for they all claimed that colonised countries must strive for the recuperation of their cultural, socio-political and linguistic sources. India, on the other hand, emerged as a decisive enclave for Britain's commercial activities, as *Burmese Days* faithfully portrays. Its agricultural richness and its strategic location turned the sub-continent into a very desirable outpost especially for Britain and France.

Although *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* cannot be categorised as fully autobiographical accounts, it could be argued that they recollect some of the experiences the authors endured during the period they spent in Burma and Ghana respectively. Both novels focus on a secluded group of British administrators that become the object of the novelists' most biting satiric comments. Similarly, the success of their satire resides in their capacity to recreate a series of settings where characters give away the corruptive practices that lie beneath British colonisation. In *Burmese Days*, Orwell articulates the narration around a British club, which, despite its appearance of exclusiveness, is paradoxically depicted as a semi-ruined building.⁷ During the years of Orwell's service as police officer, the club was regarded not only as the place where the British delegates gathered but also as a secluded microcosm where the presence of natives –with the exception of servants and butlers– was completely forbidden. Contrary to his fellow officers, Orwell's reluctance to take part in the social life of clubs confirms that the author could not bear an atmosphere that reminded him of his school days at elitist Eton. As Sheldon suggests: "While Beadon and Jones were enjoying themselves at the Upper Burma Club in Mandalay, Blair would stay behind and read in his room" (88).

However, the picture of club life Orwell presents in *Burmese Days* emerges as a forthright attack directed against the pillars of the British colonial activities. Whilst native population –especially Dr Veraswani– regard the club as an emblem of prestige and distinction, the heavy-drinking habits and the slanderous character of its members demystify its pretended image.⁸ It is precisely this desire of exclusiveness and self-

⁷ Urmila Seshagari establishes a sound equation between the derelict state of the club and the decadence of the British Empire: 'But the Club's actual appearance belies its symbolic value and evokes the British Empire's decline rather than its potency; the effort to create a microcosm of England yields only a veneer of civilization that cannot conceal its own decay and degeneracy' (107).

⁸ In relation to this situation, John Atkins comments that: 'Burma received irritable officials, Scotch whisky and Club lounging and never saw any worthwhile samples of English art and culture' (72).

isolation that reinforces Orwell's satiric mockery, since it enables him to explore the nature of prejudice, the exalted Eurocentric claims and the weaknesses of British colonial rule in close-up. In a clearly Orwellian turn, which echoes the vigorous slogans of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Ellis, the epitome of racist bigotry in the novel, puts forward the foundations that should stand at the basis of the ideal British club: "My God, I should have thought in a case like this, when it's a question of keeping those black, stinking swine out of the only place where we can enjoy ourselves, you'd have the decency to back me up. Even if the pot-bellied, greasy little sod of a nigger doctor is your best pal" (23). This passage reproduces the attitudes Orwell perceived around him and which progressively impelled him to admonish the tasks he was undertaking in Burma. According to John Gross:

However much the more enlightened variety of imperialist may try to persuade himself that he is working towards an eventual goal of equality between the races, in European imperialism as it has actually developed there is an ineradicable core of racial supremacy, aptly symbolized in the novel, as it so often was in real life, by the bristling exclusiveness of the club. (33)

Most biographers and theorists that have dealt with Orwell's life and work point out that *Burmese Days* constituted an outlet through which the author was able to expiate his colonial sins. In relation to this idea, Jeffrey Meyers recalls the reflections upon his years in Burma that Orwell includes in *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937), in which the author worriedly attempted to come to terms with his shameful colonialist past: "I hated the imperialism I was serving with a bitterness which I probably cannot make clear ... it is not possible to be a part of such system without recognizing it as an unjustifiable tyranny ... I was conscious of an immense weight of guilt I had got to expiate" (66). This can explain why in *Burmese Days*, the club turns out to be the vehicle through which Orwell channels his bitter resentment towards his country's governmental aimlessness.⁹

In *A Good Man in Africa*, Boyd also introduces an isolated British outpost in order to denounce the futility of the British colonial domination in Africa. The action primarily develops in the so-called High Commission –the political and administrative centre of Nkongsamba– where Boyd presents a series of British administrators as the originators of political corruption and colonial malpractices. If Orwell identified club members with a conspicuous lack of professional responsibilities and sources of idleness, the High Commission shows similar frailties, which come to heighten the social affectation and pseudo-pretentiousness of the British ruling classes in Nkongsamba. In this context Boyd seeks to examine the political chicanery that lies beneath the administration of any colonial territory for which, like Orwell, he constructs a British microcosm where he exposes the pettiness of the delegates dispatched in Africa. The following passage illustrates how the author gradually discovers that,

⁹ This is precisely at this governmental aimlessness where, according to David Wykes, resided the incongruities of British colonialism: 'Orwell used the terms "imperialism" and "colonialism" interchangeably. For him the motive of Empire was simply greed. Colonies existed for the material advantage of the colonial power, and the ideological and institutional superstructure of colonialism rested on that sole foundation' (63).

behind its façade of political righteousness, the High Commission ignores its duties to become a simple venue for parties and jamborees:

But it wasn't always shrouded in this nostalgic fog for him: there were bar-flies and bores, lounge-lizards and lechers. Adulterers and cuckolds brushed shoulders in the billiard rooms, idle wives played bridge or tennis or sunbathed round the pool, their children in the care of nannies, their housework undertaken by stewards, their husbands earning comfortable salaries all day. They gossiped and bitched, thought about having affairs and sometimes did, and the dangerous languor that infected their hot cloudless days set many a time-bomb ticking beneath their cosy, united nuclear families. (45)

The authors' exploration of social life in *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* allow readers to realise that they tend to focus on the same follies. Both the club and the High Commission are characterised by the gossiping nature, the promiscuity and the cult of appearances of their members, which even lead Flory, the protagonist of Orwell's novel, to argue that booze was 'the cement of Empire' (39).¹⁰

Besides settings, characters become crucial elements to reinforce the writers' anti-colonial positioning. Among the many resemblances that can be pointed out, I would like to draw attention to Sam Adekunle –leader of the Kinjanjan National Party in *A Good Man in Africa*– and U Po Kyin –the Subdivisional Magistrate of Kyauktada in *Burmese Days*. Most colonial processes bring about the emergence of two contending forces who strive, on the one hand, to impose a new socio-political and economic system and, on the other, to struggle for the preservation of the country's cultural background. However, many postcolonial theorists, especially Frantz Fanon, argue that, once the colonisation of the land is completed and the foreign power takes over, there is often a small local bourgeoisie that progressively departs from the claims of the native population in order to ally with the policy of the imperial agent. As Fanon puts it: "The national bourgeoisie turns its back more and more on the interior and on the real facts of its undeveloped country, and tends to look toward the former mother country and the foreign capitalists who count on its obliging compliance. And it does not share its profits with the people" (165).

Both U Po Kyin and Sam Adekunle would represent the figure of the native who betrays his roots to seek acceptance among the members of the ruling power. As for Adekunle, his sole goal is to reach the local presidency he is running for in order to reaffirm his bonds with Great Britain, whose political world turns out to be much more seductive. Throughout *A Good Man in Africa*, Adekunle becomes a habitual attendant to the events organised by the British High Commissioner and that he flies regularly to London for business matters.¹¹ However, by means of a populist discourse and an

¹⁰ Flory's comment seems to respond to the reality Orwell perceived around him in Burma. Laurence Brander exposes the idleness that characterise club life: 'As in many up-country stations, the club was the place where the half-dozen English residents met to read the papers, play bridge, billiards and tennis, and generally be gregarious without the constraints of being on show' (78-79).

¹¹ The narrator describes the aims of the KNP in the following passage: 'He turned to the last page and read his final memorandum to the effect that the KNP and Adekunle were the most pro-

outward image that pretends to demonstrate his national commitment, Adekunle also exhibits a series of inner conflicts that Boyd satirises. The double-sidedness of the character can be better appreciated in the following excerpt, in which the contrast of appearances and reality produce a highly parodic moment: “Now, looking down on the herd of loyal subjects, Morgan saw Adekunle standing by the beer bar with a white woman he took to be the politician’s wife. Adekunle was wearing native dress and was carrying a carved ebony stick” (112). Bearing in mind Adekunle’s pro-British stance, the fact of wearing typical local garments strengthens his hypocritical attitude and validates Fanon’s theories about the ambiguous stance of this local bourgeoisie with respect to the colonial process.

In Orwell’s oeuvre the inclusion of characters such as Napoleon or Snowball in *Animal Farm* or Big Brother in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* responds to the author’s necessity to deal with the sources of villainy. His conscientious explorations of tyranny, authoritarianism and social injustice found in these characters the best means of articulating not only the dystopic scenarios of his late novels but of voicing his inner fears as well. In *Burmese Days* evil is represented by U Po Kyin, who, like Adekunle, disguises his mischievous intentions behind a veil of apparent integrity, an attitude that drives him to gain the general respect of the citizenship: “As a magistrate his methods were simple.... His practice, a much safer one, was to take bribes from both sides and then decide the case on strictly legal grounds. This won him a useful reputation for impartiality” (6-7). From the novel’s opening pages, it is easy to appreciate that U Po Kyin is prone to become a source of satire for Orwell, who recurs to exaggeration and caricature to distort the character’s image. The novelist focuses on the grotesque figure of the magistrate, presenting him as though he were a disproportionate statue: ‘Unblinkingly, rather like a great porcelain idol, U Po Kyin gazed out into the fierce sunlight. He was a man of fifty, so fat that for years he had not risen from his chair without help, and yet shapely and beautiful in his grossness; for the Burmese do not sag and bulge like white men, but grow fat symmetrically, like fruits swelling’ (5).

Both U Po Kyin and Adekunle undermine their political credibility by means of upholding bribery and blackmailing, which they consider necessary for the prospective development of their regions. However, it is their quasi-obsessive desire to enjoy the appealing British life that enhances the connections between the two characters. In U Po Kyin’s case, his ambition to join the British club induces him to, by means of false accusations, discredit other candidates and to provoke street upheavals. As these lines demonstrate, the British club bears a quasi-religious significance for Po Kyin: “The European Club, that remote mysterious temple, that holy of holies far harder of entry than Nirvana! Po Kyin, the naked gutter-boy of Mandalay, the thieving clerk and obscure official, would enter that sacred place, call Europeans ‘old chap’, drink whisky and soda and knock white balls to and fro on the green table” (143). According to some critics, U Po Kyin unmasks Orwell’s initial ambivalence towards his role as an Imperial Police officer, since he often revealed a certain distrust towards the local political administrators. Furthermore, U Po Kyin enables Orwell to widen the spectrum of his

British of the assorted rag-bag of political parties contesting the future elections and the one whose victory would be most likely to ensure the safety of UK investment –heavy, and heavily profitable– and to encourage its maintenance and expansion in the coming years’ (20).

satiric indictment since, according to Christopher Hollis, he took for granted that: "He never, even in his mood of greatest extravagance in this sentimentality, thought that that meant that every individual of a subject race was of angelic nature. On the contrary, if the British left Burma, then the obviously Burma would fall under the rule of the most ruthless and wicked of the Burmese" (34).

Besides U Po Kyin and Sam Adekunle, *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* focus on other characters that are essential to understand the authors' anti-colonial stance. Being two clearly anti-heroic novels, it is no wonder that their main roles are reserved for two anti-heroes. John Flory is the protagonist of Orwell's narration and the only one that is capable of seeing through the unfairness of colonialism. The author builds up a character whose only aspiration is to lead a solitary and, on most occasions, unfruitful crusade against racial bigotry, an attitude that turns him into an object of humiliation and scorn for the rest of club members. His anti-heroism resides precisely in his vain defence of a set of values that Orwell regards as unsustainable in a period in which pragmatism prevails. Morgan Leafy maintains a more sceptical position and shows a far less committed position with respect to Nkongsamba's socio-political controversies. Leafy is characterised by his narrow-mindedness and the belief that life in Africa is simply a matter of 'beer and sex: sex and beer' (41). Unlike Flory, whose involvement progressively transforms him into an undesirable figure, Leafy is rather reluctant to take part in anything that might endanger his already vulnerable position. However, the turbulent situation Nkongsamba goes through and the inefficiency of the administrators he works for ends up implicating Leafy in the most bizarre circumstances. In this case, his anti-heroism is even more conspicuous since his evolution throughout the novel is marked by his misfortunes, either because he is the direct responsible or because he is the victim of others' negligence.

However, as Andy Warhol once stated, everyone has a sudden yet ephemeral moment of glory. Both Flory and Leafy are involuntarily involved in a series of events in which they have to conceal their second-ratedness to behave temporarily as heroes. In *Burmese Days*, the tension that exists between the local population and the British administrators grows so unbearable that the upheaval finally breaks out. The club is rapidly besieged and its members start panicking. Boyd depicts a parallel situation in which the Nkongsambians begin to threaten the High Commission after the results of the elections come out. The fact that both Flory and Leafy assume a responsibility they have systematically avoided somehow appears as a further ironic debasement of life in the colonies. In first instance, their decision to act as decoys in order to alert the authorities about the ongoing turmoil seems to be heroic and praiseworthy. While Flory has to wade a river to reach the central police station, Leafy has to drive through the masses that surround the High Commission to take the Commissioner's wife to a safe place. In the following passage, the reader is astounded by the courageous disposition Leafy shows and which clashes with his usual indifference: "Not *you*, Arthur," he said, a surge of confidence flooding through his body, '*Me*. I'll go in your place as a decoy. I'll lead the crowd away and then the rest of you can make your escape'"(295).

Curiously, for the conscience of the British administrators, the actions of Flory and Leafy succeed because they help to preserve not only their own personal security but also to maintain the colonial order, as Orwell shows with utter crudity in this

quotation: “The whole body of policemen, military and civil, about a hundred and fifty men in all, had attacked the crowd from the rear, armed only with sticks. They had been utterly engulfed. The crowd was so dense that it was like an enormous swarm of bees seething and rotating” (251). Nonetheless, even when they seemed to have reached public recognition, reality soon overthrows the pseudo-heroic stance both characters momentarily achieve. In *A Good Man in Africa*, Leafy, by choosing the wrong direction in a crossroads, eventually returns to the core of the riot. Flory, who, like Leafy, is addressed as a ‘good man’ after his brave ordeal, encounters his native lover who unmasks an affair he had tried to keep in secret, turning him again into an object of public scorn. Furthermore, the ending of both characters demonstrates to what extent their anti-heroism has become an intrinsic part of their respective existences. On the one hand, Leafy, after knowing that Sam Adekunle has won the local elections, confirms that evil is inseparable from the very essence of the human condition. As he resignedly confesses: “The Adekunles in his world always came out on top” (288). Flory’s ending is even more tragic since, after realising that his life is no longer meaningful, commits suicide: “He could hear the servants running out of their quarters and shouting –they must have heard the sound of the shot. He hurriedly tore open his coat and pressed the muzzle of the pistol against his shirt.... Flory pulled the trigger with his thumb” (281). The endings of both characters evince what some satire theorists, especially Alvin Kernan, have suggested about the presence of a hint of ideal satirists recreate in their works. *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* are set in two worlds dominated by chicanery and dereliction, in which only few characters can get round their effects. However, as Kernan suggests: “Although there is always at least a suggestion of some kind of humane ideal in satire, this ideal is never heavily stressed, for in the satirist’s vision of the world decency is forever in a precarious position near the edge of extinction, and the world is about to pass into eternal darkness” (168).

So far, the analysis of characters in *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* has centred on their male protagonists. Although critics have not usually paid much attention to the presence of female characters in Orwell and Boyd, we could argue that their role in the two novels is very significant. The parallelisms that can be inferred are even more recurrent than with male characters, since the function of women clearly triggers questions that are central to colonialism and the ideological foundations that enforce it. *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* show two identifiable sets of female characters, which symbolically point to the racial divide authors explore. On the one hand, Elizabeth Lackersteen and Priscilla Fanshawe come to represent the figure of those young British ladies who travel to the colonies in order to enjoy the privileges that close relatives provide them with. Both characters awaken the attraction of Flory and Leafy respectively, who aspire to begin a sentimental relationship in spite of the huge differences that separate them. Elizabeth enables Orwell to establish clearly the differences that exist between the British administrators and the native population. With this character, the author strengthens the concept of microcosm alluded to before, in the sense that colonisers repeatedly show a sheer reluctance to integrate within the local socio-cultural reality. Through Elizabeth, Orwell manifests the stereotypes with which the colonialist agenda was supported and which allowed its advocates to defend the rigid dichotomy between civilised, Eurocentric postulates as opposed to the savagery of the natives.

Burmese Days is quite prolific in the inclusion of scenes in which these two premises clash, provoking the re-emergence of long and unresolved issues concerning racial differences. Trying to show his feelings for Elizabeth, Flory invites her to a tribal celebration, although her reaction is not the expected: "What was she doing in this place? Surely it was not right to be sitting among the black people like this, almost touching them, in the scent of their garlic and their sweat? Why was she not back with other white people? Why had he brought her here, among this horde of natives, to watch this hideous and savage spectacle?" (105-106). Although Elizabeth's inner monologue again reveals the usual pejorative and stereotypical discourse of the coloniser, the fact is that the situation Orwell depicts dismantles the stagnant binary opposition 'Us-Them' that lies at the basis of the colonial agenda. It is quite paradoxical to see Elizabeth –a member of the so-called WASP mainstream– experiencing what 'Otherness' means, since, in this context, Elizabeth no longer holds the inherent superiority that colonial thought has traditionally embraced, but a rather disadvantaged and uncomfortable position. As regards the role of Priscilla Fanshawe in *A Good Man in Africa*, the similarities that can be drawn with respect to Elizabeth Lackersteen are notorious. As Orwell's character, Priscilla's life in Nkongsamba is almost restricted to the parties and jamborees that are hosted by the British High Commission, thus having no contact whatsoever with members of the native population. Like Elizabeth, Priscilla forms part of the high society and also awakens the attraction of the novel's protagonist. She emerges as a character that takes advantage of her father's position in order to benefit from the privileges it unquestionably confers. One suitable example is the way she manages to place her husband-to-be in a post of certain responsibility within the High Commission although his qualifications are more than dubious, a fact that reveals the inner corruptions that underlie the administration.

Following with the comparison of characters in both novels, the figure of the doctor is particularly relevant in *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa*. Doctors play a central role not only due to their narrative significance but also as regards satiric considerations. Dr Murray in *A Good Man in Africa* and Dr Veraswani in *Burmese Days* appear as the last two exponents of righteousness and credibility in the suffocating worlds Boyd and Orwell construct. Dr Murray¹² is a local physician in Nkongsamba whose moral and professional integrity is often threatened by the political contrivances plotted by Sam Adekunle. Veraswani, on the other hand, is a learned and easy-going man who looks forward to joining the British club, which he regards as an emblem of prestige and social distinction. The personality and behaviour of both characters can enable us to establish a link with some of the theories on the association of satire with medical practices Mary Claire Randolph puts forward in her works. Randolph states that, in medieval and renaissance times, satirists were frequently attributed medical faculties since their main concern was literally to extirpate vice and corruption from society. Metaphors related to the medical realm were often applied to satirists, whose

¹² It is rather complex to discern whether William Boyd purposefully selected this name for this character, but it is a coincidence that his father's name is the same (Alexander Murray Boyd). Both are local physicians in little African regions. It seems, thus, that we can perhaps retrieve certain biographical details from this character.

pens were seen as scalpels and their writing materials were related to surgery. As Randolph states:

[t]o the Renaissance critic and satirist, satire is a scourge, a whip, a surgeon's a surgeon scalpel, a cauterizing iron, a strong cathartic; its mission is to flay, to cut, to burn, to blister, and to purge; its object is now a culprit, a victim, a criminal, and now an ailing, submissive patient, a sick person, bursting with contagion; and the satirist himself is a whipper, a scourger, a barber surgeon, an executioner, a 'doctor of physik. (34)

In fact, Murray somehow assumes this function and begins a lonely fight against the political chicanery of both the High Commission and the KNP, which, as the novel demonstrates, turns out to be completely unsuccessful. In spite of his effortless –yet pointless– struggle, the ending of Dr Murray upholds the apocalyptic message Boyd occasionally conveys in *A Good Man in Africa*, since honesty is penalised whilst evil triumphs. While he is driving, Dr Murray has a car accident and dies, causing an unbearable shock in Leafy. In the following passage, his silence after knowing the tragic event reveals that, with Murray's death, all hopes and expectations vanish:

'It's just a routine call, sir, whenever there is a death. To pass on the information.' 'A death?' 'Of a British subject.' Morgan felt his heart begin to beat faster. He took a deep breath. He shut his eyes, a tremor passing through his body. 'I see,' he said. 'Who is he?' 'A man. A Dr Murray. Dr Alexander Murray. From the university... Hello Mr Leafy. Are you still there?' (310)

If we recall Kernan's words when he pointed out that the hints of ideal that usually appear in satiric literature end up being ostracised by the generalised wickedness, Dr Murray would again be a good means of exemplifying the critic's postulates. Also, as will be stated later, Murray symbolises the difficulties that the satirist has for closing a work, in the sense that the writer's struggle to do away with vice cannot be limited within the frame of a novel or poem.

Although Dr Veraswani's end is not that tragic, it can be observed that his evolution throughout *Burmese Days* is full of hindrances and humiliations, most of them as a result of his racial condition. It was suggested above that his main aspiration is to join the club, in spite of its unanimous rejection to accept a coloured man. Veraswani only finds the support and encouragement of Flory who, due to his proximity to the doctor, is also repudiated by the most xenophobic members. Contrarily to Dr Murray, Veraswani is astounded by anything related to the British iconography, which he exalts even though Flory usually tries to restrain the doctor's devotion. He even defends the beneficial effects colonialism has over the native population, which he believes should acknowledge the Empire for its generosity and enlightenment: "My friend, my friend, you are forgetting the Oriental character. How is it possible to have developed us, with our apathy and superstition? At least you have brought to us law and order. The unswerving British Justice and the Pax Britannica?" (41). Similarly to Dr Murray, Veraswani goes through a series of events in which he is publicly debased and which frustrate his expectations of becoming a club member. Paradoxically, it is U Po Kyn the one that finally gains access to the club, reinforcing once more Leafy's idea that "the

Adekunles in the world always came up on top.” However, in the case of *Burmese Days*, what Orwell seems to be pointing out is that Veraswani's failure to join the club should be interpreted as a triumph rather than a disappointment, bearing in mind the corrupted image it conveys. If Dr Murray tragically dies in a car accident, Veraswani is surprisingly relegated to the post of assistant surgeon in a secondary hospital: “The dreaded nod and wink passed somewhere in high places, and the doctor was reverted to the rank of Assistant Surgeon and transferred to Mandalay General Hospital. He is still there and is likely to remain” (283).

To finish with this comparison, it is worth referring to two characters that have not been usually explored although, through their role in the novels, it can be perceived how the authors channel their critique towards the Empire. The presence of Verrall and Dalmire in *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa*, respectively, demystifies the imperial project and those who uplifted its decisiveness. These two characters come to dismantle these ideas since Orwell and Boyd paint them as good-for-nothings whose only aim is to enjoy the pleasures that their privileged, though undeserved, position offers them. Verrall is a military policeman dispatched in Kyauktada for surveillance purposes, although his real motivations go well beyond his professional duties. He is exclusively devoted to cultivate his appearances, a fact that allows Orwell to analyse the Empire as a source of pretentiousness and the British administrators as epitomes of irresponsibility and negligence, as the following passage evinces: “Verrall was the youngest son of a peer, and not at all rich, but by the method of seldom paying a bill, until a writ was issued to him, he managed to keep himself in the only things he seriously cared about: clothes and horses. He had come out to India in a British cavalry regiment, and exchanged into the Indian Army because it was cheaper and left him greater freedom for polo” (202). As regards Dalmire, the allusions we find in *A Good Man in Africa* are scarce but most of them depict him as a young British man whose family connections have pushed his career, although his merits and curriculum are unknown. Boyd's portrait of Dalmire is dominated by the idleness and dubious working capacity of the character:

‘No, no. That comes later.’ Dalmire paused, he seemed slightly embarrassed. ‘Didn't I tell you that? We're going on holiday. Leaving after Christmas. I thought it might be fun to go skiing. New Year on the slopes, a welcome in the mountains, that sort of thing.’ ‘HOLIDAY?’ Morgan exclaimed, appalled. ‘But you've only been out here for a couple of months. Christ, my last leave was in March.’ ‘I'm taking it off my leave, don't worry,’ Dalmire said hastily. ‘It was Priscilla's idea actually. Arthur said it would be fine.’ (221)

With these two characters, Orwell and Boyd unveil a reality that was inextricably associated to the development of the colonial activities in India and Africa and which finally motivated the decay and degeneration of the British Empire.

I would like to put an end to this study referring to the parallelisms that can be observed in the endings of *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa*. Most satire theorists agree that the nature of the mode justifies the absence of conclusive chapters, since satirists keep on perceiving that, in spite of their criticism, vice and corruption are still deeply rooted in their respective societies. As Dustin Griffin suggests: “Satirists ... find difficulty in closing because there is no natural end to their anger concerning the

subject on which they could speak” (188). The endings of the two novels are, in this sense, manifestly satiric because none of them seems to round off the problematic succession of events Boyd and Orwell delineate. This also implies that the structure of a satiric writing does not adjust to the conventional and linear development of other narratives, a fact that explains why, in *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa*, the situation that is depicted at the beginning of both novels seems to be practically identical, if not worse, to their respective ends. *Burmese Days* opens with a detailed description of U Po Kyin’s legal and political chicanery and ends with the character’s appointment as the new Deputy Commissioner, earning, as the narrator ironically points out, “twenty thousand rupees in bribes” (285). In *A Good Man in Africa* Sam Adekunle wins the elections even though he repeatedly proclaims his apology of bribery and blackmailing as licit or illicit political mechanisms.

In these pages I have attempted to analyse the extent to which Orwell’s anti-colonial spirit can be noticed in Boyd’s *A Good Man in Africa* by means of establishing a comparative study between the two novels. It could be concluded, therefore, that these two works offer significant similarities as regards the use of settings, characters and narrative structure; factors that contribute to enhance their anti-colonial stance. *Burmese Days* and *A Good Man in Africa* respond, in this sense, to the personal experiences of both authors, who went through the colonial days from two distinct but somehow parallel perspectives. Orwell and Boyd approach colonialism as a symbol of exploitation and decadence and as an institution that is only conceived for the benefit of a few. Their examination seeks to reveal the corruption and frailties of imperialism, for which they turn to satire in order to demythologise the heroic aura that was often associated with the colonial administrator. The novelists, thus, succeed in presenting characters that are exclusively interested in safeguarding their public image even though this fact leads them to appear as hypocritical and slanderous good-for-nothings.

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Özet

William Boyd'un *A Good Man in Africa* Adlı Eserinde George Orwell'in Sömürge Karşıtı Anlam İzleği: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Çalışma

George Orwell'in eserlerinin kazanmış olduğu ticari ve eleştirel önem akıldaki tutulduğunda, Orwell geleneği çerçevesinde özgün ve yenilikçi yaklaşımlar veya motifler geliştirmek oldukça zordur. Bununla beraber, Orwell'in anlatılarının zenginliği, yalnızca romanlarının ve denemelerinin düz yorumlarından kaynaklanmayıp, aynı zamanda Orwell'in temalarının çağdaş yazarlar tarafından kendi tarihsel, sosyal ve edebi bağlamlarında yeniden uyarlanmasından gelir. Bu, Orwell'in *Burmese Days* (1934) adlı romanında İngiliz yöneticilerin duygusuzluğunu, kayıtsızlığını ve yetersizliğini eleştirmek amacıyla yarattığı atmosferi *A Good Man in Africa* (1981) adlı romanında yeniden üreten İngiliz yazar William Boyd için de geçerli bir durumdur. Burada ilginç olan başka bir nokta da, her iki romanın da yazarların ilk romanları olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla, bu makalenin amacı her iki romana uygulanacak karşılaştırmalı bir çözümleme ile özellikle yazarların hiciv becerilerine odaklanarak İngiliz sömürgeci kurumlarını irdelemek ve bu sürecin zeminini oluşturan Avrupa-merkezci ideolojileri ortaya çıkarmaktır. Makalede, yazarların, önemli ölçüde paralellikler gösteren, olayların geçtiği mekân, karakterler ve anlatı özellikleri üzerinde odaklanılarak, sömürgeciliğin tutarsızlıkları ve onu savunanların zaaflarını açığa çıkarmak amaç edinmiştir.

Senecan Stoicism and Shakespeares's *Richard III*

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Scholars have long identified Lucius Annaeus Seneca's dramatic influence in Shakespeare's Roman plays, most notably in *Antony and Cleopatra*, *Coriolanus*, *Titus Andronicus*, and *Julius Caesar*.¹ But few if any readers have considered *Richard III* as an early example of how Shakespeare manifests Seneca's Stoic thought, dramatic conventions, and tragic characters to construct arguably one of his most complex and creative villains, Richard III.² The frequent appearance of Seneca's rhetorical tropes in the play, which readers have cited extensively over the last century, forges an undeniable link between the two. However, critical attention continues to focus primarily on the Roman heroes and later villains found in *Macbeth*, *Othello*, *Hamlet*, and *King Lear* rather than on the English leaders.³ And, despite the strong rhetorical connection between *Richard III* and Senecan tragedy and the acknowledgement that Shakespeare appropriates Seneca's Stoic thought in other plays, readers of *Richard III* have neglected to study this philosophical significance, which informs Richard's character and the play's moral *exemplum*: to eschew absolutism in kingship.⁴

¹ For an analysis of Senecan influence in Shakespeare's Roman plays, see J. L. Simmons' "Shakespeare and the Antique Romans" (*Rome in the Renaissance: The City and the Myth*, Ed. Paul A Ramsey. Binghamton: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1982. xvii. 77-92).

² Reuben A. Brower acknowledges "that the Senecan hero was among the important models for the heroes of Elizabethan tragedy" (*Hero and Saint: Shakespeare and the Graeco-Roman Heroic Tradition*. New York: Oxford UP, 1971. 168). Brower encourages the reader to understand "that in certain respects the dramatic image of the hero in tragedies of the Elizabethan period reflects a philosophical ideal" (143)—that the moral writings of Seneca influence Shakespeare along with the dramatic ones; however, Brower does not treat Shakespeare's villains.

³ Like J. L. Simmons, Robert S. Miola likens Othello to Hercules in Seneca's *Hercules Furens* and compares his tragic heroes and villains with those in Shakespeare's Roman tragedies ("Othello Furens." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 41 (1990). 49-64), not his histories. For further information on the relationship between Seneca's *Medea* and Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, see Rosalind Meyer's "'The Serpent Under't': Additional Reflections on *Macbeth*" (*Notes and Queries* 47 (2000). 86-90). Michael Pincombe concentrates on Senecan influence, specifically the "gloominess" of the woods and Lavinia's sorrow in Act Four, scene one, in *Titus Andronicus*. He notes that, while Ovid is the most cited classical source for this scene, Seneca's less-often cited play, *Thyestes*, also provided a source for Shakespeare as well. ("Classical and Contemporary Sources of the 'Gloomy Woods' of *Titus Andronicus*: Ovid, Seneca, Spenser." *Shakespearean Continuities: Essays in Honour of E. A. J. Honigmann* Vol. 13. Ed. John Batchelor, et al. New York: Macmillan and St. Martins, 1997. 40-55). It is interesting to note that, while Shakespeare inherits the so-called "Tragedy of Blood" from Seneca, his gory episodes outnumber and exceed the carnage found in Senecan tragedy.

⁴ R. F. Hill argues that, in *Richard III*, Shakespeare manipulates rhetorical tragedy inherited from Seneca to create "the expression of deep feeling...only achieved by an accumulation of rhetorical devices" (458), which Shakespeare's frequent use of the antithesis and punning proves. Hill omits Shakespeare's reliance on Senecan thought in his analysis, which I will illustrate to be pivotal in

T. S. Eliot suggests in “Seneca in Elizabethan Translation” that the “misconceptions” of Senecan influence rest not so much with the obvious legacy, the “Tragedy of Blood” or the “bombast in Elizabethan diction,” but with “his influence upon the thought...in the drama of Shakespeare and his contemporaries,” which Eliot cites as “undervalued” by readers of Elizabethan drama (63).⁵ The important philosophical influence Seneca exerts over Shakespeare emerges in Richard’s speech, extremist politics, and unnatural body and mind, which he follows with Stoic constancy as a counterbalance to Henry VI’s weakness. To reinforce Tudor ideology, Shakespeare presents Richmond as a synthesis that ends division through the Stoic idealism Richard lacks, despite his reliance on Stoic values, such as reason, fortitude, and constancy. The power vacuum that results from Henry’s inability to hold the crown generates extreme ambitions for the crown, and Shakespeare develops these warring ambitions through a Stoic lens provided by Seneca’s philosophical drama and prose and resolves them by introducing Richmond, who ends chaos by relying on Stoic ideals. Seneca’s works, then, not only provide dramatic and linguistic models for *Richard III*, but they also offer a philosophy and a historical framework Shakespeare employs imaginatively both to create Richard and to recreate a violent historical time in England’s history that parallels the brutal one in which Seneca lived and wrote.

I

Before tracing Seneca’s influence in *Richard III*, it is first necessary to consider this influence on writers of the English Renaissance, which emerges primarily in their imitation and adaptation of his dramatic form. Seneca proved attractive to Elizabethan playwrights, who adopted his use of antithesis, alliteration, bloodiness, ghosts, and patterned word play, especially stichomythia, which I will examine in relation to *Richard III* later on. These characteristics define the plays Seneca wrote during a historical period that witnessed intense political and social upheaval created by tyrannical Roman tyrants, including Claudius, Caligula, and Nero, each of whom Seneca and members of his family knew personally. The cruelty and violence that characterize Seneca’s tragedies reflect the age in which he lived, and this world engendered not only equally tragic plays but also an adherence to Stoic philosophy,

understanding Richard’s character and the function of Stoic virtue and vice in the play. “Shakespeare’s Early Tragic Mode” (*Shakespeare Quarterly* 9 (1958), 455-469).

⁵ Eliot elaborates on the presence of Seneca’s Stoic thought in Shakespearean tragedy in a brief essay focused solely on the topic: “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca” (*T. S. Eliot Selected Essays 1917-1932*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1932. 107-120). Though Eliot refutes Shakespeare’s interest in Seneca’s prose writings, he asserts that Shakespeare’s exposure to Senecan Stoicism would have proceeded through Kyd’s, Chapman’s, or Marston’s “Senecanism,” i.e. an Elizabethan version of Senecanism, rather than from Seneca’s drama or prose writings themselves. While he argues that “Seneca is the *literary* representative of Roman stoicism, and the Roman stoicism is an important ingredient in Elizabethan drama” (112), his argument only offers a suggestion for further reading and emphasizes the difficulty and importance of such a study: “the influence of Seneca on Elizabethan drama has been exhaustively studied in its formal aspect, and in the borrowing and adaptation of phrases and situations...the penetration of Senecan sensibility would be much more difficult to trace” (120). As a result, this influence has not yet been identified in *Richard III*, despite its importance. Eliot’s suggestions provide a framework for this essay in which I trace the “Senecan sensibility” in Richard’s stoic character.

which praises reliance on reason and unflinching courage as a counter to the daily atrocities he witnessed.⁶

Renaissance writers responded to this tragic mode in particular, and they not only emulated and modified Seneca's tragedies but also augmented their plays with more formal language and gorier episodes. Jasper Heywood first translated three individual tragedies of Seneca, *Troas* (1559), *Thyestes* (1560), and *Hercules Furens* (1561), into English separately before Thomas Newton published the collection of all ten, *Seneca, His Tenne Tragedies*, in English by 1581.⁷ Almost all of the early Elizabethan tragedians mirrored Seneca's tragic style, and by the early 1590s, when Shakespeare wrote *Richard III*, playwrights were familiar with Seneca not only through the original Latin and the available French, Italian, and English translations, but also through popular English tragedies in imitation of Seneca. The most notable examples, of course, include Thomas Sackville and Thomas Norton's *Gorboduc* and Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy*, which provide early models of Senecan influence.⁸ Christopher Marlowe, another source for Shakespeare's dramatic and poetic language, remained no less affected by Senecan influence, which emerges most obviously in the structure of *Tamburlaine*, *Edward II*, and *Dido, Queen of Carthage*.⁹ And while Senecan tragedy serves as a prototype for Renaissance playwrights, each applies the conventions to different degrees in their plays.¹⁰

⁶ Francis Holland's biography of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Seneca* (New York: Books for Libraries, 1920) provides detailed information about his life (5 B.C.-65 A.D.), times, philosophy, and works. Holland offers a psychological view into Rome's chaotic environment and into the tyranny with which Nero, Claudius, and Caligula ruled. He explains Rome's disorder and everyday tragedies as a vehicle for describing why Seneca wrote his bloody plays, moral essays, and letters, including the *Letters ad Lucilium*, where he praises a bleak, Epicurean fatalism and dissociation from the world, which holds only tragedy. For a concise but informed analysis of Seneca as a Stoic Epicure, see Reid Barbour's *English Epicures and Stoics: Ancient Legacies in Early Stuart Culture*. Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1998. 8,12-16).

⁷ Heywood's translation of Seneca's tragedies is the earliest one and the most extensive. Other translators include Alexander Neville, who translates *Oedipus* in 1563 and John Studley, who translates *Medea* and *Agamemnon* in 1566. Though Thomas Nuce translates *Octavia* in 1566, scholars generally agree that Seneca did not write this last play, which is now placed just after his death. For a history and an annotated bibliography of Renaissance translations of Seneca, see Selma Guttman's *The Foreign Sources of Shakespeare's Works* (New York: Octagon Books, 1968. 39-40). Many of Seneca's prose works were translated into French, Spanish, Italian, and German, as well as in English (*The Woorke of...Seneca, Concerning Benefyting*. Trans. Arthur Golding, 1578; *De remediis forturitorum*. Trans. Robert Whytton, 1547).

⁸ Earlier poetry, the morality plays, and Marlovian verse also provide other sources of patterned language for Shakespeare, who employs all these forms in his *oeuvre*.

⁹ Marlowe, like Shakespeare, distinguishes himself from other Renaissance dramatists and candidly announces his superiority in the Prologue to *Tamburlaine* when he sets his play apart from contemporary playwrights, or "From jiggling veins of rhyming mother-wits / And such conceits as clownage keeps in pay" (ll. 1-2).

¹⁰ For an early but useful essay on how Renaissance writers adapted Seneca's dramatic techniques in translations of Seneca and in their own plays, see T. S. Eliot's introduction to the 1966 reprint of Newton's 1581 translation, *Seneca, His Tenne Tragedies* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1966. v-liv).

Like his contemporaries, Shakespeare fashions qualities of Seneca's tragic characters to invent heroes, tyrants, and villains; however, Shakespeare departs from many of the early Elizabethan dramatists by investing his characters with Stoic values.¹¹ Senecan dramatic form and language affect Shakespeare no less than his fellow dramatists, but Shakespeare builds on this classical form by lending a greater theatrical intensity in *Richard III* than what is found in early Elizabethan tragedy. He creates Richard's iniquitous yet courageous character by blending Seneca's rhetorical tropes with his Stoic thought.¹²

Stoicism spread in Shakespeare's time not only through Seneca's drama, however, but also through his prose works. Shakespeare had a variety of classical sources to attach Stoic characteristics, including constancy to nature, courage, fortitude, and moderation, to his characters.¹³ It is important to note that Shakespeare would have been exposed to the Stoic values found in other classical writings, but his interest in Senecan tragedy and philosophy carries a historical significance that would have compelled him to imitate Senecan drama and philosophy in *Richard III* for several reasons. First, both writers respond to violent political upheavals created by weak leadership and cruel tyrants. Shakespeare would not have failed to link the bloodiness in Roman history with that of medieval England. Neither would the parallel between villainous Roman tyrants and Edward Hall's version in *The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lancaster and York* of the vicious Richard III have gone unnoticed.¹⁴ As well, Seneca's popularity among sixteenth-century writers and Shakespeare's interest in Rome's violent history when he writes his bloodiest play, *Titus Andronicus*, suggests that he has a long-standing curiosity for Seneca and the Roman world at the time he writes *Richard III*.¹⁵

As early as the late 1550s and '60s, Elizabethans employ Seneca's dramatic conventions as a source for the bombastic, bloody style of their tragedies; however, characters imbued with Stoic philosophy, like John Webster's Duchess in *The Duchess of Malfi*, who exemplifies Stoic idealism, appear more frequently on the Jacobean than

¹¹ See John Matthew Manly's "Introductory Essay," p. 4 (*The Tragedies of Seneca*. trans. Frank Justice Miller. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1907. 3-10).

¹² Though T. S. Eliot suggests that "in the plays...Stoicism is present in a form more quickly to catch the fancy of the Renaissance than in the prose epistles and essays" (57), I argue that Shakespeare employs both the prose and the plays to create Richard's character as one that opposes moderation, a Stoic virtue Seneca espouses in *De Clementia*, which outlines his political philosophy to Nero.

¹³ See Norman T. Pratt's history of Stoic philosophy and its valuation of moderation (*Seneca's Drama*. Chapel Hill: U of Chapel Hill P, 1983. 35-73).

¹⁴ Indeed, the combination of Roman tyranny with Hall's Tudor-friendly "history" of Richard provided Shakespeare with enough material that he imaginatively re-figures for his plays. As Russ McDonald reminds readers, "Not only was Shakespeare able to read Latin literature in the original, but he also seems to have liked it and to have decided that theater audiences would too" (*The Bedford Companion to Shakespeare: An Introduction with Documents*. 2nd ed. Boston and New York: Bedford and St. Martin's, 2001. 149).

¹⁵ For a thorough treatment of Shakespeare's application of classical sources, including Seneca, for literary and historical purposes in his plays, see T. W. Baldwin's *William Shakespeare's Small Latin and Less Greeke* (Vol. 2. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1944. 549-616).

the early Elizabethan stage.¹⁶ This is perhaps due in part to the availability of Seneca's prose writings in English.¹⁷ Robert Whyttinton translates into English Seneca's *De remediis fortuitorum* in 1547, which features a dialogue between *Sensua*, the senses, and *Ratio*, reason. Whyttinton's translation provides a means for the Elizabethan to read the philosopher along with the tragedian; however, most of the early English dramatists relied more on Seneca's tragic conventions than on his Stoic precepts.

Shakespeare wrote his early tragedies, including *Richard III*, as the influence of Seneca spread in England in the 1590s, and Whyttinton's prior translation gives Shakespeare the opportunity to read Seneca's Stoic philosophy in English before he writes *Richard III*. Even if Shakespeare never read the translation, his knowledge of Latin, his interest in the classics, including Senecan drama, and his fascination with Rome's history and myths suggest that he would have been familiar enough with Seneca's ethics via the tragedies and perhaps the Latin dialogues to have considered his Stoicism.¹⁸ And, given Seneca's popularity among Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists

¹⁶ Shakespeare's appropriation of Senecan values in fact prefigures later Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists, including John Webster and Ben Jonson, whose plays feature tenets of Stoic philosophy more explicitly. In Webster's *The Duchess of Malfi*, the Duchess confronts mortality with a tranquil spirit, though death and violence erupt around her. Her resolve in a chaotic and bloody world parallel the immovable fortitude widely praised by Stoics like Marcus Aurelius (pupil of the famous Epictetus), who Webster might have had in mind while developing the Duchess' character. Marcus Aurelius' advises one to pattern the self after an ordered existence, mimetic of the natural universe (see his *Meditations. Marcus Aurelius and His Times*. Trans. George Long. Ed. Irwin Edman. New York: Walter J. Black, 1945.11-133). It seems more probable, as T. S. Eliot posits, that Webster had Seneca in mind. Though the Duchess "could curse the stars...nay the world to its first chaos" (IV.i.95, 97), Bosola reminds her that "the stars shine still" (IV.i.99), strengthening her constancy to nature by paralleling herself to the universe, for she projects a tranquil resolve, with "I am Duchess of Malfi still" (IV.i.110). Eliot argues in "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca" that these lines directly parallel Antony's "I am Antony still," which Shakespeare most likely derives from Seneca's Medea: "*Medea superest?*" (113).

¹⁷ Dramatists begin to develop Stoicism from Seneca, as opposed to other available sources, because they had first imitated his tragedies, which were of more interest to the early Elizabethan dramatists than, for example, Cicero or Quintillian. It was only later, with the publication of Thomas Lodge's English translation of Seneca's philosophical works in 1614 (and again in 1620) and with early seventeenth-century writers' expanded knowledge of the classics that Stoic values begin to figure prominently in English drama, which prizes classical learning. This perhaps explains Jonson's derogatory line that Shakespeare "hadst small Latin, and less Greek," which appears in his introduction to the First Folio (see Leonard Barkan's "What Did Shakespeare Read?" *The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare*. Eds. Margreta De Grazia and Stanley Wells. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 2001. 31-48).

¹⁸ Dennis Kay provides an excellent history of Shakespeare's education and reading material as a youth in the Stratford grammar school. Shakespeare would have been exposed to Latin primarily through theological texts, like the Geneva Bible, which Kay argues he would have translated at least in part, and through dialogues and shorter dramas, or colloquies, which he also read and translated as part of his language training. Though it is difficult for anyone to speculate on which exact classical texts Shakespeare read in school, nothing prevented the learned playwright from exploring Latin texts, such as Seneca's philosophical prose, during and after his education. Like McDonald and Barkan, Kay explains that Shakespeare would already have studied Cicero, Quintillian, and Erasmus, who translates Seneca, Juvenal, Virgil, Horace, and Persius. At the

who adopted his rhetorical techniques and reinvented his Stoic precepts, one cannot imagine that Shakespeare would have ignored Seneca the philosopher while he imitated Seneca the dramatist.¹⁹ As Leonard Barkan proposes, if “Ovid and Plutarch are visible everywhere...Seneca is only a little less prominent” (40) in Shakespeare’s plays.²⁰

II

In *Richard III*, Shakespeare reshapes the ideals found in Seneca’s most famous ethical writings, including the *Dialogi* and the *Epistulae Morales*, in which Seneca presents rules for moral conduct; *De Otio*, in which he espouses adherence to nature as the highest good; and *De Providentia*, in which he describes the Stoic fatalism that will drive his heroes and tyrants alike to their destiny.²¹ Shakespeare combines these elements in Richard, who possesses characteristics of the tyrant Lycus by projecting *clara virtus* (*Hercules Furens*, l. 340) or “glorious courage” as a justification for murder. As well, he imbues Richard’s speech with the same hypocrisy and brutal action attributed to Atreus, the Senecan tyrant from *Thyestes* (Boyle 149). Like Seneca, Shakespeare infuses brutality and ambition in Richard’s character and dialogue to reflect the savagery enacted onstage. He creates a tumultuous setting in which Richard garners power through language manipulation and reprehensible acts, and he employs elements that distinguish Seneca’s dramatic form, including the five-act form, the morbidly grotesque, foreboding ghosts, and rhetorical bombast.²² Shakespeare not only

least, Shakespeare was exposed to Seneca in Latin as an older boy in school (*William Shakespeare: His Life and Times*. Ed. Arthur F. Kinney. Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1995. 32-44).

¹⁹ Seventeenth-century writers would find Seneca the dramatist and Seneca the philosopher at seeming odds since, as Reid Barbour maintains, “his life as it was commonly constructed in the Renaissance portrays on the one hand a philosopher whose principled freedom was sold for sycophancy at the most vicious and tyrannical court in history, and on the other hand a brave adviser who struggled to prevent or to mitigate the atrocities of the tyrant” (*English Epicures and Stoics: Ancient Legacies in Early Stuart Culture*. Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1998. 8).

²⁰ Russ McDonald explains that Shakespeare most often consults Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* (the English translation by Arthur Golding, 1567, and/or the Latin version, since Shakespeare did not read Greek) and Plutarch’s *Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans* (Shakespeare primarily uses Thomas North’s English translation) for classical sources. Other influences include the Bible, at least indirectly, and, most famously, especially for the history plays, Edward Hall’s *The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lancaster and York* (second edition, 1548), and Raphael’s Holinshed’s *Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (1578, 1587). McDonald argues that Shakespeare’s classical, i.e. Latin, training in the Stratford grammar school exposed him to Cicero, Virgil, Ovid, Horace, Suetonius, Terence, Livy, and Seneca, who was studied less often, but whom Shakespeare was prepared to read on his own even after his education. (*The Bedford Companion to Shakespeare: An Introduction with Documents*. 2nd ed. Boston and New York: Bedford and St. Martin’s, 2001. 145-162).

²¹ See Ralph Graham Palmer’s introduction to and translation of Seneca in *Seneca’s De Remediis Fortuitorum and the Elizabethans* (Chicago: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, 1953. 1-25). Palmer traces the development of Stoicism through Cicero and Seneca and documents the tenets of Stoicism from Seneca that define his philosophy. For further information on Palmer’s citations and history, see pp. 2-3.

²² Susan Snyder asserts that Terence, the comic dramatist, rather than Seneca, the tragedian, was most probably the model for the five-act structure, which I would support given Shakespeare’s delight in combining elements of tragedy and comedy, perhaps most evident in *Romeo and Juliet*.

invests the dialogue with Seneca's dramatic tropes to stimulate verbal warfare between Richard and other characters, but he also reveals that Richard's supremacy lies in his speech, at least at the beginning as he strives for absolute power (F. L. Lucas 120). Language enhances Richard's authority over other characters before he achieves the crown. But it also proves ineffective when he loses rhetorical skill, self-control, and ultimately, the political power he craves.

In the first half of the play, Shakespeare fashions Richard's identity by granting him a persuasive predominance over real or perceived competitors. Frequently, Richard substitutes the language of another character to reshape meaning through repetition, as he does with Rivers in Act One. Richard steals Rivers's phrase with one of his own to create a mask of pretended humility. He reworks Rivers' line, "if you should be our king," for his own purpose by feigning surprise at Rivers' suggestion, while also covering his evil ambitions by denying his desire for the crown. Richard cloaks Rivers' suggestion that he should be king in the same language and reconstitutes how Rivers perceives his ambition by stating: "If I should be? I had rather be a pedlar" (I.iii.147-148). The exchange between Richard and Rivers parallels the consistent path Richard establishes early on to twist meaning as an effort to secure power. He dons a Machiavellian disguise to take control over how those around him perceive his desires, while attempting to conceal his ambition with a humble façade.²³

The early encounter with Rivers, though minor, illustrates Richard's *modus operandi* for the entire play. More importantly, it indicates how Shakespeare combines linguistic techniques and philosophical precepts inherited from Senecan drama to empower Richard, who not only speaks through puns and *double entendres*, as with Rivers, but also through stichomythia to exert his will over those around him. In the *Oxford English Dictionary*, stichomythia is defined as a prominent characteristic of Greek drama and plays in imitation: "In classical Greek drama, dialogue in alternate lines, employed in sharp disputation, and characterized by antitheses and rhetorical repetition or taking up of the opponent's words."²⁴ Typically, classical and Elizabethan dramatists employ stichomythia in verbal warfare, where one character manipulates his or her opponent's language to use for defensive and offensive purposes as a means of achieving power through language.²⁵ Heywood's 1559 translation of Seneca's *Troades*

For further information on Shakespeare and genre, see "The Genres of Shakespeare's Plays" (*The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare*. Eds. Margreta De Grazia and Stanley Wells. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. 83-97).

²³For a comparison between *Richard III*, Seneca, and Machiavelli, see W. A. Armstrong's "The Influence of Seneca and Machiavelli on the Elizabethan Tyrant" (*The Review of English Studies* 24 (1948). 19-35).

²⁴Note that *Richard III* is cited as an example of this technique in the *OED*, by critics of Seneca's use of stichomythia, and by readers of Shakespeare's patterned language. For the full definition, see the *OED Online* ("stichomythia," *OED Online*, 2nd ed., 26 July 2004 <http://www.oed.com>.)

²⁵See also T. S. Eliot's definition of stichomythia, which he explains as "repeating one word of a phrase in the next phrase...where the sentence of one speaker is caught up and twisted by the next...as an effective stage trick...[and] something more; it is the crossing of one rhythm pattern with another." Eliot offers an interesting critique of how this "trick" works in the plays of Renaissance writers who catch it in their drama ("Seneca." *Selected Essays 1917-1932*. New York: Harcourt, 1932. 72).

illustrates the point best.²⁶ Stichomythia characterizes the vituperative exchange between Pyrrhus and Agammenon in Act II, lines 343-348:

Agammenon
 And thou a bastard of a maid deflowered privily. Whom, then a boy, Achilles got
 in filthy lechery!
 Pyrrhus
 The same Achilles that doth possess the reign of gods above: with Thetis, seas;
 with Aeaus, sprites; the starred heaven with Jove.
 Agammenon
 The same Achilles that was slain by stroke of Paris' hand.
 Pyrrhus
 The same Achilles whom no god durst ever yet withstand.

Each character repeats the phrase “the same Achilles” for support, which becomes a more abusive verbal attack on each other, with tragic, bloody consequences by the end of Seneca’s play.²⁷

Shakespeare, who derives this rhetorical technique primarily from Seneca, employs stichomythia to signify Richard’s superior reason, which manifests itself as a talent for cunning, in his bid for power. In Act One, scene ii, Richard engages Anne, whom he attempts successfully to woo through epigrammatic stichomythia, which he contrives through intricate verbal interplay. He begins his flirtation with Anne, turning her curse into flattery by deflecting her hatred through antithesis:

Anne
 Thou wast the cause and most accursed effect.
 Richard
 Your beauty was the cause of that effect—
 Your beauty, that did haunt me in my sleep
 To undertake the death of all the world,
 So I might live one hour in your sweet bosom.
 Anne
 If I thought that, I tell thee, homicide,
 These nails should rent that beauty from my cheeks.

²⁶Note that Heywood lengthens and varies Seneca’s original Latin meter, which few if any English poets, with the exception of Milton, can imitate successfully in English prosody. Heywood also augments Seneca’s tragedies to suit his own poetic interests; however, he preserves stichomythia because the alliterative sound quality would have appealed to Renaissance audiences. For further information on Heywood’s translation of Seneca, see *Hero and Saint: Shakespeare and the Graeco-Roman Heroic Tradition* (New York: Oxford UP, 1971. 148-149, 170-171).

²⁷ Eric C. Baade examines Heywood’s translation and adaptation of Seneca’s varying meters, which consist of iambic trimeter and lyrical meters for the chorus. He notes that Heywood’s translation, as opposed to Studley’s or Neville’s, “shows real genius...to make sense of the garbled Latin [of] Seneca’s meaning” (*Seneca’s Tragedies*. Ed. Eric C. Baade. London: Macmillan, 1969. xxi). Heywood captures this meaning despite his substitution of the popular fourteener, which he varies occasionally with other meters and feminine, or unaccented, endings to lighten otherwise heavily stressed lines.

Richard
 These eyes could not endure that beauty's wrack;
 You should not blemish it, if I stood by:
 As all the world is cheerèd by the sun,
 So I by that. It is my day, my life.
 Anne
 Black night o'ershade thy day, and death thy life!
 Richard
 Curse not thyself, fair creature—thou art both.
 Anne
 I would I were, to be revenged on thee.
 Richard
 It is a quarrel most unnatural,
 To be revenged on him that loveth thee.
 Anne
 It is a quarrel just and reasonable,
 To be revenged on him that killed my husband. (II. 120-137)²⁸

Shakespeare captures the rhythm patterns between the two, often to contrast two images as a corollary to the contrasting emotions: Richard's professed love against Anne's apparent hatred. Frequently, Shakespeare places emphases on their opposed positions through spondees to emphasize that the poetic substitution corresponds with the marital one: Anne's former intended is effectively traded for Richard, her future husband. "Black night" corresponds rhythmically with "Curse Not," and "These nails" balance "These eyes" for a physiological opposition; the "quarrel most unnatural" provides a necessary antithesis to the "quarrel just and reasonable." Ironically, the one who is "revenged" rather than "revenged on" proves to be Richard, who becomes Anne's husband despite her violent opposition, for the "homicide" eventually becomes the "husband." Though Anne rails against Richard: "Out of my sight! Thou dost infect my eyes," Richard redirects sight for his own purposes: "Thine eyes, sweet lady, have infected mine" (I.ii.148-149). Through stichomythia, Richard cajoles Anne, eradicating her indignation while he transforms her opinion of him solely through persuasion.

Shakespeare presents the dialectic to offer a synthesis (their marriage) that signifies Richard's ability to persuade and gain mastery through language, and it is not the only time antithesis produces a synthesizing medium that balances and overcomes opposition. Rhetorical devices invest Richard with power and frame how he conquers resistance. His alternate definitions and verbal cross talk allow him to destabilize meaning as much as the political structure in the play, and his manipulative rhetoric gives him a finesse that Senecan tyrants, who also employ verbal thrust and parry, violent exchange, and elaborate sound patterns, lack. Despite this difference, Shakespeare preserves the fierce ambitions Senecan tyrants enact through violent speech and acts. If Richard kills Anne's fiancé for the same political motivation and brutality that Seneca's Lycus kills Megara's brothers in *Hercules Furens*, he

²⁸ For this and all quotes from Shakespeare's play, see *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works* (ed. Alfred Harbage. New York: Viking, 1969).

accomplishes a psychological success that Lycus does not by winning Anne.²⁹ Richard constructs elaborate power games that enable him to achieve the crown not only through sheer force but also through effective rhetoric, which becomes less effective as Shakespeare introduces Richmond, the synthesizing medium formed from antithetical forces in the play. He marries language with political domination, and one consistent theme emerges in the play and in Richard's struggle for the throne: those who possess rhetorical skill gain power and those who do not, lose it.

III

In the exchange between Richard and Anne, Shakespeare illustrates how Richard manipulates language to secure an advantageous marriage, and, by extension, authority. However, when Richard meets and spars with Elizabeth in Act Four, in a scene that prefigures his waning rhetorical and political power, he believes her as easily won over as Anne. Elizabeth exercises an equally aggressive rhetorical power that signifies Richard's decline because not only can he not overcome her, he cannot recognize her evasion either. She parries every thrust with equivalent force, and the question of who actually controls whom arises despite Richard's quick dismissal of her after their rhetorical battle: "Relenting Fool, and shallow, changing woman!" (IV.iv.431). Epigrammatic stichomythia dominates their exchange, and each character trades barbs with a driving intensity that reflects the high stakes, that are life, death, and power, in the play:

Richard
 Infer fair England's peace by this alliance.
 Elizabeth
 Which she shall purchase with still-lasting war.
 Richard
 Tell her the king, that may command, entreats.
 Elizabeth
 That at her hands which the king's King forbids.
 Richard
 Say she shall be a high and mighty queen.
 Elizabeth
 To veil the title, as her mother doth.
 Richard
 Say I will love her everlastingly.
 Elizabeth
 But how long shall that title 'ever' last.
 Richard
 Sweetly in force unto her fair life's end.
 Elizabeth
 But how long fairly shall her sweet life last?
 Richard
 As long as heaven and nature lengthens it.
 Elizabeth

²⁹ See A. J. Boyle's comparison of Lycus' wooing of Megara in *Hercules Furens* and Richard's wooing of Anne in *Richard III (Tragic Seneca: An Essay in the Theatrical Tradition*. New York: Routledge, 1997. 149).

As long as hell and Richard likes it.
 Richard
 Say I, her sovereign, am her subject low.
 Elizabeth
 But she, your subject, loathes such sovereignty.
 Richard
 Be eloquent in my behalf to her.
 Elizabeth
 An honest tale speeds best being plainly told.
 Richard
 Then plainly to her tell my loving tale.
 Elizabeth
 Plain and not honest is too harsh a style.
 Richard
 Your reasons are too shallow and too quick.
 Elizabeth
 O no, my reasons are too deep and dead—
 Too deep and dead (poor infants) in their graves.
 Richard
 Harp not on that string, madam; that is past.
 Elizabeth
 Harp on it still shall I till heartstrings break. (ll. 343-365)

Each character reinterprets the opponent's discourse, manipulating speech to support their positions and reinforcing their opposing arguments through the frequent exercise of stichomythia, which is employed by *both* characters, whose speech reflects a marked use of antithesis and alliteration. The repetition of "deep and dead" emphasizes the human loss Richard's violence has produced, which resonates with Elizabeth, who, unlike Anne, cannot forget Richard's murderous strokes.

Elizabeth's wish for "an honest tale" that "speeds best being plainly told" becomes more dangerous as the "plainly told" tale left to be told is Richard's murderous nature and greed for power. Like Seneca's Lycus, who proposes to marry Megara even if it occurs through force in *Hercules Furens*, Richard trades the eloquent flattery of Act One for coercive threats when his "loving tale" fails to win Elizabeth. His advice to persuade Elizabeth's daughter "sweetly in force" reveals Richard's monstrosity—that he has killed innocent victims and would kill again to hold his crown. Though Richard's asides have already exposed his vicious character, it is only at the end of the play that extreme ambition overtakes the rhetorical skill that gave him political control in the beginning. Rather than Richard gaining mastery over Elizabeth, she effectively conquers him.³⁰

In opposition to the exchange between Richard and Anne in Act One, Elizabeth and Richard's verbal encounter does not result in a synthesis accomplished by a union between antithetical positions. Rather, it intensifies the discord resulting from Richard's tyranny, which Elizabeth grasps and exposes in her equal, if not superior, rhetorical

³⁰ For further analysis between female characterization in *Richard III* and Seneca, see Harold F. Brooks' "Richard III, Unhistorical Amplifications: The Women's Scenes and Seneca." (*Modern Language Review* 75 (1980). 721-737).

skill. Her unwillingness to acquiesce to Richard's proposition signifies a notable shift in Richard's rhetorical power because it exposes his weakness: excessive vice that, coupled with success, generates a blinding pride—a tragic characteristic that overtakes virtually all of the heroes and villains in Seneca's tragedies. More importantly, the loss of rhetorical skill and the emergence of Richard's latent ambition signal a weakness in his reason, which not only unmasks his desire to others but also creates in Richard a false security in his intellectual powers. Once he loses the ability to rationalize his options and to outwit his competitors, Richard, like the tragic characters Seneca creates, meets his fatal end.

IV

Speech functions as a method for characters to exercise political and psychological control over their antagonists, and Senecan influence in the scene between Richard and Elizabeth in Act Four materializes not only through their argumentative dialogue but also through Richard's irrepressible egoism.³¹ Shakespeare bestows on Richard an ability to grasp the throne by understanding both his enemies and friends as he pretends humility through fraternal or courtly love. But when vice overtakes his rhetorical power, Richard sacrifices political and psychological influence to fulfill his extreme ambition, as fatal to him as to his classical counterparts Oedipus or Agamemnon. At first, a "cold" (*3 Henry VI*, III.ii.133) reason drives Richard, whom Margaret labels a "ragged fatal rock" (V.iv.27) in *3 Henry VI* and whom Elizabeth claims, "in such a desperate bay of death ... [to] rush all to pieces on [his] rocky bosom" (IV.iv.232, 234). Richard fulfills the rock-like determination of a traditional Stoic hero from his earliest appearances in *3 Henry VI*, but Shakespeare complicates Richard's character, beginning with his soliloquy in Act Three, scene two in *3 Henry VI* when a contradictory portrait of Richard emerges as he confesses that "a cold premeditation" (l. 133) drives his "dream on sovereignty" (l. 134).

By *Richard III*, Shakespeare manifests the danger of extreme power rendered in Seneca's *Oedipus*, *Agamemnon*, and *Thyestes* through Richard, whom he allows to seize and hold power only so long as reason governs his speech. Stoic ideals, including self-possession, fortitude, and constancy, motivate Richard to achieve the crown, and like the Stoic hero, he exercises reason over his emotions. Once he sacrifices his rational aptitude for irrational aspirations, however, Richard loses verbal and political power as a result of his immoderate thought and behavior, which Shakespeare reflects in his speech; Richard's exchange with Elizabeth prefigures his loss of power over his enemies, rhetorical or otherwise. At once possessed of vice and courage, constancy and extremism, Richard's corruption precludes reason, the most important governing agent to the Stoic and one that Seneca praises in his tragedies, letters, and an important dialogue I will consider in relation to Richard's skewed worldview: *De remediis fortuitorum*.

³¹ See Robert S. Miola, *Shakespeare and Classical Tragedy, the Influence of Seneca* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) for a more developed discussion about language as a means of creating identity both in Seneca's tragedies and Shakespeare's plays. Miola asserts that the rhetorical technique of Seneca, inherited and appropriated by Shakespeare, is "a language of self-creation, the means by which characters will themselves into being and power...an intense often vacillating struggle to create and achieve identity" (76).

Richard displays the indifferent and detached spirit that Seneca espouses in *De remediis fortuitorum*, which expresses Stoic fatalism through the dialogue between Senses and Reason. Reason, which refuses to surrender to the fear that enslaves the senses, governs the Stoic self, as the faculties of the mind parallel the natural world with an imperturbability that denies weakness:

Sensus.
 Morieris.
 Ratio.
 Putbam to aliquid noui dicere, ad hoc veni, haec ago, huc me singuli ducunt dies.
 Nascenti mihi, hunc natura posuit terminum.³²

Richard appears to possess these characteristics; however, Shakespeare reevaluates Stoic doctrine when he conceptualizes Richard's character. Whereas moral virtue compels the Stoic to follow a natural course with constancy, which forms the foundation upon which Stoic doctrine rests, extreme determination spurs Richard to moral turpitude. In a comparative analysis of Seneca's moral essay *De beneficiis* and Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens*, John M. Wallace suggests that "virtue ... transforms itself into a vice" (352), and I would extend Wallace's argument to *Richard III* by asserting that the same type of transference occurs in Richard's character. Instead of shedding generosity for moral degeneracy, which Wallace argues occurs in *Timon of Athens*, Richard sheds other Stoic virtues, including his self-determination, which falters in Act Five, as he allows extreme vice to redefine his character.³³

Richard's extreme constancy to his abnormal nature coupled with his courage against opposition allows Shakespeare to transform Seneca's moral precepts into immoral aims in *Richard III*; what appear as virtues metamorphose into vice when undertaken excessively and immorally. Richard's inner resolve, which he presents early on through manifold, deceptive roles that permit him to achieve authority through language, reflects not only this excess but also a driving and extreme perversion that controls him. He imparts the duplicitous method with which he will assume power in Act Three of *3 Henry VI* and relates the various guises he intends to assume, foreshadowing his power play in *Richard III*:

Why, I can smile, and murder whiles I smile,
 And cry, 'Content!' to that which grieves my heart,
 And wet my cheeks with artificial tears,
 And frame my face to all occasions.

³² The sixteenth-century translation reads: "Sensua. Thou shalt dye. / Reason. I thought thou woldest have shewd me some newes. I cam for the end that I go about, every daye ledeth me therto; nature set me what I was borne that ende of my ryse and course." (Seneca, *De Remediis Fortuitorum*, trans. Robert Whytynnton, 1547 in *Seneca's De Remediis Fortuitorum and the Elizabethans*. Ed. Ralph Graham Parker. Chicago: Titus, 1953. 31).

³³ Wallace suggests that in *Timon of Athens* Shakespeare manipulates Seneca's "borderline between true generosity and thoughtless extravagance," with extremity as the vehicle for skewing the boundaries between virtue and vice, which he believes reshapes Seneca's "ethos" (*Timon of Athens* and the Three Graces: Shakespeare's Senecan Study," *Modern Philology* 83 (1986). 349-363). See especially p. 350.

I'll drown more sailors than the mermaid shall;
 I'll slay more gazers than the basilisk;
 I'll play the orator as well as Nestor,
 Deceive more slyly than Ulysses could
 And, like a Sinon, take another Troy.
 I can add colors to the chameleon,
 Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
 And set the murderous Machiavel to school. (III.ii.182-193)

Shakespeare redirects the values inherent to Stoic idealism by creating Richard as a protean creature whose evil intentions defy the Stoic's resolve to act with a principled conscience. Richard manifests his malevolence with a composure and constancy to self-will reflexive of a Stoic hero, but this seeming heroism remains fuelled by immoderate ambition and extreme vice. Yet, even if vice motivates Richard from the beginning, it nevertheless competes with the appearance of Stoic virtues present in the beginning of *Richard III*, when Shakespeare crafts a brilliant portrait of Richard's courage, self-determination, and constancy through Richard's opening soliloquy, when he reveals his unnatural body and "deadly hate" (I.i.35). These "virtues," which are not virtues at all in Richard, allow him to cover his ambition and more ironically, to fulfill his goals.

Like the vicious Atreus of *Thyestes*, Richard embodies a god-like character, imbued with the Stoic fortitude that gives him the determination to overcome obstacles to the throne. As Geoffrey Miles suggests, Shakespeare adopts qualities of "the god and the rock," which "sums up the Stoic aspiration to absolute perfection and power over oneself."³⁴ Miles elaborates on the presence of an impenetrable spirit in the divine quality of Shakespeare's Brutus, Julius Caesar, and Coriolanus, who imitate or are overtly compared to gods. However, Miles, in his analysis, neglects Richard, a self-deified paradox of courage *and* villainy. Richard acts as a god, but as an infamous one who murders at will to achieve kingship. He exemplifies the excessive pride that defines Seneca's Atreus, who announces his self-apotheosis at the beginning of Act V of *Thyestes*: "Acqualis astris gradior et cunctos super / Altum superbo vertice attingens polum."³⁵ Richard will act with the same self-destructive hubris. The danger of absolute constancy in both characters, as in Hercules in *Hercules Furens*, remains in their development of "superhuman aspiration" that may "grow, directly or crookedly."³⁶ Richard, who remains fixed in "superhuman aspirations," misappropriates Stoic ideals as he achieves and strives to hold the crown. He lacks Stoic virtue or responsibility, for neither an inner moral compass nor a divine light of conscience fuels Richard, who will

³⁴ See Miles' *Shakespeare and the Constant Romans* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996. 45-46). Miles gives a thoughtful analysis of Shakespeare and Seneca's Stoic Tyrant, but concentrates, like many critics, on *Coriolanus*, *Julius Caesar*, and *Antony and Cleopatra* rather than *Richard III*. His chapters about Seneca and Stoic heroism in the Renaissance provide an interesting and useful definition of the Stoic hero's tendency to self-deification and to an invulnerable resolve that applies not only to the Stoics in Shakespeare's Roman plays but also to Richard's character.

³⁵"The peer of stars I move, high over all, / And with exalted head attain the heavens! (II. 885-886, trans., Jasper Heywood). Pratt includes an excellent analysis of the play, focusing on Atreus' tyranny, which he argues as fundamentally opposed to Stoic virtue despite his reliance on some ideals that drive Stoicism (106).

³⁶ Miles, pp. 61-62.

“clothe [his] naked villainy / With odd old ends stol’n forth of holy writ, / And seem a saint, when most [he] play[s] the devil” (I.iii.335-337). Rather, he persists in a course antithetical to Stoic idealism and ultimately suffers the consequences of supplanting virtue with vice.³⁷

V

The absence of Stoic virtue permits Shakespeare to deify Richard as a god that enacts tyranny typical of the Stoic villain and to characterize Richard’s career as a product of amoral absolutism rather than Stoic heroism. Shakespeare invents an oxymoronic blend of both the villain and the hero in Richard’s character, for Richard promises to follow a course true to the self, but Shakespeare creates this self as a monstrosity, a disaster of nature. The beginning of Richard’s self-assertion occurs in 3 *Henry VI*, when he describes how his “mother’s womb” rejected him:

Why, love forswore me in my mother’s womb;
And, for I should not deal in her soft law,
She did corrupt frail nature with some bribe
To shrink mine arm up like a withered shrub;
To make an envious mountain on my back,
Where sits deformity to mock my body;
To shape my legs of an unequal size;
To disproportion me in every part,
Like to a chaos, or an unlicked bear-whelp... (III.ii.153-161)

Richard adopts the Stoic precept to elect the natural world as a guide and echoes the Senecan Stoic, who acts in accordance with nature.³⁸ Shakespeare fashions Richard’s character as an inhuman horror to manipulate what appears as a Stoic virtue, the constant self, into Stoic villainy, the evil self. Richard follows the precepts of nature, true to Reason’s answer to Senses in *De remediis fortuitarum*, but his character’s extremism transforms Stoic idealism into Stoic tyranny. His resolve to act in accordance with the self proves disastrous, as Richard is:

Curtailed of ... fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling Nature,
Deformed, unfinished, sent before [his] time
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up,
And that so lamely and unfashionable
That dogs bark at [him] ... (*Richard III*, I.i.18-23)

³⁷ Nicolas Brooke argues that Shakespeare’s familiarity with the Morality plays, specifically the recognizable figure Vice, “a sardonic humorist, by origin a kind of clown, who attracted to himself the attributes of anti-Christ bent on the mocking destruction of accepted virtues” (57) surfaces in Richard’s character, which embodies Vice. For further information on *Richard III* and its parallel with the Morality plays, see *Shakespeare’s Early Tragedies* (Bungay, Suffolk: Methuen, 48-79). Shakespeare blends “attributes” of the Morality plays in Richard to form an antithesis to Richmond, whom Brooke argues as the figure that re-establishes a Christian, orderly pattern upon which “the whole theory of Tudor history is built” (78).

³⁸ See Audrey Chew’s *Stoicism in Renaissance English Literature* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988. 15).

Though Richard will “prove a villain” (I.i.30) devoid of virtue, he nevertheless achieves his goals with meticulous reason and fortitude displayed in his “plots ... laid, inductions dangerous” (I.i.32). As the “subtle, false, and treacherous” (I.i.37) Richard vies for the crown, he dissembles by reflecting “dissembling Nature,” which has formed him into a hideous shape. Created as an abnormality, Richard proceeds with equally chaotic actions. He imitates a crooked nature with Stoic resolve and with a pathological intensity reflective of Seneca’s dramatic interpretation of a pathetic universe in *Medea* and *Oetaeus*.³⁹ Whereas it is primarily the earth that adapts to reflect Seneca’s overarching motif, “*formas dolor / errat per omnes*” (*Oetaeus*, ll. 252-253) [“pain in all its forms” (Pratt 77)], in *Richard III*, it is Richard who reflects the chaos generated by excessive war in his unnatural form. Despite or perhaps because of Richard’s deformed body, he maintains the virtues attached to Stoic idealism, demonstrating an ability to withstand opponents with the fortitude of any Senecan hero. His “naturally” unnatural mind manifests itself in his cunning words and phrases that defy the underlying moral virtue inherent either to the Senecan hero or stoic. Furthermore, his adherence to this form leads to Richard’s downfall at the end of the play, when Richmond divests Richard of the god-like authority with which he murders.

If Richard’s collapse begins with self-apotheosis, it ends with a loss of rhetorical skill and a momentary lapse into fear after the ghosts predict his doom in Act Five, a scene that recalls Hercules’ fear after he sees supernatural beings upon returning from Hades in *Hercules Furens*. Richard replaces the Christian God, which he appeals to in fear, with himself and struggles to reassert reason, which breaks apart:

Have Mercy, Jesu! Soft! I did but dream.
O coward conscience, how dost thou afflict me!
The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight.
Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.
What do I fear? Myself? There’s none else by.
Richard loves Richard: that is I am I. (V.iii.179-184)

Richard’s loss of composure in Act Five serves as the sole example of his failed resolve in the play, and like Seneca’s Oedipus, his fear portends his decline. In *Oedipus*, Seneca presents his title character as one more carried away by fear than governed by reason, an obvious difference from Richard, whose governing reason falters only briefly when faced with supernatural elements and “coward conscience”. Oedipus’ ability to accept the inevitable allows him to face unchanging fate, which Richard will not. Rather, Richard’s lack of assurance in Act Five intensifies his absolutism and constancy to a self that embodies vice. It also leads him to proceed irrationally as he trusts Fortune to grant him victory:

The sun will not be seen to-day;
The sky doth frown and low’r upon our army.

³⁹ Pratt argues that Seneca’s *Medea* expresses a “fantasizing, hallucinating pathological emotion ... raised beyond human limits to represent the paroxysms of a world transformed by the voyage of the Argo (and the early Roman Empire)” (78).

I would these dewy tears were from the ground.
 Not shine to-day? Why, what is that to me
 More than to Richmond? For the selfsame heaven
 That frowns on me looks sadly upon him. (ll 283-288)

Fortune deserts Richard, but it reveals another Stoic feature that Shakespeare invests in the play. Just as Seneca endows Fortune with thematic significance in the politics of *Agamemnon*, Shakespeare creates Fortune as Richard's overarching political outlook based on "drunken prophecies" (I.i.33), which prove dangerous for the tyrant to hold. Norman Pratt asserts that in *Agamemnon*, "only the modest life is secure" because Seneca "fuses Fortune and immorality and treats Fortune not as an agency external to human life but as a moral condition, a state of excess causing its own downfall" (112).

Just so with Richard, who loses power due to moral degeneracy and excessive ambition, which Shakespeare reflects in his reliance on Fortune rather than the divine right that he will introduce in Richmond's consistent appeal to God in Act Five. Richard describes Fortune rather than God as the governing force of this world, a dangerous slip from his typical espousal of Christian humility and grace: "Unto the dignity and height of fortune, / The high imperial type of this earth's glory" (IV.iv.244-245). Richard remains constant to the turning wheel he too lately realizes has "frowned" on him, even unto death, when Catesby describes Richard's tenacity as god-like, for he "enacts more wonders than a man, / Daring an opposite to every danger... / Seeking for Richmond in the throat of death" (V.iv.2-3, 5). It is clear to all but Richard that he needs "rescue ... rescue, rescue" (V.iv.1) mostly from himself, but he perpetuates constancy and fortitude, responding to Catesby by maintaining a continued reliance on Fortune, reflective of Stoic fatalism: "Slave, I have set my life upon a cast, / And I will stand the hazard of the die" (V.iv.8-9).

Shakespeare leaves Richard's character devoid of remorse, and his absent conscience indicates that his constancy produces vice and "the hazard of the die," a pun on fate and fatal, as Richard's Fortune changes, and his life ends thereafter. The renewed determination Richard displays acts regressively, for it redirects him into evil rather than to reason—if not to repentance before an inevitable death—and strengthens Shakespeare's political ethics, which he imbues with religious and Stoic significance. In the last act, Richard upholds his corrupt and ambitious persistence even as he displays an admirable courage that characterizes the Stoic hero. Despite his "babbling dreams" he exhorts his men to deny their conscience and fight with the brutality of the sword:

Go, gentlemen, every man unto his charge.
 Let not our babbling dreams affright our souls;
 Conscience is but a word that cowards use,
 Devised at first to keep the strong in awe:
 Out strong arms be our conscience, swords our law! (V.iii.308-312)

Richard's violation of the natural order, as his "sword" functions throughout the play as his governing "law," begs the question of how one should treat Richard and the alternative his character presents. Because Richard has replaced God with himself, upsetting the natural hierarchy, his character takes Stoic constancy to an extreme level in opposition to Stoic virtue. Shakespeare revises Stoic ideals of the hero as a divine

entity when he creates Richard as a tyrant who acts as a god by supplanting order with chaos. His systematic murder of the rightful heirs defies the natural progression that subordinates men, even kings, to God. As well, it provides a means for Shakespeare to articulate a political position that concurs with the Stoic doctrine Seneca advocates in *Oedipus* and *Agamemnon*: justice tempered by moderate action and careful thought.

In Senecan drama and prose, justice may proceed only through a divine wisdom that governs reason. Shakespeare draws on this “divine order” or “divine reason” that gives the Stoic a moral framework and an overarching divine compass, which functions as part of the soul—a spiritual dimension Richard lacks:

Puto, inter me teque convenient externa corpori adquiri, corpus in honorem animi coli, in animo esse partes ministras, per quas movemur alimurque, propter ipsum principale nobis datas. In hoc principali est aliquid irrationale, est et rationale; illud huic servit, hoc unum est quod alio non refertur sed omnia ad se refert. Nam illa quoque divina ratio omnibus pareposita est, ipsa sub nullo est; et haec autem nostra eadem est, quae ex illa est.⁴⁰

Richard’s exhortation to his army to “march on, join bravely, let us to it pell-mell, / If not to heaven, then hand in hand to hell” (V.iii.313-314) marks the shift when vice takes over any appearance of virtue Richard possesses, and Shakespeare uses Richard’s vice to introduce the divine right or “divine reason” that places the “rightful” Tudor heir on the throne.

Through the marriage of a Lancastrian with a Yorkist, “the true succeeders of each royal house, / By God’s fair ordinance...” (V.v.30-31), Richmond and Elizabeth will provide England with Tudor “peace” (V.v.39) in contrast with the upheaval Richard has created. Shakespeare not only resolves tension in the play through Richmond’s victory and marriage, but he also reestablishes “divine reason” by offering a king who fulfills the moral role Seneca prescribes in his Stoic philosophy. By replacing “One that hath ever been God’s enemy” (V.iii.253), Richmond presents himself as one supported by “God and Saint George” (V.iii.271) as the “ruling element,” spiritually ordained by God, that counters Richard’s extremist politics. Shakespeare accomplishes this resolution by proposing moderation and justice in Richmond’s character to correct the vice and chaos that threatens to overwhelm England permanently. As one who “draw[s] the form and model of [the] battle” (V.iii.24) with the same just and level hand that will later govern it, Richmond displays Stoic virtue antithetical to the moral corruption Richard’s character represents. He will “limit each leader to his several charge” and “part in just proportion ... power” (V.iii.25-26) as a reflection of Seneca’s political ethics and prescription for kingship in the first book of *De Clementia*, which Seneca

⁴⁰“I think you and I will agree that we acquire external goods for the body; that the body is looked after for the sake of the soul; that the soul has subordinate parts, through which we achieve movement and nourishment and which are given to us for the sake of the ruling element of the soul. This ruling element is partly rational and partly irrational: the irrational part serves the rational, which alone is subordinate to nothing else but has everything subordinate to itself. For the divine reason has authority over all and is subject to none; so our human reason must have the same quality as the divine, since it derives from it”. Letter 92, trans. C. D. N. Costa (*Seneca: 17 Letters*. Wiltshire, England: Aris and Phillips, 1988. 104-105).

writes to advocate moderate use of power by kings.⁴¹ Through Richmond, Shakespeare submits the proper balance necessary for correct kingship—moderation and justice—as an answer to the problem of extremism, at least in an Elizabethan world that corresponds to a Stoic one.

In each of the histories, *1 Henry VI*, *2 Henry VI*, *3 Henry VI*, and *Richard III*, the major contenders for the crown display immoderate action, inciting violence through the prideful ambitions of two warring families, the Yorks and Lancasters. By presenting Richard as a Stoic character both reflective of and opposed to Stoic ideals, Shakespeare constructs an elaborate political framework that allows him to demonize Richard and to juxtapose two ideas of kingship against one another. Both extreme forms stand at opposite ends of the power spectrum, though they both generate the same result: chaos. From a political standpoint that supports the Elizabethan interpretation of history, Richard loses the crown because his usurpation defies the divine right. Shakespeare supports this ideology both by transforming Richard's Stoic tendencies into vice and an irrational reliance on Fortune and by introducing Richmond not only to end the division in England but also to promote the moderation praised in Seneca's Stoic philosophy.⁴²

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⁴¹ Pratt, p. 169.

⁴² For an excellent history of the Wars of the Roses, see Peter Saccio's *Shakespeare's English Kings* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977. 157-186). Richard, the last Plantagenet king of England, had as much right to the throne as Henry VII if not more, since the Tudor claim was a tenuous one at best. Ironically, Henry VIII, Elizabeth I's father, was related to the Plantagenet line through his mother, which complicates Shakespeare's manipulation of history and Richard III's character even further (186). Saccio notes the many modifications Shakespeare, following Edward Hall's *Union of the Two Noble and Illustrious Houses of Lancaster and York* and Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles of England*, made to fuel his own imaginative and political purposes (158).

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Özet

Seneca'cı Stoacılık ve Shakespeare'in *Richard III* Adlı Eseri

Edebiyat araştırmacıları, uzun bir süredir, Lucius Annaeus Seneca'nın Shakespeare'in Roma oyunları ve özellikle de *Antony and Cleopatra*, *Coriolanus*, *Titus Andronicus*, ve *Julius Caesar* adlı eserleri üzerindeki tiyatroya yönelik etkilerini ortaya koymuşlardır. Fakat yalnızca pek azı *Richard III* adlı eserin, erken bir örnek olarak, Seneca'nın stoacı düşüncesini, tiyatroya yönelik kurallarını ve tartışmalı olarak Shakespeare'in en karmaşık ve yaratıcı kötü karakteri olan III. Richard'ı yaratmak için kullandığı trajik karakter özelliklerini örnek aldığı açıkça ileri sürmüştür. Seneca'nın stoacılığı Richard'ın karakter özelliğini ve oyunun da ahlak dersini belirler: krallıkta

mutlakçılıktan sakınmak. Bu felsefi etki, Richard'ın konuşmalarında, radikal politikalarında ve stoacı bir sebat ve tutarlılık gösterme sonucunda elde ettiği ve VI. Henry'nin zayıflıklarını dengeleyen, doğal olmayan bir beden ve zihin yapısıyla ortaya çıkar.

Tudor ideolojisini sağlamlaştırmak için Shakespeare, Richmond'ı, akıl, cesaret ve sebat gibi Stoacı değerlere olan inancına rağmen Richard'ın sahip olamadığı Stoacı idealizm aracılığıyla bölünmeyi sonlandıran bir sentez olarak sunar. Henry'nin tacını korumadaki beceriksizliğinden kaynaklanan iktidar boşluğu, aşırı taç hırsı doğurur ve Shakespeare bu çatışan hırslar konusunu, Seneca'nın felsefi drama ve düzyazısından sağladığı stoacı bakışla geliştirir ve bunları Stoacı ideallere dayanarak karışıklığı sonlandıran Richmond karakteri ile tasarlayıp sentezler. Seneca'nın eserleri, *Richard III* için sadece tiyatroyla ilgili dilbilimsel modeller oluşturmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda, Shakespeare'in temsili bir şekilde Richmond'ı oluşturmak ve Seneca'nın yaşadığı ve yazdığı zalim dünyadakine paralellik gösteren İngiltere tarihindeki şiddetli dönemi yeniden yaratmak için kullandığı bir felsefe ve tarihsel çerçevede sunar.

Chicana Deconstruction of Cultural and Linguistic Borders

Maria Antonia Alvarez

The national boundary –1933 miles– established in 1848 to separate two nation-states, Mexico and U.S., is a border that “epitomize the polarization of the world into center and periphery” (Sanchez 50), even though there is no noticeable difference in the natural landscape as one crosses that border between a northern Mexican province and Texas or Arizona. Thus, the literature of the American southwest is filled with various and often conflicting ethnocentric assumptions about regional and ethnic meaning and significance, because “Anglo ‘visitors’ to the southwest do not define or experience ‘westness’ in the same way as those who are born there or as those who view the southwest as more north than the west” (Gish 2). Since no ethnicity, no group offers the ultimate truth, some critics are now concerned with the perspective of community and autonomy within Chicano studies and with the way Chicano literature, written in English since 1960, deals with its border in ways that change the map of American studies and of North American cultural and linguistic landscape. This is complemented, as Mary Louise Pratt affirms, with another point of view that “regards ethnic cultures as the borderlands, sites of ongoing critical and inventive interaction with the dominant culture, as permeable contact zones across which signification moves in many directions” (89).

The *borderlands*, that area that reaches over both sides of the United States-Mexican border, is understood as an area where three major cultures –Mexican, Mexican-American and Anglo-American– “have interacted, and been in considerable conflict, for more than five hundred years” (Goodman xvi) or where “the domestic and the foreign have long met on the frontier” (Kaplan 16). This is a basic theme in American studies which “has undergone revision from the vacant space of the wilderness to a bloody battlefield of conflict and conquest, and more recently to a site of contacts, encounters, and collisions that produce new hybrid cultures” (17). The space between South Texas and Mexico derives from a clear understanding that history, after 1848, decided that this space –the *borderlands*– was on the U.S. side, but, as Jose David Saldivar affirms that “the mapping of cultural theory within the discourse of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands is an initiation” not only “to literary scholars, historians, cultural studies critics”, but also to “anthropologists, feminists, mass culture critics, public interest lawyers, and anti-racists” to draw again “the borders between folklore and the counter-discourses of marginality, between everyday culture and high culture, and between people *with* culture and people *between* culture” (1997: 17). And in a later essay, Saldivar suggests that “[t]he sheer magnitude of the border crossing and diasporic migrations have not only altered and complicated the boundaries of ethno-racial formations but has also disrupted the traditional terrain of U.S. area studies in the context of globalization” (2002: 85).

The *borderlands*¹ as a sense of place

For Chicana writers, a sense of *place* becomes essential, since their stories are held together by *what* the people who populate the stories say and *how* they say it; how they look at the world outside and at the world inside. Thus, all these manifestations in the Mexican-American border were dramatically explored by Gloria Anzaldúa in her influential book *La Frontera/Borderland*, and also by Sandra Cisneros in her collection of short stories *Woman Hollering Creek*.

Moreover, many critics have studied the theme of place; for instance, Walter Mignolo, who considers that “the postmodern and the postcolonial are two faces of the same coin, locating imaginary constructions and *loci* of enunciation in different aspects of modernity, colonization, and imperial word orders” (35). José David Saldivar centers his thought about the sense of place on an attempt to “identify and characterize a shift that has been going on in Chicano/a cultural politics” (2002: 84). Rolando Hinojosa-Smith affirms that “writers impart a sense of place and a sense of truth about the place and about the values of that place. It isn’t a studied attitude but, rather, one of a certain love, and an understanding of the place that they captured in print for themselves” (98-99). Foucault has stated in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, that the history of *space* is an understudied subject of research, and for this reason it has been necessary the rediscovery of *space* and its local narratives by critical social theory, since “a whole history remains to be written of space –which would at the same time be the history of power– from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat” (149). In the same work, Foucault made his now famous statement that “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together” (100). For this reason, he conceives discourse as “a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable” (100). He adds, to be more precise, that “we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated discourse; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies” (100).

Derrida also argued about the dismantling and undoing of solid conceptual grounds, such as the notion of *unity* which he describes as “the destabilizing drama on the scene of the text, which has happened a sort of overrun that spoils the boundaries or divisions” (83). According to Richard Bernstein, not many contemporary writers “equal Derrida in his sensitivity and alertness to the multifarious ways in which the ‘history of the West’ –even in its institutionalization of communicative practices– has always tended to silence differences, to exclude outsiders and exiles, those who live on the margins” (51). Moreover, Bernstein adds that this is one of the reasons why Derrida speaks to those who have felt the pain and suffering of being excluded by “the prevailing hierarchies embedded in the text called ‘the history of the West’ –whether they be women, Blacks, or others bludgeoned by exclusionary tactics” (52).

¹ For further discussion of the concept of the *borderlands*, which has its own independent, though related history, see Juan A. Castro’s “Richard Rodríguez in ‘Borderland’: The Ambiguity of Hybridity”, where he explains that “border studies, as an autonomous discipline, was founded in the 1950s by the social scientists Julian Samora, Gilbert Cardenas, and, in particular, Charles Lomis”. Despite its origins in the social scientists, the discipline of border studies soon incorporated the historical and literary themes previously associated with the concept of the *borderlands* ... what once was the borderlands became the border (2001: 115).

All these theories about people who live on the margins may apply to the problematic of *borderline* in Chicana literature. The treatment of the *spatial* theme in Chicano feminism is related to the cultural geopolitical position of the *borderlands*² and the myth of the *frontier* in American history, although the West here was no wilderness or virgin land, but a space of cultural encounter –the homeland of Spanish settlers who had displaced the indigenous population in colonizing New Spain’s far northern frontier. For this reason, Jose David Saldívar (1991) insists on the necessity of making an effort to achieve a trans-national Latino pan-Americanism where native Chicano border cultures, such as South Texas, are not dissolved, but unite Mexico with Mexicans living in the U.S.; that is to say, to create *new* borderlands, which can be more integrated into the North American sphere than the old borderlands used to be. And more recently, Saldívar has written again about “this uneven discursive terrain of the border in the American western field-Imaginary of the American West” (1997: xiv), trying to “reconstruct the things said and concealed about migration and immigration; the enunciation required and those forbidden about the legacy of conquest in the Americas” (1997: xiv). In Saldívar’s view, “border discourse not only produces power and reinforces it but also undermines it, makes it fragile, and allows one to map and perhaps thwart the cultures of US empire” (1997: xiv). In the same way, J.B. Jackson thinks that instead of focusing on dwellings, the road system must not be neglected in the study of traditional landscapes, and we have to keep in mind Paul Gilroy’s model of a ‘black Atlantic’, which conceives black culture as a transnational formation where discrete national spaces are interwoven by crossings and migrations” (190).

For many new Americanists, the field of Chicano studies has begun to change what the literary historian Amy Kaplan sees as “the conceptual limits of the frontier, by displacing it with the site of the borderlands”, since it links “the study of ethnicity and immigration inextricably to the study of international relations and empire” (16). Furthermore, if the Chicano cultural critic Pérez-Torres is correct in his argument that “the borderlands make history present the tensions, contradictions, hatred, and violence” (12), a quick look at the way in which the paradigm of the borderlands has been treated by official U.S. culture indicates how fuzzy the American frontier continues to be within the culture. As Jose Saldívar puts it, “only by *contextualizing* the borderlands paradigm within a Chicana studies subaltern tradition can we begin to avoid the temptation to pedestalize or fetishize it” (1997: xiii).

The borderland between Mexico and the United States, ‘the homeland Aztlán’ is the opposite of an inhabitable territory. It is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary, in a constant state of transition, populated by the prohibited and forbidden: “*los atravesados* –the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the *mulato*, the half-breed, the half dead; in short, those who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the

² The concepts of *border* and *hybridity* are central to the definition of Chicanism, and the defense of cultural difference is considered significant within the Chicano / Mexican American community. For a more liberal application of these concepts see Richard Rodriguez’s *Hunger for Memory* where he concludes that miscegenation and intercultural contact are giving rise to a new brown American reality that will finally make real the promises of equality and opportunity and the dreams of cultural inclusiveness that have frequently characterized Rodriguez’s vision of “the future of California is its Latinoization” (1997: 151).

normal” (B³ 3). Anzaldúa stresses that “twentieth century mass immigration from Mexico to the U.S., especially undocumented immigration, must be understood as part of the centuries-old tradition of migration and *mestizaje*”(B 3)⁴. But she wants it to be “an island between the nations –a *mestizo* borderlands ... whose intersection gives it life ... with an affirmative language of hybridity and a geography of in-betweenness” (B 3), because, as Hinojosa-Smith says, they didn’t return to Mexico; they didn’t have to. They were “*borderers* with a living and an unifying culture born of conflict with another culture” (1994: 99). Also the language was a strong element to unify their ‘sense of place’.

Gender definitions on the border

According to Anzaldúa, feminism has reformed the traditional sphere of domesticity in a way that is “different from the oppressive vernacular house models of the native tradition, claiming their own space and making a *new* culture with their own feminist architecture” (B 22). She insists that a borderland is “a vague and undetermined place in a constant state of transition” (B 3). She wants to facilitate communication so that Chicanas “from one side and from the other side can come together” (B 86). The habits of crossing will allow people from South Texas and New Mexico to coexist in this multi-centered framework, visiting their family home without losing their identity: “We have a tradition of migration, a tradition of long walk. Today we are witnessing *la migración de los pueblos mexicanos*, the result of the odyssey to the historical / mythological Aztlán” (B 11).

For an analysis of gender definitions on the *border* we must take into account the study of Elizabeth Coonrod Martinez on the sexual relations and Chicana artistic identity, while examining four examples of sexual initiative as subjectivity in fiction, thinking that “since the middle of 1980s, other fiction by Chicanas similarly reveals a strong female character (and writer) who creates her own path, with words, subjectivity, and images” (131). Coonrod adds that “fiction of cultural resistance includes an inner discourse of resistance to patriarchal traditions in the Chicano culture” (131), and in a fiction like that, “sexual experience outside of marriage no longer brings shame or disappointment to the female character. Such characters perform as independent subjects whose presence is not dependent on another being, but rather on her own actions (131). That is to say, if Chicanas want to follow their own way, female characters must also control erotic imagination and make their own sexual choices.

We should keep in mind the resistance to spatial notions that Chicanas now want to dismantle, since they object to the housing of their identity in the national edifice which becomes a prison for women. According to Sonia Saldivar-Hull, the geopolitical aspect that distinguishes Chicana feminism, in its double focus on gender and race, from white feminism, “extends beyond the re-mapping of the domestic United States-Chicano borderlands and it establishes transnational links between the Latina diaspora

³ Gloria Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987.

⁴ See Mark A. Eaton’s “Dis(re)membered bodies: Cormac Mc Carthy’s Border Fiction”, where he explains how McCarthy’s *Blood Meridian* examines the formation of a “decidedly *mestizo* culture from the panoply of cultural practices, ethnicities, and material bodies inhabiting the border region” (2003: 162).

inside the U.S. and Latinas at home, in their countries, south of the U.S.-Mexico border” (1991: 224). Chicanas deconstruct cultural insides and outsides by situating themselves on a border or threshold position: “the space between home and exile is the location from which they can question and renegotiate acts of inclusion and exclusion that constitute national communities and the closure of nation-based narratives” (1991: 224). Chicanas insist that the space of their culture, the Mexican border lines of the southwest, “was not the peripheral fringe of the American historical process, but a place of its own right –home or Atlán–, the native homeland of different peoples from Angloamericans” (1991: 224). And after the phase of cultural nationalism and post-national concerns in the 80s, the border takes on a different meaning with a focus on “internal heterogeneity, on internal differences in gender, region, sexuality, and on mapping transnational spaces” (1991: 224).

As Cherrie Moraga states, they must learn to see themselves “less as U.S. citizens and more as members of a larger world community” (62), without accepting the geopolitical borders that have divided “Chicano from Mexicano ... we call it ‘Raza’—an identity that dissolves borders. I am an American writer in the original sense of the word, an American ‘con acento’ (62). Moreover as Gloria Anzaldúa presents in her visionary manifesto of a ‘new mestiza consciousness’ the figure of the *tragic mestiza*, nostalgically looking back to a lost homeland, is replaced by the figure of a “*new mestiza*, who embraces the utopian potential of her hybrid identity” (B 79). Anzaldúa insists that a Chicana learns “to juggle culture, has a plural personality and operates in a pluralistic form” (B 79). She learns “to be an Indian in Mexican culture and to be a Mexican in an Anglo point of view” (B 79).

Ana Castillo is concerned about the *mestiza* origins, reestablishing the link between contemporary Chicana *mestizas* and their pre-Columbian past, at the same time as she introduces a shift in the mode of seeing it towards a liberation of mestiza self-perception: “We, *mestizas*, heiresses of Christianity, have been alienated from our intuitions and dreams, our same-sex lovers, and our umbilical tie to the Mother-Bond Principle by over four thousand years of spiritual oppression, not only five hundred years of relentless racism (MD⁵ 223). And Castillo adds: “We have all come to suffer the fate of *The Massacre of the Dreamers* whenever we have dared to utter the prediction of the inevitable fall of the Omnipotent God in the Sky” (MD 223)⁶.

The final chapters of both *Borderlands* and *Massacre of the Dreamers* announce each author’s geographic solution to the problematic of contemporary exile: the mapping of an alternative home site⁷. Yet, as Saldivar-Hull states, “Castillo does not represent the past as would a historian or an archaeologist, but views it in a visionary and prophetic mode, making the reconstruction of the past, to use Castillo’s telling terms, a

⁵ Ana Castillo. *Massacre of the Dreamers : Essays on Xicanisma*. Arburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994 .

⁶ According to Sonia Saldiver-Hull, this passage alludes to three major themes: “first, the theme of the ‘countryless woman’, the *mestiza* as exile within her home country; second, the nostalgia for maternal origins, pre-Columbian matriarchal symbols, and the wish to return to the lost past; and third, the theme of the gaze, as a critique of dominant ways of seeing—of the fetishizing male eye of power, through visionary and prophetic modes of perception” (1991: 240).

⁷ In Foucault’s (1986) terms, where as Castillo’s critical counterspace is heterotopian Anzaldúa’s is utopian.

resurrection of ancestor-visionaries and their dream-memory” (241). Furthermore also creating an identity for all the Chicanas, even though they have to move from one side of the border to the other: an identity that gives them the illusion of freedom and safety.

Cisneros’s characters inhabiting the border: *Woman Hollering Creek*

Cisneros situates her *tejana* short story collection *Woman Hollering Creek* on the *border* –the regional South Texas tradition of geopolitical resistance– focusing on inter-regional migrations within the Chicana homeland. Like many of the stories in the book, “Woman Hollering Creek” and “Never Marry a Mexican” explain the advantages and the difficulties of crossing two countries, as Cisneros describes the condition of living on the border between Anglo and Mexican cultures. The protagonists inhabit a border zone between Anglo and Mexican cultures where the perpetual clash and collision of two sets of signifiers and two systems of social myth can throw any one culture’s gender ideology into question. While “Woman Hollering Creek” dramatizes the positive aspect of border living –the possibilities it offers for transformation– in “Never Marry a Mexican” the ambiguous space between cultures generates only confusion and, finally, a new rigid gender definition.

For Jean Wyatt the dialectic between the fluidity of the borderland and the seeming intransigence of internalized icons of womanhood in both of them are important themes to explore (1995). A *borderland* offers a space where a negotiation with established gender patterns is possible –where cultures overlap, and definitions become flexible. Cisneros draws attention to the changing meaning of signifiers in the *border zone*⁸ by using the same words to mean two different things: for example in both short stories the phrase *en el otro lado* can mean either the United States or Mexico, moving its referent according to the side –Mexico or the United States– on which the speaker lives.

Cisneros also questions the labeling of things by juxtaposing English and Spanish in another vignette, “Bien Pretty”, when the narrator observes: “*Urracas*. Grackles. *Urracas*. Different ways of looking at the same bird. City calls them grackles, but I prefer *urracas*. That roll of the *r* making the difference” (W⁹ 164). The shift from one language to the other, and back again, implies a shift between cultural codes: the narrator is able to look at the animal first from one side of the border and then from the other. This important stylistic strategy is a linguistic conflict often present in Latino literature. The collision of languages, for Mary S. Pollock¹⁰, “ramifies to spiritual, political, practical, and aesthetic aspects of border culture and society” (56). For instance, the dedication of *Woman Hollering Creek*: “For my mama, Elvira Cordero

⁸ For an example of the shift that has been going on in Chicano/a cultural politics, see José David Saldívar, where he suggests that this change is not “definitive”, but it is “framed in the cultural semiotics of anti-racism and the critique by mass cultural producers of dominant state-centric thinking” (2002: 84).

⁹ Sandra Cisneros’s *Woman Hollering Creek*

¹⁰ In her analysis of Chicano literary style ““A Woman with a Foot on this World and one Foot on that”: the Bilingual Perspective of Sandra Cisneros”, Pollock affirms that “Cisneros and the Chicano community she addresses are bound in their public expression by the philosophy of the dominant language, but Spanish interpolates itself into English to represent that part of the identity which English leaves out” (1993:56).

Anguiano, who gave me the fierce language. *Y para mi papá ... quien me dio el lenguaje de la ternura. Estos cuentitos se los dedico con todo mi corazón*”, shows that Cisneros represents both sides of the border. Even though she writes for Anglophone readers, the meaning of the Spanish words is clear enough from the English context to be understood for them.

According to Cecil Robinson, “Chicano writers, who are revivifying the literature of the Southwest, have by their contribution allowed for a double view of the Chicano in American literature, the view from without and the view from within” (90). For a woman living on the border the gender role becomes unstable, since she has to move back and forth between Mexican and Anglo signifying systems in a continual motion. While the Mexican woman, Cleófilas, can hear in the sound of the river called *Woman Hollering Creek* only the wail of *la Llorona*¹¹, the Chicana Felice, who can go back and forth between cultural paradigms, interprets the creek’s hollering as a Tarzan shout, and so gives the word *hollering* a new definition.

On the one hand, “Woman Hollering Creek” opens up gender definitions on both sides of the border, while on the other hand, “Never Marry a Mexican” tempers the optimism about border existence. Going back and forth between the two different cultures can be creative, generating a third way of looking at the world—a mestiza way, as in “Woman Hollering Creek”. However, living in a border zone, in the space between the different worlds a Chicana inhabits, can also mean getting caught between two cultures, like Clemencia in “Never Marry a Mexican”, who is both “alienated from her mother culture [and] ‘alien’ in the dominant culture” (B 12). In *Woman Hollering Creek*, Sandra Cisneros’s central theme is how Mexican popular culture and traditional Mexican narratives limit the Chicana’s sense of identity, considering them as cultural limitations in the lives of Mexican-American women.

In “Never Marry a Mexican” Clemencia does not fully grasp the meanings of Mexican or Anglo signifying systems: “But what could be more ridiculous than a Mexican girl who couldn’t even speak Spanish, who didn’t know enough to set a separate plate for each course of dinner, nor how to fold cloth napkins, nor how to set the silver-ware” (W 69), while in “Woman Hollering Creek” poor Cleofila can not even understand her husband—of Mexican origin but born *on this side*— who “demands each course of dinner be served on a separate plate like at his mother’s” (W 49).

In the literature of the border, as Thomas Torrans affirms, it is not that the area itself stamps some geographical change on its characters; rather, it is the “divisiveness of the boundary” which becomes important for the two cultures; the border, becomes “the canvas on which the tales are painted, and the writers “must draw on that heritage, interpreting a hybrid people and a harsh land” (2002: 145). According to Bakhtin’s theory, we seem to be experiencing an awareness of the “complex intersection of languages, dialects, and jargons”, which is forming a “new literary consciousness” (470-1). The value of this struggle is both social and aesthetics. “Such an active plurality of language and the ability to see one’s own media from the outside, that is, through the

¹¹ *The llorona* is a legendary Mexican figure of sorrowful womanhood, a mythical apparition of a madwoman of Mexican folklore, often referred to as *Malinche*, the lover of Hernán Cortés, who weeps for the children she has drowned and thrown into a river; for this the reason, in most of the versions she is seen near a creek or a river.

eyes of other idioms” can create the conditions for “exceptional linguistic freedom” (471). Cisneros’s voice is formed by the sound of many voices speaking across the borderlands in the smooth and dangerous curves of the creeks, out on the street or in the kitchens. As she states in Sagel’s interview: “I felt like a ventriloquist” when I had to “transcribe voices of the people of the community I knew so well” (1991: 74). And she added: “I’m trying to write the stories that haven’t been written. I felt like a cartographer; I’m determined to fill a literary void” (1991: 74).

The ambiguity of border existence is immediately tied to the ambiguity of language, as the reader observes in the first paragraph of Cisneros’s tale “Never Marry a Mexican”, when Clemencia remembers what her mother told her: “Never marry a Mexican, my ma said once and always. She said this because of my father. She said this though she was Mexican too. But she was born here in the U.S., and he was born there, and it’s not the same, you know” (W 68). *Mexican* seems to mean two different things within the same paragraph: a Mexican born in Mexico and a Mexican born in the U.S. The change that takes place in the meaning of the word *Mexican* from one side of the border to the other suggests that Clemencia’s birth in the *borderlands* gives her a vision that allows her to perceive things from both sides of the border and to function in either Anglo or Mexican discourse, “And I’d say, Shit! But that’s –how do you say it?– water under the damn? I can’t ever get the sayings right even though I was born in this country. We didn’t say shit like that in our house” (W 73). The difference between the discourse “in this country” and the discourse “in our house” leaves Clemencia in the *borderlands*, in a place that is located between the two sides. Thus, while she is thinking of Drew, the white lover who abandoned her eighteen years before and who remains the obsessive center of her thinking, she repeats again: “Hadn’t I understood ... he could never marry me. You didn’t think ...? Never marry a Mexican. Never marry a Mexican. No, of course not. I see. I see” (W 80). Here *Mexican* means Clemencia herself.

Thus, what a Mexican is depends on where you stand, and for Jean Wyatt, Clemencia is “caught between two discourses and has a foothold in neither. Although she means the term Mexican to apply only to potential suitors, the word is “a shift” in this story, and its shifting does not stop at men, but moves on to designate Clemencia herself” (50). Adopting the Anglo racist definition of *Mexican* “ultimately means identifying against herself; and having emptied the term of value, she is left without resources when Mexican confronts her as the signifier of her own identity” (50). What led Clemencia to misinterpret *Mexican*, and “her own social position, has tragic consequences; abandoned by Drew, she remains in an abstract space between cultures, isolated from both Anglo and Mexican American communities, where she replays in memory scenes from the sexual drama with Drew that took place eighteen years earlier” (50).

Because of her by-culturalism and by-lingualism Cisneros has two completely ways of looking at the world, but this produces not only motivation but also pressure. The gap between Chicana and Mexican culture becomes more apparent when Clemencia’s friend Felice drives Cleofilas and her small son across the creek on the way to San Antonio. When they drove across the *arroyo*, the driver opened her mouth and “let out a yell as loud as any mariachi” (W 55). Felice explains that every time that she crosses that bridge she does that: “Because of the name, you know. Woman Hollering, *Pues*, I holler. Did you ever notice how nothing around here is named after a

woman?" (W 55) And she adds: "Unless she's the Virgin. I guess you're only famous if you're a virgin" (W 55). The Chicana, who stands between Anglo and Mexican cultures, is not captive to the myths of either culture. That's why she likes the name of that *arroyo* and she feels like hollering like Tarzan. Felice can hear in the creek's voice either *la Llorona's* lament or *Tarzan's* cry, and chooses what she likes. Cisneros does not problematize Felice's use of male codes to define a new female self.

Felice drives a truck which is not only the outward sign of Felice's independence, freedom of choice, and mobility, but the vehicle which drives Cleófilas and her son to safety. Thus, the Chicana's bicultural –and cross-gender– flexibility opens a new range of female possibilities: As Robin Ganz states, in her short stories Cisneros takes advantage of her "biculturalism, she enjoys her life in two worlds, and as a writer she's grateful to have twice as many words to pick from two ways of looking at the world, her wide range of experience is a double-edged sword" (1994: 29). Not only does the cry of the stream give way to a resounding yell, not only does Cleófilas see beyond the whimpering lamentation of the long-suffering woman to the possibility of a woman who shouts out triumphantly "a yell as loud as any mariachi" (W 55), but the example of Felice's loud self-assertion apparently enables Cleófilas to regain her own voice. She acquires an experience in the story that afterwards she will tell her father and brothers. The story ends: "Then Felice began laughing again, but it wasn't Felice laughing. It was gurgling out of [Cleófilas's] own throat, a long ribbon of laughter, like water" (W 56). Cleófilas crosses over the *borderland* to identify with Felice, and her laughter, –indistinguishable at first from Felice's– expresses a new woman in her own voice.

In conclusion, Sandra Cisneros uses a woman's shout, a holler, to represent a voice that, like Felice's, resists male violence and defies the idea of women as silent victims or sufferers. Furthermore, unlike her character Clemencia, Cisneros sees this reconstruction of myths and the living identities tied to them as a communal process, shared with other Chicana writers. The similarities of linguistic patterns, narrative devices and thematic ideas create a hybrid bicultural literature built on dual perspectives, which present alternative viewpoints on diverse issues concerning with real and metaphorical borders, and whose form generates complex and multifaceted interpretations.

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Özet

Meksikalı-Amerikalı Kültürel ve Dilbilimsel Sınırların Yapıbozumu

Meksikalı-Amerikalı edebiyatındaki sınır olgusu Meksikalı-Amerikalı kimliğinin dünyadaki yerini temsil eder. Hinojosa-Smith'in de ileri sürdüğü gibi "sınır cennet değildi ve olmak zorunda da değildi, çünkü o cennetten daha fazlasıydı—o evdi" (1994: 97) ve Sandra Cisneros'un *Caramelo* (2002) adlı eserinde açıkladığı gibi, sınırı geçerek hiç kimse şarkı söyler gibi hissetmez: köprüyü geçer geçmez her şey başka bir dile bürünür. Meksikalıların El *otro lado* adını taktıkları Amerika'nın güneybatısı Meksikalı göçmenlere hala tanıdık bir mekân gibi görünmektedir ve burayı geçmek aynı şeyi *başka bir taraftan* görmek gibidir, zira 150 yılın ardından hala Meksikalı geçmişinden gözle görülür izler taşımaktadır. Bu makale, Meksikalı-Amerikalı anlatısının anahtar teması, son zamanların genel çalışma konusu ve feminizm için özel bir olgu olan Meksikalı-Amerikalı sınırının bazı durumlarını çözümleyecektir.

**Seeking Self in a Simulated World: Hyperreality in
Richard Ford's *Independence Day* and
Frederick Barthelme's *Two Against One***

Alex Ambrozic

Hyperreal fiction serves as the literal manifestation of a world of perpetual simulation. By offering unreality as real presence, hyperreal texts embody the difficulty one experiences trying to gain psychological retreat from a world of continuous unfounded imaging.¹ Hyperreal texts foreground the representation of the individual's struggles against, and accordance with, the simulated nature of reality in postmodern America. In the world of hyperreality, one is constantly confronted with a culture so immersed in simulation that the real and the feigned have the potential to become utterly inverted. Operating within such a landscape, hyperreal texts dignify the individual's quest for resonant meaning by asserting that it is through the individual's search for authenticity that one claims a genuine sense of self. *Independence Day*, Richard Ford's Pulitzer Prize-winning sequel to the *Sportswriter*, presents the trials and tribulations of living in a world of simulation. Acting in accordance with an inauthentic and unpredictable milieu, the protagonist of Ford's novel, Frank Bascombe, drafts a simulated sense of self to counter the prevailing uncertainties of contemporary life. Yet Frank's simulated model of self, like the substitutable signs in the contemporary milieu, proves to be nothing more than an insincere facsimile confusing the distinction between imitation and authenticity. For Frank Bascombe, as for many protagonists of hyperreal fiction, the simulated life proves unsatisfactory because it precludes the necessary negotiation between the ideal and reality. Furthermore, the simulated life keeps one from making life-affirming choices. Like Frank Bascombe, Edward Lasco, in Frederick Barthelme's *Two Against One*, manufactures a mechanical existence through intentional isolation and disengagement. He contrives such an existence in pursuit of the best possible lifestyle for himself. Comparable to Frank's approach to life, Edward's simulated existence proves dissatisfying, and makes him vulnerable to unnatural considerations. Although Edward Lasco's life is much less grounded than Frank Bascombe's, both protagonists seek emotional grounding in similar ways: both characters adopt a simulated way of life to counter the contemporary disarray that has infiltrated their lives; they both fear intimacy and complication; and both Edward and Frank learn that simulation is not a viable substitute for the richness of reality. Although the respective realities they face are somewhat different, the depths of Frank's and

¹By psychological retreat, I mean the difficulty the individual has trying to attain objective distance from one's given society's ideologies. This idea is derived from Louis Althusser's notion that "all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects" (160). Put another way, the governing ideology of any given society must be internalized by its individual members as socially right or beneficial in order for it to sustain itself as the prevailing doctrine (Tyson 1). Given such hegemonic domination, the individual's capacity to assess the predominant ideology from an objective standpoint is impaired.

Edward's introspection are similar. Edward and Frank confront issues of fear and emotional inadequacy. And, although they both learn that the comforts of a simulated life are unfulfilling, Edward chooses to suffer the consequences of the mechanical life, whereas Frank learns to live life passionately.

From a contemporary American literary standpoint, the hyperreal's penchant for representation not only humanizes its characters and familiarizes their world, but also indicates a departure from what Christopher Lasch sees as "modernism's dead end" (157), perpetuated by "a type of art that no longer seems to refer to anything outside itself" (131). Depicting the world as unreality, the hyperreal demonstrates how the "sign aims to be the thing, to abolish the distinction of the reference, the mechanism of replacement. Not the image of the thing, but its plaster cast. Its double, in other words" (Eco 7). In its creation of a world unmistakably like our own, yet not our own because it is fictional, hyperreal fiction draws attention to itself as artifice. Moreover, the hyperreal's representative impulse all but eliminates the reader's need for suspension of disbelief because it grounds its concerns within an identifiable and socially applicable framework.

Critic Robert Dunn, in "Fiction that Shrinks from Life," argues that characters of hyperreal texts "appear to be victims of an irony felt but not understood. They are vacuums into which the whole terror-filled outer world presses" (24).² What Dunn fails to consider here is that whether or not these characters recognize themselves as victims of irony, the hyperreal text deconstructs the machinations behind the spectacle³ of consumer society⁴ to point out its exploitative strategies. Certainly, the painful element of many hyperreal texts is found in their characters' gravitation toward the "hallucinogenic" (Jameson 120) glare of consumer society. Yet characters of hyperreal texts often find fulfillment once they achieve a complex understanding of their commodified world. Many characters in hyperreal fiction, unlike a large number of their

² The terms "hyperreal" and "minimalist" are often used interchangeably when critics refer to what they see as a particular kind of contemporary fiction. Mistaking the "restriction of its field of vision" (Lasch 131) for an unsophisticated aesthetic and its conflation of subject and object in the "society of the spectacle" as characteristic of "pop fiction," critics have attached such pejorative labels to contemporary minimalism / hyperrealism as: "Pop Realism," "Dirty Realism," "Neo-Domestic Neo-Realism," and "Designer Realism." Most of these terms, found in Verhoeven (42), were gleaned from Herzinger (8), Barth (2), and Saltzman (5). Stylistically, Ford's *Independence Day* is not minimalist. However, it portrays elements of contemporary reality as being hyperreal

³In *The Society of the Spectacle*, theorist Guy Debord elaborates on the preponderant influence of the market economy over contemporary America. He discusses the contemporary landscape's governance by what he calls the "spectacle," or "the historical moment at which the commodity completes its colonization of social life" (29).

⁴Jean Baudrillard refers to "consumer society" as the new postmodernity that has emerged because "we are everywhere surrounded by the remarkable conspicuousness of consumption and affluence, established by the multiplication of objects, services, and material goods" (29). Because of our preoccupation "with the acquisition and manipulation of goods and messages," resulting in a relative lack of interaction with our fellow human beings, we have proliferated "a fundamental mutation in the ecology of the human species" (29). Baudrillard attributes the demise of the more grounding frames of reference of the past to the overwhelming influence of the media and informational networks, and contends that the contemporary individual has become alienated by her/his obsession with the rhythms of the object's "incessant cycles" (29).

postmodern predecessors, gain sophisticated insight into the contemporary text of America. So, contrary to Dunn's contention that contemporary hyperrealism is overly-motivated by "private interest,"⁵ it is "expansive"⁶ in terms of clarifying what forces in contemporary America paradoxically fill the vacuum and thus perpetuate the ironic tension felt.

Characters of hyperreal texts try to protect themselves from instability once the inconstancy of the postmodern milieu dramatically affects their lives. To safeguard against the disruptive forces inherent in contemporary life, characters of hyperreal texts often adopt a mechanical, simulated way of living. In this way, Ford's Frank Bascombe and Barthelme's Edward Lasco can be viewed as hyperreal prototypes. Their concerns are both identifiable and applicable to the contemporary world they inhabit. Indeed, Frank and Edward's world is our world, one where the search for meaning and how meaning is generated is what preserves the self from complete dissolution into a sea of simulation.

In *Independence Day*, Frank Bascombe (a one time short-story writer, then sportswriter, now realtor), finds himself in a meditative purgatory following his divorce. A writer by nature, Frank ruminates (in great detail) about everything from the routes he takes on his daily travels to his current life philosophy. Frank often feels "broody and insubstantial" when he thinks of the events leading up to his divorce, and spends "days puzzling over that summer seven years ago, when life swerved badly and [he], somehow at a loss, failed to right its course" (7). As a coping mechanism and safeguard against making future life-altering mistakes, Frank adopts a "simulated way to live," a sort of "mechanical isolation" (434) espoused to minimize adverse consequences. During Frank's phase of "emotional disengagement" (390), a stage of life he aptly calls the "Existence Period," he learns that "laissez-faire is not precisely the same as independence" (177). Rather than ridding his life of irrevocable mistakes during the Existence Period, Frank inadvertently compounds his angst: he allows the stigma of past failures to kindle his present gaffe of privileging function over feeling. Frank must learn that it is only through one's meaningful connections with others that one finds significance. And it is only through making choices that one activates one's independence and morality. Realizing that "freedom isn't worth a nickel unless you can act on it" (384), Frank discovers that the manner in which individuals live with the "incidents [they] can't control make [them] what [they] are" (371).

In the real estate business, Frank bears witness to the renunciation of an irrevocable past. He sees in many of his clients the self-defeating "need for an unattainable fresh start" (47) that debilitates prospective home buyers because their hopes are predicated on a hypothetical ideal that no practical choice can procure. Joe and Phyllis Markham, in particular, are delusional enough to want the simulation of Vermont life in New Jersey, and do not understand that they must "bring life to a place"

⁵"By private interest [Dunn] mean[s] writing focused almost exclusively on relationships in families, traditional, untraditional or broken, lives lived in undistinguished, transitory milieus far from the centers of culture and power" (24).

⁶Dunn contends that contemporary minimalism / hyperrealism is not "expansive" because it "holds no large vision of society, history or intellectual struggle. There are personal ills and inefficacies but no awareness of social wrong, nothing that could be changed. This fiction is post-catastrophe -- a literature of self-conscious, self-designated survivors" (24).

rather than “[depend] on the place to supply it for [them]” (76). Believing that their prospective home should magically grant them the ideal life they desire, the Markhams radically reject the homes Frank shows them on the grounds that they want all their “best options left open as long as possible” and do not want “to have taken any obvious turns, but also not to have misread the correct turn” (57). Holding steadfast to their hopeful delusions, the Markhams cease to believe that the past operates the way it usually does (that is, irreversibly), leaving them in a frustrating homeless state. Their denial of the unalterable nature of the past is symptomatic of client “disorientation,” a phenomenon detailed in the real estate textbooks Frank Bascombe has read:

Client abruptly begins to see the world in some entirely new way he feels certain, had he only seen it earlier, would’ve directed him down a path of vastly greater happiness -- only (and this, of course, is the insane part) he inexplicably senses that way’s still open to him; that the past, just this once, doesn’t operate the way it usually operates. Which is to say, irrevocably. (51)

The Markhams’ dissatisfaction with the real estate options open to them emanates from their belief that happiness derives from things external to themselves. They exhibit difficulty “accepting the place providence has found for [them]” and must find truth in Emerson’s credo that “Discontent is the want of self-reliance” (264). In addition to being self-reliant, it is essential that the Markhams operate within the realm of conventional human experience. Once they stray from the way life “usually operates,” their desires become unrealistic. It is not until the Markhams decide to rent one of Frank’s houses in what they perceive to be a less-than-ideal district that Frank sees them as being “in a firm acceptance mode” (424) that speaks of contentment.

Frank’s own recognition of the power of willed contentment occurs while reflecting on his need to simulate the persona of a good father. In this capacity, Frank accepts the fact that “under the terms of [his and his children’s] un-normal life [they] have to make extra efforts, even if they’re wastes of time” (18). Adding to the frustration of being geographically remote from his son and daughter (Frank in New Jersey, they in Deep River, Connecticut with their mother) is the knowledge that with children “there’s never a now, only a then, after which you’re left wondering what took place and [try] to imagine if it can take place again so’s you’ll notice” (305). Influencing every one of Frank’s decisions is his self-consciousness about the past. “When you’re young,” Frank writes, “your opponent is the future; but when you’re not young, your opponent’s the past” (95). Caught in “the time in life when whatever was going to affect [him] ‘later’ actually affects [him]” (94), Frank constantly calculates how each decision he makes might come back to haunt him in the future. In defiance of his fear of the days to come, Frank must grasp the “difference between risking something (which [is often] morally necessary) and throwing caution to the winds” (434) so that his contrived state of existence does not debilitate the relationships in his life any further.

Frank’s precocious but emotionally disturbed fifteen-year old son, Paul, is haunted by a fractured, irrevocable past. He barks in memory of the family dog, Mr. Toby (and most probably his older brother, Ralph), because “it seems like [their deaths] ruined everything that was fixed back then” (292). Like his father, Paul “tries to control too much” (381), and this debilitates him to the point where he “has begun to picture the

thinking process" (14). A source of extreme aggravation, Paul's thinking process "seems to be made of 'concentric rings' that will not 'fit down flush on top of each other' in the congruent way he thinks they should" (14). Convinced that Paul, like himself, "is drawn to the fissures of between the literal and the imagined" (343), Frank wants "to offer [Paul] a better [conception of himself] so that he doesn't get too attached to the one he's hanging onto now, which doesn't seem too successful" (249). In the spirit of helping Paul find an improved perception of self, Frank plans a trip to Cooperstown with his son so that he "can get on with [his] job of lifting sagging spirits, opening fresh, unexpected choices, and offering much-needed assistance toward life's betterment" (47). Cooperstown, a municipality Frank describes as "just a replica (of a legitimate place)" (293), and its "[Baseball] Hall of Fame -- impersonal but shareable -- [are] meant as the staging ground[s] for a new life's safe beginning" (382). But, as Frank is to learn while emerging from the Existence Period, one cannot "stage" security.

Most challenging to Frank is "adopt[ing] the view that [his] son needs what only [he] can supply (even if it's not true) and then try for all [he's] worth to imagine just what that something might be" (210). During the Existence Period, Frank uses simulation and imagination to allay harsh realities. He consciously maintains Paul's happy moods by deliberately reducing the risk of "breaking his spell, since soon enough," thinks Frank, "he'll look on life and conclude like the rest of us that he used to be happier but can't remember exactly how" (342). Simulating calm, acceptance, and understanding, Frank performs the duties of his "fatherly job" (15) in a deliberate, contrived manner. An appropriate backdrop, therefore, for the most shocking event to take place in the novel, is a batting cage (a machine designed to simulate a batter-pitcher duel). Subsequent to Frank coercing Paul into the batting cage (one of the few occasions Frank acts on impulse in the novel), Paul flirts with injury (making his father uneasy) and gets hit in the eye by a seventy-five mile-per-hour pitch. The impact of the baseball "knocks [Paul] flat down on his back with a terrible, loud *thwock*. After which," Frank relates, "everything changes" (361).

Paul's injury serves as a revelatory experience for himself and his parents. Paul's mother suggests the possibility that "[Paul] will quit [barking] now" (410), and Frank's girlfriend, Sally, recognizes something "more human," "powerful," and "angular" in Frank's voice following Paul's mishap (433). Sally detects that Frank has been "'vitality moved' by something 'deep and complicated,' which [Paul's] injury may have been 'only the tip of the iceberg for'" (433). Perhaps, Sally predicts, Frank "was already off and running into 'some other epoch,' maybe some more 'permanent period'" (434). Positive change is also found in Frank's relationship with his ex-wife, Ann. On the phone, following their son's accident, Ann tells Frank that she feels "very good about [him]" (412), and apologizes for the other night when she accused Frank of thinking that "'be' and 'seem' were the same concept (which may have been true once but isn't now)" (244).

During his Existence Period, Frank demonstrates difficulty distinguishing imitation from authenticity. At the novel's close, however, it is evident that while Frank appreciates simulation as a necessary aspect of social life, he understands that significant meaning is only attained once one differentiates between facsimile and genuine experience. Irv Ornstein, Frank's long-lost stepbrother who is in the simulator business, tells him: "'Nothing else seems as interesting as simulation when you're in it.

Everything seems simulatable. Except, ... the people who do it best are the people who leave their work at the office. Maybe they're not always the geniuses, but they see simulation as one thing and life as another. It's just a tool, really. ... You get in trouble when you confuse the two" (370). Frank demonstrates the ability to discriminate between simulation and genuine experience at the end of the novel while he is among the crowd gathered to watch the Independence Day procession in his neighborhood. Even after "glimps[ing] behind the parade's façade" (426), Frank feels that his "heartbeat quickens" at the sound of the trumpets and he feels "the push, pull, the weave and sway of others" (451) as the Fourth of July parade begins. Asserting one's independence "is not so simple a matter," writes Frank Bascombe, "which is why we fight to be known by how hard we try rather than by how completely we succeed" (429). Essential to achieving a sense of independence is struggling to procure psychological retreat from the pageantry associated with rituals, rites, and traditions so that one might locate the source of the profound meaning underlying the spectacle.

Frank Bascombe accepts simulation as a part of life because myth and performance play significant roles in the development of his personal and national identities. Answering Paul's question regarding "what actually supposedly happened" in Cooperstown, New York, Frank explains:

'Baseball was supposedly dreamed up here in 1839, by Abner Doubleday, though nobody really believes that. ... It's just a myth to allow customers to focus their interests and get the most out of the game. It's like the Declaration of Independence being signed on the Fourth of July, when it was actually signed some other time. ... It's a shorthand to keep you from getting all bound up in unimportant details and missing some deeper point.' (294)

Inherent in Frank's explanation of the mythical element of history is the suggestion that significance is not found within history's "simulatable" details, but in the resounding influence of its pivotal events. The "deeper point," the profound quality of the occurrence, is not ascertained from its expendable details but is divined from its "power" as a "moment of transition" (286). The degree to which one accepts permanence as an illusion corresponds to the extent one is willing to exchange the pursuit of meaning for the false security of absolutes. Once Frank Bascombe exchanges categorical thinking for a more fluid consideration of life's phenomena, he discovers the symbiotic relationships between simulation and life, self and community, citizen and country.

Like Ford's Frank Bascombe, Barthelme's Edward Lasco tries to protect himself from instability once the inconstancy of the postmodern milieu dramatically affects his life. To safeguard against the disruptive forces inherent in contemporary life, Lasco takes on a similar mechanical, simulated way of living. Adopting a humorous, yet poignant tone, Barthelme's *Two Against One* demonstrates how the individual imagination can no longer compete with the unreality of the postmodern milieu. Faced with the difficulty of asserting his individuality in such a social environment, Lasco must learn that negotiation between the ideal and reality, simulation and genuine emotion, leads to a unique, more fulfilling understanding of the contemporary scene. In order for Barthelme's protagonist to live a full life, it is incumbent upon him to recognize the contemporary landscape's limitations in granting fulfillment.

Before receiving an unexpected visit from his estranged wife and her boyfriend, Edward Lasco spends his fortieth birthday “debating with himself the advisability of ordering, from an outfit in California, a complete, prepackaged, do-it-yourself dual band satellite dish” (3-4). Since their trial separation, Edward substitutes watching television for the intimacy he once experienced with his wife. He uses “earphones instead of the speakers built into the television cabinet ... to be aware of the quiet house” (6), the earphones physically connecting him to the sound. Human intimacy is displaced by Edward onto his mechanical surroundings in an attempt to find new expressions of closeness. About Edward’s television watching, his wife, Elise, explains: “It’s how he gets connected to the world. But he’s afraid to watch anything very long, because he’s afraid he’ll miss something else” (63). Edward’s fear of “missing something” while watching television depicts his apprehensive, diffident nature. This fear reflects Edward’s frustration with his human limitations in a world of possibility. Once he establishes (what he perceives to be) the best possible lifestyle for himself, Edward inevitably grapples with his convictions which are “pockmarked with blind sides, things not noticed, things not taken into account” (59), leaving him vulnerable to the consideration of otherwise irrelevant alternatives.

Although Edward is attracted to alternatives, he simulates a controlled environment through the isolation of variables. In search of consistency, Edward tries to be true to himself, and finds that his convictions alienate him from potentially better alternatives. And, Edward’s awareness of the opportunities eluding him perpetuates his part in a state of marital limbo. Edward separates from Elise because he desires stability and possibility simultaneously. Anxiety develops, however, whenever the stable and possible prove to be mutually exclusive.

Stability, like meaning, is elusive to Edward. Fastidiousness about keeping order in his household and in his new solitary life is an attempt to combat the disorder encroaching upon him. Edward’s obsessions with control and order are depicted through the enjoyment he gets from putting a new vacuum cleaner together, his desire to play board games, and his wish that his house guests for the weekend would leave so as to get “everyone back in place” (145). Through his longing for simplicity, Edward develops principles that resist postmodern disarray. However, his unyielding nature often perpetuates the type of contemporary confusion he aims to avoid. Edward’s lack of desire to be physically intimate with his wife, for example, leads to his conviction that:

if you didn’t want to make love it was better not to, even if in so doing you risked everything. Even if you made the other person feel unwanted, unloved, unattractive, sexually inadequate, emotionally cut off. He’d had lots of arguments with himself about it, telling himself that he ought to just bite the bullet, close his eyes, fantasize, do what is necessary, and for a while he had done that, carried on as if it were for him an important part of their life together. But finally it had seemed more important to be able to tell her the truth. What it had come to was that it was more loving, more intimate not to make love to her than it was to do it when he wasn’t much interested. (22)

Through his perverse, self-indulgent abstinence, Edward aims to assert control over himself, his partner, and his life. Essentially, he “risks everything” for his convictions,

and ironically justifies his abstinence as being “more loving, more intimate” than making love. Although Edward and Elise’s love for one another has become “much less demanding” (248), each still needs to be the other’s primary concern. They struggle to maintain a sense of emotional security in their relationship despite their selfish inflexibility.

The most significant of Edward and Elise’s problems is recognition of the fact that their love for one another, like the free-floating substitution and differentiation in the modern milieu, is “situational” (102). Sometimes they love each other, sometimes they do not, prompting thoughts of “ways in which they could live together and not live together at the same time” (105). In essence, Edward and Elise lament the fact that love, in contemporary America, has become “too complicated, too vague. Except in retrospect, there [is] no way to measure it. ... there [are] so many things to say, so many of them contradictory” (102). What love is “said to be [in a postmodern context] isn’t an accurate representation of what it is” (171). Once a relationship becomes familiar, Edward tells Elise and her friend Lurleen, “something else is wanted” (174). Relationships built on traditional values, according to Edward, are so contrived “because it’s easier. The maintenance,” says Edward, “is a by-product, a killer waste that makes people imagine that things are better than they are, that things are possible” (174). The tension between what love is “said to be” and what it is for Edward and Elise perpetuates tragic irony in the novel. They know they will feel dissatisfied, regardless of whether they shape their relationship according to traditional tenets or not. This knowledge generates anxiety and sorrow.

Conflicting desires create a postmodern double-consciousness of which Edward and Elise are tragically aware. In time, Elise knows she will remember Edward with the same nostalgia she experiences when she recalls her childhood. She says to Edward, “Every once in a while I’ll see something, remember something we did together, and I’ll feel a trace of it, a hint. ... I’ll think it was better when I had you” (255). And, given the fact that they are drifting farther apart in their separation, there is a definite mournful gloom in Elise’s conviction that “there’s only one man for one woman. [Edward] for [her]” (248). Typifying the painful element of Edward and Elise’s unsubstantiated feelings for one another are the last lines of the novel, spoken to Edward by his girlfriend: “Edward. [Elise] loves you. I promise” (264). The heartbreaking component of the novel is sustained not only by the double-consciousness that Edward and Elise share, but also by virtue of the dramatic enormity of their present actions and anticipated memories. Their current and projected circumstances are simulated to engender sympathy for themselves on an individual level. And, given the “dramatic” quotient of Edward and Elise’s situation, perhaps the ultimate tragedy in the novel is found in their need to create intersecting scenarios with one another even though these theatrical permutations prove continually disconcerting.

When Edward is approached with the prospect of a three-way marriage (connecting him with Elise and her boyfriend, Roscoe), he considers it seriously and learns that even though “he didn’t want to be afraid of something and be dumber than he was in order to cover the fear” (236-37), “something about sharing Elise with Roscoe didn’t work” (236). Through all the contradictions that Edward must endure regarding his relationship with Elise, he feels that “[h]e and Elise just were. ... no matter what happened they would always be connected” (223-24). In fact, “[h]e also guessed that his

living alone was some kind of phony living alone and not real living alone. ... It wasn't that he anticipated her return – he wasn't sure he thought she would ever come back – but that he imagined that she would never leave him" (90). While trying to convince himself that Elise will never leave him, Edward must contend with evidence to the contrary. The tentative nature of Edward and Elise's future together is demonstrated through the contradictory language of the text, establishing a sympathetic perspective of their emotional quandary. Because their theatrics are spawned by a desire to stay connected even though they hinder their relationship at every turn, the uncertainty of Edward and Elise's destiny inspires both frustration and compassion.

Edward and Elise have become part of "a growing phenomenon in our culture" (100). They are "people staying together but living apart. People with other people in their marriages. People with two husbands, or two wives, or extra children picked up God knows where" (100). Feeling inexplicably linked to, as well as repelled by, Elise, Edward is not quite certain when "things had slipped their moorings" (245). He wonders

how he had managed to have a wife and not have a wife at the same time, how his wife happened to have a boyfriend who wasn't a boyfriend, how the two of them managed to live together while he lived alone, ... how everything that was supposed to be perfect and beautiful, the sex-love-marriage system, the source of all good and the protection against all evil, ... had eluded him so entirely. (51-52)

Edward discovers the answers to these questions are complicated since, in a postmodern context, "nothing ever comes to anything, because anything it could come to could never be true" (253). Thinking in absolutes is no longer appropriate. The "sex-love-marriage system" is no longer a categorical imperative. Truth is fleeting and arbitrary. Everything seems simulatable. However, one's desire for the semblance of fixed order amidst rampant possibility remains constant.

Reminiscing about the drives he and Elise took out "in the suburbs, where all the houses were alike" (19), Edward muses:

There was contentment in those drives, a sense of a world properly ordered, appropriately in control, and at bay. Edward liked looking at the homes they passed, homes where small hopes had been effectively met, thinking of himself both as an integral part of that world, of having a home like that himself, where the warm yellow light from the interior laced the edges of the leaves of the chinaberry tree that stood just outside the glass, and somehow, too, as a glider in that world, a planetary traveller with no exceptional powers or capacities, and every good intention. (19-20)

The warmth and consistency shown in the above passage measure the distance Edward and Elise have travelled from such a comforting scene. They have been seduced by the false promises of the postmodern milieu. They think they can satisfy two conflicting desires simultaneously, and this assumption separates them. As time moves on, Edward and Elise become tragically aware that their desires for order, comfort, and consistency will be thwarted. Despite this knowledge, they struggle to simulate a life that will facilitate satisfaction even though fulfilment is fleeting.

Hyperreal fiction responds to the cultural hegemony (predicated on consumerism and simulation) that has colonized the individual (Pheloung 172). While delineating the confusion such a society generates between the imaginary and the real, simulation and experience, it asserts that one can achieve meaning through understanding the difficulties inherent in making these distinctions. Once one acknowledges how the spectacle works to draw one away from authenticity, the contrived nature of reality becomes apparent and the manipulative allure of consumer society becomes jeopardized. Hyperreal texts depict what critics deem a culture that has been colonized by the commodity, one that does not allow for an uncomplicated division between the individual and consumer culture. Yet their characters' attraction to the imaging of consumer society creates a concomitant need for release, retreat, escape, and transformation that can be found, the hyperreal text claims, through an understanding of the human desires consumer society exploits.⁷ What makes this contemporary vision unique is the contention that individuals can find fulfillment through their search for resonant meaning in and beyond the ersatz world that captivates them.

Hyperreal texts render the ubiquitousness of popular culture to provide us with greater insight into ourselves as part of the contemporary world. The individual and the contemporary milieu are only separable, the hyperreal text suggests, in terms of the degree to which the individual recognizes the machinations behind consumer society and the human desires it exploits. Most often, protagonists of hyperreal texts use phenomena of the contemporary landscape as metaphors to render corporeality to their internal emotions. For the most part, they appeal to their surroundings to provide answers to their existential questions. Hyperreal fiction illustrates the individual's struggle (or lack thereof) to achieve psychological retreat from the contemporary milieu. It is ironic that psychological retreat and meaningful connection are often found through the protagonists' understanding that the simulations of contemporary America, being ubiquitous, can serve as universal frames of reference and tools of self-expression. When Frank Bascombe and Edward Lasco simulate personae that are merely replicas of "legitimate" human beings, they act in accordance with the simulated world that surrounds them. Once Frank Bascombe realizes that the overwhelming influence of the spectacle on individual lives occludes understanding, however, he begins to comprehend the machinations behind postmodern America. This realization gives him

⁷Here, Lois Tyson's claim that the individual psyche and social ideology are dialectically related is particularly helpful. In her book, *Psychological Politics of the American Dream: The Commodification of Subjectivity in Twentieth-Century American Literature*, Tyson considers

the ways in which the individual psyche and its cultural milieu inhabit, reflect, and define each other in a dynamically unstable, *mutually constitutive* symbiosis. In this context, psychology is always cultural psychology and politics are always psychological politics, not because, as poststructuralism would have it, the structures of consciousness are inscribed within the processes of social signification, but because both the structures of consciousness *and* the processes of social signification are inscribed within the same dialectics of desire. (2)

A deconstruction of the human desires consumer society exploits, then, can bring the individual closer to an objective understanding of his or her psychological and emotional space within the contemporary world.

greater insight into who he is in a world of which he is a part. Like Frank Bascombe, Edward Lasco is given the opportunity to recognize the shortcomings of a simulated manner of living. Unfortunately, Edward chooses to exist in a mechanical, rather than life-affirming fashion.

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Özet**Simüle Dünyada Kendini Arayış: Richard Ford'un *Independence Day* ve Frederick Barthelme'in *Two Against One* Romanlarında Hipergerçekçilik**

Hipergerçek anlatılar sürekli devam eden simülasyonun edebi göstergeleri görevini görmektedir. Gerçek olmayı gerçek varlık olarak sunan hipergerçek metinler sonsuz asılsız hayallerin dünyasından psikolojik anlamda soyutlanmaya çalışan deneyimlerin de imkansızlığını dışa vurmaktadır. Hipergerçek metinler bireyin postmodern Amerika'da simüle edilmiş gerçeğin doğasıyla olan savaşını ve ona uyum sağlayışını göstermeyi önplana çıkarmışlardır. Hipergerçek dünyada kişi, gerçek ve uydurma olanın potansiyel olarak sürekli yer değiştirebileceği, simülasyona batmış bir kültürle karşı karşıyadır. Böyle bir çerçeve içinde yer alan hipergerçek metinler bireyin ancak özgün olanı arayışının sonucunda gerçek kimliğine kavuşabileceğinin işaret eder, ve bireyin yankılanan anlamların peşinden gidişini yüceltirler. *Independence Day* Richard Ford'un *Sportswriter*'da yayımlanmış olan Pulitzer ödüllü serisidir ve *Two Against One* Frederick Barthelme'nin simülasyon dünyasında verdiği sınavları ve sıkıntıları konu etmektedir. Gerçek olmayan ve değişken bir çevreye göre hareket eden Ford ve Barthelme'nin roman kahramanları simüle yaşam şekillerini şu an geçerli olan günümüz yaşamının belirsizliklerine karşı geliştirirler. Yine de Frank Bascombe'nin ve Edward Lasco'nun simüle modelleri, aynı günümüz ortamının temsili göstergelerinde olduğu gibi özgün ile taklit olanın ayırt edilemediği sahte birer kopyadan öteye gidemezler. Bascombe, Lasco ve diğer pekçok hipergerçek roman kahramanı için simüle yaşam, ideal ve gerçek arasındaki gerekli uzlaşmayı sağlayamadığı için yetersiz kalacaktır.

Testimonial Stories of Dorothy Allison's White Trash Queer Identity

Aycan Çetin

*Voice means presence, presence means origin,
and origin implies Logos/the Word, the Godhead,
the authority of Truth—the source and substance
of power.*

JEANNE PERREAULT, *Writing Selves:
Contemporary Feminist Autobiography*

Allison's fiction is self-aware, self-reflective, and testimonial in nature. Her stories carry tracks of the brutality of her childhood in the rural south. Her first novel, *Bastards Out of Carolina* (1992) is told by Bone who is out-of-wedlock. She is the little daughter of Boatwrights of Greenville County, South Carolina. The story starts with Bone's childhood memories and life among her mother Anne who works as a waitress and her numerous aunts, uncles, and cousins. They are "white trash" and very crowded. Bone's life gets brutal after her mother's marriage with "Daddy Glenn". The story continues with a climax of sexual abuse. Daddy Glenn abuses Bone brutally. Through the eyes of an innocent but clever child, Bone sees and tells the events acutely as the narrator of the novel. The novel encompasses sensitive and complicated mother-child relations, sexual awakening of a child, sexual abuse and self-hatred in the context of southern white trash poverty.

The sexual abuse of the narrator at the hands of her stepfather is also a centered theme in Allison's short story "River of Names". In the story, the narrator whose name is not mentioned tries to get rid of the memories of her abusive father. She has a lesbian relationship with Jess who is from a middle class. Jess's father is a university professor. Allison contrasts her memories with Jess's life which she can estimate from her naïve point of view. She tells "violent stories" to Jess to entertain her and to face her memories which disturbs her in her dreams.

Allison writes her lived experiences without censoring them. Her autobiographical testimonial stories are collected in her book *Trash*. She acknowledges in the story, "Preface: Deciding to Live", that autobiographical element of her stories is the "reinvented experience" of her as a working-class lesbian. Autobiography serves a political goal in this sense. Her memories are "reinvented" for a political representation of working-class lesbians.

There are three main reasons why Dorothy Allison writes from her testimonial queer point of view. First, she endeavors to create a "subject position" in order to *represent the invisible* in her society. Working-class lesbians, white trash population of the rural south are the ones who are represented in her fiction. She aims to deconstruct the stereotypes of her population who are poor whites. To reach her political goal, she

asserts her difference from middle-class white Americans and steps forward with her queer identity to subvert the stereotype.

Second, *story telling* is a concept that opens a free space in which Allison can confront with the social injustices, male-centered violence, and overcome her frustration as a non-traditional woman. As literary critics widely agree, the discontented life models of non-traditional women have led them to turn to fiction for identity and self-representation. Thus, mingling the real with uses of language, the literature they produce concludes the confrontations by revealing *her truth*.

Third, Allison uses not just the trope of storytelling to empower herself but specifically the trope of *therapeutic recovery*. As psychologists argue, remembering and telling stories about traumatic events is essential both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims. Allison, therefore, writes for recovery from her traumatic experiences of her life in white trash rural society in Greenville, South Carolina.

Representing the Invisible

In Dorothy Allison's fiction, body encompasses a political dimension not only because she writes her bodily experiences to foster *écriture féminine*, but also because she tries to represent the invisible through bodies rather than emotions. Body is a crucial element in contemporary women's writing and hence women's writing is often spoken of as "writing the body" (Perreault 9). Hélène Cixous writes, quotes Perreault "Women must write through their bodies" in order to break the male reason on writing (9). Cixous insists that "women are body" and "more body hence more writing" (9). Accordingly, asserts Perreault, since the female body has so often been the object of male discourse, *écriture féminine* has the great appeal of seeming to be the voice of the female body speaking about itself as subject.

Kelly Thomas argues that Allison's literary representation of body is a means to depict poverty. Poverty can carry both positive and negative meanings depending on the representations. Allison's attitude towards the poor changes as well. Thomas writes, "Allison's narrative depicts the intricate ways in which the body visibly registers degrees of poverty and how such embodied indigence can carry vastly different meanings, ranging from aesthetically and morally uplifting to trashy and repugnant" (168). Human body is related to the society in Allison's fiction. In other words, bodies are at the core of a society for Allison. In her works, the trashy bodies are worthless—represented like cattle which reproduce and multiply without family ties, kinship or friendship, but with only the very presence of the bodies themselves in a degraded society. She writes in "River of Names":

We were so many we were without number and, like tadpoles, if there was one less from time to time, who counted? My maternal great-grandmother had eleven daughters, seven sons; my grand-mother, six sons, five daughters. Each one made at least six. Some made nine. Six times six, eleven times nine. They went on like multiplication tables. They died and were not missed. I come of an enormous family and I cannot tell half their stories. Somehow it was always made to seem they killed themselves: car wrecks, shotguns, dusty ropes, screaming, falling out of windows, things inside them. I am the point of a pyramid, sliding back under

the weight of the ones who came after, and it does not matter that I am the lesbian, the one who will not have children (5).

She represents her society like multiplying bacterium with a purpose: Her being lesbian makes sense in such a community since she is determined not to contribute to the formation of this crowded and wicked society. In the story, the people of Greenville become coded as “trashy” because they are associated with unregulated reproduction, unrestrained and perverse sexuality, and negligent work ethic. She differs from the others in her society with her sexual choice.

As Thomas coincides, Allison’s attitude towards her society is dark and intricate. Although she depicts these people in degraded positions, Dorothy Allison opposes the hegemonic discourse over the white trash identity which suggests that poverty only happens to people who deserve it. She writes in *Bastards Out of Carolina*,

I show you my aunts in their drunken rages, my uncles in their meanness. And that’s exactly who we are said to be. That’s what white trash is all about. We’re all supposed to be drunks standing in our yards with our broken-down cars and our dirty babies. Some of that stuff is true. But to write about it I had to find a way to pull the reader in and show you those people as larger than what contemptible myth. And show you why those men drink, why those women hate themselves and get old can’t protect themselves or their children. Show you human beings instead of fold-up, mean, cardboard figures (12).

Allison attempts to show the reader that people of her society are humans. Although she confesses that she exaggerates some of the stereotypical traits of them in order to take the attention of the readers, beyond this technical innovation, she wishes to say that her people are like the other humans in the universe in the way they react to the events. The life conditions in the rural south force them to act like that. What turns them into white trash community is not their choice but the adverse circumstances.

There have been scholarly investigations relating to the construction of “whiteness” as an aspect of racial identity in the United States. Accordingly, being white is not enough to be on the upper side of the ladder. “The trashy poor are despised and degraded,” writes Kelly Thomas, “because they are white, but never white enough: they don’t have enough money; they don’t consume properly; they don’t believe in narratives of social progress” (169). According to her, this is a heterosexual middle-class discourse that constructs “whiteness”. But the people in Dorothy Allison’s society are not coded as whites in the first place. They are poor and degraded people, and their whiteness is of the secondary importance. In the story “River of Names”, Allison shows her family photos to Jess in order to describe their overall view. She writes:

I’ve these pictures my mama gave me—stained sepia prints of bare dirt yards, plank porches, and step after step of children—cousins, uncles, aunts; mysteries. The mystery is how many no one remembers. I show them to Jesse, not saying who they are, and when she laughs at the broken teeth, torn overalls, the dirt, I set my teeth at what I do not want to remember and cannot forget (4,5).

Middle-class heterosexual discourse has seen poverty as a sub-culture based on vice, filth and moral ignorance. Allison attempts to subvert this notion in her stories by asserting that poverty is not these people's choice. They deserve respect and tolerance in the universal level. The concept of testimony makes her stories realistic. She attempts to assert that things happen in the way she tells in her stories. But does she really represent them realistically? Is it possible to represent anything as it is in reality? What are the limits of her testimony?

According to Ananta Ch. Sukla, representation is basically an ocular concept that explains the dualistic nature of human experience referring to the relation between two items in human experience—the internal and the external, the mind and the world. *Representation* in its Latin origin *repraesentare* means “to make present or manifest or to present again” confining the referent almost exclusively to inanimate objects that are literally brought into someone's presence—to present/embodiment/manifest an abstract idea/thought through/in a concrete object or even sometimes to substitute one object for another (1). Moving from this definition, one should not concentrate on the validity of her stories as testimonies, but one should rather ask, what abstract thoughts and feelings does Allison reveal through her testimonial representations? Frustration, ignorance, helplessness, weakness and anger are among the feelings that frequently occur in Allison's stories. Her testimony, moreover, points out the need for a social, economic and political reform and recovery for the society. It is fair to say that her testimony serves a political goal for her community.

Allison is also concerned with the representation of the *female white trash* experience. She attempts to show that the experience of women differs from that of men. Kelly Thomas coincides that Allison is concerned with the poor women and turns towards female experience and the challenges that poverty presents for women's sexuality, motherhood, and childcare. Thomas also believes that Allison's works painstakingly illustrate the ways in which poor white women are “doubly vulnerable” to the physical and emotional effects of poverty in American culture. First of all, they dwell at the bottom of the cultural and social hierarchy internal to “whiteness”, and they habitually suffer sexual mistreatment and political disenfranchisement as a result of their poverty. Indeed, as Thomas asserts, in Allison's fiction the poor white female body is a politicized concept and the patriarchal discourses about sexuality converge to enforce traditional social hierarchies. In the “River of Names”, Allison exemplifies male violence against women. She writes in “River of Names”:

Almost always, we were raped, my cousins and I. That was some kind of joke, too.

What's a South Carolina virgin?
'At's a ten-year-old can run fast.

It wasn't funny for me in my mama's bed with my stepfather, not for my cousin, Billie, in the attic with my uncle, nor for Lucille in the woods with another cousin, for Danny with four strangers in a parking lot, or for Pammie who made the papers. Cora read it out loud: “Repeatedly by persons unknown.” They stayed unknown since Pammie never spoke again. Perforations, lacerations, contusions, and bruises. I heard all the words, big words, little words, words too terrible to

understand. *DEAD BY AN ACT OF MAN*. With the prick still in them, the broom handle, the tree branch, the grease ... objects, things not to be believed... whiskey bottles, can openers, grass shears, glass, metal, vegetables . . . not to be believed, not to be believed (6).

Male violence is treated as a means of limiting women's freedom and mobility in Allison's fiction. In addition to rape, there is a great deal of domestic violence brought out of the private domain, where men are able to do what they want without interference. The reader, therefore, gradually discovers numerous forms of violence through Allison's fiction and nonfiction (domestic violence, rape, marital rape, homosexual rape, child abuse, incest rape, sexual harassment are among them). She writes in italic capital letters, "*DEAD BY AN ACT OF MAN*" to indicate the male origin of violence.

Masculinity of violence is neither a new subject nor belongs to only Allison's community. As Allwood quotes from Marie-Victorie Louis's article "Violences Conjugales" (1990); ". . . with only a very few exceptions, in all these cases, including when the violence is homosexual, the attackers are men." She also asks: "Why has such an enormous and so obvious a reality not yet been taken into account? Why has the relation between the sex of the attacker and that of the survivor not been identified by criminologists, legal sociologists, the police, and researchers as a central question?" (120). Allison's stories, like the feminist activists, point out the inadequacies in the legal system, and the urgent need to evaluate the law in its living social context. In her stories about violence, gendered power relations are in play.

Power and sexual violence are interrelated subjects. Thus, Bruce Kokopeli and George Lakey define "rape" as asserting power through sexuality. In "More Power Than We Want: Masculine Sexuality and Violence," they write, "Rape is the logic of masculine sexuality. Rape is not much a sexual act as an act of violence expressed in a sexual way. The rapist's mind-set—that violence and sexuality *can* go together—is actually a product of patriarchal conditioning" (444). Kokopeli and Lakey believe that the dilemma occurs from the fact that since masculinity is a form of domination, no one can rest secure, and the struggle goes on forever unless men are actually willing to give up and find a more secure basis for their identity. Allison shows this in her fiction. For example, in "River of Names", James goes blind because of his father, Butch is killed by his uncle, Lou is raped by some stranger men, Mark and Luke get their ear lobes sliced by the will of a man who is their boss in county farm where they are sent to work. Men violate women, children and the other men in Allison's fiction.

In "River of Names", the concept of "feminization of a male rape victim" comes forward. The boys treat Cousin Lou like a woman when they violate him in the gas station:

Lou got caught at seventeen and held in the station downtown, raped on the floor of the holding tank.

Are you a boy or are you a girl?
On your knees, kid, can you take it? (10).

This quotation shows that feminization of a male rape victim reinforces the subordination of women by men. Thus, for Allison, sexual violence against women is not only culturally pervasive but also a condoned concept which is perceived as a primary means by which men establish their “manhood”. Allison is against the concept of “manhood” attained by exerting power through fear and violence. Thus, heterosexuality is under inspection in Allison’s testimonial fiction. Allison seems to agree with Barbara Krasner who asserts that “... women can not be feminists and heterosexual where heterosexuality is understood as a political institution that is based upon our operating construction of gender that lends itself to the oppression of women” (Zita 312).

Lesbianism is one possible strategy for resistance against violence in fiction by women. Dorothy Allison creates lesbian ethics in her fiction. Lesbian ethics generally challenges masculine writing. Sarah Lucia Hoagland particularly asserts that “lesbian ethics” challenges the concept of “female agency” which is prescribed by the feminine fiction with a masculine discourse. It challenges the model of being a decent woman, the myth of nurturing mother, lesbian invisibility, and trivialization and/or “naturalization” of male violence against women. She says, “Lesbian ethics is an ethics of resistance and creation, lesbian ethics is an envisioning and discussion of possibilities, given lesbian lives, for a transformation of values ... It is revolution” (402). Hoagland believes that heterosexuality constitutes an oppressing context that erases female agency. Lesbian community, on the other hand, constitutes an alternative context that makes heterosexual oppression defective and invalid.

As Harris argues, lesbianism can be merely a protest against male dominance and an expression of freedom from the restrictions of the feminine role. However, lesbianism can also be seen just as an expression of the appreciation of women and femaleness. In other words, lesbianism can be a separatist, alternative life-style for women rejecting male oppression, yet it can involve a process of self-discovery and self-affirmation, a process of learning how to relate to another human being as her equal in a mutual and shared relationship.

Allison’s queer identity affirms both arguments. As Jillian Sandell writes, her queer identity enables Allison to see her life differently. In Sandell’s “Telling Stories of ‘Queer White Trash’”, Allison acknowledges:

If I wasn’t queer, I wouldn’t be a writer. I’d live in a trailer park. Probably in Greenville, South Carolina. I would probably have six kids. I would probably beat them. I would probably drink. I would probably be dead. I’m forty-three. In my family that’s a long time to live. I think that being a lesbian gave me the possibility to see my life in different terms (Sandell 225).

As Josephine G. Hendin argues, in the Western literary tradition, in order to speak, to represent herself and the other women, a protagonist assumes either a masculine position or chooses to hide her feminine identity. However; “Homosexuality serves as metaphor for a spectrum of impulses that blurs clear distinctions between male and female and diverts attention from the war between the sexes. It focuses on resistance to conventional notions of sexual power or the patriarchy” (Hendin 171). Thus in Allison’s fiction humanity is the essential concern in the context of protest against violence resulting from traditional gendered roles. It is fair to say that, Allison’s

fiction leads her readers to inspect the norms of heterosexual reality and reconsider lesbian separatism in terms of male violence. She holds her queer identity as a strategy to control patriarchy both in life and in her fictions.

Allison's fiction, then, could be considered as socialist in attitude in terms of the social reforms it suggests. However, the immediate effects of such suggestions are questionable within the capitalist system. Allison's fiction represents the degraded side of American culture in which the democratic liberties change their content and lose their effectiveness. In Allison's fiction such cultural troubles as juvenile delinquency, dissolution of family and neighbourhood bonds, drug abuse, racism and sexism are all signs of failure in the present system. On the other hand, any protest among white trash people does not occur. Therefore, any social reform can not be achieved on the national level. This situation might be the result of the fact that the continuing oppression of these people is being obscured by the capitalist system with its patriarchal foundations. Alan Sinfield calls this downfall as "a failure *at the level of culture*" (627). The solution he seems to support is a kind of welfare-capitalism, an alternative to socialism. He explains, "actually welfare-capitalism is an attempt to ameliorate and preserve capitalism, by protecting against and compensating for its disadvantages" (627). Because despite the promises, he writes, Americans are suffering the inefficiency and inhumanity of capitalism, and the imperialism of patriarchy (627).

Alan Sinfield believes that the American social classes are entrapped by the capitalist hegemonic ideology which is active in the practices of everyday life. He says, "We are born into it, come to consciousness within it; it is confirmed, continually, in the practices of everyday life. Our subjectivities ... is constructed in ideology. Hence we recognize ourselves as the kinds of people ideology needs us to be" (628). The people represented by Allison are poor whites who do not consume enough to be considered as agents in the capitalist system. Capitalist ideology, thus, ignores the economic and social problems of these people. These white trash people do not question their condition as well, because they are born into it. They unconsciously acknowledge that they are not valuable for the nation. This indicates the power of the capitalist ideology which turns these people into invisible and mute citizens. The question that comes to mind in terms of power of dominant ideology is: How come such confronting voices as Dorothy Allison occur in such a repressed society? And why does such a powerful ideology allow subversive voices like Allison?

As Sinfield explains, despite their power, dominant ideological formations are also under pressure from diverse disturbances. In Foucault's words, "Where there is power, there is resistance". These disturbances do not stem only from "irrepressible humanity," but also from pressures and strains which the social order inevitably produces within itself, even as it attempts to secure itself. As Raymond Williams puts, quotes Sinfield,

We have no emphasize that hegemony is not singular; indeed that its own internal structures are highly complex, and have continually to be renewed, recreated, and defended; and by the same token, that they can be continuously challenged and in certain respects modified. ... the central, effective and dominant systems of meanings and values ... are not abstract but ... are organized and lived" (630).

So the dominance of capitalist ideology depends on continuous processes of renewal, reinterpretation, adjustment and dilution. Thus, these processes are guided in relation to “alternative” and “oppositional”; “residual,” and “emergent” cultural formations such as the literature of the protest (630). Sinfield states that the dominant groups may tolerate, repress, or incorporate these opposing formations; but that will be a part of continuous, urgent and often strenuous project. Therefore, even the stories of displacement, marginality or class inequalities serve capitalism. Thus, no matter whether these stories can challenge the oppression based on economic inequality, the widespread approval of Dorothy Allison’s fiction shows that Americans easily consume and enjoy her stories of the white trash. Indeed, “capitalism has proven to be notoriously efficient in its ability to recuperate radical ideas and turn them into commodities to be consumed within the market economy” (Sandell 213).

Dorothy Allison’s testimonial stories seem to be approved by the capitalist system. As Don Wayne puts it, quotes Sinfield, “... dominant ideology gives a certain rein to alternative discourses, ultimately appropriating their vitality and containing their oppositional force” (629). According to this theory, even the protesting voices of the marginal play into the hands of dominant ideology. Because that the protesting voices are allowed to exist shows that they are tolerated by the dominant ideology.

Telling Testimonial Stories and Validity of Subjugated Point of View

Telling testimonial stories about one’s own personal life is a trend peculiar to contemporary Western cultures. Writers on the margins tend to tell their subjective experiences in order to enable and foster the organization of social and political communities. Because all stories, argues Ken Plummer, share the fact that they are “social actions embedded in social worlds” (Sandell 212). Thus, writing about her own marginalized life from her subjugated point of view, Dorothy Allison inevitably depicts a portrait of southern white trash society in her testimonial stories.

In terms of testimonial writing, it can be useful to know the real life of Dorothy Allison in order to give better meaning to her works. Dorothy Allison was raised by her waitress mother and abusive stepfather in Greenville in awful life conditions. The family, informs Carolyn E. Megan, was appallingly poor, with both parents working several jobs yet continuously struggling to get out of debt. “Born out of wedlock and into a society that held impoverished people in contempt, Allison learned what it was to be marginalized and to live on the periphery” (Megan 544). Her family then moved to Florida in order to escape debt when she was a teenager. In Florida she had an opportunity to free herself from the perceptions held about her and the other white trash people in Greenville. She eventually managed to start a new life and become a good student and a writer. This was a turning point for her as she learned how to reveal herself in literature through her testimonial writings. It was in her twenties, writes Megan, when Allison became involved in the feminist movement and began to understand the importance of giving voice to her life story. As Thomas quotes, Allison writes in *Skin: Talking about Sex, Class, and Literature*, “... those who cannot change their own lives have every reason to be ashamed of that fact and to hide it” (172). Allison is aware of the difficulty to speak when one is still on the margins of society. Thus, she starts writing when she is freed from her white trash past. She believes that she has the privilege to write because she is the witness of the life in Greenville. But,

what knowledge does Allison possess? How privileged is her subjugated knowledge? Can her standpoint in the story be transformed into any ideological epistemology such as feminism or socialism? To what extent does her standpoint provide a basis for white trash life, poverty, gender hierarchy, and relations of race in the South? And to what extent does it provide a basis for *queer* experience? These are some of the questions that go round her fiction.

Self-representation is an important key concept in testimonial literature. Dorothy Allison is not only a lesbian but also a white trash and she has got two reasons to be represented in order to resist. Those who are on the margins are not burdened with individualism, subjectivity, identity, or authorship. Thus they suffer from a lack of self, identity, and intelligence. Eventually, they become coded as marginal in the representations of privileged white men. Marginal people who are deprived of formal recognition of their subjectivity in mainstream arts and letters seek to write themselves for self-representation. Their philosophy is "I write therefore I am". They take a subject position and write their personal experiences in a testimonial voice.

Subject positions that marginal authors take are usually constructed within the context of human, social and economic relations. Thus, story telling becomes for the marginal writer a way to understand her/his place in the society. Story telling creates a space to reconstruct and embody her/himself in literary representations. Telling one's story in the way one determines subverts the imposed inscriptions previously held for him/her.

Jeanne Perreault points out the concept of "crisis in representation" mainly based on the relation of subjectivity to language. Accordingly, a feminist critic must conclude that the male writers rely on their fantasies, wishes, or fears of the "feminine" to "subvert the Subject, Representation, and Truth" (8). On the other hand, she argues, *écriture féminine* fosters women to speak as subjects to subvert masculinist discourse on women. Here, the act of writing goes parallel with the emotional/psychological expressions of the self. If we agree with Michel Foucault's argument that "One writes in order to become other than what one is" (Gilmore 11), then we should agree that women write to construct an identity different from the one held for them in their society. As a result the validity of testimonial writing should not be questioned in terms of revelation of the facts.

Testimonial Writing as a Mental Healing from a Trauma

Storytelling not only helps women to constitute their own identity but also helps them to heal their previous wounds. Especially writing about one's trauma leads her/him to escape from the effects of the destructive experience. This writing process enables the author to reconsider his/her experience on the way to recovery.

Stories of intense crisis such as being raped or facing violent actions, argues Gilmore, share a basic structure of suffering, surviving, and surpassing. Dorothy Allison is aware of her suffering and survival, and she is in the stage of surpassing her traumas. Thus her stories focus on her stages of suffering, survival and her burdened conscience resulting from her ability to survive. There are two visible effects of her testifying traumas in her stories. First, she mentally heals herself by writing about her traumas and gets stronger after each experience of telling what she feels. Second, she feels responsible for the other subjugated people who are injured in these stories. She

assumes the responsibility for “witnessing” and testifying. Such consciousness leads her to deal the traumas as cultural concepts although she experiences and interprets them personally. She writes about her intense feelings about her survival in “River of Names”:

I dig out the pictures, stare into the faces. Which one was I? Survivors do hate themselves, I know, over the core of fierce self-love, never understanding, always asking, “Why me and not her, not him? There is such mystery in it, and I have hated myself as much as I have loved others, hated the simple fact of my own survival. Having survived, am I supposed to say something, do something, be something? (6).

She answers the questions she asks in “River of Names” in her other work “Survival is the Least of My Desires” in *Skin*:

I need you to do more than survive. As writers, as revolutionaries, tell the truth, your truth in your own way. Do not buy into their system of censorship, imagining that if you drop this character or hide that emotion, you can slide through their blockades. Do not eat your heart out in the hope of pleasing them. The only hope you have, the only hope any of us has, is the remade life (216).

Reinforcing the feminist motto of “personal is political”, Allison’s sincere testimony attempts to show the need for political intervention against sexual abuse and to transform her nightmare into a narrative as a means of coping with her damaged body and psychology. Here is an example for her writing about her abusive stepfather, the terror and violence she had to face when she was a little girl, quoted from “River of Names”:

I was running up the hall. He was right behind me. “Mama! Mama!” His left hand—he was left-handed—closed around my throat, pushed me against the wall, and then he lifted me that way. I kicked, but I couldn’t reach him. He was yelling, but there was so much noise in my ears I couldn’t hear him.

“Please, Daddy. Please, Daddy. I’ll do anything, I promise. Daddy, anything you want. Please, Daddy.”

I couldn’t have said that. I couldn’t talk around that fist at my throat, couldn’t breathe. I woke up when I hit the floor. I looked up at him.

“If I live long enough, I’ll fucking kill you.”

He picked me up by my throat again (9).

Testimonial stories consist of expressing explicitly subjective experiences, they are the secrets of the storyteller and thus should address to the proper community to be effective. In other words, author must know the right cultural codes of the members of the society to whom s/he tells the story. As Sandell writes, “There must be social worlds embodying community support to receive them” (212). For Sandell, community support is very important because if stories cannot find a social group to receive them, they turn into *lies* and they do not cause mental recovery but social isolation and disempowerment. Such stories cannot foster connection between the margins and the

center. Neither a psychological, nor a political goal can be achieved through testimony made in this way.

Dorothy Allison's stories seem to be in between *truths* and *lies*. It is fair to say that what turns a story into a lie or truth is the class of the storyteller. If a marginalized writer writes testimonial story of her own class experience, s/he must control the tone to be accepted by the mainstream society. Some literary techniques and innovations can help the marginalized author be read by the members of the mainstream society. Allison writes about white trash people's degraded life in a very vulgar language. The vulgarity of the actions and dialogues make her characters grotesque. What makes her fiction stand in between truth and lie is her use of grotesque, irony and a kind of humor. In Sandell's words, "Some stories about class are easier to tell ... when couched in terms of humor, irony, or deceit" (212). If the tone of the story is controlled well by the author, and if the message giving is kept in certain doses, the stories can find a large audience. Thus, there is a limited marketplace for the authors on the margins.

Receiving the right market in the system is important for the author in terms of communication and mental healing. Although a testimonial story creates its own kind of knowledge, the meaning and the validity of the story depends on how the readers "read" it. The story is a reciprocal entity in the way it allows communication between the writer and the reader. The story is about what the readers can not receive and what they can. The meaning is therefore constructed in the dialogue between the reader and the writer. This dialogue which is constructed between the writer and the reader leads the writer to recovery from the trauma she/he writes about. Therefore the act of reading is equally important as the act of writing.

Deborah M. Horvitz argues that, Dorothy Allison's novel *Bastards out of Carolina* explores rather a complex and commingled relationships of sexual trauma, its repression, and its potential healing through narration. She writes, "I suggest that narrative offers a unique possibility for healing. Not until the victim encounters and translates her "unspeakable" tragedy into "her" story can she envision a future devoid of violence" (40). For Horvitz, writing about the "unspeakable" is the provision for the mental healing.

In her story "Preface: Deciding to Live" Dorothy Allison's narrator says, "Writing it all down was purging. Putting those stories on paper took them out of the nightmare realm and made me almost love myself for being able to finally face them. More subtly, it gave me a way to love the people I wrote about—even the ones I has fought with or hated" (Megan 586).

Allison restates her theme of storytelling as a means of survival and understanding. In her autobiography *Two or Three Things I Know for Sure* (1995), she writes, "Two or three things I know, two or three things I know for sure, and one of them is that to go on living I have to tell stories, that stories are the one sure way I know to touch the heart and change the world. ... Two or three things I know for sure and one of them is that telling the story all the way through is an act of love" (587).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the interactive nature of storytelling as cultural intervention and political praxis fosters Dorothy Allison to write testimonial stories through her white trash and queer identity. By writing down her experiences from the white trash queer

point of view, she challenges the stereotype that the mainstream society holds about white trash people, for she manages to show how these experiences shape her understanding of her own lesbian identity and the other women's identities. Storytelling enables her to represent herself and the other women in a literary world, thus provides visibility and solidity with her literary characters. Having witnessed and experienced the traumatic events, she seems to feel a responsibility to write about them. Through storytelling she gradually heals herself, and pays her debts to the others in her society.

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Özet

Dorothy Allison'un "Beyaz Süprüntü" Eşcinsel Kimliğine Tanıklık Eden Öyküler

Dorothy Allison çocukluğunu Amerika'nın güney eyaletlerinden South Carolina, Greenville'de geçirmiş bir yazardır. Greenville, "beyaz süprüntü" (white trash) olarak nitelendirilen fakir beyazların yaşadığı bir kasabadır. Allison annesi ve üvey babası ile Florida'ya taşınarak üniversite eğitimi aldıktan sonra Greenville'de yaşadıklarını tanıklık eden (testimonial) öykü ve romanlarıyla tüm açıklığı ile anlatmakta ve kendi eşcinsel kadın kimliği ile "beyaz süprüntü" kimliğini bu öyküler aracılığı ile harmanlamaktadır. Allison'ın bunu yapma sebebi, öykü anlatma yoluyla bu fakir ve hor görülen toplumun üyelerini temsil ederek onların toplumda var olduklarını hatırlatmak, kendi eşcinsel kimliğini ortaya koyarak cinsel kimlik seçimini topluma kabul ettirmek, bu öyküler aracılığı ile politik bir topluma hitap etmek ve politik bir örgütlenmeyi sağlamak ve son olarak çocukluğunda yaşadığı sarsıntıları (traumas) tüm açıklığı ile okuyucuya anlatarak okuyucu ve kendisi arasında bir bağ kurmayı başarıp, psikolojik anlamda kendini iyileştirmektir.

Un-constructing Narrative Identity: Caryl Churchill's *Cloud Nine*

William S. Haney II

1. Individual and Social Transformation

Caryl Churchill presents a vision of justice in a theater that is playful, comic, and startling, but also subversive in a manner she intends to be “not ordinary, not safe” (1960, 446). As a feminist artist who experiments with subject, form, and style, Churchill departs from the Brechtian technique of distancing the audience and develops a new process of identifying and confronting social problems. She is particularly concerned with gender oppression and the inequalities of capitalism, largely induced by patriarchal ideology. In defining human identity, Churchill shows how the representation of a dramatic work to an audience parallels the way an individual represents the self to society. She exposes the patriarchal definitions of masculinity as dependent on the exclusion of the feminine as “Other” in a closed structure of oppositions in which the feminine is objectified and women repressed. In her confrontation with traditional male dominated theater, Churchill deals not only with stages, curtains, scenes, and lighting, but also with the historical and economic conditions that support and legitimize male hegemony. In *Cloud Nine* and *Top Girls*, Churchill links societal change with personal development, showing that individuals can effect significant changes not only in themselves but also in society. The relevance of Churchill's feminist drama for sacred theater derives in part from its linking of opposites. Her approach to theater opens the spectator to an inner space beyond the opposites of male/female, power/powerlessness, subjective experience/historical circumstance. Her plays transcend the duality of subject and object through empathy and inter-being, an experience her spectators can relish (*rasa*) through what Robert Forman calls “knowledge-by-identity” as they approach non-intentional pure consciousness.¹¹

Constructivists such as Steven Katz (1978) claim that consciousness always has an intentional object, and that even mystical experience is constructed by language and culture. As Forman argues, however, mystical or sacred experiences “don't result from a process of building or constructing mystical experiences ... but rather from an *un*-constructing of language and belief ... from something like a *releasing* of experience

¹¹In Sanskrit Poetics, *rasa* is an aesthetic experience through which awareness, “transcending the limitations of the personal attitude, is lifted ... above pain and pleasure into pure joy, the essence of which is its relish [*rasa*] itself” (De 13). It “consists in blissful enjoyment of the self by the self” (Chakrabarti 144-45), with self here referring to pure consciousness (*turiya* or the fourth state of consciousness after the waking, sleeping and dream states). Through *rasa* a theater audience will remain detached from all specific emotions and thereby appreciate the whole range of possible responses to a play without being overshadowed by any one in particular. As such, the taste of *rasa* involves tasting an idealized flavor and not a specific transitory state of mind. By invoking the emotional states latent within the mind through direct intuition, *rasa* provides an experience of the subtler, more unified levels of the mind itself.

from language” (1999, 99; Forman’s emphasis). Intentional experience entails a subject being aware of an object, which William James classifies into two kinds of knowledge: “knowledge-about,” which we gain by thinking about something; and “knowledge-by-acquaintance,” which we gain through direct sensory experience (Barnard 1994, 123-34; Forman 199, 109-27). Forman refers to the pure consciousness event as a non-intentional experience or “knowledge-by-identity,” in which there is no subject/object duality; “the subject knows something by virtue of being it. ... It is a reflexive or self-referential form of knowing. I *know* my consciousness and I know that I am and have been conscious simply because I *am* it” (1999, 118; Forman’s emphasis). As a truly direct or immediate form of knowledge, non-intentional experience is thus devoid of the dualism of the subject-perceiving-object and subject-thinking-thought (Forman 1999, 125).

Some Western philosophers do make a distinction between two aspects of consciousness similar to the intentional/non-intentional division. John Locke, for example, says it is “impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive” (1975, 335). Jean-Paul Sartre, moreover, although without referring to samadhi or higher states of consciousness, says that along with the awareness of objects in any intentional perception, there is also a “non-positional consciousness of consciousness itself” (1956, lv). This reflexive “non-positional consciousness,” which is non-intentional, Sartre refers to as consciousness “*pour-soi*,” (for itself), while the object of consciousness is “*en-soi*” (in-itself): “For if my consciousness were not consciousness of being consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of the table without consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an unconscious—which is absurd” (1956, Liv). For Sartre, “non-positional self-consciousness” is beyond perception in that it is not itself an object of intentional knowledge knowable by the thinking mind, although it nevertheless ties perceptions together. For the thinking mind to know consciousness as an object would imply an infinite regress, which Sartre argues against through a *reductio ad absurdum*. For Sartre, however, this epistemological dualism is only a theoretical experience of intentional consciousness against a background of self-reflexiveness; it is not a sacred event. As Forman notes, “non-positional consciousness” for Sartre “transcends my particular ego-infused situation. ... [However,] one can sense oneself as a disengaged or withdrawn consciousness *pour-soi* only amidst or behind the encounters with the *en-soi*” (1999, 156).

Even without considering sacred events, therefore, Sartre contributes to a Western precedent for a twofold epistemological structure of perception: intentional knowledge of the object, and non-intentional non-positional self-awareness. Within the framework of ordinary experience, Sartre’s “non-positional self-consciousness” is analogous to transcendental pure consciousness. As Forman explains, “Though most of us overlook the inherently transcendental character of consciousness and identify with our roles, this identification is a mistake: we are not truly our roles, and we all intuitively know it” (1999, 157). Churchill’s *Cloud Nine* dramatizes this distinction, helping the spectator intuit the difference between intentional consciousness through which we identify with our roles and egos, and non-intentional consciousness through which the qualityless self knows itself reflexively through “knowledge-by-identity”. This non-intentional experience encompasses those defined by Western drama theorist

as liminal, sublime, metaphysical, surrogated, transluminating, holy, transcendent, all of which are linked to an experience beyond narrative identities.

Cloud Nine

1. Player/Role

Rachel Blau du Plessis has pointed out that socialist/feminists working in theater have tried to “break the sentence” of the symbolic order that legitimizes masculine authority (1985). In analyzing Churchill's theater as a feminist deconstruction of “the sentence” of patriarchal subjectivity and its institutions, Amelia Kritzer examines the key elements of theatrical representation that Churchill challenges. Kritzer explains that “the sentence” in theater consists of four conventions: a) the space accommodating the stage and audience; b) the relation between the performance and the written role of at least one actor; c) the “density of signs,” as Roland Barthes defines it (1972, 26), created by lighting, staging, and the actor's physical presence, gesture, vocal tones, and costume; and d) time (1991, 8). Churchill takes on the first element of space by giving voice to female and feminist viewpoints. This involves breaking down the patriarchal boundaries erected on stage between performers and audience. Churchill “uses both Brechtian devices (such as seating non-performing actors on stage) and literary techniques (i.e., fragmented narratives and open endings) in her plays to challenge the convention of audience passivity and engage the audience in a relationship to imaginative reciprocity” (Kritzer 1991, 9). The second element, the player/role relationship, has a special significance for feminist theater. It is based on Barthes description of theater as “the site of an ultracarnation, in which the body is double, at once a living body deriving from a trivial nature, and an emphatic, formal body, frozen by its function as an artificial object” (Kritzer 1991, 27-8). In theater, which reflects in the process of undermining the social construction of identity, the performer/role doubleness reinforces the masculine/feminine opposition central to a masculine or patriarchal subjectivity. As Kritzer puts it,

Theater's player/role opposition mimics the division and hierarchization of masculine and feminine. The player is real, while the role makes visible the false man—i.e., the feminine—that must be repressed in the attainment of subjectivity. Stage parlance, which places the player “in” a role, confirms the penetrable, “feminine” quality of the role, as well as the unitary, “masculine” quality of the player. (1991, 9)

In this hierarchized opposition between the “real” man as the unitary player and the “false” man as the feminized role, the “false” man position sustains the “real” masculine subject as a phallic unity by reinforcing the role as the “other” that threatens masculine unity. The false man of the role position masquerades on stage as the real or true man, who is both comforted and threatened by the role. This doubleness of theater, which replicates the ambiguity of the subject/object division, can be seen as opening a sacred space in Churchill's theater within the subjectivity of actors and audience.

The sacredness of theater unfolds within the space of subjectivity created by the decontingencing of the subject through a dis-identification with fixed roles. The dis-identification or decontextualization of subjectivity that begins with the player/role

doubleness of representation accelerates when the player is a woman. A “woman playing a role would be not-man enacting false man, and the reassuring value of doubleness would be lost” (Kritzer 1991, 10), with the effect of accentuating the threat to the phallic unity of the true man, who ironically would be exposed as doubly false. For this reason women tend to be cast as ideal feminine objects given to passive acceptance of the hierarchal male/female opposition. Because the patriarchy considers the true woman (player) and false woman (role) to be the same, women are generally denied the kind of ambiguities and fragmentation that construct, but can also deconstruct social identity. Feminists like Churchill try to express a non-patriarchal subjectivity by answering Hélène Cixous' call for an *écriture féminine* (1986). This project would help dissolve the male/female opposition and the link between the phallus and the word that marks patriarchal discourse, and substitute a “density of signs,” the third convention noted earlier, based on feminine attributes: breast, clitoris, and vagina. According to Kritzer, “Feminist theater must attempt to deconstruct the socially constructed wholeness of the gendered subject. To do so, it must break down the masculine/feminine opposition reified in the player/role division, theatricalizing the possibility of a subjectivity based in multiplicity and relationality rather than binary opposition and separateness” (1991, 11). This deconstructed place is where women, as Cixous puts it, would make a “shattering entry into history” (1976, 880). But in fact this entry always already occurs whenever an actor plays a role, for the doubleness of representation can be understood not only in terms of the division between a true man/woman and a false man/woman, but also between the constructed identity of any role and the witnessing or self-reflexive attention of the player performing this role. As Churchill's theater suggests, the point is not only “to deconstruct the socially constructed wholeness of the gendered subject,” as Kritzer puts it, not only to fracture the subject into multiple identities, but also to disassociate oneself from all identities in the sacred taste of a void of conceptions, or the fullness of non-intentional consciousness as pure witness.

2. Identity and Gender in *Cloud Nine*

Cloud Nine, written in 1978-79, has two acts: the first is set in Victorian Africa and explores the links between imperialism and the oppression of Africans, homosexuals, and women; the second is set around a hundred years later in 1970s London, where several members of the same family in Act One together with their new friends try to free themselves from their Victorian heritage. In playing with the element of time (the fourth convention Kritzer identifies), Churchill not only separates the two acts by a hundred years while maintaining continuity, but also has the characters—specifically the mother (Betty) and her two children (Edward and Victoria)—age only 25 years between the acts. Act One begins with Clive coming home after touring the restless native villages to the care of his wife, Betty, who complains about the rudeness of their servant, Joshua. Betty tells of the unexpected arrival of a widowed neighbor, Mrs. Saunders, who Clive will incessantly pursue, and he in turn tells Betty of the imminent arrival of their friend Harry Bagely, a homosexual with whom Betty is infatuated. During the first act, while the socially constructed identities of the characters gradually dissolve, the Clives and friends hold a Christmas picnic, hostilities with the Africans mount and Joshua patrols the compound. Edward is caught playing with his

sister's doll, Harry inadvertently reveals his homosexuality to Clive, and in the final scene Joshua aims a gun at Clive as he makes a wedding toast. In addition to the identity un-constructing effect of the player/role doubling, we see a farcical clash between the outrageous behavior of the characters and a Victorian ethical code common in British satire.

Act Two, set mostly in a London park, consists of a series of scenes from every day life in the 1970s and features both familiar and new characters: Victoria, now a middle-class professional, and her husband, Martin; Lin, a working-class lesbian who becomes Vic's lover, and her daughter Cathy; Vic's brother Edward, now a gardener in the park, and his lover Gerry; their mother Betty, recently divorced from Clive and about to become liberated; and Lin, Vic, and Edward in a *ménage à trois*. The characters from Act One find sexual liberation in Act Two, but have not completely thrown off their Victorian ghosts. In the doubling of roles, none of the characters are played by the same actors in both acts, while one character plays the roles of Ellen and Mrs. Saunders in Act One.

Churchill, who accentuates the doubleness of theatrical representation by cross-casting her characters, makes these comments in the Preface:

Betty, Clive's wife, is played by a man because she wants to be what men want her to be, and, in the same way Joshua, the black servant, is played by a white man because he wants to be what whites want him to be. Betty does not value herself as a woman, nor does Joshua value himself as a black. Edward, Clive's son, is played by a woman for a different reason—partly to do with the stage convention of having boys played by women (Peter Pan, radio plays, etc.) and partly with highlighting the way Clive tries to impose traditional male behavior on him. (1985, 245)

By contrasting two historical periods, Churchill shows how sexuality and power are not fixed but can change over time along with the other personal qualities of our constructed identities. The fact that the identity of the characters as characters continues across the two acts, then, depends not on their roles, genders or any of their changing attributes, including narrative or memory, but rather on their witnessing awareness remaining unchanged, providing a sense of continuity to a shifting conventional identity. In analyzing Paul Ricoeur's concept of discursive or narrative identity, Dieter Teichert writes that "To be a person and to gain one's identity—in the sense of identity as selfhood—means [for Ricoeur] to be a being which does not possess a stable, closed and fixed identity. Identity as selfhood is not simply there like an objective fact. To possess an identity as selfhood means to be the subject of dynamic experience, instability, and fragility" (2004, 185-86). As Ricoeur says, "narrative identity is not a stable and seamless identity. Just as it is possible to compose several plots on the subject of the same incidents ... so it is always possible to weave different, even opposed, plots about our lives" (1988, 248). But even though flexible and open, narrative identity is derived from intentional consciousness, either that of ourselves, as in autobiography, or of society in the case of our constructed roles. Teichert continues that "The self does not exist as an isolated, autonomous entity which constitutes itself as a Cartesian ego. Nor is the self a mere passive product of a society. Ricoeur's position takes a middle path between these extreme positions. Selves are built up in the process

of assimilating, interpreting, and integrating the contents of the cultural environment” (2004, 186; Ricoeur, 1969). In Churchill’s theater, the dynamic, unstable and fragile identities of the characters are woven into different plots, but the changeable nature of these plots exposes a background of non-intentional consciousness through which these identities are held together.

Against the background of self-observation, which is nonchanging, *Cloud Nine* dramatizes the liberating move from patriarchal domination to greater individual freedom. Clive’s role as Cathy in Act Two highlights the arbitrariness of gender and hegemonic status, as well as the openness and flexibility of human development. As Churchill says, “Cathy is played by a man, partly as a simple reversal of Edward being played by a woman, partly because the size and presence of a man on stage seemed appropriate to the emotional force of young children, and partly, as with Edward to show more clearly the issues involved in learning what is considered correct behavior for a girl” (Preface 1985, 246). This cross-casting has the effect of startling the audience out of their preconceptions about human relationships and the distinctions of race, gender, and power.

This startling effect is further enhanced by the irony of cross-cast performers playing the role of the “other” they try to deny. Clive as Cathy in Act Two caricatures his role as patriarch in Act One, and despite being black Joshua has a pseudo white-male subjectivity apparent in his contempt for his own race and for Betty, who as a woman is oppressed like blacks. Betty in Act One is played by a man, to ironic effect when her homophobic husband, Clive, embraces her. She tries to seduce Harry Bagley, family friend and explorer, who is having casual affairs with Edward and Joshua. Ellen, Edward’s governess, lusts after Betty, but is forced to marry Harry after he mistakenly comes on to Clive. In unexpected ways the play shifts our conceptions of space, time and identity in two acts that span over a hundred years. These differences of setting, time and narrative discourse are balanced by corresponding situations in each of the acts; while the relaxed quality of Act One generates passion and disturbance, the kaleidoscopic design of Act Two produces lethargy. Churchill’s aesthetics simultaneously calls attention to and undermines the qualities of her fictional world and its characters, not only by changing the narrative context, but also by exposing all contexts and character attributes to be illusory constructs that conceal an underlying disinterested awareness. The multi-level paradigm and partial discontinuity between the two acts thus empower the characters to begin shedding their socially conditioned attributes.

In deconstructing gender politics, Churchill makes gender visible by separating it from the body and sex. As the characters are introduced, the incongruities multiply: Joshua, played by a white, internalizes colonial values; Edward, played by a woman, tries to elude the role expectations of his father; and Victoria, at first played by a doll, illustrates the mindless status of Victorian children. The play begins with the imperialist song, “Come Gather Sons of England,” with the characters introducing themselves in the rigid language of rhymed couplets. Betty says:

I live for Clive. The whole aim of my life
Is to be what he looks for in a wife.
I am a man’s creation, as you see,
And what men want is what I want to be. (251)

Even in her adulterous attraction to Harry Bagley, she remains locked in her role as object, unable to become an active agent:

Betty: When I'm near you it's like going out into the jungle. It's like going up the river on a raft. It's like going out in the dark.

Harry: And you are safety and light and peace and home.

Betty: But I want to be dangerous.

Harry: Clive is my friend.

Betty: I am your friend.

Harry: I don't like dangerous women. . . .

Betty: Am I dangerous?

Harry: You are rather.

Betty: Please like me.

Harry: I worship you.

Betty: Please want me. (261)

The degree to which Betty as a character identifies with her role as object prevents her from experiencing her sexuality directly, compelling her instead to experience it through the mediated idealizations of the male: "You are safety and light and peace and home" (261). And later: "Betty: Can't we ever be alone? Harry: You are a mother. And a daughter. And a wife" (268). The immediacy of her experience of sexual indulgence is erased, replaced by the masculine representation of it, which takes primacy over female desire. Moreover, if Betty were played by a woman, her role as a not-man enacting a false man would undermine the reassuring doubleness of representation that preserves masculine identity. But Betty's being played by a man maintains the hierarchized opposition between the true man as the unitary player and the false man as the feminized role. The false man position of Betty as man would thus seem to sustain the masculine subject as a phallic unity by reinforcing the role position as the "other" that threatens masculine unity. The problem, however, is that the performer, although played by a man, is supposed to be a woman. Does this mean that she is ironically sustained as a masculinized subject with a phallic unity? If so, the gay Harry hasn't noticed, for he resists seduction by Betty as a man, acting a woman, even though s/he supposedly reinforces masculine empowerment. But then, is Harry really a man seeking empowerment himself? In the ambiguity of the pairing of Beth and Harry, they can be viewed as either a heterosexual or homosexual couple, depending on whether Betty is viewed in terms of gender or biology. This complex, defamiliarizing doubleness in Churchill's theater, which multiplies the ambiguities of the subject/object division, creates a sacred space in the subjectivity of actors and audience by first scrambling and then emptying out its content. What replaces this content is not only a Brechtian critical mind but also the suggestion of an impersonal, disinterested awareness that witnesses the rapid decontingencing of any sense of conventional identity—whether of a fixed and finite subject, or "the subject of dynamic experience, instability, and fragility" open to a variety of opposing plots (Teichert 2004, 185-86).

The lesbian Ellen tries to seduce Betty, but like Betty she also fails to communicate her feelings directly. She can only express her desire by trying to substitute herself for Harry. When she says, "I love you, Betty," Betty responds from an indoctrinated perspective, "I love you too, Ellen. But women have their duty as soldiers

have. You must be a mother if you can" (281), spoken convincingly as a "man." Joshua reports to Clive on having spied on Ellen's talking "of love to your wife, sir," but Clive refuses to take it seriously (285). He does however condemn Betty for her flirtation with Harry, which he also hears about from Joshua. Indeed, no woman in Act One succeeds in fulfilling her desires. Mrs. Saunders tries in vain to fend off Clive, and when she succumbs he can only satisfy himself:

[He (Clive) has been caressing her feet and legs. He disappears completely under her skirt.]

Mrs. Saunders: Please stop. I can't concentrate. I want to go home. I wish I didn't enjoy the sensation because I don't like you, Clive. I do like living in your house where there's plenty of guns. But I don't like you at all. But I do like the sensation. Well I'll have it then. I'll have it, I'll have it--

[Voices are heard singing The First Noël.]

Don't stop. Don't stop.

[Clive comes out from under her skirt.]

Clive: The Christmass picnic. I came.

Mrs. Saunders: I didn't.

Clive: I'm all sticky.

Mrs. Saunders: What about me? Wait.

Clive: All right, are you? Come on. We mustn't be found.

Mrs. Saunders: Don't go now. (263-64)

Though farcical, Clive as the symbolic father imposes his divine right as a colonialist on anyone he pleases, exploiting his linguistic authority and control over language and desire. In coercing his lascivious will on Mrs. Saunders, he flaunts the caricature of a romantic rhetoric: "Caroline, if you were shot with poisoned arrows do you know what I'd do? I'd fuck your dead body and poison myself. Caroline, you smell amazing. You terrify me. You are dark like the continent. Mysterious. Treacherous" (263). Mrs. Saunders like Betty is reduced to monosyllables—"Don't stop. Don't stop." Clive's discourse, as Kritzer puts it, "enforces the opposition between subject and object on both women and colonized people, as is evident in parallels between patriarchal concepts of women and Western European concepts of Africa in his speech" (1991, 118). As in the above quotation: "You are dark like the continent." Similarly, when he hears of Betty's infidelity, Clive says, "This whole continent is my enemy. ... I sometimes feel it will break over me and swallow me up. ... you must resist it Betty, or it will destroy us. ... We must resist this dark female lust, Betty, or it will swallow us up" (277).

Although Betty agrees to resist these dark impulses, the play's sexual nonconformity suggests a covert resistance to patriarchal authority. But Betty as played by a man shows resistance not only to male authority—as in a subject/object, male/female opposition discussed by Kritzer—but also to the very constructedness of the personal subject, whether male or female, which is based on our identification with arbitrary attributes. Churchill's overall dramatization heightens our mindfulness of body, mind, thoughts, and emotions in a manner that opens a space in our attention between these attributes and awareness *per se*, with the result that awareness mirrors itself. The

matter of theater as mirror is the mirror, just as the matter of awareness is awareness—mirroring the emptiness of fullness.

One of the most comical scenes of the play involves the misunderstanding between Clive and Harry, who mistakes Clive's assertion, "There is something dark about women, that threatens what is best in us. Between men that light burns brightly," as an expression of homosexual desire (282). Clive is taken aback when "Harry takes hold of Clive" (stage directions), and says, "My God, Harry, how disgusting" (283). Afterwards, forced by Clive to take a wife, Harry proposes to Mrs. Saunders, who chooses to be alone, and then to Ellen who he finds more receptive, though ironically their both being attracted to the same sex offers little prospect of conjugal bliss. Shortly afterwards Betty sees Clive kissing Mrs. Saunders and attacks her. Clive springs to the rescue, declaring, "Betty--Caroline--I don't deserve this--Harry, Harry" (297). To appease his wife, he embraces and kisses her, a show of affection between two male actors who again can be viewed as having either a heterosexual or homosexual relationship, but who also instill a sense of "identity" beyond cultural constructs.

The basic doubleness of representation we find in Act One has long been noticed by drama theorists who describe the paradox of acting in which the performer remains detached from the emotion of a role even while evoking this emotion in the spectator, as in Diderot's paradox between actor and spectator and Stanislavsky's paradox within actors observing themselves. But the paradox in Churchill is that roles and emotions are not more convincingly played but more convincingly undermined. As is well known, drama theorists point to a state of consciousness beyond ordinary emotion and speech: Brook's "total theater" touches on the transcendent, and "holy theater" makes the invisible visible; Grotowski's "poor theater" induces a state of "translumination" in performer and spectator; and Barba's "transcendent" is a quality of the performer's presence. Theater not only engages the critical mind, but also expands consciousness in performers and spectators (see Meyer-Dinkgräf, 2001). In "Theater Degree Zero," Ralph Yarrow develops this approach into a "metaphysics of praxis" (2001, 90). Hence, as Churchill so aptly demonstrates, self-discovery involves not so much knowing what you are, as knowing what you are not. This entails watching yourself carefully and rejecting or "zeroing" all that doesn't go with the basic fact: "I am." The spectator in *Cloud Nine*, as in any theatrical doubleness of representation, is led away from the identification with "I am this or that," whether "this or that" is a performance, a role, a self-image, or even a job, friends, and family. What remains after racial, ethnic, professional, gender, and other attributes fall aside is simply the "I am" of impersonal, non-intentional self-awareness. In this process one goes from knowing and identifying with relative qualities, toward a taste (*rasa*) of pure knowingness beyond the subject/object duality of conceptual content. Even if distinctions remain in our awareness, sacred theater helps us to un-construct our perceptual experiences, to see them as transitory properties of the mind and body. We initially witness these experiences from the nonattachment of what Sartre calls "non-positional consciousness" or consciousness "pour-soi," and then move toward a qualityless, impersonal "I am" transcendent to yet immanent within duality. Churchill's feminist theater accentuates this witnessing attention by deconstructing the oppositions that would preserve the masculine subject, however ambiguously or under threat. Any egoic identity is revealed to be an illusion, nothing more than a relational matrix of multiple energies.

3. Mindfulness

Cloud Nine, therefore, not only challenges, as Brecht does, “the traditional belief in the continuity and unity of the self” by showing how individuals evolve through different historical contexts (Speidel 1982, 45); it also undermines the notion that a series of contexts fully constitute the individual. The sacred quality of Churchill’s theater suggests that the individual, not completed by the sum of social fragments, has another dimension: mindfulness or witnessing awareness. The ability to develop mindfulness is part of the Theravada Buddhist tradition. As Wallace explains, mindfulness as a practice entails an observation of

the body, feelings, mental states and mental objects of oneself and others. A common theme to each of these four applications of mindfulness is first considering these elements of one’s own being, then attending to these same phenomena in others, and finally shifting one’s attention back and forth between self and others. Especially in this final phase of practice, one engages in what has recently been called reiterated empathy, in which one imaginatively views one’s own psychological processes from a “second-person” perspective. (2001, 213)

Churchill’s doubling and cross-casting of characters encourages mindfulness, a second-person perspective between player and role, or as noted earlier the third-person perspective of Mead’s notion of “the generalized other” (Whitehead 2001, 18). When the player, such as Betty in Act One, is a man in the role of a woman, s/he is spontaneously mindful of his/her multiple identities. The player/role division, far from locking the subject (performer/spectator) within binary oppositions, explodes all conceptual boundaries through a multiplicity that not only deconstructs a gendered wholeness but also destroys the very concept of identity, whether essentialist or constructed. In breaking down masculine/feminine oppositions, the identities of the player/role mutually negate each other through a multiplicity of the “I is not I,” as Yarrow illustrates in his analysis of Beckett (2001, 84-89). Experiencing (non) identity as not this/not that (*neti, neti* in Buddhism) points to the qualityless state of “I AM” (Maharaj 1988). This knowledge-by-identity of non-intentional witnessing consciousness is mirrored in the sacred events suggested by Churchill’s theater.

4. Are We Really Free?

In Act Two, as the pace slows down and the language expands to express unprogrammed desires, we see the effect of the power structure on sex and relationships. Clive is gone and with him the authoritative center, replaced by greater freedom and a matching uncertainty. Lin as a lesbian mother reverses Ellen’s position in Act One by making her own decisions without constant self-doubt and feeling the need for patriarchal approval. Scene One begins with the child Cathy, played by Clive, in a rebellious mood, responding to Lin’s suggestions for games to play by repeating, “Already done that” (289). Her defiant attitude sets the mood of questioning and exploration in which the characters reject normative behavior and the play further explores the place beyond cognitive content.

As mothers in a park playcenter, Lin says to Vic, “I really fancy you” (290). In contrast to the first act where the women were usually confined indoors, the outdoor setting here fosters open expression and freedom of choice. While Vic and Lin talk

about their lives, we see their preoccupation with ordinary everyday concerns in which they make their own decisions:

Lin: I've got a friend who's Irish and we went on a Troops Out march. Now my dad won't speak to me.
 Victoria: I don't get on too well with my father either.
 Lin: And your husband? How do you get on with him?
 Victoria: Oh, fine. Up and down. Your know. Very well. He helps with the washing up and everything.
 Lin: I left mine two years ago. He let me keep Cathy and I'm grateful for that.
 Victoria: You shouldn't be grateful.
 Lin: I'm a lesbian.
 Victoria: You still shouldn't be grateful.
 Lin: I'm grateful he didn't hit me harder than he did.
 Victoria: I suppose I'm very lucky with Martin.
 Lin: Don't get at me about how I bring up Cathy, ok?
 Victoria: I didn't.
 Lin: Yes you did. War toys. I'll give her a rifle for Christmas and blast Tommy's pretty head off for a start. [Tommy is Vic's son.]
 [Victoria goes back to her book.] (291-92)

Lin has rejected certain aspects of her socially constructed identity, but she still craves acceptance by the people she likes. The characters break taboos and find new identities, but the important thing in Act Two is not their new identities, which they eventually transcend, but the process of transformation itself: giving up the familiar world and their status quo as a substitute ideal, and seeking out instead new possibilities for love and happiness. The fact that the characters espouse one sexual preference over another is secondary to the fact that they have begun the process of transformation and self-discovery. The contrast between gays and straights adds to the doubleness of representation, sharpening awareness of both the arbitrary nature of all social conditioning, and of the need to deconstruct and overcome this conditioning, which gays and women may have more practice in than ordinary males.

Edward and Gerry talk about their different attitudes toward gender roles, with Gerry at one point describing in graphic detail a homosexual encounter with a stranger on the train, insinuating that he's more liberated than Edward. Later they discuss their relationship: Edward says he likes knitting and wants to be married, and Gerry says he doesn't mind the knitting but wants a "divorce." Afterwards, Edward discloses his bisexuality to Victoria:

Edward: I like women.
 Victoria: That should please mother.
 Edward: No listen Vickey. I'd rather be a woman. I wish I had brEasts like that, I think they're beautiful. Can I touch them? (307)

By the end of Act Two, Lin, Vic and Edward have a *ménage à trois* that plays havoc with the doubleness of representation by being simultaneously heterosexual, homosexual and incestuous.

In contrast, Martin can only express a conventional desire for his wife and like most ordinary men feels insecure about discussing his sexual prowess. He talks about his feelings with Vic:

Martin: My one aim is to give you pleasure. My one aim is to give you rolling orgasms like I do other women. So why the hell don't you have them? My analysis for what it's worth is that despite all my efforts you still feel dominated by me. ... You're the one who's experimenting with bisexuality, and I don't stop you, I think women have something to give each other. (301)

Martin feels insulted because he thinks Vic hasn't been able to get herself together, but Churchill suggests that none of the characters have succeeded in doing so, that their behavior will never lead to the desired results. The point suggested here is not only that the characters will find it hard to make changes in their personal lives, to lay to rest the ghosts of Victorianism, but also that they will always face other conceptual or ideological constraints obstructing their happiness and freedom by leading them to identify with other narrative identities. The very absence of happiness and freedom, however, implies the possibility of their attainment. The performers and spectators intimate this, not by sensing the end of patriarchal hegemony, which they don't, but rather by participating in the co-creation an intersubjective space beyond language and the emotions of attraction/repulsion.

Churchill convincingly portrays the attenuation of worldly emotions in leading the spectator to a taste of the presence of non-intentional consciousness (*rasa*). A significant example is Betty, who divorces Clive at the beginning of Act Two in a futile attempt to break her ties with the past. Her children haven't fully accepted her, and she has lost her sense of independence. But finding a job gives her confidence and leads to her experimenting with autoeroticism: "Afterwards I thought I'd betrayed Clive. My mother would kill me. But I felt triumphant because I was a separate person from them" (316). When Vic, Edward and Lin try in their drunken orgiastic ritual to evoke a mythical goddess, Vic says, "You can't separate fucking and economics" (309). But even with her newfound eroticism and job, is Betty really fulfilled?

Critics have noted the lack of wholeness or completion in *Cloud Nine*. As Mark Fortier says, the fact that the characters change for the better "doesn't mean that they all find their essential selves" (2002, 119)—essential self here being defined not as non-intentional pure consciousness but rather the ultimate construct. Moreover, Act One does not complete the destruction of Victorianism, just as Act Two does not complete Betty's transformation. It offers only the "before" and "during" but not the "after," which the audience must imagine for itself (Kritzer 1991, 129). The play in fact dramatizes the point that "before" and "after" are conceptual constructs, that the immediate reality of non-intentional consciousness is "during," the on-going process of transformation that zeroes or voids the mind of thought. For the spectator, the sacredness of Churchill's theater unfolds in the experience of "during" as a space of inter-being that compels us to break out of a doubled reality mediated by representation—even while using representation as a means of escape. The openness of "during" in *Cloud Nine*, which takes precedence over the closure of "before" and "after," collapses oppositional structures in the immediacy of a participatory presence between performer and spectator.

5. Conclusion

Churchill demonstrates how society imposes a system of social identity on people that not only oppresses them but also limits their options to a set of alternative identities that are usually no less oppressive. As M. Silverstein says, Churchill “remains committed to the search for new representational forms, new strategies for encoding the body, new ways to organize the sex/gender relations we live in,” all under the cultural conditions that shape anything new we might create (1994, 20). Churchill, however, not only situates the potentially new within cultural contexts. She also suggests how these contexts can themselves evolve into new forms through a reciprocal relationship between our changing sets of beliefs and concepts, which collectively constitute our cultural conditions, and the never-changing void of conceptions that lies beyond these conditions. Although her plays do not explicitly address the possibility of a non-intentional pure consciousness event, they demonstrate that no socialist or feminist enterprise can succeed in realizing the better self merely on the basis of conceptual maneuverings. Moreover, by portraying an unsayable dimension of human experience, they provide the backdrop for, and contribute significantly toward, the very possibility of a new consciousness. Churchill uses feminism in helping us to unconstruct our perceptions and behavior and thus to forget our concepts and beliefs.

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Özet

Anlatısal Kimliğin Çözülmesi: Caryl Churchill'in *Cloud Nine*'ı

Caryl Churchill, *Cloud Nine* (1979) adlı eserinde, feminist bir drama geliştirerek, toplumu değiştirmenin en iyi ve belki de tek yolunun önce toplumdaki bireyleri değiştirmek olduğunu gösterir. Bana göre, öz-dönüşüm basitçe bir takım kültürel olarak teşvik edilmiş kabulleri başkaları ile değiştirerek oluşmaz. Churchill, *Cloud Nine*'da, kadın/erkek, güçlü/güçsüz gibi bazı ikili karşıtlıklar arasındaki boşlukları ortaya koyarak, karakterleri ve okuyucuları kutsal bir duygudaşlık ve iki arada var oluş alanına götürerek öz-dönüşümü teşvik eder. Karakterlerinin ve okuyucularının öyküsel kimliklerinin altını kazarak, onları acı veren gündelik yaşamdan uzaklaştırırken bununla birlikte onları daha iyi bir öz için gereken özgürlük ve tamamlanma alanlarına iter.

Churchill, aynı zamanda, kendini keşfetmenin kim olduğunuzu bilmektense kim olmadığınızı bilmekle ilgili olduğunu gösterir. Bu ise, en temelde ve maksatsız olan bir öz-bilinçlilik bağlamındaki "ben" olgusu dışındaki her şeyi "sıfırlamak" ile mümkündür. Onun feminist tiyatrosu, eril özneye veya egocu kimliğe imtiyaz sağlayan karşıtlıkları, çoklu kuvvetlerin ilişkisel matrisinin bir parçasından başka bir şey olmadığını ileri sürerek, yapı bozuma uğratar. *Cloud Nine*, " 'ikinci şahsın' perspektifinden birinin kendi psikolojik sürecini" görmesi olarak tanımlanan kimliğin, aynı zamanda göz tanıklığı veya farkındalık içerdiğini göstererek, bir dizi bağlamın bireyi tamamıyla oluşturduğu iddiasını zayıflatır (Wallace 2001, 213). *Cloud Nine*'daki karakterlerin marifetleri ve çaprazlanarak kalıp değiştirmeleri özneyi kilitleyen oyuncu/rol, maskülen/feminen ikili karşıtlıkları çerçevesinde olgusal sınırları çözerek farkındalığı destekler.

**The Dialogue of History and Self:
The Politics of Chronotope in *Ulysses***

Gülden Hatipoğlu

James Joyce has been regarded as the icon of high modernism, and his works, especially *Ulysses*, are considered to be the milestones of world literature. At the beginning of his literary career, he was an outcast protesting the volatile conditions of his native country. Today he is an idol treasured as a genius in academic studies. His stylistic and aesthetic innovations not only revolutionized the prose style in literature, but also destroyed the established understanding of all centralized notions. Focusing on his artistic innovations and ignoring his Irish identity, the critics have regarded Joyce as an apolitical writer until recent decades. However, in order to fully comprehend the motives behind Joyce's works, his inevitable urge to question the definition(s) of Irish identity should be scrutinized. It is impossible to ignore the fact that James Joyce is a post-colonial Irish writer, who chose exile "to forge in the smith of [his] soul the uncreated conscience of [his] race" (*Portrait* 288). A colonial Irish-Catholic consciousness searching for alternatives both to blind nationalism and oppressive British imperialism is evident in *Ulysses*, which has generally been subjected to literary criticism merely regarding its innovative modernist techniques. Since Joyce's politics and aesthetics are one, all these techniques serve as a means to reject a single-voiced ideology as well as to deny all centred and stabled conceptions of history and identity. In this respect the chronotope, namely time and space, in *Ulysses* carries highly significant connotations.

The characters' journeys in time through their memories and the mythic parallels open a gateway to Irish history, and therefore connect the past, present and future. Through this dialogic "two-way road" linking the past and the present, Joyce manages to redefine Irish identity and dismantle the established homogeneous essence of Irishness. Accordingly, this article aims to explore the function of chronotope in the novel by showing how it serves as an opening to Irish history, which is dynamic and in the process of becoming.

The nature of chronotope, literally time/space, in the novel genre is defined and illustrated by M. M. Bakhtin in his essay, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" in *The Dialogic Imagination*. Bakhtin borrowed the term "chronotope" from the work of Soviet physiologist A. A. Uxtomskij, whose lecture on the chronotope in biology Bakhtin attended in 1925. "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" argues that narrative genres of literature are determined by the relation of people and events to time and space. In his long essay Bakhtin offers several definitions of chronotope, but in a fundamental sense it is "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (84) and "the place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied." (205) He asserts the inseparability of space and time, since he considers time as the fourth dimension of space. In order to grasp the ways in which the relationship of people to their world operates, one should examine the chronotope of literary genres, which can be defined as the "form-shaping

ideology” of a genre (Morson and Emerson 366). Especially historically manifested narrative forms, like the novel, invoke particular combinations of time and space.

Since actions are necessarily performed in a specific context, chronotopes differ according to the context and its relation with actions and events. All contexts are shaped fundamentally by the kind of time and space that operate within them. In this sense, Bakhtin mentions Einstein in order to illuminate the key features of chronotopes. In the chronotope, as in Einstein’s physics, time and space are not separate but are “intrinsically interconnected and constitute a whole”; chronotopes may change over time in response to current needs since they are historical, and the relation of chronotopes to each other may be dialogic. (Morson and Emerson 367-369)

Bakhtin offers a series of questions related to the concept of the chronotope. Are time and space shaped by the events that take place in them? What role do particular sets of social and historical factors play in shaping personal identity? If the self or existence is socially and historically shaped, does this shaping happen differently from the shaping of public selves and roles? How does the everyday realm interact with the historical realm? How does the past influence the present and what is the relation of the present to possible futures?

Following these questions, Bakhtin distinguishes particular chronotopes in which each genre offers a different image of a person. Each genre also suggests a different concept of history, society, and other categories essential to an understanding of culture. For instance, actions that would be highly incredible in a nineteenth century realist novel may be fully expected in a chivalric romance or other adventure tales. Therefore, each genre in a given time and space, adopts different parameters of value and meaning. As Morson and Emerson state, in literature and culture, time is always in one way or another *historical*, and space is always *social*; thus the chronotope in culture and literature can be defined as a “field of historical, biographical, and social relations” (371). In other words, as Bakhtin assumes, narrative forms are always historical.

Bakhtin argues that some genres come closer to an accurate understanding of the “actual historical chronotope” than others. In “Discourse in the Novel”, he describes the novel as having the most complex set of language and the richest sense of the world. Thus, what is true of languages of heteroglossia is also true of chronotopes. Having the most complex sense of chronotopicity, the novel offers the most profound image of people, actions, events, history and society. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the discourse and chronotope theories of the novel introduced by Bakhtin are two aspects of the same theory.

Bakhtin gives a few intriguing examples of chronotopic motifs. For example in Gothic fiction, the castle is not just a kind of building, but an image “saturated through and through” with a specific sort of time and a special sense of history (245-246). Everything about the castle carries the “traces of centuries and generations” visible in its architecture, portrait gallery, weapons, furnishings and archives, all of which suggest “particular human relationships involving dynastic succession and the transfer of hereditary rights” (246). Apart from such minor examples, Bakhtin offers three major types of chronotopes in the development of the novel: “Greek Romance”, “Adventure Novel of Everyday Life”, and “Biography and Autobiography”. Since there is not enough space for discussing each of these types, only the chronotope in Bakhtin’s best-known example, “Greek Romance”, will be explained.

As Bakhtin points out, Greek Romances, written between the second and sixth centuries A.D, display remarkably similar plots: A boy and a girl meet unexpectedly and are overcome by a sudden passion, but cannot marry. The lovers are parted, and for the major part of the novel, they seek one another, overcome obstacles, lose and find each other, suffer difficulties. At last they are reunited and the romance closes with a happy ending. It is significant that hero and heroine do not change, mature, grow, or even age biologically as a result of their adventures. It is apparent that "time" in Greek romance is perceived as "pure digression" rather than as "real duration" in which experience changes people. Actual historical context and historical time are entirely irrelevant to these adventures. Characters are not shaped by the specific social and historical world in which they live. As time is not specific in the Greek romance, space is interchangeable. For a shipwreck, one needs a sea, but which sea makes no difference. For chance meetings and miraculous occurrences, one needs an alien country, but any alien country will do. Another apparent aspect of Greek romances is that the characters lack initiative and individuals are completely passive. Real growth and "becoming" are absent from this type of plots. Bakhtin, therefore, concludes that the chronotope of the Greek romance is "the most abstract of all novelistic chronotopes" and also "the most static" (110).

On the other hand, a single text can contain "multiple" co-existent chronotopes which emerge in a dialogic relationship. Especially the modernist and postmodernist texts are polychronotopic since the dominant chronotope is challenged by others and characters are allowed to invade each other's chronotopes. *Ulysses*, in this respect, sets an example to the dialogic relationship between different chronotopes. In the concluding section of his essay Bakhtin defines the chronotope as a "bridge, not a wall" between the mind and the world (255). In *Ulysses* James Joyce draws a bridge not only between the characters' minds and the world, but also between the past and the present, specifically in the Irish context. The burden of history in *Ulysses* haunts the characters. The chronotopes they move in and out are their own personal past and that of their race. Joyce rummages the bag that contains not only Ireland's but of all mankind's past chronotopes, and combines them with the chronotopes of his time. This way, he manages to reconstruct Irish history. Since it is possible to define Stephen, Bloom and Molly as textualized historical bodies, it is necessary to discuss the writer's and novel's engagement in the question of history.

In today's understanding of historiography, history is perceived as a "narrativized past" (Fairhall 8) which comes to us often in the form of a narrative, namely a story. Historical knowledge is a construction, and this fact places historical discourse on the same level as any rhetorical performance; thus, history becomes a textualization. As Fredric Jameson states, the "problem of representation, and most particularly the representation of History is essentially a narrative problem, a question of the adequacy of any storytelling framework in which History might be represented" (qtd. in Fairhall 8-9). By encapsulating the past within a framework, history indeed entraps it. By destroying the established construction of the past through presenting different interpretations and angles, Joyce aims to liberate Irish history. The coexistence of multiple chronotopes in *Ulysses* reveals Joyce's attempt to escape from the imprisonment of both literary and historical narratives. The history of the Irish race had been misrepresented in the hegemonic narrative of a conquering power both in historical

chronicles, literary works, and magazines like *Punch*. In this sense, *Ulysses* rebels against official history.

The events of a single day in *Ulysses* take place in the city of Dublin, which exists as a living and participating entity in the novel. It is still a colonial city under British domination, since the events take place on 16 June 1904, before Ireland became an independent state. Joyce wrote *Ulysses* between 1914 and 1921 when Ireland was struggling for political freedom which it gained in 1921. While writing *Ulysses* in Trieste, Zurich and Paris, Joyce looked back on his homeland from the perspective of the Continent. Yet during those years, just like Ireland, Europe had changed too. It lived through World War I and the revolutions and wars in Russia. Although the story (if one can talk about a story) takes place in the city of Dublin in 1904, Joyce brings together different chronotopes.

Ulysses reflects the circumstances of the era of its writing. It constitutes a response not only to the Easter Rising and other upheavals in Ireland, but also to World War I, the social change in Europe, and the emergence of modernism in art. Dublin in *Ulysses* is still the deposed capital of an economically stagnant colony, yet it belongs to a larger world. Joyce's awareness of the war finds expression in the novel through themes and motifs which suggest what is to come in 1914 and what is actually going on during the composition of the novel. In the "Nestor" episode, just after Stephen starts his history lesson by asking the students where Pyrrhus¹ fought the famous battle, he hears "the ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry, and time one livid final flame" (*Ulysses* 9-10). Later in "Circe", the same imagery recurs when Stephen smashes a lamp at Bella Cohen's brothel. Through the imagery of a battle fought in 279 B.C., Joyce echoes the recent Irish history – the revolts and upheavals in Ireland – as well as foreshadowing the First World War that was to come. Throughout *Ulysses* we hear of an excursion boat that had caught on fire and sunk the previous day in New York's East River. Bloom thinks: "All those women and children excursion beanfeast burned and drowned in New York. Holocaust" (*Ulysses* 182). Another character, Tom Kernan recollects a conversation: "Terrible affair that *General Slocum* explosion. Terrible, terrible! A thousand casualties. And heartrending scenes. Men trampling down women and children. Most brutal thing" (*Ulysses* 238). The citizens of Joyce's Dublin think of the *General Slocum* as a disaster, because they cannot think of anything worse. The disaster of *General Slocum* is mentioned in the book partly because Joyce wanted to document the actualities of 16 June 1904, but it serves another purpose as well. A dramatic irony arises here, because the readers of *Ulysses* know, as Joyce did, what a merciless beast would be born at the heart of Europe only ten years later, namely World War I. Consequently, the characters of *Ulysses* live not only in their fictive time frame, but also in the future time that casts its shadow into the novel. Therefore, the pre-colonial and colonial past of Ireland, the chronicles of 16 June 1904, and the current history of Europe in the time Joyce was writing the novel combine to form a polychronotopic narrative.

¹ Pyrrhus was the king of the Hellenistic kingdom of Epirus. In 281 he went to Italy and defeated the Romans. His victories against Rome were so costly that he had to withdraw from Italy. His remark "Another such victory and I shall be ruined" gave name to the term "Pyrrhic victory" for a victory obtained at a great cost.

The textual and narrative structure of *Ulysses* presents answers to the question posited by Bakhtin: How does the past influence the present, and what is the relation of the present to possible futures? In *Ulysses* time remains not an alienating but a uniting factor joining past with present to shape the future. Daily social details of Dublin life on 16 June 1904 co-exist with the memories of the characters and their mental journeys to the past. History is revealed to us in *Ulysses* via memory. Through the portal of each character's memory, the book opens to different times and spaces. In this respect, Ira B. Nadel's words summarize the chronotope of *Ulysses*: "Memory individuates time as history" (36). Not only the history of individual characters, but also the history of Ireland and mankind are telescoped in Joyce's novel; therefore history is given through multiple perspectives as it is narrativized and textualized.

The unification of the past and future within the present moment is symbolized in the "Ithaca" episode where Bloom and Stephen, the father and the son, are having a conversation on the correspondence between Irish and Jewish races. The sufferings of two nations from dispersal, persecution and oppression are mentioned along with the prospects of national revival. Following this conversation, there is a moment of mutual recognition between Stephen and Bloom. Stephen feels in Bloom's voice the profundity of the past, and Bloom senses in Stephen's youth the promise of the future:

What was Stephen's auditive sensation?

He heard in a profound ancient male unfamiliar melody the accumulation of the past.

What was Bloom's visual representation?

He saw in a quick young male familiar form the predestination of a future.
(*Ulysses* 610)

In addition to the overall structure of *Ulysses*, the "Wandering Rocks" episode should be granted a special attention for its involvement in the issue of time and space. The episode, like *Ulysses* on the whole, is committed to historical, cultural and social issues. In fact, "aesthetics itself is crucially a social and cultural matter for Joyce" (Platt 73). Within this labyrinth-like episode, most of the characters in *Ulysses* appear one by one moving about Dublin between the hours of three and four. The eighteen sections of the episode correspond to the eighteen episodes of the novel. Therefore, the "Wandering Rocks" episode is generally considered as the microcosm of *Ulysses*. Frank Budgen in *James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses* tells us that "Joyce wrote the *Wandering Rocks* with a map of Dublin before him on which were traced in red ink the paths of the Earl of Dudley and Father Conmee. He calculated to a minute the time necessary for his characters to cover a given distance of the city" (53). The modern mechanization of the city was "mathematically designed with a map of Dublin in one hand and a clock in the other" (Platt 86). The simultaneity of actions and the close control of the relation between clock time and distance in space constitute the chronotope of the episode on the surface. However, the episode combines multiple chronotopes through characters' inner monologues that narrate past histories.

It should be taken into consideration that the Dublin of *Ulysses* is not just any city. For one thing, this city is a colonized space. The positioning of Church and State at the beginning and end of the episode indicates a relationship between the "authority"

and the Dubliners wandering in the streets. As Len Platt points out, the episode is full of missed opportunities (87). Characters miss trams and boxing matches, fail to connect, leave stories incomplete and so on. Hence, the failure of the fulfilment of the characters' goals matches with the failure of Ireland's historical self-construction. The Dublin of the "Wandering Rocks" is, in this sense, historically defined.

The historical fabric is woven around the catalogue of historical figures mentioned in the episode: Cardinal Wolsey; Mary, Queen of Scots; Lord Aldborough (an eighteenth century nobleman); Lord Talbot de Malahide (an admiral); Lord Molesworth; Robert and Mary Rochefort (the Earl and Countess of Belvedere). This particular group of aristocratic names appears in one particular section of the episode, the "Father Conmee" section. Father Conmee has a particular interest in the past. He is a Catholic priest who is moving in "times of yore" (*Ulysses* 223). History is present everywhere in the episode not only in reference to historical figures, but in the street names, places and statuary as well. Great Charles's Street, William Street, George's Quay, and James Street and other street and place names alike point out the presence of English monarchs in Ireland. The old Bank of Ireland, the Irish Parliament from the eighteenth century and St. Mary's Abbey are also mentioned besides a long list of buildings including the Empire Music Hall. In this respect, it is possible to say that the episode, like *Ulysses* does on the whole, "reads backwards" (Platt 88). However, this reading commemorates something other than a vibrant national culture. The listed personages and street names are, indeed, the markers of an imperial and colonial history. They give the episode a historical dynamic: the dynamic of colonization which embodies a past stretching back to the twelfth century when the English first set foot on Ireland. Time and space, or history in this context, is ideologically (re)constructed within the labelling of the cityscape and in the characters' minds. And the history that we read is an Anglicized one. The modern city of 1904 is built with the bricks of the colonial past. Colonial construction of the city, therefore of Ireland, is reinforced by the fact that "Dubliners, as well as the city itself, talk history. They reconstruct history and they deploy historiography" (Platt 89).

Many Dubliners in the "Wandering Rocks" episode narrate historical events. Ned Lambert, for example, tells the story of Fitzgerald who fired Cashel Cathedral (*Ulysses* 230), and Tom Kernan tells Emmet's death, Lord Edward Fitzgerald's escape from major Sirr and the arrest of Francis Higgins (*Ulysses* 238-40). Thus, the characters in the episode are in a way, writing histories. Apparently, the past is fundamental to a reading of the contemporary urban setting. In this sense, Joyce sets a dialogic relationship between the past and the present.

If the "Wandering Rocks" episode is considered to be a narrativized history of Ireland, the positioning of the Church and the State at the beginning and end of the episode gains an ideological significance. For it indicates that historical writing, therefore the construction of history, is dominated by the authority of the Church and the State in Ireland. This symbolic reference recalls the words of Stephen uttered in the first episode of the novel: "I am the servant of two masters ... an English and an Italian ... The Imperial British state and the holy Roman catholic and apostolic church" (*Ulysses* 26).

Apart from the diverse narratives and mental journeys of the characters and topographical structures of the city of Dublin, the mythic parallels in the novel also

enable Joyce to establish connections between Ireland's past and present. From the beginning, critical readings of *Ulysses* have focused on its similarities to Homer's *Odyssey* since Stuart Gilbert's schematic study appeared in 1930. Although Joyce deleted the Homeric headings in the final manuscript, the Odyssean headings have been used when distinguishing the episodes because they dominated the critical discussion of the work for many years. However, recent works, especially Maria Tymoczko's *The Irish Ulysses* shifted the central critical approach to the novel by interpreting it as a reworking of the Irish myths in an urban setting. In this way, Tymoczko exposes the link between Ireland's cultural memory and its pseudohistory. In her book Tymoczko defines the pseudohistory of Ireland as "another type of Irish historical literature, a genre going back to the seventh and early eighth century, when the Irish learned classes attempted to reconcile the relatively short time line of traditional oral history with the long time line contained in Christian and classical history" (Tymoczko 168). As Tymoczko argues, the most important piece of pseudohistory is, of course, *The Book of Invasions*, which has a significant place in Irish literary history and historiography.

In *Ulysses* the framework of Irish pseudohistory determines the relationships of the main characters and they provide a counterpart for the Greek mythos of the book. It is possible to see the wanderings of Leopold Bloom as the identification of medieval Irish voyage tales, rather than the adventures of Odysseus. The commonly accepted symbolic values attributed to Bloom as the wandering Odysseus derive from European critical tradition which sees nothing particularly Irish about him. However, if Joyce's writings are to be set in the context of Irish tradition, there is a specific question that should be asked. Why is Leopold Bloom a Jew? Maria Tymoczko asserts that Joyce's constellation of characters in *Ulysses* – especially Leopold Bloom – is based on the mythic structures of *Lebor Gabala Erenn* (*The Book of the Taking of Ireland*), generally known in English as *The Book of Invasions* (Tymoczko 24).

The Book of Invasions contains the pseudohistory of Ireland before 432 A.D., the accepted date of the coming of St. Patrick to the island and the beginning of written history in Ireland. The story includes sections of cosmogony and old myth. Eventually, it tells the "history" of Ireland since the Creation, giving accounts of the conquests of Ireland before and after the flood and concluding with the invasion of the sons of Mil. *The Book of Invasions* and its associated kinglist became the matrix for the rest of Irish history and literature. It is still a part of popular history among the Irish (Tymoczko 25).

According to *The Book of Invasions*, there are six invasions of Ireland. The sixth and the last group of invaders, the Goidels—descendants of Noah, and genealogically related to their predecessors in Ireland—are involved in building the Tower of Babel. After that architectural disaster, they establish a language school, becoming language teachers with a specialty in Hebrew and Irish. They are invited to Egypt at the time of the pharaohs because of their erudition. Their leader, Nel, is given Scota, the daughter of the pharaoh, as wife. The Goidels become sympathizers of Moses and aid the Israelites in their flight from Egypt. Moses is grateful for their help and offers the Goidels a place in the Promised Land inviting them to accompany the Hebrews. However, the Goidels decline Moses's offer. After some years the Goidels are expelled from Egypt in revenge for aiding the Israelites. They undertake various travels. Eventually they go to Spain, where they make conquests, settle down, and take wives. While in Spain the Goidels see Ireland from a high tower and decide to go there. After

various struggles with their predecessors in Ireland (the Tuatha De Danann), the Goidels (or Milesians) defeat the Tuatha De Danann and arrange a settlement with them—the Milesians get the upper half of Ireland, and the Tuatha De Danann get the half below ground (Tymoczko 25-26). It is quite ironical that the Milesians have left the bondage of pharaoh in Egypt only to end in the house of British imperialism centuries later.

If *Ulysses* is considered as a journey to Ireland's past, the Jewish identity of Leopold Bloom stands out to be significant, since Jews are probably the most historically oriented people. In this sense, there is a strong connection between the Irish and the Jews. Joyce wrote in a note-sheet entry for the "Cyclops" episode that "Jews & Irish remember past" (qtd. in Nadel 48). Furthermore, in the "Ithaca" episode, Bloom and Stephen compare Hebrew with Irish:

What points of contact existed between these languages and between the peoples who spoke them?

The presence of guttural sounds, diacritic aspirations, epenthetic and servile letters in both languages: their antiquity, both having been taught on the plain of Shinar 242 years after the deluge in the seminary instituted by Fenius Farsaigh, descendant of Noah, progenitor of Israel, and ascendant of Heber and Heremon, progenitors of Ireland. (*Ulysses* 609)

Although the Irish history stretches back to antiquity long before the Milesians had set foot on Ireland, it is possible to date the birth of the nation on the island with the coming of the Milesians (Goidels). Maria Tymoczko's symbolic identification of Bloom the Jew with the Milesians signifies that Bloom embodies the pre-natal memories of the Irish race.

The Goidels (Milesians), with whom Bloom is identified, are the last invaders of Ireland, and as recorded in *The Book of Invasions*, they could have been Jews because they were invited by Moses to have their share in the Promised Land. The Goidels are the allies of Moses but not Hebrew, sympathetic to Moses but not among the chosen people. Their contribution to the Hebrew history was significant, but they deliberately choose to follow a different direction. In the same way, Bloom is Jewish from his father's side and has sympathy for the Jews, but his actual identity and experience is not Jewish. According to the religious law, Jewish descent comes through the mother's line and Bloom's mother and maternal grandmother both have Irish names. Thus, Bloom does not appear to be a Jew. He is not circumcised and he has twice been baptized as a Christian. In the cabman's shelter Bloom tells Stephen explicitly that "in reality" he is not a Jew (*Ulysses* 564). In this sense, Bloom's mixed identity – his Jewish sympathies and ancestry combined with his Irish experience – mirrors the early history of the Goidels in *The Book of Invasions*. Moreover, Bloom's preoccupation with Egyptian images, for example in the "Calypso" and "Circe" episodes, reflects the sojourn of the Goidels in Egypt. When he is accused in the "Circe" episode of sexual assault by the maid Mary Driscoll, Bloom is defended by J. J. O'Molloy on the grounds that "such familiarities as the alleged guilty occurrence [are] quite permitted in my client's native place, the land of the Pharaoh" (*Ulysses* 446). Similarly, Herbert Howarth supports the view that associates Ireland with Israel. According to Howarth, the Irish thought of themselves as the Children of Israel, and of England as the Egypt of the Pharaoh, and of the deliverance from English tyranny as their Exodus (24). In an essay, W. B. Yeats also

draws a comparison between Ireland and Judaea at the time of the birth of Christ and writes that the Irish race, transformed by a national art, would become “a chosen race, one of the pillars that uphold the world” (qtd. in Benstock 109).

Joyce’s decision to make the main character in *Ulysses* a Jew was not simply a literary concern. He thought that in general the Irish and the Jews were similar and their destinies were alike. In his letter to Carlo Linati, Joyce refers to *Ulysses* as “an epic of two races (Israelite-Irish)” (*Letters* 271). This explanation compares the colonial suffering of the Irish to the Israelites’ bondage and captivity. Joyce’s ambivalent attitude towards Ireland’s colonial status points at the pseudohistorical genealogy of Irish language. Joyce elaborates on this fact in his 1907 Trieste lecture, “Ireland, Island of Saints and Scholars,” arguing that Irish language “is eastern in origin, and has been identified by many philologists with the ancient language of the Phoenicians” (*Occasional, Critical and Political Writing* 110). In Elizabeth Butler Cullingford’s words, “the ideology of a linguistic map ... connects Ireland with the Semitic Orient ... rather than with ‘mainland’ Britain” (Attridge and Howes 219).

Leopold Bloom, whose Jewish identity is uncertain, fantasizes about the Orient and is subjected to the racial hatred of Irish nationalists, and thus embodies, among other things, Joyce’s affirmation of cultural hybridity. From a wider perspective, as Neil R. Davison mentions, Bloom’s struggle as an Irish-Jew represents the oppressing impact of the historical social codes of nationalistic discourse on individual consciousness (12). Accordingly, the multiple representations of Bloom throughout *Ulysses* counter the inflexible labelling of Otherness.

Besides his representation as the “other”, the interchangeable identifications of Bloom throughout *Ulysses* are interwoven around the Greek term “metempsychosis” meaning reincarnation, which is introduced to the reader in the third episode where Bloom first appears in the novel (*Ulysses* 66). When his wife Molly asks Bloom what “metempsychosis” means, Bloom explains that it “is what ancient Greeks called it. They used to believe you could be changed into an animal or a tree, for instance. What they called nymphs, for example” (*Ulysses* 67).

Accordingly, in “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel” Bakhtin identifies the notion of metamorphosis as a particular determinant in the chronotopic structure of “the adventure novel of everyday life” in terms of the self’s existence in everyday life. He defines metamorphosis or transformation as “a mythological sheath for the idea of development” (113), and states that “everyday life is that lowest sphere of existence from which the hero tries to liberate himself, and with which he will never internally fuse himself.” (121) According to Bakhtin, “the everyday world is scattered, fragmented, deprived of essential connections.” (128) In this form of chronotopic structure, the lack of a single everyday time reveals “*social heterogeneity*” and “socially heterogeneous elements come close to being contradictory.” (129)

Ulysses, in which the events take place in a single day in Dublin, seems to be localized on the surface; yet the mythic “metempsychosis” of characters, especially Leopold Bloom, reveals another story and opens up a chronotopic gateway to the Irish past. *Metempsychosis* refers to the rebirth of Ireland’s past history from Celtic myths and legends. In *Ulysses*, the Hebraic Milesian (Leopold Bloom), reappear in contemporary Dublin. Joyce reanimates Celtic pseudohistory in *Ulysses* via using *metempsychosis* as a philosophical centre. Bloom is at times Homer’s Ulysses,

Milesian, the Wandering Jew and Hamlet's father. Towards the end of the novel, Bloom returns his home. In a symbolic sense, the journey in *Ulysses* is a journey to Ireland; in other words, the book is a sort of journey undertaken to and for a reincarnation of Ireland. The metamorphosis of Bloom throughout the novel indicates the heterogeneous and hybrid essence of Irish history and culture opposing the homogeneous Irish identity tried to be created by Irish nationalism and British imperialism.

Thus, Bloom, who wanders on the path of history in time through spiritual metamorphosis, becomes the eye of memory in *Ulysses*. His memory, in this sense, is an access to Irish history. It is significant that it is the eye of the "other", the Jew, which we share in order to have a vision of the Irish past. Bloom's role in *Ulysses*, therefore, complements the dialogic perspective of the novel; for according to Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, we need the eye of the "other" in order to see ourselves.

The embodiment of the pseudohistory of Ireland in *Ulysses* in the characters indicates that Joyce undertakes the role of a historian. In this way, he perpetuates the Irish literary tradition by documenting the chronicles of a single day in contemporary Dublin through mythic correlatives. Preserving history was a primary duty of the Irish learned classes, therefore early Irish literature had a historical cast. *Ulysses* can be situated within this tradition of "narrativized history". The book is loaded with allusions to former historical events and to Ireland's political and cultural history. Joyce also documents the details of the social world of 16 June 1904. He provides us with sufficient information to write the history of Bloomsday hour by hour for several characters in the book. Thus, in varied ways, Joyce functions as a historian, writing the history of his city and his nation in a form that integrates the historical and the fictitious.

Consequently, the polychronotopic structure of *Ulysses* serves as a means to reject the essentialist and dualistic discourse of both Irish nationalism and British imperialism by establishing a dialogic relationship between past and present. The colonial past of Ireland is continued in the colonial presence. This continuity can be measured in the topographical elements such as street names and statuary. Different cultures and histories also meet in some other dimension of chronotope through the characters' journeys in their memories. In this way, Joyce refuses to serve the clear-cut historical and cultural divisions of time and space by establishing a dialogic interaction not only between the past and the present, but also between cultures. The city of Dublin and the single day on which the events take place becomes a threshold where the present encounters with the past. In addition, the pseudohistoric identification of Leopold Bloom also allows different chronotopes to co-exist in the novel and redefines the present. As Bakhtin states, "if taken outside its relationship with past and future, the present loses its integrity, breaks down into isolated phenomena and objects, making of them a mere abstract conglomeration." (146) In this chronotopic motif of meeting, the contact between the past and present is realized via the characters' memories and the topographical structure of Dublin city, as well as the mythic correlatives. This approach constitutes one of the central driving forces of Joyce's ideological stand against the constructed representation of Irish history, identity and culture. On the whole, *Ulysses* carnivalizes history sustaining a counter-model not only to mainstream traditions but also to the colonial and imperial discourse of his time.

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Özet

Benlik ve Tarihin Diyalogu: Ulysses'te Kronotopun Politik ve İdeolojik Yansımaları

Modernist edebiyatın ikonları arasında kabul edilen ve roman yazım tekniğinde yerleşik tüm normları sorgulayarak yıkan James Joyce'un *Ulysses* adlı başyapıtını, yazarın hem İrlanda Milliyetçiliğine hem de İngiliz Emperyalizmine ideolojik bir başkaldırısı olarak okumak mümkündür. Bu bağlamda, romanın kronotopu, diğer bir deyişle zaman ve mekânı ele alış ve sunuş biçimi, Joyce'un tarih ve kimlik kavramlarını hangi açılardan sorguladığına, aynı zamanda da İrlanda kimliğini ne şekilde yeniden tanımladığına ışık tutması açısından önemlidir. Romandaki mitik paralellikler, karakterlerin belleklerinde ve anılarında yaptıkları yolculuklar, Dublin kentinin topografik yapısı ile anlatımdaki polifonik ve karnivalesk öğeler, İrlanda tarihine açılan bir geçit oluşturarak geçmiş, bugün ve geleceği ilişkilendirerek birbirine bağlar. Özellikle İrlanda'nın kültürel ve politik tarihine yaptığı göndermelerle, roman yer yer "tarih yazımı"ni sorgulamakta ve bunu da "öteki"nin gözünden ve bakış açısından sunmaktadır. Farklı zamanlar ve mekânlar arasında kurduğu bu diyalojik ilişki ile James

Joyce temel olarak İrlandalı kimliğinin homojen ve merkezîyetçi tanımlarını yıkmaktadır. İrlandalı Dedalus, Yahudi Bloom ve İspanyol kökenli Molly'nin taşıdığı tarihsel kimlikler, İrlanda'nın mitik tarihi ile ilişkilendirilmiş ve bu kimliklerin romanın sunduğu kronotopik yapıya ne şekilde hizmet ettikleri ortaya konmuştur. Sonuç olarak, bu makalede, Mikhail Bakhtin'in ortaya koyduğu kronotop kavramı ele alındıktan sonra, James Joyce'un *Ulysses*'te farklı kronotopları (zaman ve mekânları) diyalojik bir ilişki içerisinde biraraya getirerek İrlanda tarihini ve İrlandalı kimliğini nasıl yeniden tanımladığı incelenmiştir.

**The Feminist Politics of Maternal Malevolence:
Tony Harrison's *Medea: A Sex-War Opera* (1985)**

Ivar Kvistad

*In every quiet suburban wife
dissatisfied with married life
is MEDEA, raging!*

- Tony Harrison, *Medea: A Sex-War Opera* 371

Reproductions of Euripides' tragedy *Medea* with implicit or explicit allusions to women's liberation and feminist discourses have been frequent since the late nineteenth century. Mobilised at nineteenth century *fin de siècle* Suffragette rallies, *Medea's* ongoing association with feminism continues in modernity with several overtly gender-oriented reworkings of the narrative, such as those by Tony Harrison, Christa Wolf, and Kerry Greenwood. *Medea's* association with feminism is also covertly alluded to in several other modern, implicitly emancipatory, *Medeas*. For example, the anti-imperialist mobilisations of the narrative by Pier Paolo Pasolini, Heiner Müller, Brendan Kennelly and Liz Lochhead all allude to the modern discourses of feminism and women's liberation. It would seem that the association between Euripides' narrative paradigm of *Medea* and the emancipatory discourse of feminism is deeply entrenched in the western imagination.

Writing in a milieu that has seen the influence of 'second wave' feminism, the feminist *Medeas* of Harrison, Wolf and Greenwood, like those of Miranda Seymour and Jacqueline Crossland might also be called 'originary *Medeas*': they all point towards the idea of an original *Medea* narrative that has been overshadowed or eclipsed by the Euripidean narrative of the infanticidal mother. Cast as revivals and reinstatements of pre-Euripidean narrative traditions, they all, in comparable ways, strategically imply a cover up of the traditions that did not cast *Medea* as the infanticidal mother. These modern *Medeas* all attribute the Euripidean representation of *Medea* as the murderer of her children to phallogentric and patriarchal ideologies. As will be seen, Tony Harrison's *Medea: A Sex-War Opera* (1985) follows the pattern of these 'originary' *Medeas* in disavowing the Euripidean narrative tradition of *Medea's* maternal infanticide. However, while this may add complexity and dimension to a character who is, and has been, routinely essentialised as an evil stepmother figure, it should be noted that this also potentially disables a gendered interrogation of the infanticide tradition that might, I argue, be useful to a feminist and politically dissident project.

Tony Harrison's *Medea: A Sex-War Opera* was written in 1985 and produced for the stage in 1991 by the Volcano Theatre Company who merged it with Valerie Solanas' *Society for Cutting Up Men (SCUM)* (1968), a defining 1960s counter-culture 'anarcho-feminist' manifesto (Volcano Theatre Company 1-5). This is appropriate: *Sex-War Opera's* narrative has continuities with feminist discourse on a number of fronts and central to its radicalising project is its interrogation of the symbolic meanings attached to femininity. Like Euripides' *Medea*, *Sex-War Opera* privileges the

significance of the narrative of Medea's reputed infanticide, using it as a provocation to question the specific gendered and institutionalised discourses that construct maternal subjectivity and, by extension, the idea of maternal infanticide as an exceptionally abhorrent crime.

Sex-War Opera questions and politicises the discourses that inform the lives of women in modernity. Like subsequent texts by Harrison, such as his film *Prometheus* (1998) which condemns the contemporary disengagement with utopian visions (Hall 129-40), *Sex-War Opera* foregrounds the political necessity of engaging with the discourses that prevent a realisation of social justice. Reflecting the complexity of this undertaking, *Sex-War Opera* is highly sophisticated in terms of its form, language and politics. One of the most innovative versions of Euripides' *Medea* to appear in the twentieth century, *Sex-War Opera* shifts from mimetic to abstract and symbolic modalities of representation, and from ancient to modern contexts. For a theatrical text, it is epic - it is over 80 pages long. *Sex-War Opera* is also multi-lingual, quoting a number of Medea narratives in a variety of European languages, from ancient Greek to classical Latin, from seventeenth century French to modern English. *Sex-War Opera* offers detailed critiques of these literary, dramatic and operatic productions of Medea, now institutionalised in the Western literary and musical canons. *Sex-War Opera* is thus a highly informed text that is self-conscious of its position amongst the different narrative and formal traditions of the Medea legend. Further, the many languages of the text mirror its representation of competing political discourses: the text presents several feminist and anti-feminist political positions in the form of an ongoing dialogue of answer and response. This dialogue is continuous with its musical form as well as the ongoing dialectics of contemporary feminist discourse.

Reflecting its formal emphasis on multilingual exchange, *Sex-War Opera* advocates the need for translation, the importance of hearing the voice of the feminine Other. The play reiterates this theme throughout its unfolding narrative and lucidly summarises it towards its end:

Did you know that what you hear
is from Euripides' *Medea*
of 431
that's 431 BC!
The breaking of male monopoly
has just begun!

These words from a women's chorus
at least 2000 years before us
weren't much heeded,
but since what they sung then
should still be listened to by men
a translation's needed... (Harrison 447)

This call for a woman's perspective, a perspective that responds to the cultural dominance or 'monopoly' of masculine epistemologies, frames the narrative of *Sex-War Opera*. This passage appears in the closing scene of the text, and is a response to an earlier scene in the play when the Chorus interrupts Medea's execution saying, 'Listen!

All of you! Before/ you hear tonight's new score/ what strikes your ears?' (370). The equivalent to the Euripidean choral speech calling for new songs to be sung about women (Warner 73), these passages emphasise that *Sex-War Opera* is primarily concerned with constructing a 'new song' about women, a new version of a mythology that has historically demonised women. But how exactly does *Sex-War Opera* construct its appeal for new narratives, and how progressive is its 'new song' about women?

Responding to Patriarchal Canons

Sex-War Opera opens with a representation of the infanticidal mother as a fetishised image of ultimate horror. Before a growing effigy of Medea wielding a knife, the male chorus recites what the text describes as their 'multi-lingual hatred' (366). The chorus quotes from eleven literary, theatrical and operatic versions of the Medea myth that demonise Medea for the murder of her children. The quotes are taken from the Medeas of Euripides, Seneca, Pierre Corneille and Luigi Cherubini, amongst others, who variously describe Medea as a barbarian, tigress, witch and wretch. The effect is a sense of relentless hostility directed towards Medea as the infanticidal mother emanating from a range of texts within the Western literary and musical canons. However, the spectre of Medea eventually overwhelms the chanting men; as it grows, the chorus' reaction shifts from escalating vocal hostility to silent fear: like the Lacanian Other, the more it is fought against, the more its power grows (Žižek 6).

The suggestion built into this dramatic opening of *Sex-War Opera* is twofold. Firstly, the cross-cultural hatred directed towards Medea as a maternal child killer confirms the pervasive but problematic idea that maternal infanticide is universally considered abhorrent and thus justifiably condemned. Secondly, the opening of *Sex-War Opera* demonstrates the role of textual genealogy in reproducing and continuing particular discourses as cultural institutions.

Sex-War Opera's incorporation of other Medea narratives from the corpus of the Western literary and musical canons points towards the formative role of artistic canons in institutionalising patriarchal ideologies and the symbolic arrangements that perpetuate women's oppression. *Sex-War Opera* suggests that the ideologies of the Medea narrative are consistently reiterated across the continuum of the Western literary canon: Harrison's text refers to the ancient Euripidean *Medea* as well as its Roman, Renaissance, nineteenth century and other counterparts, in several languages and translations. Harrison's text is thus suggestive of the role of literary and artistic canons in perpetuating and reproducing ideologies about women. In *Sex-War Opera*, the narrative of Medea becomes representative of the discourses that render the figure of the 'bad mother' as a fetish of hatred; the opera, thus, questions the various literary, theatrical and musical institutions that give form to the Medea myth for their complicity with dominant, misogynising ideologies.

The point of an inherent male bias in the literary canon is a conventional charge of feminist literary criticism (Gilbert and Gubar, Djikstra). It is also suggestively affirmed in *Sex-War Opera* when the Chorus voices a suspicion of the fact that in musical drama, specifically operas such as *Tosca*, *Carmen* and *Madame Butterfly*, women always die (369). The Chorus proclaims, '... women in their last death-throes/ have always drawn male fans' bravos/ and fags' applause!' (369). The suggestion is that women on stage die as a result of a male fantasy to see them die; theatrical

representations of dying women fulfill an institutional, misogynising desire to destroy women. This idea that canonical, operatic narratives service the subjectivity of the masculine subject becomes explicit when the female Chorus asks ‘which sex does a myth support’? What male propaganda lurks/ behind most operatic works/ that Music’s masking’? (370). While this idea is open to the criticism of being reductive and essentialising about masculine desires and the politics implicit in artistic productions authored by men (see Žižek and Dolar 6), it has leverage from the fact that the classical music and operatic canon has, up until the late twentieth century, been dominated by the works of male composers.

Sex-War Opera politicises the ‘masked agenda’ of opera when the male chorus suggests that they do not want to see opera if they are to hear the preaching of women’s rights. The male chorus insists that it would prefer to see opera only so that they can ‘hear sopranos sing/ on gala night’ (369). The male chorus’ implicit suggestion is that ‘the opera’ is essentially an apolitical space, as if the aesthetic productions of ‘high culture’ can operate outside politics – which they clearly do not (see, for example, Said 137-57). However, in the light of the earlier comments of the female chorus, this response reads as a deliberate occlusion and obfuscation (‘masking’) of the politics of operatic dramas, via the male-serving romanticism inherent in the idea that music is apolitical.

The myth of Eve from the biblical book of *Genesis*, like the narrative paradigms of opera, is another key cultural institution that *Sex-War Opera* infers is part of the battery of phallogocentric myth and ideology. In the scene of Medea’s execution, the State Official [Jason], after complaining about the rising cases of maternal infanticide, appeals to God the Father, telling him that he should have left Eve in the form of Adam’s rib (368). By doing this, the text draws attention to the misogyny of the biblical narrative of *Genesis* in which the ‘first woman’ is the cause, and the person to blame, for the fall from paradise. Harrison’s text thus echoes feminist critiques of this influential and defining myth of femininity in Western culture (Rich 118-23; Kristeva 17-24, and Ostriker 37-8).

Institutions of Marriage & Kinship

After the scene in which the male chorus’ chants its multilingual hatred towards Medea, the narrative of *Sex-War Opera* depicts two modern ceremonial processions that are suggestive of women’s subjugation in a patriarchal society. The first procession is of a woman on death row being escorted to an electric chair; she is called in the text ‘Medea’ and her crime is the murder of her children. The second procession is that of a wedding, where a bride, named in the text as both Creusa and Hysipyle, is taken to a golden throne. The two figures are visually linked to each other; their respective ‘seats’ mirror each other on the stage and Creusa’s golden bridal crown is reminiscent of the electrocution cap worn by Medea (367). Further complicating the scene is the representation of two, apparently conflicting, narratives in the text that both detail the circumstances of the death of Creusa: the death of Creusa through Medea’s gift to her of a poisoned bridal gown and robe; and the death of Creusa through the apparatus of state law.

The visual mirroring of Creusa’s wedding and the electrocution ceremony of the modern Medea is suggestive of an equivalence between the two events: the implicit idea

is that both represent institutions that are complicit with the interests of men. Provocatively, Harrison's play compares marriage with capital punishment; it is suggestive that when the electrocution lever is finally pulled, it is the bride, the Creusa figure, who is electrocuted rather than the convicted criminal, the modern Medea figure (371). While this narrative move is perplexing because it is not in alignment with the idea of maternal infanticide as a punishable crime, the dramatic presentation of the execution of a bride has a symbolic resonance with the dissidence implicit in the Euripidean *Medea*. The execution of the bride echoes the Euripidean and 1970s radical feminist idea that marriage is an institution that primarily serves the interests of men and a patriarchal society. More specifically, the execution of the bride suggests that marriage is like a punishment for women, an idea that is continuous with the argument of Adrienne Rich in *Of Woman Born*, the iconic feminist critique of the logic of self-sacrifice that informs both marriage and its complicit institution of motherhood.

The electrocution of Creusa is significant because it implicitly raises the question: whom do the discourses of maternal criminality really affect? The answer, following the logic of *Sex-War Opera* would be: all women. The suggestion is that the sensationalising discourse of the alleged maternal child-murderer's criminality fatally affects the lives of all women. The figures of the good bride (Creusa) and the bad mother (Medea) represent formative discourses of female subjectivity, particularly in a society that functionalises women to the role of child-bearers. *Sex-War Opera* represents these discourses as enacting a symbolic violence upon the female subject. The text constructs Creusa as a bride who is representative of the women who participate in the social institution of marriage; she represents their complicity with this institution and the sacrifices that it entails. That is, Creusa, by complying with the dictates of the institution of marriage also in effect reinforces the phallogocentric social institutions that prescribe women in specific roles and that inflict symbolic violence upon them. *Sex-War Opera's* representation of the electrocution of Creusa thus becomes a symbolic register of institutional patriarchal violence against women, a violence that is inscribed on their bodies.

Jason does not recognise the sexism or gender dissymmetry of patriarchal institutional discourses. In the scene of Medea's second confrontation with Jason, he tells Medea that their sons will remain safe in Corinth and 'will want for naught' (415). To this, Medea replies that they will want 'only for a mother' and hence, by remaining in Corinth, their safety will be 'dearly brought' (415). Jason does not recognise the value of the mother precisely because he is a product of a patriarchal society that systematically denigrates and marginalises the value and subjectivity of mothers. After this exchange between Jason and Medea, *Sex-War Opera* foregrounds the specifically patrilineal structures of child ownership to further its politicisation of the social conventions that marginalise maternal subjectivity. Medea, in a rhetorical correction of her relationship to her children, tells Jason that she will send wedding gifts to Creusa so that Creusa will love 'our, no *your* sons' (415). This line is a strategic phrasing of the idea of child ownership, designed to seduce both Jason and Creusa through its displacement of Medea's symbolic connection to her sons. However, Medea's phrasing of this line also points towards a recognition of the dissymmetrical operations of patriarchal kinship structures that construct ownership, and thus power, primarily with fathers rather than mothers.

Discourses of Maternity & Infanticide

In *Sex-War Opera*, in the scene of the state execution of Medea, the State Official [Jason] blames the rising occurrence of maternal infanticide in modernity on the women's liberation movement (368). This section of the text is resonant with the hostility of nineteenth century *fin de siècle* responses to the New Woman (see Djikstra 333-51) as well as some contemporary responses to feminism. So, while Jason's hostility to women's liberation sensationalises feminism's social influence, it remains historically consonant with the prevalent criticisms that are routinely directed at the movement: as Eva Cox notes, feminists are often accused of anti-motherhood in a way that conspires to derogate the value of the feminist movement (Cox 1). The image of maternal infanticide that Harrison's text foregrounds then is expedient to a feminist project: it allows for an exposure of popular diatribes against feminism and foregrounds the idea that such sensationalising discourses operate to obfuscate a feminist voice.

The connection between the mythological figure of Medea and modern murderous mothers in *Sex-War Opera* relies on the assumption that the modern construction of maternal infanticide is informed by a 'sex-war' where mythologies of gender are used as weapons between (conventional, patriarchal) men and (feminist, politicising) women. Indeed, the mythology of motherhood is, perhaps, the singularly most important discursive formation that feminists have had to grapple with in the 'sex-war' that comprises the libertarian struggle for sexual equality. This point is illustrated in classic feminist studies on motherhood, such as those by Adrienne Rich, Dorothy Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Ann Dally and Elisabeth Badinter, as well as in the more recent and nuanced studies by (for example) Patrice DiQuinzio, Michelle Boulous Walker and Sara Ruddick. Maternity remains a pivotal political site of feminist criticism due to the consistent reduction in patriarchal societies of women to the maternal function and the role of reproduction. Indeed, maternity is integral to, and complicit in, conventional and patriarchal discourses that only provide limiting and prescriptive social roles for women, defining them primarily through their relationship to others – men and children – rather than defining the female subject in terms of their individuality (see DiQuinzio x-xvii).

Harrison's text draws attention to the discourses of maternity that operate as part of the social order's disciplinary process that inscribes women's bodies and determines their subjectivity. Following the Euripidean narrative, when Medea contemplates murdering her children in *Sex-War Opera* she oscillates between conviction and hesitancy in going through with her plans (418). This affirms the complexity of a mother's subjectivity, displacing conventional tropes of the essentially nurturing maternal bond and a unified maternal subject. The story of *Medea*, as relayed by *Sex-War Opera*, lives out the repressed underside of the conventional image of the nurturing mother. However, Medea's repeated lament that she will never see her sons make their marriage beds, or place garlands on their heads and see them married (420) suggests that the Medea of *Sex-War Opera* will also regret the murder of her children. Indeed, the text describes these ideas as being 'like a thought that will not leave the mind' (420) and the text repeats them to emphasise their obstinacy (427 and 430). In this respect, *Sex-War Opera* constructs Medea according to the conventional and naturalised representation of the 'mother behaving naturally': the mother that will be sorry to see the death of her sons. Although the text, through fleeting representations of the mother

contemplating infanticide, alludes to the Euripidean de-naturalisation of maternal love, it finally displaces the Euripidean deconstruction of maternity in favour of politicising the fetishisation of Medea as an infanticidal, 'unnatural' and evil mother.

Sex-War Opera does not, in the end, subscribe to the narrative tradition of Medea as the murderer of her children. Instead, it presents two versions of the episode of the death of Medea's children to emphasise the fact that the canonical Euripidean version is only one of several mythical narrative traditions. After the scene of the death of Creusa and Medea's murder of her children, *Sex-War Opera* presents a variation of the mythical tradition of Medea that it constructs as more accurate and 'true.' In this alternative tradition, Medea is a goddess who has fourteen sons pursued by the Corinthian mob who systematically 'stone' each one of the sons to death (429-30). By privileging this alternative variation of the Medea legend, given in antiquity by Pausanias (Page xvii), *Sex-War Opera* politicises the dynamics of selectivity that canonises some narratives over others, pointing towards the ideological nature of canonisation.

Harrison's text thus suggests that the narrative variations regarding the circumstances of the murder of Medea's children and the identity of who instigates it reveal the shifting ideological uses of the Medea myth. The narrative explicitly relays the idea of the political uses of the Medea narrative in the commentary on the two versions between the onlookers, the Downstage Man (DSM) and Downstage Woman (DSW). In response to the representation of a mob of Corinthians murdering Medea's fourteen children, the DSM insists that this version is not the true or 'proper' story. The DSW replies that the tradition of Medea as the murderer of her two children is a specifically male version of the story, and that the 'true story' is that there were fourteen sons (431). She explains that the Corinthians bribed Euripides to represent Medea as a murderer. What is significant in this dialogue is that it presents one version of the myth as true and the other as false, gendering and essentialising them as male or female: the true version is female, the untrue version is male. In terms of furthering a feminist project, this schematic presentation is potentially useful in foregrounding the sexual politics that are inherent in the question of who controls and formulates the authoritative works of a literary canon.

In effect, the spectre of maternal infanticide in *Sex-War Opera* inscribes two conflicting discourses upon its representation of the maternal body. It alludes to the Euripidean idea that the maternal bond is a naturalised and hence mythological construct. However, it also, simultaneously and paradoxically, constructs and reiterates maternal infanticide as a horrific act that only a misogynist narrative tradition could affirm. Thus, instead of critically examining conventional discursive 'conceptions' of maternity, *Sex-War Opera*, in the end, reproduces them. The premise of the play is that the Euripidean representation of maternal infanticide, like other canonical representations of the monstrous-feminine, services a cohesive, misogynising and patriarchal project. While the idea of a unified and monolithic 'patriarchy' has been consistently attacked by feminists as simplistic, *Sex-War Opera* strategically deploys the idea of a unified patriarchy to construct its contrary, enunciative and political position; that is, it mobilises what Diana Fuss describes as a strategic use of an essentialism (Fuss 18). However, the text's suggestion that Euripides 'blackened the woman in his play' (431) uncritically endorses the discourses that immediately

condemn maternal infanticide as unjustifiable and unnatural, thus displacing the otherwise radicalising significance of the Euripidean representation of maternal infanticide (see Kvistad 209-18). In the end, *Sex-War Opera* offers limited examination of the discursive construction of the infanticidal mother; it does not problematise this figure's complicity with idealisations of the full-time mother and innocent child or with phallogocentric discourses of the rights-bearing individual. Instead there is a simple disavowal of the tradition of Medea's maternal infanticide and the canonical Euripidean version of the story. Thus, *Sex-War Opera* abandons an opportunity to re-write a discourse about the maternal subject and in its stead affirms a safer, conventional and hegemonic construction of maternity.

Inscriptions of Gender Dissymmetry

While *Sex-War Opera* may be conventional in its final reproduction or affirmation of the nurturing maternal subject, it retains its ostensibly feminist political edge by emphasising social arrangements of gender dissymmetry. In anticipation of Medea's electrocution, the Chorus establishes a link between the figure of Medea and modern constructions of murderous mothers by the public news media. The text explicitly describes the Chorus' commentary during this scene as a 'feminist critique' (371). In it, the Chorus suggests that the contemporary mass media builds mythologies about women, especially women convicted of crimes such as child murder:

Some mother, some deserted wife
kills her kids with a kitchen knife,
here, today!
When you read the press reviews
of what you're seeing she'll be news
and not a play.

MOM KILLS KIDS reads *New York Post*
and that "mom" 's MEDEA's ghost
still unfulfilled.
As long as things go on like this
without a sex-war armistice
kids will be killed.

Not costumes and old myths of Greece;
the Argonauts and Golden Fleece –
Manhattan!
Infanticide appears to grow
and in the female crime bureau
files fatten.

And the sex-war's still being fought,
which sex does a myth support?
you should be asking.
What male propaganda lurks
behind most operatic works
that Music's unmasking?

Beneath *all* Greek mythology
are struggles between HE and SHE
that we're still waging.
In every quiet suburban wife
dissatisfied with married life
is MEDEA, raging! (370-1).

The text's framing of tabloid representations of maternal infanticide is a call for a discourse analysis of modern mythologies about destructive forms of maternity. In asking for the identity of those whom the Medea myth supports, the Chorus implicitly charges the modern mass media for championing the views of men in their constructions of destructive maternity. It suggests that it is difficult for the modern mass media *not* to mythologise and sensationalise maternal infanticide and child murder. This has a degree of credence in contemporary cultural histories of mothers accused of infanticide. For example, the Lindy Chamberlain case (1980-7) in Australia led to publications that exalted the crime as a type of 'ultimate crime.' One pulp commentary sensationally dubbed it 'the trial of the century' (Brien); another more incisive feminist commentator, explicitly compared Lindy Chamberlain to Medea (Mead 20). Similarly, in Melbourne 2003, the convicted maternal child killer Kathleen Folbigg, after being found guilty of the murder of her four children, was described as 'the most hated woman on earth' (Knowles 3). In a meditation on maternal infanticide, the Australian Kathleen Folbigg case and the American Paula Yates case, Joanne Fedler wrote: "Perhaps, if hell exists, Yates and Folbigg will burn for what they have done" (43). The point is that such media constructions of accused child killers buy into what might be called a Medea mythology where maternal infanticide becomes sensationalised as a type of 'ultimate crime,' a crime of mythical and symbolic proportions that speaks to socially ascribed ideas of criminality and Otherness – and by extension, discursive constructions of the 'human' subject.

However, the sensationalist representations of infanticidal mothers in the mass media can be read as the repressed underside of a society that publicly valorises the image of the devoted mother, whose life revolves around her children (Salecl 2473). What is at stake, and what is played out in the discourses of the mass media, are the symbolic meanings attached to women's bodies as maternal 'life giving' subjects: the ideal of the nurturing mother and the evil of the infanticidal mother, it would seem, comprise a powerful mythology that needs both reiteration and defending. In other words, the media representations that sensationalise constructions of maternal infanticide can be interpreted as the result of a persistent mythology that generally privileges some perspectives over others, and when it comes to representations of maternal infanticide, arguably privileges the perspectives of men over women - just as the Lindy Chamberlain case called for a feminist interrogation, most famously made by Kerry Goldsworthy (19-20).

Sex-War Opera also foregrounds the issue of institutional sexism through its representation of the discursive conventions that gender the domestic and public spheres. In the scene that introduces the Argonauts, Jason's crew affirm their love of their life at sea, their love of 'the brine and the boiling foam and the steady beat of the heavy oars' before revealing that, more specifically, they are

glad to be away from the women at home
 away from women's incessant demands
 into the sort of heroic life
 a man couldn't share with any wife,
 and only a man understands (375).

This passage both reproduces and questions the gendering of public and private spaces. Schematically, these spaces become the masculine space of homosocial relations that is also the site of men's careers, and the feminine space of the home, domesticity and men's marital links to their wives. One is a space for the heroic; the other is the epitome of an un-heroic space. The point is that Harrison's text suggests that these spaces are gendered in a way that is exclusionary and misogynist; they are arranged on the premise that women are 'unable to understand' a 'truly manly heroic life' (375). When Jason takes Medea on his ship, the *Argo*, to escape the wrath of her father, the crew detests her presence. Several Argonauts pitch their contempt at Medea, calling her a 'damned woman' and a 'foreign bitch' and telling Jason to throw her in the sea (403). The representation of a binary scheme of gendered spaces in *Sex-War Opera* is part of its exposition of the way in which gendering discourses frame and control the activities of men and women.

Hercules epitomises the ideal of the socialised male subject; he encourages others to conform to the Law of the Father. When Hercules converses with the Sons of Medea, he tells them that it is 'time to move on from mother's milk to wine' and that it is 'time to cut the umbilical cord, time to make a start on manly things' (423). Hercules' speech to Medea's sons ascribes a primacy to the realm of the maternal; it becomes the realm that the male subject needs to renounce, disavow and deny if he is to develop and evolve according to the symbolic precepts of the patriarchal social order. Hercules insists that women, like femininity, should be regarded with contempt: he says women are bad for the body and the soul, he brands all women as wicked whores, and he tritely wishes death upon his wife (377-9). *Sex-War Opera* constructs this blatant misogyny, however, as a logical outcome of a symbolic order that is designed by and for men.

Another logical extension of Hercules' subscription to hegemonic, homosocial bonds between men is his homosexuality. As noted by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, homosocial relations that structure men's relations with each other exist on a continuum of desire, including repressed homosexual desire (1-2). Prefiguring Sedgwick's study, *Sex-War Opera* dramatises the repressed underside of homosociality for subversive, political purposes. The text subverts Hercules' championing of homosocial relations by rendering it as, more specifically, homosexual: Hercules' homosocial values quickly become, simultaneously but not necessarily discontinuously, homosexual. In the scene when Hercules talks to the Sons of Medea on their way to Creusa's wedding, he tells them of the value of masculinity. Hercules says that it is good to know how to "throw a man on his back with the flip of a hip" and to "get to know what a man's muscles are for" before trying to entice Medea's children to feel his 'iron thighs' (422). The homosexual, pedophilic allusions operating within the economy of Hercules' macho banter represents precisely what more conventional homosocial relations repress: homosexuality. Harrison's text, thus, subverts homosociality by presenting homosexuality as one logical extension and consequence of it. In this way, *Sex-War Opera* strategically mobilises conservative homophobic discourses to symbolically

‘unman’ and humiliate Hercules. However, despite the implicit and perhaps inadvertent endorsement of homophobia, *Sex-War Opera*’s allusion to pedophilic relations constructs a dramatic and provocative representation of the abuses of the establishment upon those whom it is yet to invest with the privileges of a rights-bearing subject.

Sex-War Opera’s representation of the establishment’s sexism and abuse of power, particularly as summarised in the character of Hercules, forms a moralising narrative about the doomed fate of solipsistic social arrangements that are oppressive to the feminine. Presumably in response to the Argonauts’ misogyny, the triple goddess magically makes the crew of the Argo suffer at the hands of women. The punishment of Hercules is particularly graphic and is induced by a moment of epiphany. Heracles realises that the monsters he once slew were in fact representations of the mother in disguise (434), an idea recalling certain feminist commentaries on ancient myth (for example, Tuana 255). As he descends into madness and identifies with the repressed feminine, Hercules replaces his traditional clothing of lion-skin with women’s clothes (434). In mockery of the heroic labours for which Hercules is best known in myth, Hercules undertakes a series of ‘women’s labours.’ These consist of:

A lifetime’s famous labours, wars
finishing with female chores,
peeling carrots, mopping floors!

Not cutting off the Hydra’s head
but struggling with sewing thread (435).

By depicting Hercules performing these domestic tasks, the text draws attention to the gendering of such practices. *Sex-War Opera* thus politicises the ways in which discourses of gender inform everyday life and become naturalised in conventions of behaviour that service, and are integral to, social arrangements of sexual dissymmetry.

The circumstances surrounding Hercules’ madness further emphasise the entrenched hegemonies of sexual dissymmetry. Echoing the mythological tradition in which Hera drives Heracles mad, the triple goddess of *Sex-War Opera* drives Hercules ‘off his head,’ with the result that he ends up murdering his children, clubbing them to death (436). The text bases this infanticide episode on a narrative tradition of the Hercules myth that is significantly marginalised in favour of the stories that celebrate his heroic conquests. The Downstage Woman notes the apparent double-standard that informs the construction of Hercules’ mythical career as essentially heroic while Medea remains known, primarily, for the murder of her children. The Downstage Woman says, “ ‘He killed his children! I don’t hear you/ give even a *sotto voce* boo... So where is Hercules’s electric chair... is Medea/ the one child-murderer you fear [?]’ ” (437). This dialogue emphasises the gendered dissymmetry that structures the received mythical traditions of two child murderers: the man (Hercules) apparently gets away with it, but the woman (Medea) is demonised and inextricably marked by it. Thus, for *Sex-War Opera*, the Euripidean tradition of Medea as the mother who killed her children becomes readable as an ‘old male-concocted curse/ of infant slayer’ (445). It is men, as the speakers within the social order, who give form to the social order that women, such as Medea, must negotiate.

The idea that representations of maternal infanticide are encoded in particular and different ways to paternal infanticide is a point illustrated by the contrasting reception of the Medea and Hercules myths. This reception is symptomatic of a profound and structural sexual dissymmetry in Western culture: a point that *Sex-War Opera* reiterates through its references to the various canonical texts that construct and reiterate Medea as a figure of hatred but that systematically neglect to indict Hercules or Agamemnon in a comparable way. For *Sex-War Opera*, 'tabloid Medeas' are politically suspicious and questionable representations precisely because they mirror this Medea mythology; they reproduce fetishisations of feminine evil that are arguably complicit with discourses that privilege masculine subjectivity. Through its construction of this politicising argument, the Euripidean motif of infanticide becomes a vehicle for *Sex-War Opera* to explore the 'invisible,' silenced, naturalised discourses that generate and sustain social arrangements of dissymmetry. In this respect, *Sex-War Opera* strategically mobilises and transforms what initially appears as the 'misogynist' narrative episode of Medea's infanticide into an emancipatory discourse.

Sex-War Opera has structural similarities with other modern feminist Medeas because they also disavow the Euripidean narrative of Medea's infanticide. This phenomenon, this pattern of disavowal, has proved to be politically useful: it has enabled reflection upon the ideological uses of canonical and other narratives to reinforce structures of gender relations, as well as reflection upon the related discourses that inform the social practices, rights and expectations of, and for, the feminine subject.

However, the modern feminist Medeas disavowal of the Euripidean narrative of infanticide is not the only or most powerful way to construct an oppositional voice. The provocation inherent in the affirmation of the representation of maternal infanticide could, for example, further politicise female subjectivity by foregrounding the shifting discourses of rights-bearing subjectivity across cultural and historical contexts and across the categories of sexual difference. That is, while the Medeas of Harrison, Wolf, Greenwood and others strategically disavow the Euripidean narrative tradition of Medea's infanticide to realise their political purpose, they are, ironically, in danger of inadvertently reifying the conservative constructions of maternal subjectivity and individualism that they might more usefully contest. Further, by implicitly condemning Medea's infanticide, they buy into the symbolic investments encoded in the figure of the infant as a representative of the human subject or rights-bearing individual that has, historically, been exclusively masculine (see Stormer 110-1).

The disavowal of the Euripidean infanticide narrative in the modern feminist Medeas is attributable to, and symptomatic of, feminism's origins within the humanist tradition of liberation theory (see Curthoys 109). However, if, as Nathan Stormer asserts, the humanist tradition is also one that has historically marginalised and denigrated feminine subjectivity, there is an underlying danger that feminist discourse may unwittingly reiterate the masculinist bias of the humanist tradition to which it is indebted. This would seem to be the case in the feminist interpretations that implicitly condemn the narrative of Medea's infanticide: by affirming the infant as a rights-bearing subject or subject of value, they displace the rights of the feminine subject. These disavowals of the Euripidean narrative are not only in danger of naturalising and perpetuating depoliticised discourses of 'the individual,' however. They are also in

danger of reinstating the myth of the nurturing mother and of silencing an analysis of the discourses that construct maternal infanticide as a radical act in the first instance.

In other words, the strategy of disavowal inadvertently marginalises the (maternal, feminine) subjectivity of the instigator of infanticide, Medea, and occludes the broader, structural, and formative role of the State or social order in endorsing or adjudicating practices of violent inscription on its subjects. In emphasising the personal, moral transgression of Medea's infanticide, the modern feminist Medeas that disavow infanticide occlude the political circumstances of Medea's predicament in the narrative that predisposed her to conduct the infanticide: namely the threat of the Corinthian establishment to murder her children and Medea's appropriation of the institutional right of the paternal subject to murder *his* children. Positioned outside the logic of her 'personal revenge' upon Jason, Medea's infanticide takes on a political, strategic significance: it affirms her agency, her defiance, her refusal of subjugation, and exposes the discourses that engender and perpetuate sexual dissymmetry.

The symbolic role of Medea's attributed infanticide, even in the modern feminist narrative renderings that disavow it, however, remains radical: it is a spectre that haunts their rejection of it. Despite their softening of the radicalising potential of Euripides' narrative of infanticide, the modern feminist Medeas bolster their politics through their engagement with the variety and complexity of the discourses that form feminine subjectivity. Although they could more compellingly and provocatively interrogate specific discourses of maternity through an affirmation of the infanticide motif, feminist Medeas, such as Tony Harrison's *Sex-War Opera*, nonetheless enable an ongoing conversation with the political effects of the competing and (now) shifting discourses of feminine subjectivity. It is to this emancipatory project, and others like it, to which the narrative of Euripides' *Medea* owes its enduring appeal and ongoing reproduction in the modern world.

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Özet

Anaerkil Kötü Niyetin Feminist Politikası: Tony Harrison'ın *Medea: A Sex-War Opera* (1985) Adlı Eseri

Tony Harrison'ın *Medea: A Sex-War Opera* (1985) adlı eseri, Euripides'e ait klasik kadın düşmanı anlatı şablonunu bebek katili temsili yüzünden açıkça kınar. Euripides'in anlatı geleneğine karşılık olarak *Sex-War Opera*, cinsiyet kazandırılmış anlatılar, söylemler ve kadın düşmanlığını ve toplumsal anlamda cinsel asimetriyi devam ettiren kurumların eleştirisini yapar. Kaldı ki, feminist söyleme olan yakınlığının yanında, *Sex War Opera*'nın feminist siyaseti sınırlıdır: siyasal projesini annelik bağını yeniden üretmektense onun doğallaştırılmasını sorgulayarak daha radikal bir şekilde gerçekleştirmiş olabilirdi. Bu makale, merkezde, farkına varmak, açığa çıkarmak ve annelik bağları üzerine kurulu kültürel mitleri eleştirmek yoluyla; hem Euripides'in metinlerinin radikal siyasal potansiyelinin hem de Medea anlatılarının gücünün ve Batı kültürel hayal gücü üzerindeki etkisinin takdir edilebileceğini ileri sürmektedir.

**The Neglected Petry Repertoire:
An Alternative Witness in *Country Place***

Amy Lee

Ann Petry has an unusual status in the context of contemporary American literature. When her first novel, *The Street*, appeared in 1946, she was hailed by some as the female equivalent of Richard Wright because Lutie Johnson, the female protagonist in the novel, echoes Thomas Biggers in her suffering from the same kind of oppressions as depicted in *The Native Son*, yet it has made another landmark in black literature.¹ Hernton wrote that “*The Street* was the first writing in which a black man is killed by a black woman for being an unmitigated villain in the oppression of that woman” (59). The successful rendering of a young black woman who unfortunately and mistakenly believes in the American dream firmly establishes Ann Petry as a leading female writer in the history of black protest novel which is regarded as the golden period of black American literature in the 1940s. Petry, who started her writing career as a journalist, wrote numerous short stories and two more novels. Her third novel, *The Narrows*, which is a courageous pondering of an interracial relationship in the mid-twentieth century America, is well-received by critics and readers as a whole. The depiction of a romantic relationship between Camilo Williams Treadway, a white heiress, and Link, a black orphan who grows up in the margins of the rich white American society, pushes the frontier of black writing beyond the scope of immediate oppression, to include complex issues relating to class and gender conflicts among and between the races. The realistic descriptions in Ann Petry’s fictions have been highly praised as one of her trademarks, reflecting an intelligent use of real-life materials gathered in her earlier journalistic career.

Ann Petry’s second novel, *Country Place* (1947), however, does not receive as much critical attention as her two other novels, and critics’ comments are usually less

¹ There has been a lot of discussion of Petry’s first novel, *The Street* (1946). While the plot mirrors in many ways the fate of a black person living in the white American society in the 1940s, using a woman as the main character is a new and daring move. The different biological identity of the protagonist makes a lot of difference in terms of the problems addressed in the novel. It is not just a matter of gender, but gender is closely related to class, and the presence of the race issue creates new complications for the gender issue. Even the social environment means different things for the two genders. The interrelationship of these factors has been discussed by the following critics: Barrett, Lindon. *Blackness and Value: Seeing Double*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Barry, Michael. “Same Train be Back Tomorrer”: Ann Petry’s *The Narrows* and the Repetition of History.” *MELUS*, 24: 1, Spring 1999, 141-159; Clark, Keith. “A Distaff Dream Deferred? Ann Perry and the Art of Subversion.” *African American Review*, 26: 3, Fall 1992, 495-505; Lenz, Gunter H. “Symbolic Space, Communal Rituals, and the Surreality of The Urban Ghetto: Harlem in Black Literature From The 1920s to The 1960s.” *Callaloo*, 0:35, Spring 1988, 309-345; Park, You-me and Gayle Wald. “Native Daughters in the Promised Land: Gender, Race and the Question of Separate Spheres.” *American Literature*, 70: 3, September 1998, 607-633; Wade-Gayles, Gloria. *No Crystal Stair: Visions of Race and Gender in Black Women’s Fiction, Revised and Updated*. Ohio: The Pilgrim Press, 1997.

adamant than those concerning the other two novels. Some critics regard *Country Place* as artistically inferior to the other novels, and Alaine Locke writes in "A Critical Retrospect of the literature of the Negro for 1947" that the novel:

for all its needle point competence, has neither the surge nor the social significance of her first novel, *The Street*. Ann Petry has deeply studied and carefully documented her setting, and it has the distinction of being an authentic cross section of New England town life instead of a vignetted Harlem ghetto (7).

The carefully studied and rendered white setting and essentially white characters, however, is not absolutely convincing to all readers. McDowell wrote in a footnote of her article discussing *The Narrows* that "*Country Place* (1947), Petry's second novel, is not discussed here because it seems to me of lower quality than the first and third novels." (141) Some critics disapprove of the story of a non-black community, which takes the novel out of the scope of protest literature which is seen as Petry's own territory. Nick Aaron Ford writes in "A Blueprint for Negro Authors" that *Country Place* is inferior to *The Street* because it is "conjuring up vicarious experiences of a white society with which [Petry] was not minutely familiar" (277). Black American writers, especially in historic moments such as the 1940s, are stuck between a loyalty towards the craft of writing and a social obligation to their racial origin.

Country Place is not without its admirers though, and for very different reasons. In "The Forties: A decade of growth", Charles Nichols, Jr. comments that black American writers in the 1940s have gained new grounds in their art, one of which is a widened exploration of the Negro experience, and "not only are these writers exploring many more aspects of negro experience, but in such works as ... *Country Place* ... they are not even primarily concerned with Negro life" (379). The plot's major concern with white setting and white characters is read as a sign of an improved craft because black writers are not restricted to subjects relating to their immediate circle only. Similarly, Arthur P. Davis writes in "Integration and Race Literature" that the advancement of Negro writing can be seen from the fact that "another group of writers have elected to show their awareness by avoiding the Negro character" (143). Robert A. Bone even goes so far as to say that *Country Place*, with only marginal Negro characters, is "the best of the assimilationist novels" (69 in Vernon E. Lattin).

Ann Petry herself, among debates as to the merits and the symbolic value of the novel, claims that the reason of her writing is only because she "happened to have been in a small town in Connecticut during a hurricane".² If we take Petry's word for the reason of the composition, *Country Place* is very much an artistic product of an impressive personal experience by a writer who has a gift of rendering a realistic environment and characters, and using these realistic elements imaginatively. How should one approach this second novel of a recognized talented writer who has gone on to produce other great works after this? Are we to read this as a failed attempt to write outside of her own immediate experience, or something readers have not allowed her to do given the historical and cultural background?

While this paper is not trying to give a definitive evaluation of the novel, it is a serious attempt to examine a critically neglected piece of work by an acclaimed writer.

² Quoted in *Interviews with Black Writers*, ed. John O'Brien (New York: Liveright, 1974), p.161.

The following discussion has two main aims. Firstly, the paper reads the novel in the context of Petry's more famous output, to note the novel as committed to criticizing the social and political situations of the 1940s American society. Secondly, the novel's deviation in form, characterization and style from Petry's two more famous novels is seen as an experiment with alternative ways to achieve the goals of protest literature in its 1940s tradition. The use, for example, of a single narrator's voice who is seemingly unrelated to the drama of human conflicts, frames the narrative as a piece of oral history now documented for posterity's pondering. A first person narrator adds subjectivity to the way the story is perceived, but it also gives it weight through the actual narration. Telling the story to the readers directly like this transforms the story from an incident in memory into part of social history.

Country Place refers to a small town Lennox, Connecticut, in New England in the 1940s after the war. When the narrator, a local drugstore owner of the name of Fraser, introduces the events of the story, he calls Lennox "a quiet place, a country place" (6) which is positioned at the point where the river pours itself to the Long Island Sound. The country place here is thus a quality of the town Lennox, and this quality has much to do with the kind of events that take place among the characters. Every summer, people from the city come to stay in this village and depart in September when summer is over, leaving Lennox "to all appearances, a quiet, sleepy village" (7). Just as Fraser is about to introduce the main characters and unfold the story, he adds as a note of explanation: "I say to all appearances because wheresoever men dwell there is always a vein of violence running under the surface quiet" (7). The location of the events, therefore, is not just a setting for fates and experiences to unfold, but it is also an active participant in the creation of the whole drama of human life.

The significance of the locale in Ann Petry's novels is a familiar feature to her readers. *The Street* is not just the physical entity of the 116th street where Lutie Johnson and her son live, but also a symbolic presence which embodies the social, cultural, economic and gender oppression under which Lutie is suffering. *The Street* has its own militia of sex-starved black and white men who prey on powerless young black women; white men who survive on exploiting black labor; black men and women who are crushed by the economic frustration; and black children who either turn into criminals or broken cowards because the Street takes away their family. *The Narrows*, Petry's third novel, shares a similar double identity as the physical environment at which the majority of the events take place, as well as a symbolically liminal space where the two binary opposites, in terms of race, economic status, gender, and truth, encounter. Link and Camilo, Abbie and Bill, Powther and Mamie, Jubine and Bullock all play out their stories in the realm and under the powers of the Narrows. Fraser says that his record of events contains "something of life and something of death, for both are to be found in a country place" (7). In Petry's fictional world, it is in the nature of the place which actively gives birth to certain stories.

Physical locations apart, characters in the novels, black and white alike, are inevitably dwarfed beside the absolute control of great Nature. At the beginning of *The Street*, even before the introduction of the main protagonist Lutie Johnson, a great wind sweeps across the whole street, seeps through cracks and openings into the crowded flats, and overwhelms not only the physical environment, but also sets the dominating mood of the entire novel. The wind literally renders Lutie blind to the

reality surrounding her, and stirs up a host of passions, dreams and illusions which fuel the development of the events. The fog, which veils the real identity of Camilo Treadway when she first meets Link, is similarly crucial in the later revelation of the conflicts among characters, and plays a central role in all moments of dramatic importance. The fog at Monmouth not only makes it difficult for characters to see clearly and act wisely, but it also renders the portrayal of the truth almost impossible without a great price. Natural phenomena are elicited to help in the representation of symbolic truths and conflicts.

The quiet Country Place also shows its true colors because of a storm. As Fraser remarks in his introduction of the story, Lennox awakens out of the usual quietude after the outrageous weather change. The storm not only physically uproots trees and destroys houses, but its underlying current stirs up hidden desires, anger, and frustration which accumulate an explosion of rage, resulting in deaths, losses, and disillusionment. Regarding the aftermath of the storm, Fraser remarks that “most of these things would have happened, anyway, but because of the storm they took place sooner than they normally would have” (7). The storm, to which Ann Petry attributes the original idea of her second novel, assumes the role of a direct agent in unleashing the power of the characters’ internal feelings and desires. Lil’s desire and the actual execution of her murder plan, Glory’s dream of fulfilling her erotic desire with Ed, Johnnie’s determination to find out and face the truth of his marriage, as well as Weasel’s anticipation of the burst of the bubble, are all carried to their finale with the additional force of the storm. Viewed as such, the characters in *Country Place* share the same role with other characters in her other novels, as puppets in the context of the social environment, and powerless in the midst of nature. Human fate is very much a result of social environment.

Against the inevitable and unavoidable forces of nature and environment, Ann Petry’s novels also show the human efforts to counteract these overwhelming impositions on human destiny. In *The Street*, in spite of the penetrating wind and the evil forces of corruption and despair in her society, Lutie still fights to get a decent place for herself and her son Bub, believing that a private flat, no matter how crowded, can take them away from the contaminating Street and bring them closer to her ideal of a decent middle class life. Min, however, puts her faith in a piece of gigantic furniture, believing that her security is to be found when she can locate an accommodation for her big table. Abbie Crunch in *The Narrows* keeps a careful watch over her house to make sure that the doorknob will shine and the kitchen does not smell of cooking because this is her way of counteracting discrimination against Negroes. Her house is her castle where she asserts her identity as equally, if not more, decent than ordinary middle class white people. Obviously Malcolm Powther, the black butler of the Treadway family, also shares this mentality, and approves of Abbie’s effort.

In Lennox, the most easily recognized construction is the Gramby House, the family seat of the wealthiest family, the Grambys. Although Fraser was born and raised in Lennox, he is also puzzled about the status of the house. He muses in the narrative:

It is called the Gramby House, never the Grambys’ house. I do not know why. Perhaps because it is the largest house in Lennox; or because it is the only brick house; or possibly because its occupants, Mrs. Gramby and her son, Mearns, were the town’s wealthiest citizens (6).

The imposing Gramby House is not only the landmark of the small town in terms of its stature, but it is also a symbolic expression of the wishes of the people in the town. Old Mrs. Gramby and Mearns are both mentally leading a “still-life”, both pretending that the change of times has not touched their lives. The determination to hold the movement of time can easily be seen in Mrs. Gramby’s action regarding the cats. Not only are they all named Leon, but with each death a similar one is sought to replace the dead one, as if the three cats have eternal lives. As for Mearns, although he is a grown man, his mental and emotional reliance on his mother makes him no different from an eight-year-old boy. The unchanging appearance of the Gramby House, however, is only an illusion the characters seize to fight the desperate battle against the changing times.

Amidst the powerful forces of the physical and cultural nature, and the desperate fight put up by the trivial human beings, what have been occurring again and again are the dreaming and the disillusionment of the individuals in all three of Ann Petry’s novels. Lutie Johnson shapes her dreams around the American ideal drawn by the example of Franklin, goes on to confront all hurdles in her way with blind courage and misplaced faith. But her “futile attempts to escape the poverty of New York’s inner city provides the most startling example of the corrosive effects of racism and poverty on the human psyche” (854), only to be disappointed and destroyed when she realizes too late that her destiny is not included in the American dream, as summarized by Henderson in her article about black women’s identity. Other characters, despite their experiences, are all under illusions of some kind. Even Mrs. Hedges, who has successfully turned her disadvantages into her assets and leads a comfortable life in *The Street*, is still under the illusion that the love of a man is to be the target of her life. Junto, the white master of the underground world in Harlem, stubbornly believes in the myth of the black whore, and that money is the all possible means to arrive at his end. The oppressors and the oppressed in *The Street* are all winding around the little finger of some kind of dreams, whose nature is by definition deceptive.

Petry has used these dreams of riches to portray the desperate need of a sense of worth and individuality in each of her characters. Every one suffers an emptiness which seems to be an inherent part of that society so that they need to hold onto some objects for identification. In *The Narrows*, Abbie’s strict moral standard comes from her belief that she has a mission to represent her kind, in behaving and living more decently than the middle class white Americans, so as to uphold the dignity of her race. What she does not understand, or refuses to see, is the degree of corruption and decadence among the “respectable” white people, who moreover will never recognize what she is struggling to assert. Similarly Powther pays a heavy price in adopting his rich employers’ value system in choosing his life partner. Camilo and Link may be tempted by the romantic idea of assimilation between different identities regarding race, class, and culture, but in their subconscious they are nonetheless very much a product of the values prevailing in *The Narrows*. Even Bullock, the chief editor of the *Monmouth Chronicle*, cannot escape the trap of self-deception, although he wants to preserve the appearance of truthfully reporting the real life of his society.

In *Country Place*, the disillusionment suffered by the Lennox inhabitants takes on an additional significance compared to the characters’ experiences in *The Street* and *The Narrows*. Lutie’s naïve faith in and final betrayal by the American dream, and Link’s being sold out by his colour, are disappointments easily recognized as owing to

their racial identity. Yet with every advantage over the Negro characters, the white community in Lennox still cannot escape from the sometimes fatal illusion. Johnnie the returning war hero finds his home a betrayed dream and his marriage a great lie. Glory finds in dismay that marriage and even the transgressive romantic relationship does not give her the freedom she seeks. Lil's scheming does not bring her the desired romance or a life of luxury. Ed Barrell, the local Don Juan, cannot achieve his dream of eternal youth even when he manages to court local women one by one. Even Old Mrs. Gramby, with her strict rules and discipline, fails to freeze time and change, and has to watch helplessly the extinction of the family name. In *Country Place*, Petry shows only too clearly that disappointment in life is not a condition restricted to a particular race, but an almost universal experience in the culture. It is a feature of the American culture to let its believers down, in spite of their race, gender and class.

Thus it is in a similar use of an overriding imagery, the symbolic significance of a physical space, and a common theme extending throughout the novels of Ann Petry that we can position *Country Place* firmly within Petry's repertoire. The locale, which has an overwhelming impact on the fate of the individual characters, has always been an equally active force on plot movement and thematic development in her novels. At the same time, the extent of nature's intervention in her stories symbolizes the current of human desires and fears underneath the seemingly polite and civilized society, when it also points out the helplessness and passivity of human endeavours. These framing similarities with her other novels are perhaps the reason why some critics endorse *Country Place* as an assimilationist novel even though all the major characters are white and the community is white.

Yet *Country Place* is more than just another social critique in the line of her two other novels. The idiosyncratic features of this essentially "white" novel have posed other possibilities. While *The Street* and *The Narrows* adopt the documentary-type of portrayals in terms of the events and the characterization, *Country Place* orients towards a sensational murder story type of narrative. This murder story narrative framework immediately calls to mind features of an established genre, among which are the special role of the narrator and the ideological position of the narration. Readers relate differently to a narrative if it is told by the recorder of a solved crime, for the reader-narrator relationship formed is one of total dependence.³ In *Country Place*, Fraser as the trustworthy narrator has given the narrative authority as official history of human life.

Doc Fraser secures the readers' trust very much in the tradition of Arthur Conan Doyle's or Agatha Christie's famous detective partners - Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson, and Hercule Poirot and Captain Hastings. Dr. Watson and Captain Hastings

³ The readers' total reliance on the narrator of crime fiction is an unwritten agreement. The whole genre of detective fiction builds upon this total acceptance of what the narrator reveals to the readers in the course of unfolding the crime. Failure to observe this convention results in either badly written, unconvincing crime fiction, or an exceptionally brilliant trick of the readers. Agatha Christie, one of the most famous British detective fiction writers, makes her name in 1926 by a brilliant violation of this agreement. *The Murder of Roger Ackroyd* is told by a first person narrator, a doctor, who turns out to be the murderer himself. Decades after its publication, critics and detective fiction fans are still examining the genius with which the writer achieves the deception.

usually act as the official recorder of their detective friend's successes, for they themselves are also involved in the investigation. Watson and Hastings are partners of the detectives who are inevitably biased in their narration, as they make personal comments during the investigation; though in fact a great deal of the joy in reading the stories comes from this intimacy between the partners. Doc Fraser, in a similar vein, imparts to us his familial root in Lennox, as well as his close connection with all the major characters in the story right at the beginning of his narration. Information he considers necessary for the readers to establish an impression of the narrator includes: "his age, where he was born, whether he be short or tall or fat or thin" (5). For very fairly he goes on to say that "fat men do not write the same kind of books that thin men write; the point of view of tall men is unlike that of short men" (5).

Once started with this note of frankness and reason, Fraser virtually takes the readers into his confidence. He even makes a confession about his personal bias against the female sex, be it human or feline; though ironically in the same breathe he reveals that he is devoted to his "partner" in the drugstore, a female cat called Banana. At this point in the narrative, readers of detective fiction may find themselves in the familiar space of the involved narrator trying to report what has already taken place, at the same time warning the readers that he might not be as objective as he wants to. The difference in this set up, however, is the partnership. Instead of the bohemian Sherlock Holmes or the funny foreigner Hercule Poirot, an altogether different species has taken her place beside the faithful narrator of the events. Banana is more than just a pet for a lonely old man, for even without the ability to use words, her attitude towards the characters finds a presence in the narrative penned by Fraser. Besides, just like the famous detectives, Banana comes out of the events miraculously untouched, and continues to eye the fallible humans from her transcendental position. Banana's status as a cat and an authoritative commentator of the human condition fits well into Petry's repertoire. And in this case, her Otherness from these white human beings gives her a special position as an Other that can observe and not be observed, reversing the position of the mainstream white and the Other black.

Felines have always been a personal mark of Petry's writing, be it short stories, novels, or even youth fiction. Harris remarked that in *Tituba of Salem Villiage*, cats are regarded as "authoritative evidence against the women who would be kind to them" (113), an agent of the devil or his reincarnation, probably something to do with the piercing feline gaze. One of the cliché ways to tell the identity of a witch during the Salem events is to see if the person is in communication with that animal or not. In Petry's novel, Tituba the black slave who is marginalized and oppressed in the New England white community finds companionship in a cat. This, however, adds to her culpability for she is seen to be closer to an animal than a human being. The absurdity of this incrimination surely points to the deep racism existing not only in the seventeenth century witch hunt but which is still prevalent in the twentieth century America. The companionship offered by the cat to Tituba, and its insight into the danger of human prejudice, puts the cat in a much more "human" position than many of the human characters in the story, black or white.

The feline has been used for different purposes in Petry's writing. In her famous short story, "Miss Muriel", the old shoemaker Mr. Bemish owns an intelligent cat, Maya-ling. The narrator likes this responsive cat, and together, they form a strange alliance

as they witness this reversed discrimination: the white Mr. Bemish being marginalized and actually expelled from a black community. The neutrality of the cat echoes the neutrality of the girl-narrator, giving them both a transcendental position in reading the reality. In *The Narrows*, the complex themes and structure also grant the feline identity an additional mythical dimension. Jimmy, an erotically hyperactive handicap who haunts the dock and scares women off, is given the nickname of the Cat; and Link during unhappy moments of his relationship with Camilo decks her with vicious and selfish qualities supposedly of a cat. It is interesting that in both these cases, it is not a real animal which the characters are referring to, but only an impression prevalent in their cultural environment. The (mis)conception of the cat-like qualities is but another illusion people blindly embrace under the influence of their culture.

In *Country Place*, feline presence reaches a new height of variety and centrality. The number of feline characters makes it impossible to ignore their metaphoric and symbolic significance in this seemingly straightforward story of love and hate, life and death. While some critics refer to this novel about white characters and white community life as inferior to other of Petry's more obvious successes, I think that the manipulation of the feline characters has created an interesting dimension to the narrative from which to understand the significance of the essentially "white" story. Beginning with the first page of the novel, cats have taken control of the non-verbal narrative, and rendered their insights and opinion known through Doc Fraser's narration. Without the need to say a thing, Banana the mother cat, the nameless black cat which dashes out into the road when Johnnie Roane comes home, and the numerous tomcats which all bear the name of Leon, make the narrative of *Country Place* what it is. Although on paper it is Doc Fraser the old drugstore owner who pens the book, Banana and the other cats in the narrative have all become powerful outsiders who have a role to play in the construction of this piece of human history.

Like many other detective stories, *Country Place* operates on a double time scale. On the one hand there is the narrative present when Doc Fraser is recalling the events already happened and choosing important details to relate in this report. After this outer frame, the story proper begins when the plot-present takes over, in this case the return of Johnnie Roane to Lennox after four years at the front. Hoping to give a surprise to his wife and his parents, he decides to take a taxi and walk into his home unannounced. Unfortunately, before he sees his folks, a shadow is cast over his return by the appearance and the accidental death of the black cat under the wheels: "The cat was flattened in the road, smashed into flat, black fur and dark red blood. The blotches of blood seemed to increase in size as [Johnnie] looked" (18). After four years of fighting for the glory of the American ideal, what welcomes Johnnie home is not the "Glory" he thinks he deserves, but a cruel sign to tell him that his ideal of glory is tainted with black people's blood. At both levels of the narration, the cat is instrumental in laying down the emotional content of the events.

Even before the revelation of the incidents to follow, no reader will imagine that the story heralded by the blood of the black cat is to be a happy one. The choice of a cat evokes other values assumed to be feline: jealousy, desire, uncontrolled emotions, ruthlessness, cool scheming, and indifference. The squashed body of the black cat is also an announcement of the nature of the human story to follow, which at different stages of development is to be commented by the silent but gazing felines which are the

Other in this human society. Whenever Banana sees The Weasel, “her tail swells to twice its normal size and she swats at him with her claws unsheathed” (5) because she has a personal dislike of the man. Banana’s dislike of The Weasel, as well as her indifference to showing it in public, has been accepted by Fraser unquestionably, justifying the authority of this Other over human matters.

The Gramby cats are similarly endowed with the authority to comment on the human condition and a freedom to express their opinions openly. When Glory goes to see her mother, Lil, who is married to Mearns and living in the Gramby House, we come face to face with the cats’ eerie power of understanding:

One of the cats jumped down from the sofa, landing on the floor with a thump that started [Glory]. She’d get rid of those devilish cats, too. They were always making sudden, uncanny movements. It was easy to believe that this one had read her thoughts and was protesting against change of any kind (48).

Not only does guilty Glory feel the sharp gazes of the cats, even the cool-headed Lil “lowered her voice and did not look toward the cats” (48) as she voices her discontent about her mother-in-law and the place. It is also interesting to see that the cat’s dislike of Glory and Lil comes from its disapproval of “change of any kind”, which is speaking old Mrs. Gramby’s words from the heart.

The Leons’ human-like understanding and judgment is evident not only in their dislike of intruders into the Gramby family, but also in their ability to “see” justice done. On the night when old Mrs. Gramby is supposed to die from too much chocolate and no insulin, Lil returns home late to see that the old lady has been saved in time and her plan falls through. Utterly crushed, she hides in her own room, afraid to face anyone because her intention is only too clear. Leon III, as usual, wants to get in, and won’t have mercy on her even on this night of disappointment and failure:

The cat yowled, making a sound so loud and so unpleasant that she covered her ears with her hands. He would probably howl outside the door for hours. She uncovered her ears to listen. His cry was outraged, as though he were possessed of a malicious human intelligence (173).

While the human beings downstairs cannot do anything about Lil’s attempted murder though they know of her intention, the cat in his way haunts her and reminds her of the monumental resistance within the four walls of the Gramby House. For the Leons are not simply pets of an old lady, their presence manifests a psychological drama involving the depths of human wishes.

Old Mrs. Gramby’s keeping up the same number of tiger-striped cats as during the time before Old Mr. Gramby’s death to pretend that things have been the same applies to her treatment of Mearns, her son, too. Mearns marries Lil only in his late 40s, and it is not a happy marriage not only because Lil and his mother do not get along, Mearns and Lil are sexually incongruent. Mearns is his mother’s boy and has never outgrown the oedipal stage: we might even believe that Lil’s affair with Ed has to do with Mearns’ sexual repression. In the old lady’s mind, Mearns and the cats are but the same thing, a symbol of her wishes to live in the ever present past. Every night, the cats are to sleep with Mearns, and in the old lady’s will, the cats are to be given to Mearns;

as both of them are ploys to her impossible dream. Compared to the human beings, the cats are the mark of reality and real living beings.

The death of the old lady and the infamous Don Juan Ed Barrell brings the curtain down to a series of intensive and passionate human drama. Some of them are badly scotched; some of them learn a lesson and will be able to move on wiser. On the whole, this drama which is prologued by the blood of the black cat and ends with a blessing to Banana, sweeps through the human community with devastation and pain. The unfaithful wives are punished, the lover is condemned and even the Weasel goes through a pretty hard time because of his irresponsibility. Those who can go on awake from their long dream and have to face the harsh reality. The murder which is the culmination of discontent and jealousy purges the community of its deep-rooted corruption and brings a possibility of new life. In the midst of this human tragedy, the only untouched party is the clear-eyed Banana who inhabits the central position of the drugstore, who is there to witness all and yet emerge clean and promising new life to come. The Weasel's final blessing, "a [sic] easy time when she has her next batch of kittens" (190) is perhaps the best indication of the cat's transcendental existence in this narrative.

As a friend of human beings, a witness to the dramatic performances of human desires, and moreover a neutral commentator on the fallible human decisions, cats in *Country Place* have moved beyond their physical existence in the narrative, and become an attitude from a higher consciousness. Examined in the context of other of Petry's works, one may see these cats as the representation of the Other, but in this case the Other who have the power to observe and to remark on what they have seen. The cats, noted as the familiar of witches, or children's companion in other of Petry's stories, have become the Other who are striking back, revealing the emptiness of the white American culture.

For those who think that this second novel is a failed attempt to write about a white community and white personalities, a reconsideration of the feline presence may help to create a different perspective. Far from a thwarted realistic narrative, the detective story framework, the first person "objective" narrator, and the feline witnesses have all come together to create an idiosyncratic marginal space to view a universal human drama. The cats, taking up a marginal yet commanding position, remind us of the marginal hand and voice of the black female writer.

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Özet

Gözardı Edilmiş Petry Repertuarı: *Country Place*'de Alternatif Bir Tanık

Ann Petry'nin ilk romanı, *The Street*, 1946 da yayınlandığında, siyahi protest edebiyatında bir kadın geleneği oluşturduğu için sevinçle karşılandı zira Amerikan toplumunda siyah deneyiminin temsilinde bir mihenk taşı olan *Native Son* (1940) romanının erkek kahramanının deneyimini yansıtıyordu. Petry bundan başka iki roman, birkaç gençlik öyküsü ve bir kısa öykü seçkisi yazdı. Eserlerine dair övgülerin büyük kısmı Petry'nin gerçekçi karakter örgüsü ve kadın kahramanlarının içinde birer birey olarak kalma mücadelesi verdiği acımasız toplumsal, politik ve ekonomik koşullarını dile getirmedeki cesareti üzerine yoğunlaşmıştır. Petry, toplumsal cinsiyetin öneminin de altını çizerek ayrımcılık üzerine kurulu bir toplumun hastalıklarına dair oldukça kapsamlı bir sorgulamaya girişmiştir.

Bununla birlikte, Petry'nin repertuarı arasında, belirgin bir şekilde göz ardı edilmesi ile dikkati çeken bir metin vardır. İkinci romanı, *Country Place* (1947), nadiren incelenmiştir ve Petry'nin ulaşmak istediği hedefler bağlamında, muhtemelen öykü tamamen beyazlar üzerine kurulduğu için, genel anlamda bir başarısızlık olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu makale, bu göz ardı edilmiş romanı tartışmakta ve diğer metinler ile benzerliklerini ortaya çıkarmak ve yazarın şahsına has özelliklerini anlamak amacı ile de genel anlamda yazarın çalışmaları bağlamında bir yere oturtmayı amaçlamaktadır. Beyazlardan oluşan bir karakter kadrosunu kullanmanın aslında kurgusal evrende beyaz ve siyahların iktidar pozisyonlarını tersine çevirme ve böylece de Öteki'nin bir kez olsun bu çalışmanın merkezinde yer alan beyaz toplum üzerine fikirlerini ortaya koyabilme ve yorum yapabilmesi yönünde bir çaba olduğu düşünülmektedir.

**Paedophile Cultures:
Child Sexual Abuse and Constructions of the Paedophile
in British and American Culture**

C. Jason Lee

Definitions, difficulties and debates

This article examines child sexual abuse in a cross-cultural context. Various scholars, most notably James Kincaid, have explained how paedophiles epitomise the deformed monster who we must construct in order to have a sense of ourselves as the normal. Paradoxically, this extreme form of otherness in many ways defines who we are and is at the centre of discourse and what we define as normal. Before I begin an analysis of the key debates, we first need to define and examine what the monstrous, the paedophile, in this context is perceived to be. Paedophile literally means child love and it has been used to describe men and women who exhibit sexual arousal towards pre-pubescent children. The term itself is unhelpful because it may give an individual an identity, a group of personal characteristics to latch onto, potentially increasing paedophilia. Not everyone who sexually abuses a child is a paedophile and a paedophile may not molest children (Wyre, 2002: 49). By labelling an abuser a psychopath or paedophile we are to some extent excusing the behaviour as merely something that needs treatment, deeming the abuse beyond the responsibility of the abuser (Hall and Lloyd, 1993). Detective Chief Inspector Bob McLachlan, head of the Paedophile Unit at New Scotland Yard London, explains the paedophile as the quintessential monster: the 'word 'paedophile' symbolises the monster in men' (Long and McLachlan, 2002: 76). In reality there are in existence paedophilias rather than paedophilia. Brian Taylor finds eight categories, some drawing distinctions between paedophiles (those interested in pre-pubertal sex partners), pederasts (those interested in boys), and ephobophiles (those interested in sex with adolescents, also known as hebephilia). Primarily the emphasis is on looking, not rape (Weeks, 1985: 228). Popularly, paedophilia is paedophilia, the monstrous. Any differences are denied and detailed thought on the subject, like the reality itself, is anathema. As Steven Angelides illustrates, there are no subspecies of the human animal that can be categorised according to behaviours and desires for these do not equal identity. Importantly, as Angelides puts it, with paedophilia we are confronted with the limits of our epistemology of identity. Normalised cultural constructions of male sexuality in terms of conquest and domination and infantilisation of the female are consistent with adult male sexual desire for children, so when examining 'deviance' we need to ask what exactly is the deviation from? (Angelides, 2004).

According to David Finkelhor, the most cited expert in the field during the 1980s and early 1990s, 'sexual victimisation' of children takes place when there is a sexual encounter between children under the age of 13 with a person at least five years their senior and encounters of children 13 to 16 with persons at least 10 years older (Weeks, 1985: 5). We might want to question the specificity of Finkelhor's age range. With the rapid growth both in information technology and in advocating the rights of children the definitions have shifted. The Department of Health in the UK at the beginning of the

twenty first century defined child sexual abuse as involving, “forcing or enticing a child or young person to take part in sexual activities, whether or not the child is aware of what is happening”. Here the absence of a specific age range means we do not have the problem of Finkelhor’s definition, but we now have problems over the lack of specificity: what is meant by ‘enticing’, ‘young person’ and ‘sexual activities’? “The activities may involve physical contact, including penetrative (e.g. rape or buggery) and non-penetrative acts”. The definition then moves straight onto the image. “They may include non-contact activities, such as involving children in looking at, or in the production of, pornographic material or watching sexual activities or encouraging children to behave in sexually inappropriate ways” (Corby, 2000: 77).

We encounter a plethora of problems when we try and establish what child sexual abuse is and try to counteract it. Brian Fraser, former Executive Director of the National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse in the US, lists the following: there is an almost limitless range of possible activities, so how can we legislate against the limitless; it is often difficult to distinguish between levels of affection, the question being what is appropriate and what is not; often the intent of the perpetrator is difficult to ascertain; there is the ongoing debate concerning the trauma from certain types of abuse; young people are increasingly sexually active, particularly in the 13 to 18 age category; and often the terminology used in the law and the categories are vague (Fraser, 1981: 72). In 1998, forensic psychiatrist Don Grubin placed the number of children sexually abused in England and Wales at between 3,500 and 72,600 (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 21). Just as defining what child sexual abuse is leads to problems, the true extent of child sexual abuse will always be a sketchy estimate.

John Silverman and David Wilson propose paedophilia to be child sexual abuse outside the family, with paedophilia being erotic arousal on the part of a physically mature adult to pre-pubertal children or to a child in the early stages of pubertal development (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 31). This diagnostic definition of paedophilia as the act or fantasy of engaging in sexual activity with pre-pubertal children outside the family as a “preferred or exclusive method of achieving sexual excitement” is not supported by the research, with those involved in incest also abusing non-family children (Itzin, 2002: 89). The 1990s was a period that saw a drop by 31 per cent in convictions in the UK. This was due to variations in record keeping from one force to another, the withdrawal or downgrading of charges for evidential reasons and the allegations being dealt with outside the criminal justice process (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 20). We see that after the main panic over paedophilia during the 1980s there was a fall in convictions yet panic over paedophiles still dominates, particularly with regards to the Internet. Children can of course be exploited on the Internet and groomed by paedophiles into meeting them but research by the Cyber Research Unit at the University of Central Lancashire claims that the majority of children report positive experiences of face-to-face meetings and typically children report meeting up with peers (O’Connell et al, 2004).

Research based on 19 studies in the USA and Canada since 1980 and published in 1994 (the period that saw a backlash against claims of child sexual abuse) found rates of adult claims of being sexually abused as a child ranging from 6 to 62 per cent for females and 3 to 16 per cent for males. This research concluded that a prevalence rate of 20 per cent for women and between 5 and 10 per cent for males was statistically

reasonable. Variations were possibly due to: the lack of a standard definition of abuse or upper age limit (from 15 to 18); absence of agreement over the age difference between abuser and abused; different sample selections; and different forms of data collection, with face-to-face interviews eliciting a higher incidence rate (Corby, 2000: 96). Abuse of boys occurs more than is popularly acknowledged, and men are possibly less likely to admit they have been abused, but in the main child sexual abuse is of girls by men. Research in 21 countries found child sexual abuse histories in at least 7 per cent of females and 3 per cent of men, ranging up to 36 per cent of women in Australia and 29 per cent of men in South Africa (Corby, 2000: 99). According to one report, in South Africa 60 children a day are raped, some less than a year old (Morton, 2004: 1). International child sex tourism has only recently been taken seriously, and it was only in 1997, with the enacting of Part 2 of the Sex Offenders Act, that British citizens could be put on trial in the UK for child sexual abuse crimes committed abroad (Long and McLachlan, 2002).

Child sexual abuse is not on the fringes of civilisation, being a significant component of numerous societies but we need to be cautious how we interpret these statistics. Some of the difficulties have already been pointed out here. Although there is increasing scientific accuracy in gathering statistics, they are manipulated in the manner in which they are produced and interpreting the implications of the results is becoming more complex with an ongoing blurring of adulthood and childhood. Increased sexual activity of children has made it harder to distinguish what exactly sexually abuse is or to define what a child is. The prototype of sexual abuse in the 1970s was incest and this enlarged in the 1980s to include the varying degrees of childhood sexual contacts with older persons, date rape, and sexual harassment in adolescence and adulthood, with meanings and differences ignored in the unifying term known as survivorship. Wendy Maltz claimed the figure of 30 to 40 per cent for victims of child sexual abuse to be conservative and, as it became emblematic of the oppression of women generally, estimates should be just under 100 per cent (Haaken, 1998: 127). Of course, there are deep problems in ignoring differences in types and levels of abuse and with bracketing everything under the label of survivorship.

Reasons for the cry of abuse

I agree with the feminist approach that sees issues concerning masculinity at the core of any explanation of child sexual abuse. Most experts concur with the view that child sexual abuse is directly related to the socialisation of men (La Fontaine 1990: 105). Feminist and psychologist Janice Haaken has convincingly argued that the incest story became a unifying myth in the feminist movement in the 1980s and 1990s, not merely because daughters revelled in victimhood, as many have maintained, but due to rage at the father. The word myth here does not mean the opposite of truth, just that truth contains more than fact, with its meaning in “a larger world of forces” (Haaken, 2003: 90). This has a mystical tinge to it but any such notion within Haaken’s psychoanalytic belief system is regressive.

Writing in the first half of the 1990s in America, for Carol Tavris child sexual abuse stories crystallised society’s anxieties about the vulnerability of children, the changing roles of women, and the norms of sexuality. Child sexual abuse provides “a clearer focus than such vague enemies as ‘the system’, sexism, deadening work ...

‘sexual abuse’ is a metaphor for all that is wrong” (Ofshe and Watters, 1996: 11). She was vehemently condemned as a monstrous molester herself for merely uttering such things (Showalter, 1997: 157). As Haaken explains, patients and therapists became convinced that the source of female disturbances lay in forgotten childhood trauma, with primal scenes of sexual violence and graphic images of family barbarism giving way to stories of child sex abuse rings and satanic rituals (Haaken, 1998: 3). Between 1989 and 1993 numerous books and articles were written in the US and UK supporting allegations of ritual abuse but research indicated there was no evidence of organised ritual abuse of this nature (La Fontaine, 1998: 164). Elizabeth Loftus, one of the most high profile experts on false memory, comprehensively dismisses recovered memory claims and the belief that incest and molestation are central to female experience (Loftus and Ketcham, 1994: 142). Clearly false memory is such a contentious area more empirical work needs to be carried out in this field. More balanced work in the US points to the desperate need for certainty on both sides of the recovered/false memory spectrum (Pope and Brown, 1998). With the malleability of memory this certainty is illusory.

Elaine Showalter controversially analyses chronic fatigue syndrome, gulf war syndrome, recovered memory, multiple personality syndrome, satanic ritual abuse, and alien abduction, collectively (1997). For Showalter women throughout history suffered from hysterical symptoms and still do because they, like men, convert feelings into symptoms, when speaking is impossible due to shame, guilt, or helplessness. Women do not make these stories up intentionally to deceive, but they need to establish an identity, work out anger, or respond to cultural pressure. In his later book *Erotic Innocence- The Culture of Child Molesting* (1998), James Kincaid argues the common belief is that millions of adults find children so attractive they will do anything to entice them, with questions of race, gender and class being removed in the ‘pure’ desired child. Kincaid wrongly claims that adults and children do not exist (251), in that while the positioning of adulthood and childhood has a cultural context, this ignores biology. We may question what exactly makes a human being an adult but the onset of puberty is a biological phenomenon influenced by the cultural, social and historical. Writing in an American context, problematically, for Kincaid all men desire a certain type of child. While Kincaid’s arguments are convincing, what we are dealing with here is more than a mere Freudian form of repression, or in more popular terms ‘denial’. Kincaid claims simultaneously that children do not exist and that ‘child abuse is an epidemic and memory holds the key’ (244). Due to the malleability of memory it can never hold the key. By proclaiming child sexual abuse to be an epidemic he promotes the myth of the all-powerful unstoppable prevalent paedophile, a myth that this article seeks to expose.

For Jean Baudrillard the western world was promised paradise on earth by commercial industrialism. Baudrillard explained, this was “detailed in the Hollywood Myth that replaced the paradise in heaven of the Christian myth. And now psychology must replace them both with the myth of paradise through self-knowledge” (Baudrillard, 1993: 271). This powerful myth encourages and encapsulates the hunt for and invention of memories for we find that ontologically and epistemologically there is the promotion of the myth that the truth lies within. Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters make the salient point that metaphors do speak the truth but are not the truth themselves (12). The fear and cry of child sexual abuse, a very real phenomenon in the 1980s and early 1990s, may

point to something other than its literal meaning. An obsession with the inner child, often an abused voiceless child, began in the 1960s. This, added to developments in surveillance technology in the 1970s, and the immense popularity of confessional television shows in the 1980 and 1990s, led to the notion that all that is hidden must be revealed. This is society's 'wound culture', part of the American public's fascination with violently torn and opened private bodies and torn and open psyches (Seltzer, 2000: 100). Following the development of so-called 'truth drugs' for use with traumatised soldiers during the 1940s in the UK, the notion that the mind contained everything that had happened to the individual, and that this could be fully accessed, became widespread. Even into the 1970s 'truth drugs' were being used to gain convictions in criminal trials, causing serious miscarriages of justice. Within the recovered memory movement that began in the US in the 1980s there is the assumption that human memory is identical to that of machines. Given the rising dominance of computer technology since the 1970s, the fact that such an idea took hold is unsurprising.

With the proliferation of film and video technology the mind and body became compared to a machine. As Ofshe and Watters make clear, failure to recall details is explained as either due to using inaccurate recall techniques or a malfunction mechanism in the brain that "wilfully denies access to that information" (37). Some therapists, and therefore their clients, hold the view that repression due to child sexual abuse must have occurred if it cannot be remembered. According to this belief system, unless one has remembered abuse then one is living in denial and not fully human. Metaphor is replaced with a literalness that is extreme. In clinical practice the results of imaginative reflective exercises using imaginary videos offering fantasy movie-type scenes of abuse are concluded to be evidence of abuse with particular films used to 'spark' feelings and memories.

In one controversial case a fundamentalist Christian police officer, sentenced to 20 years after a conviction for allegedly sexually abusing his two daughters, claimed, "it's almost like I'm making it up; I'm trying not to ... It's like I'm watching a movie" (171). Many of those encouraging the recovery of repressed memory claim the revelation of child sexual abuse is, 'like watching a movie about someone else's life' (Bass and Davis, 1994: 73). There is the confessing of this most evil of sins, which then offers the opportunity for forgiveness and the most grace and guaranteed eternal paradise, fundamentalist Christian revivalism corresponding with the extraordinary growth of claims of child sexual abuse. Academics in mainstream American universities believe Satanists control Hollywood and send messages via horror films furthering child sexual abuse (Ofshe and Watters, 1996: 188). The influence of film is remarkable. Film and analogies to film are the primary ways in which thought, memory, identity, and truth are comprehended and explained by laypersons and clinicians alike. The eyes are believed to be working as a lens, the brain literally functioning as a magical recorder of every event, that can be replayed, that must be replayed, to reveal any moment in one's life, making the victim a heroic survivor, the victorious protagonist in their own movie, surviving both apparent abuse and apparent remembering. The most sagacious and perhaps only definite discovery in memory research in the twentieth century was simply and banally, memory is lost over time (Haaken, 1998: 54). Despite this, there is still an ongoing belief in 'total recall'.

With the focus on deliverance and salvation and ‘truth’, it is evident that this is a faith movement, with links to other American conspiracy theories concerning the preponderance of certain forms of ‘evil’. To brand any phenomenon absolute evil is unwise, as it only lends to its power and mystery, giving rise to a lack of understanding and further proliferation of ‘evil’. The paedophile galvanises the public’s attention through a rampant media. In the USA and UK the first backlash against the ‘tyranny of the paedophile’ began in the mid-1990s, but backlashes follow backlashes, the code of mistrust increasing. As Frank Furedi has distinctly shown, contact between adults and children has effectively been stigmatised (Furedi, 2001: 17). This is a deeply disturbing situation, for it concerns the essence of human development: communication through trust.

Historical idea of the child and moral panics

Despite paedophile panics and paranoia that gripped the late twentieth century, concern over child sexual abuse is nothing new. In 1878 Tardieu wrote of post-mortem findings of the sexual abuse of children upon which, in part, Freud based his original view that childhood sexual abuse was the cause of adult neurosis (La Fontaine, 1990: 39). At the end of the nineteenth century there was a fixation with rooting out the core cause of development, of ascertaining the fundamental elements of the mature human psyche. With such knowledge the past could then predict the future, just as astrophysicists at the end of the twentieth century hoped to discover the mind of God in the entrails of the fledgling universe. Due to their increasing development or decimation, scientists believed there was no point examining ‘primitive peoples’, as nineteenth century scientists put it. But both the child and the noble savage were spaces in which conclusions could be reached on the nature of what it is to be human. In 1888 Charles Darwin’s assistant and collaborator George Romanes equated human children with animals, expressing their similarity and claiming a genetic continuity between them (Roth, 1987: 83). The secrets of human origins lay within children. The belief was that the whole evolution of the species, teleological awareness, could be discovered in a close examination of the child. As W. B. Drummond revealed in 1907, the scientist, “unable to discover a living specimen of primitive man, turns to the child as his nearest representative” (Roth 1987: 85). Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) had developed the notion, taken up by Romanes and others, that the child was close to the savage, who was in turn close to nature, the child thought to be closest to man at the dawn of time. In Romanticism the noble savage is in the utopian state of childhood. Children are little angels, closer to God, residing half way between earth and the heavenly realms and mediating with the divine. Ironically, they are then more adult than adult, existing as beings simultaneously less and more evolved.

In *Madness and Civilization* (1967) Michel Foucault equated the construction of the primitive and savage with the idea of madness (Foucault, 1989: 193). Children were placed within the same equation of sublime non-reason. The belief was that truth will surface from within children and this needs to be extrapolated in the name of science and progress. As Michael Roth explains: “child psychology was partly constructed in the expectation that cultural and historical evidence enclosed within the child’s body and mind could be retrieved and used” (Roth, 1987: 85). The child must remain untainted for this to be the case. Paedophiles then attack truth itself, the essence of

meaning, the raw material that supposedly contains THE answer. Children, it was thought, had the solution to the essential questions in science and philosophy. This was incorporated within their being, actually embodied, not just a hypothetical psychological reality purely based in the nebulous regions of the mind. In a world moving further away from the physical, an obsession with the pure body and the child intensified and the obsession with wound culture was part of this.

Alongside the deification of childhood, in the film actor's adage never work with children or animals, we see children equated with animals and the savage, supposedly unable to repress their instincts. "The theory of the instincts is, as it were, our mythology. The instincts are mythical beings, superb in their indefiniteness" (Freud, 1950: 134). Children are equated with instincts and in this instance, like the paedophile, are constructed as evil. Simultaneously, for Freud the more civilised (adult) we become, the unhappier we are, the pre-occupation with a mythical childhood part of this attempt to regain happiness, a mythical paradise. An awareness of the reality of child sexual abuse followed on from growing concern over physical abuse in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1975 one American textbook of psychiatry claimed one in a million children were sexually abused but by the 1980s the figure was estimated as one in a hundred, and between 1977 and 1978 almost every national US magazine ran a story highlighting the horrors of child sexual abuse (La Fontaine, 1990: 39). In 1977 in the US there were 264 different magazines that depicted sex between children and adults (Browne, 1995: 180). With the victories of the feminist movements in the 1970s, and those for the protection of children, women spoke out who had been abused and by the 1980s child sexual abuse was no longer being ignored. In one year, between 1984 and 1985, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) in the UK experienced a 90 per cent increase in reported cases of child sexual abuse. The focus on protection is problematic as it results in the curtailing of freedom of the potential victim, rather than the potential abuser, with the electronic tagging of toddlers promoted as a real possibility in 1986 (Kitzinger, 1988). The most excessive and sensational forms of allegations of child sexual abuse were reported cases of satanic ritual abuse, a phenomenon that through intense media attention came to the forefront in America at the same period in the mid-1980s. Those believing in satanic ritual abuse, known as true believers, maintained that groups were involved in forcing people, mainly children, to have sex and engage in extreme satanic rituals.

In 1984 at McMartin preschool, in Manhattan Beach, California, 360 children were diagnosed as being sexually abused through satanic ritual abuse, the majority of charges then dropped. The general belief now is that in such cases false memories were placed in children through suggestion, hypnosis and other techniques. But this unquestioned belief in false memory is yet another conspiracy theory, frequently maligned therapists often portrayed and believed to be as pernicious and evil as paedophiles, or worse. The McMartin case had its infamous equivalents in Britain with the Orkney and the Cleveland cases. In the Cleveland case, over a period of six months in 1987, 121 children were taken into care due to allegations of child sexual abuse and it was this case that brought child sexual abuse fully into the public arena in Britain. Both cases resulted in enquiries that criticised the procedures involved and called for less intrusive intervention, while in the Cleveland cases of the 121 only 26 were judged to have been wrongly diagnosed. The panic in this instance was concerned with the

suspected socialism of those professionals involved, the female doctor Marietta Higgs castigated in the right wing press for attacking the institution of the family and being an evil working mother, feminism in this instance being the folk devil (Nava, 1988: 116).

For Kenneth Thompson moral panics are nothing new but they have become more rapid and all pervasive, encompassing many more people, with the panics over abuse questioning the institution of the family and, in particular, physical relations between fathers and their children. Moral panic is not mass hysteria. It is a technical term coined by sociologists to refer to movements that define actions, groups or persons as threats to fundamental social values and it does not mean that such public concern is entirely unfounded but, importantly it stresses the social construction of a particular danger that is out of proportion to the threat (La Fontaine, 1998: 19). Jean La Fontaine was commissioned by the Department of Health to investigate allegations of ritual abuse that had occurred from 1987 to 1992. According to La Fontaine there were a number of cases of child sexual abuse, by one or more abuser from within extended family networks or by organised paedophile rings, but out of 84 cases there appeared to be no hard evidence of satanic ritual abuse (La Fontaine, 1998: 51). With reference to Philip Jenkins, Thompson highlight 1985 to 1987 as the period in Britain where the panic was concerned with child sexual abuse within the family, 1987 to 1989 paedophile sex rings, and 1986 to 1990 child murder cases (Thompson, 1998). This strict chronological delineation must be questioned because panic over paedophile rings continued into the 1990s and surfaced again in the UK in 2003, in this instance again linked to satanic ritual abuse. In July 2004 a case collapsed that involved three girls who were under 16 in care of the Western Isles social services department. This followed charges of satanic ritual abuse in October 2003 in Lewis in the Outer Hebrides. The police claimed they had one of the accused on video raping a child. Other connected arrests occurred in Leicestershire, West Yorkshire and Dorset (Waterhouse, 2004).

In the mid-1980s doctors in Leeds developed the anal reflex dilation test and some children would undergo this procedure more than four times. If they had not been sexually abused they soon were by the state medical system. The 1989 Children Act (sec.44 (7)) in the UK allowed children to refuse medical examination and children were allowed to stay at home, rather than automatically being taken into care. Flawed cases, where children were removed from families and then returned, combined with a political climate in both the UK and USA that stressed the importance of the family, had led to a radical change in thinking and behaviour on child sexual abuse. In the 1990s child protection concerns moved from intrafamilial abuse to the abuse outside the family, with interfamilial abuse “reframed, except in the most serious cases, as symptoms of families failing to cope and provide adequate child care standards” (Corby, 2000: 4). A significant swing occurred. The demon was now the evil other, a fear that can be equated with the fear of the foreigner, reversed colonisation, immigration, or with anything perceived as alien. For Corby the idea of an extensive network of evil people preying on children outside the family can be rejected but evidence does exist of networks. How extensive they are is, of course, difficult to say with any certainty.

Following the 1980s movement away from certain forms of liberalism in the 1960s and 1970s and then the rise of the Christian right in America, there was a backlash by 1994. As the results of court cases make clear, the general public and juries

became sceptical of accusations, seeing it as the product of vivid imaginations imbued with stories from popular American Christianity rather than reality, making prosecution difficult. The 'true believers' in child sexual abuse had a major battle on their hands after accused parents of Professor Jennifer Freyd, a cognitive psychologist, founded The False Memory Syndrome Foundation in 1992. This had a remarkable international impact. By 1994, both in the UK and USA, large-scale scepticism over accusations of child sexual abuse had taken hold. As Freyd herself explains, memories contain accurate and inaccurate components. There is evidence that recovered memories are no more or less likely to be false than continuously accessible memories (Freyd, 2002: 143). Many accepted that false memory syndrome is a medical condition with scientific validity, but it needs to be stressed that this is not the case. The syndrome was invented by those accused of child sexual abuse but it is clear that false memories do exist.

According to Kitzinger, journalists in Britain made gendered judgements about the credibility of sources, with accused parents seven times more likely to be quoted in newspapers than the person recalling abuse, the patriarchal, male dominated, media conspiring against the female. However, from 1985 onwards hundreds of television programmes in the UK covered and debated child sexual abuse, such as the dangers of releasing prisoners, but none explicitly covered false memory. For Kitzinger in the early 1990s there was a form of 'child abuse fatigue', with journalists becoming bored with actual child sex abuse stories, particularly numerous celebrities saying they had been abused. The media now sought another slant on this contentious topic, hence the rapid growth in the reporting of false memory. Kitzinger explains that reports in the British media in 1994 spoke of a 'shift in the collective psyche' and a 'child abuse industry' 'in an age of matriarchal terror squads' hell bent on accusing everyone of being a sex offender (Kitzinger, 2003: 97). However, this public rhetoric is still utilised with child protection literature and politicians making the claim that everyone is a potential sex offender, this most pernicious of evils apparently everywhere. Within this debate it appears that for many it is impossible to keep away from the extremes and false certainties: 'of course she made it up'; 'all men are rapists'. Kitzinger rightly attacks the gendered ideology of the media but the child sex abuse 'industry' has not disappeared, with unlicensed therapists still wrongly diagnosing child sexual abuse. In the UK it is still possible to practice as a therapist or counsellor without any qualifications or supervision.

Problems with postmodernism and conclusions

One hundred years after Romanes scientifically equated children with animals, the majority of the world's governments acknowledged the rights of the child. On 20 November 1989 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child after 10 years of debate. This came into force on 2 September 1990. By April 1995, 172 states had become parties to the convention, the highest number of ratifications of any treaty, and a further nine states were signatories. 12 countries were neither parties nor signatories.¹ Because the majority of abusers are trusted kin, the fact that the UN convention stresses the importance of the family is

¹ Andora, Brunei, Darussalam, Kiribati, Oman, the Republic of Palau, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tonga, Tuvalu and the United Arab Emirates.

problematic. As Chris Jenks explains, “the family is one of the most dangerous places for children to live in” (Jenks, 1996: 91). The 1989 United Nation Conventions on the Right of the Child, Article 19 Section 1, states that parties must take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child (Amnesty International, 1995).

Along with attempts at prevention of child sexual abuse through global conventions there has been the promotion of the dangerous belief that child abuse has no meaning outside of the society that construes it as such (Howitt, 1992: 5). For Dennis Howitt any notion of a universal declaration is preposterous because abuse is relative and culturally defined. Without a doubt each case is different but Howitt declares, “there are no historical facts” (12). Freud apparently eventually denied the personal tragedies of those that told him of their child sexual abuse, interpreting it as fantasy. Similarly, Howitt denies the reality of history. One argument is that children experience sexual desire from an early age and a number of writers have argued in defence of adult and child sexual relations, seeing childhood as a recent social construction, with children in advanced capitalist societies, such as the USA and UK, being oppressed in the family, having no right of political or sexual expression (Nava, 1992: 134). Of course, there are difficulties, such as how do you know welfare workers or parents are telling the truth? For Howitt these questions are not worth asking because they only have meaning in terms of the interplay of the ideas of professionalism and parenthood (Howitt, 1992: 7). The call is to believe nobody because each group is talking within their own theoretical framework, within a construction that is purely in the realms of ideas, defined by groups with vested interests and entirely without external validity. Do we then maintain that the 172 states party to the 1989 convention ignored the issues of the 12 states that are not parties or signatories and are being culturally exclusive and discriminatory? People have been falsely accused of child sexual abuse and some therapists do instigate false memories with their clients but victims-survivors of child sexual abuse have also still been refused compensation for years of abuse with their individual experiences denied.² As has been pointed out, so-called therapists are not regulated in the UK, which means many exploit vulnerable clients. Simultaneously, there is still a culture of denial, particularly in the Catholic Church. Declaring child sexual abuse to be a culturally defined phenomenon is a culturally defined statement, totally falling for the fashionable postmodern zeitgeist of the 1990s.

In Elizabethan Britain the age of consent was 10 and by 1885 it was raised from 13 to 16 to prevent the sale of children into prostitution (Renvoize, 1996: 30). The legal age of sexual consent differs across the globe. From a religious perspective this is not a matter of law but of morals, sex before marriage being in many religions wrong, both self-abuse and abuse of another. Because of the reduced demand for manual labour and increased need for technological prowess, industrially developed countries often have a longer period of childhood, whereas those in non-industrialised areas take on adult

² In February 2001 the UK Home Secretary Jack Straw stated the Labour government would ensure increased payments to victims of sexual abuse. Due to compensation for claims of child sexual abuse, in July 2004 the US Roman Catholic diocese of Portland became the first to declare itself bankrupt.

responsibilities earlier. There are many ambiguities and anomalies. Girls are thought to mature earlier than boys, but girls in the UK cannot legally consent to sex until they are 16, while boys can at 14 (Corby, 2000: 10). Even though the level of abuse may have continued at the same rate our threshold of tolerance of abuse has shifted. As Jenks puts it, child sexual abuse and how it is tackled can be read as a gauge of society's response to late modernity. Importantly, "child abuse is real, but it is equally a device for constituting a reality" (Jenks, 1996: 98).

In 1989 British photographer Robert Mapplethorpe was prosecuted for two pictures of children deemed to be indecent. In March 2001 UK police threatened to prosecute American Tierney Gearon over an exhibition of photographs of her children. As with disputations over what constitutes child sexual abuse, there is a problem concerning definitions of obscene images. No act of parliament offers a legal definition of what is indecent, with the viewer's intention and circumstances surrounding the taking of the photograph irrelevant according to the law (Long and McLachlan, 2002: 135). While one of Gearon's photographs depicting her naked son urinating in snow could be construed as vulgarly crass, there is a sick irony as it is suggested the child is doing the seducing at the command of the artist-paedophile-parent, as if 'innocent' paedophiles should be protected. Inevitably, with the media hype, images deemed reprehensible are extensively published and obsessed over. The law mistakes fiction for fact but art and reality have merged just as differences between the adult and child are far from clear-cut. Complexities over interpretations of the image have led to false accusations of child sexual abuse. In one case reported in December 2003, two doctors examined a girl from the north of England thought to have had her hymen torn by penetration. Photographs taken by colposcopy were sent to a consultant paediatrician and a forensic physician who verified this. When the case went to the Court of Appeal they examined the girl and then said the pictures they had previously received had misled them, the photographs not matching what they had seen with their own eyes or their own photographs. From December 2000 to June 2003 the evidence was the girl had been sexually abused by penetration, this method of evidence being widespread in the UK with the possibility of grave miscarriages of justice (Dyer, 2003: 4).

With advances in technology there has been an increase in the ways in which children are sexually abused and simultaneously in tools used to catch abusers or inaccurately accuse suspected abusers. By the end of 2003 London's Metropolitan Police had built a list of 800 suspects involved in computer file swapping and "30 peer-to-peer cases in the UK so far involved hands-on-abuse in which the children in the images were real-time victims" (Gillan, 2003). Fears of child sexual abuse on the internet are aspects of anxieties over the control of technology, media reports continually claiming the apparently hyper-intelligent paedophile is always one step ahead of the police, possessing a demonic supernatural cunning and technological awareness, the Gothic beast at one with the machine. The industrial age and the Gothic are intimately associated and in the construction of the paedophile we see this relationship continued in the ultimate nightmare of the unstoppable sex machine. Concurrently children, just as paedophiles, are seen to be the new monsters out of control, running information technology companies, masters of the machines, having a greater understanding of the technological world that dominates, possessing power over

adults and breaking all moral codes. Both the paedophile and child are conceived as threats to social cohesion.

Older men's, and sometimes women's, obsession with young people as sexual partners equates with the ancient belief that having intercourse with youths increases longevity, arresting or even reversing the aging process. This continues today, the notion held by some that sex with a virgin can cure diseases like HIV, mirroring the Dracula legend, which is the most recurrent culturally re-worked myth of the twentieth century (Twitchell, 1981). In a world where many individuals strive for privacy this most secret of sins must be made public, society possessed by the privacy of the other. With the eyes of the public guided by the fangs of the press, each child sexual abuse story becomes a feeding frenzy, each morsel of misery drained from sounds, words and images, in an attempt to find authenticity and truth in pain. While the paedophile is equated with the supernatural machine, the machine paradoxically is the metaphor for the fear of non-containable nature. Technology is "constitutive of the extended phenotype of the human animal, a dangerous supplement enjoying an originary status" (Pearson, 1997: 223). The division, or lack of it, between the human and the inhuman, the natural and the unnatural, is complex. "History now appears to have reached the perplexing point when it is no longer possible to determine whether technology is an expression of our genes or a sign of nature's cultural conspiracy" (Pearson 1997: 223). The paedophile is constructed as both pre and post-human, united with the machine and the original evil of humankind. Fear of observation by paedophiles leads to further observation and surveillance, the fear being the fear of control by machinery. Paedophilephobia is technophobia. As with the myth of the girl seductress, the myth of the paedophile as vampire is dangerous as it implies a desire on the part of the victim, a desire for seduction. This myth, unearthed here, is galvanised in a plethora of films, such as *The Sweet Hereafter* (Atom Egoyan, 1997), *Beloved* (Jonathan Demme, 1998), and *Mystic River* (Clint Eastwood, 2003), and various stories in myriad American cultural and media forms, has seduced media manufacturers and consumers alike. The paedophile and the abused child in construction and reality combine and mirror two identical concerns of western culture since the enlightenment, the evil savage and the rapacious demonic-angelic child beyond boundaries, encapsulating anxieties concerning control. In societies dominated by observation and control the paedophile is constructed and observed as the untraceable gap in the system, the unstoppable evil escaping and beyond the boundaries of surveillance and containment.

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Özet

Pedofil Kültürler: Çocuklara Yönelik Cinsel Taciz ve İngiliz ve Amerikan Kültüründe Yapılandırılan Çocuk Seviciliği

Çocuklara yönelik cinsel tacizin ve çocuk seviciliğın tanımları genişletilmektedir. Çocuk tacizinin kapsamı üzerine yapılan arařtırmaların çerçevesi bellidir ve son dönem kültürel tarih gözden geçirilmiştir. Açılmış bellek devriminde film metaforlarının nasıl kullanıldığı açıklanmıştır. 1980lerde yapılan hataların ardından, 1990lar boyunca ilgi, aile dışındaki çocuk tacizciler üzerinde toplanmıştır. İblis, kötü olan diğeri idi. Bu korku, yabancılara, tersine dönmüş sömürgeleşmeye, göçmenliğe ve düşman olarak algılanan herhangi bir şeye duyulan korku ile eş görülebilir. Çocuk ve cinsel taciz üzerine yapılan postmodern görüşler eleştirilmektedir. Çocuk cinsel taciz iddiaları ve satanist törensel tacizler ahlaksal korkunun sosyolojik olgusu ile birlikte incelenmiştir. Çocuk seviciliğının teknofobi ile eş anlamlı olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

**Taking Pains:
Sympathy, Suffering, and Forging White Subjectivity
in Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin***

Greta Lynn

The journals of John Dix, an Englishman who immigrated to the United States in the late nineteenth century, tell the peculiar story of one of Dix's friends who had been sleeping, for a period, at a local boardinghouse. "'Annoyed by hearing somebody in the adjoining chamber alternately groaning and laughing,' [Dix's friend] 'knocked upon the wall and said, 'Hallo there! What's the matter! Are you sick or reading *Uncle Tom's Cabin*?' The stranger answered that he was reading *Uncle Tom's Cabin*'" (Noble 143). Dix's story is one of many that speaks to the enormous cultural and personal impact of Harriet Beecher Stowe's second, and most famous novel. Though Stowe's text is generally praised for its contribution to the nineteenth-century American abolitionist movement, the wealth of scholarship on *Uncle Tom's Cabin* has succeeded in highlighting many other contemporary concerns, among them issues of feminism, suffrage, subjectivity, citizenship, and nation building. That the novel addresses socio-political concerns of its day is not, however, where it acquires its importance; rather, it is in the rhetoric through which these socio-political concerns are addressed that the reader will find the richest, as well as the most problematic aspects of Stowe's text.

This essay will examine *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in light of what Karen Halttunen calls the late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century "cult of sensibility," in which "compassionating"¹ constituted as valid a means of addressing social concerns as debate or reason. This nineteenth-century impulse towards "feeling right" (sympathetic identification with the American disenfranchised) cultivates a collective perception of oppression, abuse, and suffering—the trademarks of American slavery—that is epistemologically material or physical. That is, in demanding that white America think about slavery sympathetically, Stowe's novel also calls for an increased attention to and identification with the suffering, and heavily racialized body. Through historical consideration of the writing and performance of suffering, this essay will consider the impact and allure of the black body in pain, and subsequently question how the privileged and often exclusively white practice of sympathy intersected with a growing awareness of the power of physical anguish. Far from merely allowing white readers to "borrow" black pain in the name of understanding— and ostensibly, ending— the injustice of American slavery, the function of white sympathetic identification in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* often serves instead as a point of access for white readers to the compelling and exclusively "black" puissance inherent in bodily suffering.

This essay will argue that the nineteenth-century conception of subjectivity was fundamentally rooted in the body, and that the experience of physical pain gave the

¹ Quoted in Clark, "'The Sacred Rights of the Weak'..." pg484 n56. The reader should note that the transmogrification of the passive expression "to be compassionate" into the active verb "to compassionate" speaks to the aggressiveness with which one was supposed to "practice" sympathy. In her essay, Clark argues that "sympathy represented praxis, not theory" (479).

sufferer an undeniable claim to a corporeal subjectivity. Though in the case of the oft-abused slaves of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, subjectivity is often limited to the corporal, the sentimental power of the proliferate physical suffering of black bodies in the antebellum United States should not be underestimated. Indeed, with the rise of the penny press and the commensurate deluge of imagery of the abuse, torture and murder of slaves, representations of black bodies in America came to encapsulate a generalized, but nonetheless distinct physical subjectivity. It becomes necessary, then, that we interrogate the popular *white* desire to inhabit this physical subjectivity that the nineteenth-century press, as well as literary and political culture assigned to what Hortense Spillers calls "North America's most *coveted* body" (Spillers 78, emphasis original): the black body, and especially the black male body. Examined through the lens of what scholars such as Karen Haltunnen, Ann Douglas, Philip Fisher, Jane Tompkins and Linda Williams call "the cult of sensibility," the nineteenth-century (primarily white) desire to sympathize demonstrates a commitment to transcending racism through the absolution of racial difference, and more specifically, the desire for a sameness of experience, particularly in relation to the act of suffering. In *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, coterminous with the command to sympathize is the command to imagine, creating an experience in which white readers are offered the opportunity to fantasize about both pain and black bodies, taboos that constituted the loci of a physical subjectivity that white culture both fetishized and wanted to access. Though certainly one of the seminal fictional texts of the abolitionist movement, Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* must also be considered in light of its role as a medium through which white readers can access the black body, and once again, put it to work—this time as an objectified register of physical pain that allows white sympathizers to "suffer" vicariously in a way that endows them with a sense of physical subjectivity. Before we can understand the relationship between the "cult of sensibility," black subjectivity, white desire and *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, however, it is necessary to explore the historical and cultural import of pain, and its relationship to both the body and antebellum American spirituality.

Suffering, Spirituality and Sympathy

The significance of suffering was certainly not a new idea in the antebellum United States, but its meaning began to change by the early nineteenth century, specifically within the context of the religious practice and belief. This profound transformation was largely the result of the "erosion of Calvinist orthodoxy and the emergence of a powerful alternative often labeled liberal Protestantism" (Clark 470), a purportedly more "humanistic" manner of practicing what came to be a "devotional and practical, rather than... doctrinal or ecclesiastical... faith" (Douglas 154). The onset of a kinder vision of Christianity from that which characterized eighteenth-century American culture, this religious shift encouraged "the creation of a mainstream Protestantism culture broadly receptive to certain Christian humanist ideals" (Clark 465). In short, American Protestantism needed a makeover, and in the process of this re-making, nineteenth-century America was forced to re-evaluate the means by which both previous and new visions of Christianity would contribute to the constitution of the national self.

An important consideration in this evaluation was the role of the Christian body in the exercise of faith, for the body or the representation thereof presented the most graphic and immediate means by which the churchgoer related to his faith. In stricter, pre-reform Calvinist practices, this performative body served as an exemplar of Christian corporality, encouraging a grim vision of the virtue achieved and exhibited through suffering. The suffering body

had long been the centerpiece of Christianity; for medieval Christians, pain was both a confirmation of and a link to divinity. The inevitability of human suffering was glorified and transfigured in the Crucifixion, which forged a strong link between pain and divinity. Voluntary submission to pain contained its own grim joy, as witnessed by depictions of the trials of the saints. (Clark 471)

Pain, and suffering in particular, was considered a means by which one could effect one's own spiritual and moral growth; "voluntary submission to pain," then, was proof of not only one's spiritual commitment, but also, as Elizabeth Clark implies in her essay "The Sacred Rights of the Weak," a source of pride or joy in oneself. It may be useful to consider that corporal mortification is an effort to unite one's own body with that of Christ, by means of a practice that is distinctly about the self; the pained Calvinist body, though performative, was also a personal body, its most significant relationship existing primarily between itself and God².

The nineteenth-century shift towards a moral "universalist" practice and understanding of Christianity also necessitated a shift in the role of the body, and specifically the suffering body. Even at the end of the eighteenth century "Congregational ministers ... concurred that Christ had probably not suffered real pain, or at least not in full human measure" (Clark 472), rendering the Christian oestrus to effect moral growth through one's own corporal suffering somewhat obsolete. This de-emphasis of the suffering body of Christ meant that, "by the nineteenth century, most Protestants, despite differences across and even within denominations, had come to share a tender-minded distaste for the extravagant agony of the Passion" (472).

² Karen Halttunen writes that "Orthodox Christianity had traditionally viewed pain not only as God's punishment for sin... but also as a redemptive opportunity to transcend the world and flesh by imitating the suffering Christ" (Halttunen 304). Pain was thus performative in that it was an outward—and often visible—manifestation of sin, through which the body could be read by others as sinful or not. The body enduring pain and suffering was thus implicated in an active relationship with God—as a register for divine displeasure—and also with Christ, in the imitation of Christian sacrifice. In his essay "Materializing Conscience: Embodiment, Speech, and the Experience of Sympathetic Identification" (*Early American Literature* 36.1 [2002]) Michael Meranze disagrees, contending that the body's primary relationships—before the onset of "the cult of sensibility," but increasingly more so as it gained strength as a popular movement— could be found in "the display of the body... serv[ing] as a linchpin for a larger set of social issues relating to the economy, to labor, and to socially generated suffering" (76). In that his essay contends that mortification was sometimes achieved through dress—wearing non-dyed, plain clothes in an era in which fashion was becoming more important—it should nonetheless be noted that the model and primary relationship in such mortification is sharing the suffering of Christ, on both a personal (spiritual) and a social (exhibitive) level.

With foundations in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, the development of a more “sensitive” society was, in nineteenth-century America, seen as a move towards a more civilized culture³. Society paid increasing attention to the avoidance of pain; “in 1846, ether was first used as an anesthetic in surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital, and medicine constantly explored other avenues (hypnosis, morphine injection, refrigeration, etc.) of alleviating patient suffering” (Halttunen 310). Commensurate with the impulse to end pain was the desire to express compassion for those who suffered from it; in the “new” Christianity, “the measure of authenticity lay in the feelings, not the intellect” (Clark 467), and instead of one’s own suffering providing a register for spiritual virtue or piety, the ability to *sympathize* with the suffering of others became a measure of one’s faith. As pain now “signaled not spiritual triumph, but a breach of divinely ordained laws” (Clark 472), it was the truly virtuous and *civilized* Christian who was capable of a universalist sympathy, extending his compassion not simply to his peers, but especially to those—animals, criminals, children, slaves, and the insane—who were *not* his peers.

Sympathy was certainly not a new concept in nineteenth-century America; the wealth of scholarship on the subject demonstrates the impact that the importance of “sentimental” thinking effected upon the antebellum United States. Philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Francis Hutcheson all wrote extensively on the relationship of feelings to knowledge and the subsequent development of a “moral sense.” Their work tends to intersect particularly around their ideas on sympathy, an issue that Hume and Smith explore at length. Hume posits sympathy as human nature, the direct result of the degree to which we “converse with mankind ... the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other” (Hume 44). Social intelligibility is thus a result of sympathetic feeling, clearly demonstrating that sympathy constitutes a means by which difference—of class, race, age, ability—can be communicated and overcome. It is an effort at a more universal sentience; for, as Hume puts it, “it is necessary for us, in our calm judgments and discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect all ... differences, and render our sentiments more public and social” (44).

Adam Smith’s conception of sympathy is constructed upon that of Hume, but more firmly grounded in identification, insisting that “as we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in a like situation” (Smith 30). For Smith, sympathy is about the analogous comparison of our feelings to those of someone else, and it is always “the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy” (Smith 30). Sympathetic identification originates not in feeling, but in imagining and subsequently identifying, drawing forth comparable sentiment from one’s own experience. Significantly, Smith also posits sympathy as a system of identification more effective in the sharing of suffering than in the sharing of pleasure; sympathy thus represents a means of extracting joy from a painful experience, as sympathetic identification “present[s] another source of satisfaction ... alleviat[ing]

³ See Thomas, Keith. *Man and the Natural World: A History of Modern Sensibility*. (New York, 1983), and the above-mentioned essay by Karen Halttunen.

grief by insinuating into the heart, almost the only agreeable sensation which it is at that time capable of receiving” (Smith 37). The nineteenth-century impulse towards sympathy and sympathetic identification with suffering bodies, then, represented not only a cultural trend aimed at creating an increasingly “civilized” society, but also a point of access to the perhaps masochistic joys of demonstrating Christian virtue through sympathizing with the pain of others. The question, then, concerns what bodies were in pain, and how nineteenth-century, white America gained access to these bodies.

Though the “cult of sensibility,” particularly in its nineteenth century manifestations, encouraged Christians to “compassionate” with any body in pain, the most culturally exhibited suffering bodies were, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, slave bodies. In Karen Halttunen’s very comprehensive essay, “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture,” she describes the incredible proliferation of graphic accounts—often accompanied by images—of murders, rapes and beatings that, with the rise of the penny press, increasingly characterized reform literature in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century America⁴. The onset of the 1830’s, however, saw the rise of the “story of the suffering slave, a trope that ... became newly audible and visible in the North, where graphic portrayals of slaves’ subjective experience of physical pain emerged as common antislavery fare” (Clark 463). Print culture had found a local, common, and extremely accessible locus of violent suffering, and works such as Lydia Maria Child’s *An Appeal in Favor of That Class of Americans Called Africans* took advantage of this readily-available suffering, promising to “follow the poor *slave* through his wretched wanderings, in order to give some idea of his physical suffering, his mental and moral degradation” (quoted in Clark, p466). As Halttunen suggests, violent sensationalism was overwhelmingly popular as well as sympathetically suggestive, particularly in abolitionist circles, and antislavery advocates certainly took advantage of the emotionally compelling nature of depictions of the abuse of slaves⁵.

***Uncle Tom’s Cabin* and Sympathetic Identification**

One of antebellum America’s most famous abolitionist novels, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin, or, Life Among the Lowly* is deeply imbued with contemporary notions of the importance and efficacy of sympathetic identification, primarily with regard to slavery. Significantly, in this text sympathy is employed as a narrative device only in regard to characters who are slaves; Stowe refrains from demanding her readers’ sympathetic identification when white characters are suffering. There are many techniques through which the narrator’s demand for sympathetic identification appear in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, the most frequent being an appeal to reader through what could be called the rhetoric of second person, invoking a “you” or “ye” that is directly and unwaveringly aimed at the reader. Demanding that the reader *imagine* himself (but very often herself as well) in the same situation as the enslaved character in question, this rhetoric constitutes an attempt at redefining the lines between

⁴ Also see Karen Halttunen’s *Murder Most Foul: The Killer and the American Gothic Imagination* (Harvard University Press, 1998).

⁵ “In compiling *American Slavery As It Is*, [Theodore Dwight Weld and the Grimké sisters] sent out a long circular asking for information on ‘PUNISHMENTS—please describe in detail the different modes, postures, instruments and forms of torture’ (quoted in Clark 467-68).

self and other, white suffering and black suffering. This redefinition does not ask for a re-drawing of these lines so much as it demands that they be obviated; when Uncle Tom is first sold by the Shelby family, for example,

...for a few moments they all [Uncle Tom's family and Mrs. Shelby] wept in company. And in those tears they all shed together, the high and the lowly, melted away all the heart-burnings and anger of the oppressed. O, ye who visit the distressed, do ye know that everything your money can buy, given with a cold, averted face, is not worth one honest tear shed in real sympathy? (Stowe 139)

This significant passage outlines several issues relevant to the interpretation of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, not the least of which is the question of readership. First, this segment endows sympathetic identification with the power of “melt[ing] away all the...anger of the oppressed.” As antebellum America, particularly in the south, was deeply concerned with the highly disproportionate ratio of slaves to slave owners—and the opportunity and likelihood of a slave rebellion that such a ratio might propitiate—sympathy is presented here in a manner than soothes white fear of slave anger. Furthermore, the differences between “high and...lowly” melt away in this sympathetic display as well, though the reader should note that Mrs. Shelby's sympathetic identification is enacted against the will of Tom's family; when they see her heading to the cabin, for example, Chloe remarks, “She can't do no good; what's she coming for?” (139) This scene ensures that the reader understands that sympathetic identification benefits Mrs. Shelby, the wife of a slave-owner, and definitively not Uncle Tom or his family; ultimately, Mrs. Shelby's sympathy does not translate into action, and though it may make her feel less guilty, Uncle Tom is still sold. In *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, sympathetic identification—even in abolitionist terms—is also about white people seeking an arguably objectified surface against which their feelings can be measured and subsequently exhibited. The locus of this surface is frequently the enslaved body, and the most evident cases of the evocation of sympathy are often constructed upon or through invocations of black corporality. In qualifying the legitimacy of the fact that Eliza runs away from the “benevolent” Shelby plantation, for example, the narrator demands of the reader:

If it were *your* Harry, mother, or your Willie, that were going to be torn from you by a brutal trader, to-morrow morning—if you had seen the man, and heard that the papers were signed and delivered, and you had only from twelve o'clock till morning to make your escape,—how fast could *you* walk? How many miles could you make in those brief hours, with the darling at your bosom—the little sleepy head on your shoulder,—the small, soft arms trustingly holding on to your neck? (Stowe 72, emphasis original)

This passage incites sympathetic identification within the reader through a complex system of analogy, imagination and physicality; it first asks that the reader compare Eliza's situation to the reader's own. At once remarkably specific and sweepingly general, almost *any* reader is able to access the request for sympathy in this passage, because man or woman, old or young, white or black, rich or poor, most readers will have had a mother, some readers will have had a child, and some will have had a lover.

The point is that the passage creates an analogy in which the reader is able to slip into identification through generalities. Once there, he/she becomes *subject* to the specificities of the rhetoric that require the employment of imagination. How far could *you* walk in six hours, carrying a child? The passage further appeals to the imagination by means of its innate physicality; it concerns emotional and spiritual pain less than it invokes both the physical hardship of escape and the corporal manifestation of emotional bonds between family members. The reader must imagine through the medium of the body in pieces—walking, carrying, the bosom, a sleepy head, a shoulder, soft arms, a neck—and this metonymical use of body parts further inscribes the scene with a generality that allows the white reader imaginative access to the experience.

The physicality of Stowe's construction of the black/enslaved body in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is an aspect of the text that demands closer attention, specifically with regard to considerations of pain and sympathy. Black and white bodies serve very different purposes within the novel, and also represent different ideas. In his essay, "Hand-Writing: Legibility and the White Body in *Running a Thousand Miles For Freedom*," Lindon Barrett argues that in nineteenth century American writing, "African American bodies are understood in terms of a 'fleshliness' that overdetermines all other possible aspects of their identity" (Barrett 315), and that the "obdurate materiality" (315) of the black body limits its signification to itself. That is, the black bodies in *Running a Thousand Miles for Freedom* (and, I will argue, its contemporary, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*) act as signs of "nothing beyond themselves—signs of the very failure of meaning—for these bodies are able to signify, in their obdurate physicality, only a state of obdurate physicality" (322).

The construction of black bodies in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* only further supports this idea, as our introduction to Eliza informs us that she is worth "her weight in gold" (Stowe 8); George has a frame that he "held...so erect, [and] looked so handsome" (16); our first knowledge of Harry is "his black hair, fine as floss...his round, dimpled face" (5-6); Uncle Tom's nameless sons are "woolly-headed boys, with glistening black eyes and fat shining cheeks" (31); and Uncle Tom is "a large, broad-chested, powerfully-made man, of a full glossy black, and a face [of] truly African features" (31). If such a clear sense of the physicality of the enslaved characters were limited to the reader's introduction to them, perhaps Barrett's contention would seem less plausible; however, black characters exhibit, maintain, and are often limited to this materiality until the end of the text. Uncle Tom's body, for example, plays an integral role in the text long after he has died; Master George pointedly remarks, near the end of the text, that "[Legree has] got all [he] ever can of him" (596), demonstrating that Tom's spiritual existence has been exhausted (though it was limited to begin with) and subsequently asks Legree for Tom's body. Master George further prevents Tom's body from signifying anything else but his body in burying it in an unmarked grave on the side of the road. Though clearly meant to be an act of tenderness, this scene is equally successful at rendering Tom's import to an unidentified material objectivity; significantly, the chapter concludes with the words, "'Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted'" (598). We are to understand, then, that in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, the black body must be bear no more than material significance because its most important function is to register pain and suffering; black suffering in turn constitutes the impetus for the

sympathetic identification of not only the (many white) readers of Stowe's text, but white characters within the novel as well.

Barrett argues that white bodies signify to excess, in that they represent a site of literacy, the "site of signification" (325). For the white body, as Barbara Johnson might have it, "to mean ... is automatically *not* to be" (Johnson ix); whiteness is "coterminous with nonidentity, displacement, and self-differentiation, the markers of signification" (Barrett 321). Perhaps the only explicit example of white suffering in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is, of course, Little Eva, but there is an important difference between her pain and that of the slaves around her: Little Eva is understood to be a symbol. Eva is an example to be emulated, not a suffering body with whom we are supposed to identify sympathetically. Her last words do not express pain, but instead, "O! love,-- joy,-- peace!" (Stowe 421), effectively barring the reader from sympathizing with her. The slaves at the St. Clare plantation, however, suffer enormously at her death, and the sympathy that the reader might otherwise expect to employ as the result of Eva's demise is displaced and relocated to the slave bodies. In this regard, sympathetic identification is strictly and unilaterally reserved for enslaved characters. Sympathetic identification with upper-class white characters is almost too close for what was a largely white readership; Halttunen correctly argues that, "Although spectatorial sympathy claimed to demolish social distance, it actually rested on social distance—a distance reinforced, in sentimental art, by the interposition of the written text, stage, or canvas between the victim and the (imaginary) suffering victim" (Halttunen 309). The reader can then sympathize with characters that the reader regards from afar—slaves—but characters like Eva and St. Clare fail to evoke sympathy effectively as there is less "social distance" between these privileged figures and many white readers.

Before addressing the fact that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* privileges the cultivation of sympathetic identification—ostensibly for white characters and privileged readers—over the construction of black characters with depth, it is important to consider what pain means and effects within the text. This essay has already situated pain within the context of the changes in Protestantism that characterized eighteenth and nineteenth century America, and noted the fascination and popularity of pain in print culture of the same era. At this point, it is crucial that we consider the role of pain in the system or process not only of making black bodies, but endowing them with a subjectivity.

There is extensive scholarship available concerning the relationship between pain and subjectivity or citizenship, some of which claims its foundation in American antislavery culture. The rise of sentimentality in the antebellum United States encouraged an "abolitionist rhetoric [that] based the claim to rights on the very capacity to suffer and feel pain—what one slave narrator called 'the sacred rights of the weak'" (Clark 487). The muscular materiality of the construction of black bodies also endowed these bodies with a specific capacity to create their identity, as "the [physical] body of the black was similarly thought to define his or her role as servant and laborer" (Sanchez-Eppler 94). Corporal wounding, maiming, or general suffering "thus stands as the pain-filled consequence of recognizing the extent to which the body designates identity" (Sanchez-Eppler 114), because when the black body can signify no further than itself, any physical change—whether due to injury or not—automatically enacts a change in the identity of the character to whom the body belongs. In *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, for example, Sambo and Quimbo of Legree's plantation have been treated with

“savageness and brutality ... hardness and cruelty” for so long that it “brought their whole nature to about the same range of capacities” (Stowe 492). As readers, we are to assume that the “savageness and brutality” and “hardness and cruelty” to which they have been subjected expresses their physical experience, and it is clear that this physical suffering has changed their identities, but also bestowed an identity upon each of them. The narrator does not offer any depiction of Sambo or Quimbo *before* Legree “trained” them in physical suffering, and thus the only narrative subjectivity they are afforded is a subjectivity attained through physical subjection. We only rarely see pre-suffering black bodies; the only evident examples in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* are Harry (Eliza’s child) and Uncle Tom’s nameless children, and the reader should note that while these infantile black bodies have not suffered, they are denied any sort of personhood or subjectivity within the novel as well. In *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, then, pain and suffering are the only points of access through which black characters can acquire a narrative subjectivity. A subsequent question, however, is whether or not this rubric for the creation of novelistic subjectivity is race-blind; is the only way for white characters—and perhaps even white readers—to perceive their own subjectivity accessible through this same rhetoric of pain and bodily suffering?

Elaine Scarry’s *The Body in Pain* (1985) describes physical suffering as being “exceptional in the whole fabric of psychic, somatic, and perceptual states for being the only one that has no object” (Scarry 161). What Scarry calls the “objectlessness” of physical pain describes an important consideration in reading the pain of Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, as it is a novel that locates suffering almost exclusively within the physical. The “obdurate materiality” that characterizes black bodies in the text—limiting them to signifying *only* as bodies—subsequently limits the type of pain that these bodies can register. As a result, the depiction of pain that the reader encounters in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* is objectless, and “this objectlessness, the complete absence of referential context, almost prevents it from being rendered in language” (Scarry 162). Indeed, physical pain always invokes the issue of the ineffable, that which cannot be uttered; when the cruel slave-owner Legree, for example, kills Tom, the reader is denied the privilege of witnessing it. The narrator tells us that “scenes of blood and cruelty are shocking to our ear and heart. What man has nerve to do, man has not nerve to hear” (Stowe 587), and, it seems, man has not nerve to *say*. The “blood and cruelty” makes obvious the fact that Tom suffered “torture, degradation and shame” (Stowe 587) in a specifically physical manner, but the narrator’s inability to describe this physical pain—to make it material within language—instead inscribes it within the realm of the ineffable. Narrating the ineffable, however, is little more than an act of deferral; in refusing to narrate, the onus of the creation of Tom’s pain falls onto the shoulders of the reader, by means of an act of imagination.

The objectlessness of pain “may give rise to imagining by first occasioning the process that eventually brings forth the dense sea of artifacts and symbols that we make and move about in” (Scarry 162); in short, pain encourages imagination because it is through imagining—a state comprised “wholly [of] its objects” (162)—that pain sheds its objectlessness, and thus, the danger of ineffability. In *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, pain becomes utterable through imagination, the process through which textual pain gains an object. The imagining that allows for the articulation of pain, however, is not performed by the enslaved characters—those who actually *feel* the pain—but instead by the readers

and white characters who identify sympathetically with them. Scarry argues that “pain only becomes an intentional state once it is brought into relation with the objectifying power of the imagination: through that relation, pain will be transformed from a wholly passive and helpless occurrence into a self-modifying and, when most successful, self-eliminating one” (164). This modification and elimination of the self resonates strongly with Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, in which we see the integral role that imagination plays in the displacement of self in the deployment of sympathy. In describing the process of sympathizing, Smith writes:

...it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations...by the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. (30)

The most significant task of the white characters in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* is that of sympathy. Sympathy is also the work of the readers of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, as we are ordered, at the end of the text, to “*feel right*. An atmosphere of sympathetic influence encircles every human being; and the man or woman who *feels* strongly, healthily and justly, on the great interests of humanity, is a constant benefactor to the human race. See, then, to your sympathies in this matter!” (Stowe 632, emphasis original).

The command to sympathy, as Smith and Scarry show, is coterminous with the command to imagine, for the ability to sympathize at once necessitates an impossible absolutism of difference and harmonizing of feelings between sufferer and sympathizer. In an effort to inhabit the pain of the sufferer, the sympathizer must imagine, to some degree, that he *is* the sufferer, but there is a crucial difference: the pain that the sympathizer feels is what might be called a second-order physical pain, induced by “the *thought* of what [the sufferer] feels,” *not* the physical violence that causes what the sufferer feels. To return to Scarry’s argument, sympathetic identification, an experience intimately related to imagination, allows the sympathizer to “transform” pain from a “wholly passive and helpless occurrence into a self-modifying and, when most successful, self-eliminating one” (162). Sympathetic identification with the pain of another, then, appropriates the sufferer’s pain and transforms it into a means of suffering through which the sympathizer—who is now also the sufferer—maintains, and even gains, a great deal of agency. Such is the experience of the white characters in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, and, I would argue, its white readers. The sympathizer-turned-sufferer’s pain, however, whether he experiences it on an emotional, or even on a physical level, is always intrinsically different from that of the suffering body with whom he sympathizes, for the suffering body—especially the black suffering bodies in Stowe’s novel—is limited to its own materiality, and subsequently a pain that constitutes “a wholly passive and helpless experience.” Thus the physical pain of slavery in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* can only work to disempower its victims, but it will simultaneously work to empower those who sympathize with them. The privilege of sympathy, then, represents less a state of commensurate suffering than a site of access;

this begs the question, however, of the motivation of those who strive to inhabit the suffering of another, and further demands that we question the role of imagination in this desire for someone else's pain. What is the difference, in this case, between imagination and fantasy?

Imagination and fantasy, while certainly distinct in some ways, are psychic processes that are always in danger of overlapping. Indeed, Freud sees little difference between the two; in his essay "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming," he contends that the writing of fiction is "the art of creating imaginative form" (Freud 436), and that the act of creating this "imaginative form" originates in "phantasy." The author "creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously—that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion" (Freud 437). The notion of fiction as a "world of phantasy"—which Freud equates with the "imaginative form"—provides a provocative point of departure for an examination of sympathy, because if fantasizing and imagining are analogous, sympathetic identification with a suffering body is actually fantasizing about inhabiting that suffering body. We are to understand sympathy, then, as a process ineluctably enmeshed within the expression of *desire*, for "the motive forces of phantasies are unsatisfied wishes, and every single phantasy is the fulfillment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality" (Freud 439). Sympathy demands that we imagine the suffering of others, and actually that we fantasize about enduring pain that does not exist in our own lives; the reader should note that, unsurprisingly, black characters are always *objects* of sympathy in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, never those that sympathize.

Though useful, employing Freudian psychoanalysis as an interpretive tool in examining the masochistic implications of sympathetic identification perhaps renders the issue more abstract than it need be. For more practical, and perhaps more compelling evidence, one need only return to the historical context surrounding the *practice* of sympathy, or Stowe's novel itself. Print culture in antebellum America, for example, saw a sharp increase in "tracts and essays [that] sought to rouse maternal instincts in defense of slave women and children. Mothers who failed to make the connection were admonished point-blank to imagine the sale or murder of their own children" (Clark 483-84). Other "tracts and speeches instructed readers and listeners to imagine that they were being whipped or to imagine that their children were standing on the auction block" (Clark 479), and "humanitarian reformers frequently commanded readers to act as imaginative witnesses to the spectacle of suffering"⁶ (Halttunen 327). Female—and often white—abolitionists coined the phrase "voluntary motherhood" (Clark 484), invoking the long tradition of sexual coercion and rape of female slaves, and to encourage sympathetic identification, encouraged white women to "'fancy yourselves every moment liable to be polluted—and, if you refuse submission, to be lacerated, then forced by your tyrant to comply'" (quoted in Clark 483-484). Sympathy

⁶ Halttunen, "Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain," p327. The issue of the "eyewitness account" is also of significance here, as Halttunen contends that it "appealed to the popular voyeuristic taste for scenarios of suffering" (313), as well as lent credibility to the account—even if the "eyewitness account" was imagined. Elizabeth Clark notes in her essay (cited above), "'The Sacred Rights of the Weak,'" that *The Annual Report of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society...1852* (New York, 1852) reports that "during an incredulous discussion of Eliza's escape across the ice floes in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, a man...piped up, 'It is true; I knew the man who helped her out of the river'" (Clark 467n9).

represents a nineteenth century American “praxis, not theory” (Clark 479) in which “fancying” constituted as crucial a component as feeling. Such “fancying” on the part of the “intended audience of white northerners” (Clark 467) of submission to beatings, whippings, humiliating exhibitionism and rape, while certainly appropriate material for invoking sympathy, also recalls images that are par for the course in many of today’s pornographic publications. Indeed, Karen Halttunen suggests that “a growing predilection for scenarios of suffering was, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, becoming increasingly central to pornography *qua* pornography” (Halttunen 314). Historically, then, readers were frequently being asked to imagine—and fantasize—about submission to pain. Sympathy, however, inextricably entwined this pain with pleasure, as it was said to be “‘a dear delicious pain,’ ‘a sort of pleasing Anguish,’—an emotional experience that liberally mingled pleasure with vicarious pain” (Halttunen 308). In Freud’s essay, “A Child is Being Beaten,” he writes that the “delicious pain” of reading *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* provided “onanistic gratification” (107) for the reader—Freud’s analysis—and that Freud defined his patient’s “onanistic” pleasure as specifically masochistic.

Many of the white characters in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* express similarly masochistic desires to have their bodies reduced to the “obdurate physicality” of the slave’s body, and subsequently subjected to the same treatment. The narrator of Stowe’s novel constantly invokes a rhetoric of subjection in describing the white characters, and frequently allows these characters to express themselves through this rhetoric as well. Mr. St. Clare wonders, for example, “how much [he] might bring. Say so much for the shape of [his] head, so much for a high forehead, so much for arms, and hands, and legs, and then so much for education, learning, talent, honesty, religion!” (Stowe 216) In questioning how much he might “bring,” St. Clare is fantasizing about putting his body on the auction block, having it reduced to its parts and evaluated accordingly. A similar scene occurs in George Aiken’s dramatic rendition of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1852); when Ophelia returns to Vermont, Deacon courts her, exclaiming,

DEACON: Ah! Well, I think I do wear well—in fact, I may so remarkably well. It has been observed to me before.

OPHELIA: And you are not much over fifty?

DEACON: Just turned forty, I assure you.

OPHELIA: Hale and hearty?

DEACON: Health excellent—look at my eye! Strong as a lion—look at my arm! A No. 1 constitution—look at my leg!

(Aiken V.ii.423)

At this moment, Deacon and Ophelia are performing the auction block, with Deacon playing the slave and Ophelia the prospective buyer. Though she stops short of looking at his teeth, Ophelia still appraises Deacon and watches him dismantle his body, giving every piece a price.

Further examples of the rhetoric of subjection of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* include statements such as: “Miss Ophelia was the absolute *bond-slave* of the ‘ought’” (Stowe 227); “the senator smiled, as if he rather liked the idea of considering himself a sacrifice to his country” (112); “Mr. St. Clare found his sultana no way ready to resign her slave” (222); Mrs. St. Clare, “after her marriage, found it easier to submit than contend” (295);

[white] “masters are divided into two classes, oppressors and oppressed” (301); “we mistresses are the slaves, down here” (240); and “Mr. and Mrs. Shelby both felt annoyed and degraded by the familiar impudence of the trader, and yet both saw the absolute necessity of putting a constraint on their feelings” (80). Clearly, the language of the slave-trade permeates the text, but is not limited to trading slaves. Indeed, this vocabulary offers something that white characters find attractive, as evidenced by their frequent use of it to define themselves and their circumstances. Their use of the rhetoric of subjection, of slavery, operates under the guise of sympathy, though the desire and ultimately, the *lack* suggested by the (mis)use of such a discourse demands closer attention.

Sympathetic identification in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* can thus be understood as an expression of a white masochistic desire for the pain and suffering of the enslaved. The configuration of the slave as an object of fetish is far from a new idea; Hortense Spillers, Eric Lott and Marianne Noble, for example, have all written compellingly on the subject. The black slave—and especially the black male slave—as “North America’s most *coveted* body” (Spillers 178, emphasis original), often finds narrative employment as an “erotic object” (Noble 127), and in the case of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, a site of desire in which white characters locate and appropriate black suffering. The question now becomes: why? As Judith Butler wonders in *The Psychic Life of Power*, “how are we to understand...the cultivation of *an attachment to subjection?*” (Butler 102, emphasis original). Slaves were possessions, they did not possess. They had little social power, and even resorting to claims of masochism does not convincingly explain the white desire to not only be abused physically, but to have one’s physical *work* exploited as well. To answer this question, we must return to the question of subjectivity and its relationship to the body.

This essay has already examined the correlation between subjectivity and physical subjection, noting that while socially disempowered, the black bodies in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* claim exclusive right to physical suffering. There exists an undeniable subjectivity in suffering, and the limited materiality of the black body in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* thus posits subjectivity within the sole possession of black characters; indeed, it may be the only thing they possess. To return to Lindon Barrett’s essay on black and white bodies, if whiteness is “coterminous with nonidentity, displacement, and self-differentiation—the markers of signification” (321)—we find that whiteness is constantly positing the meaning of body elsewhere. While black bodies are limited to their physicality, white bodies are limited to always signifying *beyond* the physical, precluding the possibility of a material significance. In *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, “a second model of citizenship has emerged around the visible emotions of suffering bodies that, in the very activity of suffering, demonstrate worth as citizens” (Williams 24). Unfortunately, though, only figurative citizenship—a consciousness analogous to narrative subjectivity—is possible for the black suffering bodies within this text, and only literal citizenship is offered to their white sympathizers. If the foundation of personhood in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is physical suffering, white characters are effectively barred from exhibiting a narrative subjectivity. The masochistic *desire* for black pain and suffering that manifests itself through the practice of sympathy, then, is also indicative of the fact that white characters in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* suffer from a definitive

lack that can be located in the denial—or impossibility—of an innately physical subjectivity⁷.

That is not to say, however, that white characters—or the readers of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*—accept the foreclosure of narrative power without complaint, or without substitution. Many readers will argue that both white characters and white readers do manage to acquire a narrative subjectivity in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, and in a sense, they do, through what Elaine Scarry describes as “work”. Work, Scarry argues, “approximates the framing events of pain and the imagination, for it consists of an extremely embodied physical act and of an object that was not previously in the world” (Scarry 170). Work is related to pain in that it

...entails the much more moderate (and now willed, directed and controlled) embodied aversiveness of exertion, prolonged effort, and exhaustion. It hurts to work. Thus, the wholly passive and acute suffering of physical pain becomes the self-regulated and modest suffering of work. Work is, then, a diminution of pain: the *aversive intensity* of pain becomes in work *controlled discomfort*. (Scarry 171, emphasis original)

Would the practice of sympathy, then, not be considered “work”? This essay has already demonstrated how sympathetic identification appropriates pain and administers it to the (white) sympathizer’s body in a controlled and inherently autonomous manner; work, then, like the pain of sympathetic identification, is the transformation of pain from a passive into an active or autonomous experience. Concomitantly, a body that works in any capacity must necessarily be endowed with a materiality; the white “work” of practicing sympathy circumvents the problem that Barrett describes—the fact that white bodies can only signify beyond, and never as, themselves—by inscribing the white body with the signification of sympathetic “worker.” In their capacity as producers, the bodies of white characters—as well as those of the privileged readers of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* who practice sympathy—are ultimately redefined as material, and subsequently permitted a narrative subjectivity, but only through effectively annexing black bodies and the pain with which they are invested.

The purpose of this essay is not to undermine the significance of Stowe’s novel; certainly, there is much merit to be found in its harsh condemnation of the profligacy of America’s “peculiar institution.” The reader must consider, however, that sympathetic identification, then and now, is about the dissolution of difference between reader and character, sympathizer and sufferer. In minimizing the often crucial differences that distinguish privilege from oppression, or imagined suffering from real physical pain, there is always a danger of thinking that they are the same, rendering the impetus for social change liable to be undercut or forgotten. The “work” of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*’s white characters, and particularly its twenty-first century readers, then, should perhaps be the effort and toil of imagining—perhaps fantasizing—a “sentient” mode of response to the text that is not imbued with notions of appropriation, paternalism and essential sameness. Until then, Stowe’s “*living dramatic reality*” (Stowe 629, emphasis original)

⁷ See Elizabeth Grosz. *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction*. Routledge; London and New York: 1990. pp 64-74.

of slavery will continue to render readers “white with interest” (Stowe 607) and wholly incapable of imagining anything actively different.

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Özet

Acıları Kavramak: Stowe'un *Tom Amca'nın Kulübesi* adlı Eserinde Sempati, İstrap ve Beyaz Öznelliğine Şekil Verme

Harriet Beecher Stowe'un *Tom Amcanın Kulübesi* adlı romanı, Amerikan köle karşıtı hareketlerine yaptığı katkılarla ünlenmiştir. Fakat bu ana akım edebiyata mal olmuş roman, aynı zamanda, dil kullanımındaki çağdaş eğilimleri ve henüz gelişimini tamamlamamış olan Amerikan dilinin ülkenin vatandaşlarını tanımlarken nasıl işleme konulduğunu yansıtmaktadır.

Okuyucu bazen Stowe'un romanında gerek anlatıcı gerekse de karakterlerin "boyun eğme retorisi" altında "köle", "baskı", "dövülmek" gibi kölelik terimlerini kullanarak etrafındaki dünyayı tanımladıklarını fark eder. Bu makale Stowe'un anlatıcısı ve beyaz karakterlerin köleliği tanımlamak için bahsedilen boyun eğme retorisini kullanmadığını; bunun yerine, kendi yaşam ve bedenlerini anlatmak için bu çağdaş diyalogun terimlerini bozduklarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. *Tom Amcanın Kulübesi*'nde siyah bedenlere özgü gözle görülür bir boyun eğme ve acı çekme eğilimi vardır. Bu eğilimin yansımaları çağdaş beyaz köle karşıtı edebiyat ve kültüründe görülmektedir. Bu makale 19.yüzyıl Amerikan kültüründeki belgeler halinde ortaya koyan acı çekme olgusuna olan ilgiyi ele alır ve bu acıya olan ilginin aslında acının etkileri üzerine yapılmış kültürel bir araştırma olduğunu ileri sürer: kökleri bedende saklı olan boyun eğme duygusu. Bu makale, sempati, öznellik ve ırk üzerine bir dizi eleştirel ve teorik yazılar kullanarak, özne ve vatandaş olmanın anlamının nasıl 19.yüzyıl Amerikan olgusu olarak acı ve beden kavramları çerçevesinde yaratıldığını araştırmaktadır.

**The Long Walk Home:
V. S. Naipaul and the Narration of Home¹**

Andrew Martino

Per sopravvivere bisogna raccontare delle storie.
Umberto Eco, *L'isola del giorno prima*

Life is not what one lived, but what one
remembers and how one remembers it in order to
recount it.

Gabriel Garcia Marquez, *Living to Tell the Tale*

Home is, I suppose, just a child's idea. A house at
night, and a lamp in the house. A place to feel
safe.

V. S. Naipaul²

V.S. Naipaul is a writer who has gone to great lengths to represent himself as completely exilic. Born in Trinidad in 1932, Naipaul grew up in a transplanted Brahmin household. His grandfather emigrated to Trinidad from India as an indentured servant. In 1950 Naipaul left Trinidad to attend Oxford on a scholarship and began to actively pursue writing. All of Naipaul's writing, including novels, essays, and travel literature, can be interpreted as an attempt to come to terms with his colonial condition and Indian ancestry. The confrontation between Naipaul's idea of an India of his ancestors and his encounter with the "real" India is detailed in his book, *An Area of Darkness: A Discovery of India*. It is, I believe, at that ontological intersection, the intersection where romantic idea and reality meet, that Naipaul's conception of himself, and ultimately his view of civilization matured. The topic of this paper is to explore Naipaul's juxtaposition of the narratives of India he heard while growing up with that of his first visit to India as recounted in *An Area of Darkness*. Ultimately, Naipaul discovers that the notions of India (in family lore and physically) are incompatible. Furthermore, this paper argues that home for Naipaul exists within his writing and not in a geographically specific place such as Trinidad, India, or England.

If one is to take Naipaul's statement concerning home in the epigram above seriously, then one would be forced to confront the *possibility* that traditional conceptions of home have outlived their usefulness. Certainly the concept of security, warmth, and comfort are indissolubly related to our conceptions of home. Yet, as *An Area of Darkness* makes quite clear, those concepts prove to be false, or trap doors in the human need to feel at home in the world. As Naipaul states quite early in *An Area of*

¹ An early version of this paper was delivered at the 2003 South Atlantic Modern Language Association conference in Atlanta, Georgia.

² *The Observer*. September 12, 2004.

Darkness: “And it was clear that here [India], and not in Greece, the East began: in this chaos of uneconomical movement, the self-stimulated din, the sudden feeling of insecurity, the conviction that all men were not brothers and that luggage was in danger” (3). Especially after September 11, 2001, our notions of security have undergone a fundamental shift. What was once comfort, now leans toward a militaristic sense of security; a security I would add, that is ultimately false. In this post 9/11 world the reader of *An Area of Darkness* can identify with Naipaul’s moody desperation concerning humanity that had been largely absent before. Home and being at home can no longer be considered the inalienable right of the Occident.

An Area of Darkness functions not only as a title, but as a metaphor for the idealized India of Naipaul’s ancestors. *Darkness* is a resonant and complex metaphor that runs all throughout Naipaul’s writing. In some cases it stands for the obvious; the unknown or the unknowable. In others it stands for the outside world beyond the safety zone of familiarity and community. In others still it may stand for the past; both personal and collective. The reader of this incredible and at times maddening book follows Naipaul’s episodic excursions through various parts of the sub-continent. Through his journey Naipaul is hoping to discover that the ambiguous idea of the India he grew up with in Trinidad would correspond to the actual India he physically encounters in his travels. But such a correspondence cannot occur because, as Naipaul comes to realize, the reality of something can never live up to the idea. Although traces of its customs and traditions were evident in Trinidad, Naipaul states that India was never “real for him in any significant way” beyond that of a place from which his ancestors had come. India, in this sense, was never “home” for Naipaul, just as Trinidad had never been “home” for him: “And India had in a special way been the background of my childhood. It was the country from which my grandfather came, a country never physically described and therefore never real, a country out in the void beyond the dot of Trinidad; and from it our journey had been final. It was a country suspended in time” (21). Naipaul’s project in *An Area of Darkness* is to return to India in order to reclaim the real India for himself. However, when Naipaul arrives in India he simultaneously feels a part of the crowd (in that he now resembles others in skin color) and apart from the crowd (in that he cannot connect with the mentality of the physical India). As we shall see, the increasing momentum toward a vagabond-like persona lends a powerful aura of spectrality to Naipaul the traveler and Naipaul the errant narrator.

“India is a country of chaos, both bureaucratic and social,” Naipaul informs us over and over. It is against the backdrop of this chaos that Naipaul begins (rather quickly) to disassociate himself from not only the India he finds himself in at the time he is writing but what he calls the “idea of India,” which informs so much of his past. Out of this collision between past (the idea of India as indoctrinated in him through his ancestors) and present (what Naipaul will call “India, the world’s largest slum”), Naipaul begins to form a persona that will render him enigmatic and ontologically homeless. It is at this stage that his correspondence with the notion of the picaro begins to take seed. Alexander Blackburn defines the picaro in his book *The Myth of the Picaro*, as “A member of a caste subject to scorn, suspicion, forced into a marginal position” (9). Naipaul’s self-projected marginality coincides with certain characteristics of the picaro, especially as conceived as “the one who is apart from the crowd.” Naipaul’s marginality marks him as a continuous threat to the sedentary custodians of

literature. That is, those who deem what literature and what authors should or should not be representative of a culture. Naipaul's frequent outbursts and general ill humor often makes him an easy target for academics across the globe.

As Stuart Miller writes in his 1967 study, *The Picaresque Novel*, the hero of the picaresque stands apart from the "accepted" definition of what we usually come to think of as the hero:

The hero of the picaresque novel differs from characters in other types of fiction. His origins are uncertain. He becomes a rogue in a world full of roguery. His roguery differs from comic roguery in being gratuitous. He cannot love or feel strong emotion; he is incapable of anchoring his personality to some idea or ideal of conduct. His internal chaos is externally reflected in his protean roles. This instability of personality is seen in the picaresque novel as a reflection of the outer chaos discovered by the plot patterns. (131)

It is this profound sense of marginality, of homelessness, of not belonging to any one place, time, or community, combined with the fact that Naipaul finds himself in a chaotic and unstructured world (the Postcolonial World itself is a shambles precisely on account of the pullout of Empire) that will inform his highly opinionated view of *civilization*: "To define is to begin to separate oneself, to assure oneself of one's position, to be withdrawn from the chaos that India always threatens, the abyss at whose edge the sweeper of the gay girl sits" (44). I do not feel that Naipaul is speaking only of the chaos of India here; he is making an assessment of his own relationship to his past—a past that he discovers in *An Area of Darkness*, which cannot correspond to the structured ideal. Thus, what Naipaul ultimately discovers is that he is indefinable; ontologically homeless in the most resonant sense. With a writing that is steeped in bitter disappointment, Naipaul separates himself from his past by judging it, and in the harshest manner possible. However, this judgment is also an auto-critique in the sense that he is taking himself to task for undertaking the search for his past in the first place. As Naipaul states in his novel *A Bend in the River* (1979), "The world is what it is; men who are nothing, who allow themselves to become nothing, have no place in it" (3). That "the world is what it is" constitutes the harsh realization Naipaul comes to while traveling through India, the land of his ancestors, fifteen years before *A Bend in the River*.³

An Area of Darkness was written while Naipaul was still a young man (in his early thirties), and it can be a devastating experience to discover that one's past is largely based upon an illusion, or a fairy tale, containing only fragments of fact. Naipaul's bitterness emerges through his interactions with other Indians while on the sub-continent. Yet that bitterness is also self-directed. Naipaul resents the living conditions of the Indians and their third world status. Everywhere he looks he sees filth and extreme poverty. I believe that Naipaul's harsh criticism of India is inspired by a fear of locating this same uncleanliness in himself. *An Area of Darkness* represents a

³ It is perhaps also significant that the title of Naipaul's recent novel is *Half a Life* (2001), a title that suggests that Naipaul has yet to come to terms with his colonial condition. In his latest novel, *Magic Seeds* (2004), Naipaul continues the trials and tribulations of Willie Chandran, his character who is in search of belonging to anything.

defining moment in Naipaul's life because it constitutes a fundamental break with the past that will submerge Naipaul into a dualism: "It was a journey that ought not to have been made; it had broken my life in two" (289). From 1964 on, Naipaul would continue to fight that dualism by writing and by traveling throughout the world. In many respects his travel books are much more "literary" than his novels. However, I suggest that attention should be paid to how Naipaul looks at the world, rather than to what he says. His judgments are often harsh to the point of racism, but his tireless pursuit of the "truth" (to allow people to tell their own stories) is, I believe, sincere. What Naipaul discovers in India between 1962 and 1964 is that, while we are all products of our time, as well as our heritage, an attempt to reclaim the past is always accompanied by a danger of losing ourselves completely to a bitterness informed by the illusion of the past. Therefore, one of the central motifs of *An Area of Darkness* could be a warning that not only can one not go back, perhaps one should not even try. For Naipaul the price was the loss of any mooring to his heritage—a heritage that turned out to be utterly foreign to him.

Yet, to hypothesize that the title, *An Area of Darkness* suggests merely that "you can't go home again" (to borrow a phrase from Thomas Wolfe) is both simplistic and erroneous. Naipaul does return to the land of his ancestors by returning specifically to the nineteen acres of his grandfather's land. What Naipaul comes to realize is that despite everything he is the one who is out of place. He does not belong to India, just as he does not belong to England or Trinidad. Naipaul, for what little effort he makes to discover India (to be honest about this, Naipaul is not exactly culturally understanding),⁴ comes to realize not only his alienation from that land but his alienation from England as well. In one particularly illuminating section of *An Area of Darkness*, Naipaul discusses the search for identity during his childhood in Trinidad:

For in the India of my childhood, the land which in my imagination was an extension, separate from the alienness by which we ourselves were surrounded, of my grandmother's house, there was no alien presence. How could such a thing be conceived? Our own world, though clearly fading, was still separate; and an involvement with the English, of whom on the island we knew little, would have seemed a more unlikely violation than an involvement with the Chinese or the Africans, of whom we knew more. Into this alienness we daily ventured, and at length we were absorbed into it. But we knew there had been change, gain, loss. We knew that something which was once whole had been washed away. What was whole was the *idea* (emphasis mine) of India. (199-200)

The "idea of India" dwells in the house of his grandmother; an "idea" that is progressively receding into the darkness of forgetfulness. Naipaul's bitter

⁴ Naipaul's preoccupation with the display of public defecation is almost excessive. The sanitary conditions of India are never truly explored in his book, but they are judged quite harshly and unforgivably. It is almost as if Naipaul can recognize himself in the "filth" he describes, in part, because he does come from India and is unable to come to terms with that recognition. Naipaul has dubbed the Third World, the "Turd World" exclusively for its lack of "civilized" restroom practices and sewage disposal. It is a fundamental motif in his travel literature, and one wonders at the degree of impact the (to my knowledge, unthought) practice of public defecation has had on Naipaul.

disappointment at encountering the “real” India calls that India into question, and it also calls the legitimacy of his grandmother’s house into question. That, I would suggest, is key in understanding Naipaul’s exilic nature, which is absolute and consuming, as well as satirization of the Third World. Belonging to no place and no time, Naipaul continually returns to the only “home” he knows; his writing. Naipaul’s home is constructed through the agency of his writing. That is, if Naipaul’s exilic condition informs every fiber of his being, and it is inherent in human nature to build a home, to put down roots, then Naipaul must be constructing a home through the writing of his texts. The text becomes the only ground to which Naipaul can cling. Through the text Naipaul is assuring himself that he is human, that he is somehow, fundamentally a part of something. The text in this sense becomes not only an artifact leaving a record of one man’s life and assumes the role of ontological informant. The “idea of India,” that “area of darkness” which Naipaul attempted to penetrate physically (the actual journey to India), failed (through an unwillingness or inability to understand “them”), and has now been redirected toward an exploration of that darkness through the agency of writing. Naipaul is an intellectual (regardless of whether one agrees with his ideology, he does constitute a resonant “voice” in the contemporary world) who has attempted not to understand, because he is often unwilling, but to afford others the opportunity to tell their own stories. Naipaul begins his book *Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions Among the Converted Peoples* (1998) with a clear outline of his project: “This is a book about people. It is not a book of opinion. It is a book of stories. The stories were collected during five months of travel in 1995 in four non-Arab Muslim countries—Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia. So there is a context and a theme” (xi). The “context and theme” is that people would be allowed to speak for themselves. Yet, interestingly with Naipaul this is never quite possible. Naipaul is the quintessential “outsider,” whose presence continues to haunt the landscapes of his writing. He is that specter-like character who constitutes the apparition of the “great” writers of the nineteenth century. When Naipaul stated that the novel as genre was bankrupt, he was alluding to the authority of the nineteenth century masters and the renegades of postmodernism. With postmodernism the author as authority figure is called into question.

The “too overwhelming reality” that is India must be assimilated into the psyche for Naipaul to come to grips with his past, and this is done through the agency of writing about India. In the final section, “The Village of the Dubes,” Naipaul returns to his ancestral land; the remaining 19 acres of his grandfather’s farm. It is here that Naipaul comes to a complete realization that he is fundamentally *exilic*:

India had not worked its magic on me. It remained the land of my childhood, an area of darkness; like the Himalayan passes, it was closing up again, as fast as I withdrew from it, into the land of myth; it seemed to exist in just the timelessness which I had imagined as a child, into which, for all that I walked on Indian earth, I knew I could not penetrate.

In a year I had not learned acceptance. I had learned my *separateness from India* (emphasis mine), and was content to be a colonial, without a past, without ancestors. (274)

Naipaul’s definition of the colonial as “without a past, without ancestors” is telling. What we must keep in mind is that Naipaul is always speaking in the context of the first

person: this is *his* ontological condition. When he finally arrives at the thinking which informs *Beyond Belief*, he has moved further toward the margin of story-telling—he has assumed the role of the post-colonial picaro—that roguish traveler who calls the hegemonic discourse of the Occident into question.

Naipaul exists in an “area of darkness” that he is constantly trying to penetrate through the agency of writing. As such, he has consciously decided to leave his own past behind because it was not, nor could it have been, the past for which he had been searching. That past belonged to the memory of his grandmother’s house, replete with people, smells, talk, and emotions. The India that Naipaul had been searching for existed (note the past tense—for now it has been tainted by the “real” India) entirely within his imagination. As he states in his follow up to *An Area of Darkness*, titled *India: A Wounded Civilization*: “In India I know I was a stranger; but increasingly I understand that my Indian memories, the memories of that India which lived on into my childhood in Trinidad, are like trapdoors into a bottomless past” (xiii).

Naipaul’s search for India ends in bitterness, a bitterness that has carried over into his writing since that time. The notion of a search can, if we are to read Naipaul carefully, reveal only the simulacra; the copy of a copy from which there is no original. He discovered that he was not what he thought he was, which caused him a profound sense of anxiety. The danger resides in finding oneself, as Naipaul did, completely cut off from the past:

The world is illusion, the Hindus say. We talk of despair, but true despair lies too deep for formulation. It was only now, as my experience of India defined itself more properly *against my own homelessness* (emphasis mine), that I saw how close in the past year I had been to the total Indian negation, how much it had become the basis of thought and feeling. And already, with this awareness, in a world where illusion could only be a concept and not something felt in the bones, it was slipping away from me. I felt it as something true which I could never adequately express and never seize again. (290)

Naipaul’s slip toward the edge of the “negation” of his Indian heritage was not complete. There exists a spark which still has a claim on him. *An Area of Darkness* was Naipaul’s first book on India; there would be two more: *India: A Wounded Civilization*, and *India: A Million Mutinies Now*. However, it is India’s claim upon him, and not Naipaul’s claim upon India that emerges after his first journey there. *An Area of Darkness* is an intensely personal account of the sub-continent, and should be read as such. It is during his travels in India, and not upon the occasion of his first travel book, *The Middle Passage* that Naipaul begins to form his exilic persona. Naipaul’s exilic state has afforded him the opportunity to *exist textually* within the “space of encounter.” Naipaul’s errancy (in the sense that Blanchot defines it) is one that both threatens negation continuously (the idea of India is always in strife with the reality of the encountered India) and informs his being. Fundamentally tied to this negation is the vocation of writing. He states in his essay “Prologue to an Autobiography” that he inherited his “fear of extinction” from his father: “...His fear of extinction. That was his gift to me. That fear became mine as well. It was linked with the idea of the vocation: the fear could be combated only by the exercise of the vocation” (111). Naipaul’s father’s madness resided in his failure to become a writer. He failed to heed the call to

writing; the will to narrate—thus imposing a form—without which hover the voices of madness and estrangement. Writing becomes not only an act of resistance against negation, but, and perhaps most importantly, a way of dwelling in the world. “And it was that fear, a panic about failing to be what I should be, rather than a simple ambition, that was with me when I came down from Oxford in 1954 and began trying to write in London. My father died the previous year. Our family was in distress. I should have done something for them, gone back to them. But, without having become a writer, I couldn’t go back” (111). In order to combat the very real possibility that he had inherited his father’s madness, Naipaul knew he had to become a writer (implying something much more than simply “the act writing,” but writing as a process of discovery). In order to write he had to go back—but in literary form first—then physically. Naipaul’s status as a writer functions to combat madness and extinction by imposing a form; and that form is narrative. However, this existential homelessness should not be thought of as completely negative. Without his state of homelessness Naipaul would not be able to explore other “areas of darkness.”

Naipaul has stated over and over again that he belongs to no literary tradition. What he does belong to is a will to form (his own orientation is inspired by the “great” novels of the nineteenth century), to narrate the stories of what he sees as outsider—as dissident voice fighting against the noise of a postmodern schizophrenic howl.

As Pankaj Mishra states in his introduction to Naipaul’s recent collection of essays, appropriately titled, *The Writer and the World*, “It is hard to think of one writer so fundamentally exilic, carrying so many clashing fading worlds inside him. But what’s more remarkable is that Naipaul’s acute sense of lost glory and contentment [and here I must interject and ask what glory, what contentment? And whose? Naipaul’s, or the worlds he chooses to explore?], his anguished perception of deception and tragedy—[again I must interrupt and recall that Naipaul states ‘The world is what it is’—our inherited tragedy as a species]—things inseparable from his background and experience—co-exist with an attitude of acceptance and optimism, with a well founded faith in human striving and perfectibility. These visions aren’t usually compatible. But they work together in Naipaul, give his work its peculiar tension and richness, and make it the most sustained and wide-ranging meditation on our world” (xv). Naipaul’s “meditation on our world” somehow suggests that it is not *his* world, that he cannot belong to it, that he dwells in a condition of spectrality. In this sense, Naipaul is surely on the periphery of community, but community in the sense of the world at large. It is only such an individual, who may perhaps resist the impulse to keep moving at first, that can truly make an engagement with the world because the individual has no reference points from which to form a prior opinion, or “view.” Naipaul is a writer without definition. His texts are the closest thing we have to understand the writer, and his texts are always in a process of becoming.

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Özet

Eve Daha Çok Uzun Bir Yol Var: V. S. Naipaul ve Ev Anlatıları

V. S. Naipaul kendini tamamıyla sürgün olarak temsil edebilmek için evinden çok uzaklara gitmiştir. Romanları, denemeleri ve seyahat yazıları dâhil olmak üzere, Naipaul'un bütün eserleri, sömürgeyle ilgili ve Hintli atalarına dair kendi durumunu dile getirmek için yapılmış birer girişim olarak yorumlanabilir. 1962 ile 1964 yılları arasında Naipaul Hindistan'a ilk ziyaretini gerçekleştirir. Bu ziyaret onun *An Area of Darkness: A Discovery of India* adlı ikinci seyahat kitabında detaylandırılmıştır. Bu makale, Naipaul'un; Trinidad'ta büyürken kulaktan duyma Hindistan anlatılarını Hindistan'a yaptığı ilk ziyaretiyle bir arada değerlendirmesini araştırmaktadır. Sonuçta, Naipaul Hindistan hakkında duyduğu bilgilerin, oraya yaptığı yolculuk sırasında karşılaştığı gerçeklerle örtüşmediğini keşfeder. Buna ek olarak, bu makale "ev" olgusunun Naipaul için Trinidad, Hindistan ya da İngiltere gibi coğrafi olarak belirlenmiş bir mekânda değil, yazdığı metinlerin içinde var olduğunu ileri sürmektedir.

**Teapots and Transcendence:
The Search for Language in Virginia Woolf's
The Voyage Out and *Mrs. Dalloway***

Terri Beth Miller

According to her journals, Virginia Woolf's literary project was to "reimagine the novel" (*Mrs. Dalloway*, vii), to construct a new form of writing centered not upon the grand events and extraordinary circumstances which preoccupied literature up to that time, but rather upon the psychological nuances which inform everyday life and connect human beings to one another in hidden, often surprising, ways. A comparison of Woolf's first novel, *The Voyage Out*, with perhaps her most famous work, *Mrs. Dalloway*, reveals the complexities relating to the achievement of Woolf's literary project, which necessitated the evolution of a new literary language and technique that would, as Woolf had hoped, alter the very look and feel of the modern novel. The novels' diverse narrative techniques, symbologies, and characters illustrate various trajectories in Woolf's own search, as an artist, for a linguistic economy capable of articulating a view of life as she saw it, while other issues of authorial development, particularly as revealed in *Mrs. Dalloway*'s rectifications of a number of *The Voyage Out*'s technical problems, demonstrate the extent to which the warping and delimiting effects of existing literary and linguistic paradigms threatened the success of Woolf's creative project.

While the ten years which separate the writing of *The Voyage Out* (1915) and *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925) would see a restructuring of certain narrative forms and the refinement of the symbolic economy at work in Woolf's first literary excursions, the ideologies underlying and informing her oeuvre alter very little. What connects these two novels most significantly is the assertion of a transcendental philosophy, unique in that it is divested both of religious implication as well as of the traditional spurning of the material (*The Voyage Out*, xxvii). Rather, the driving force behind both these works seems to be the expression of an ostensibly unutterable, immaterial reality which simultaneously encompasses and undergirds the manifestations of the physical world, including, importantly, systems of language. This enveloping system, an ether or, to speak in terms more closely related to Woolf's own symbolic economy, an undifferentiated sea, is both the source of human consciousness and of the material realm which informs it, as well as the graveyard to which all such things return. The role of the artist, primarily, is to extract iterative meaning from this fluid causal force. From this paradigm, then, comes Woolf's comparison of the act of writing to the process of "tunneling," of digging not simply into the individual unconscious but also into the primordial *beingness* which she felt unites humanity and belies the sense of individual distinctness. In a review of Dorothy Richardson's novel, *The Tunnel*, Woolf described the task of the modern writer: "The method, if triumphant, should make us feel ourselves seated at the center of another mind and ... we should perceive in the helter-skelter of flying fragments some unity, significance, or design" (*Women and Writing*, 29).

Woolf conceived of her art as a preexisting language, a tapping into the amorphous, omnipresent reality manifest first in the ineffable realms of the human unconscious and given material form by the writer in the words which emanate from it. In a letter to Vita Sackville-West, Virginia Woolf describes her process of writing thus:

[I]t is all rhythm...A sight, an emotion, creates this wave in the mind, long before it makes words to fit it and in writing...one has to recapture this and set this working (which has nothing apparently to do with words) and then, as it breaks and tumbles in the mind, it makes words to fit it. (qtd. Roe, 23)

Because this reality exists first *outside* language, the process of translating it into words inevitably leads to distortions and deletions. Indeed, according to Roe, with each new publication, Woolf was tormented anew by the feeling of having left something out of her work, a fear so acute during the publication process of *The Voyage Out* that Woolf insisted upon nine distinct revisions of the text and ultimately suffered a severe mental breakdown following the novel's final release (Roe, 39). The discussion which follows will endeavor to trace Woolf's herculean project to create a new literary form capable of honoring both the gloriously beautiful physical world and the generative, recuperative immaterial realm that permeates and unites all things in it.

Before delving into the myriad thematic, symbolic, and narrative intricacies of the text, an evaluation of one of *The Voyage Out's* emblematic passage may help to encapsulate the ideas which will be presented here. In a scene in which the newly-engaged Rachel prepares to respond to her friends' congratulatory letters, Woolf writes:

Terence, meanwhile, read a novel which someone else had written, a process which he found essential to the composition of his own. For a considerable time nothing was to be heard but the ticking of the clock and the fitful scratch of Rachel's pen, as she produced phrases which bore a considerable likeness to those which she had condemned. She was struck by it herself, for she stopped writing and looked up; looked at Terence deep in the arm-chair, looked at the different pieces of furniture...at the window-pane which showed the branches of a tree filed with sky, heard the clocking ticking, and was amazed at the gulf which lay between all that and her sheet of paper. Would there ever be a time when the world was one and indivisible? (308)

Within these few short lines lie many of the motivating factors which inform not only entirety of *The Voyage Out*, but also *Mrs. Dalloway*. Here, Woolf touches upon the writer's anxiety of influence; the seeming incompatibility of material fact, symbolized by the bedroom furniture, with an awareness of an as yet undefinable metaphysical yearning, exemplified by the sky-filled tree branches; the unifying force of time, suggested by the ticking clock, and the inability of communication, especially in the form of written language as it is encountered in the text of *The Voyage Out*, to make human beings known to one another or to express such multitudinous, complementary and contradictory realities.

The *Voyage Out's* protagonist, Rachel Vinrace, exemplifies Woolf's attempt to discover a means of articulating the undifferentiated sea underlying her transcendental philosophies. The daughter of a sea captain, Rachel's affinity is with the "drowned

things” of the world; she is perceived to have lived her life perpetually among “old bones and pearls,” (Terence, her fiancé, remarks that the first time he met her, her hands were wet) and, indeed, Rachel’s own self-description is that she is both “mermaid” and ungovernable wind. Her journey into, and ultimate rejection of language, suggests the inadequacy of contemporary systems of representation to articulate the truth of human experience, the fatality of endeavoring to make that truth conform to existing paradigms. When she is first introduced to the reader, her reticence, based upon a fear of saying the wrong thing, renders her virtually speechless. With the arrival to the colony, however, she is taken under the tutelage of her Aunt Helen, the avatar of worldliness, who embarks upon a process of education based primarily upon “talk” and “reading.” At first awed by the power of novels, Rachel begins to assume the identities of the heroines about whom she reads, alternately adopting the posture of tragic self-assertion of Ibsen’s Nora and of the long suffering wife, Diana of the Crossways. Her reading of Gibbon inaugurates the period of the decline of Rachel as a sea-nymph, as the young woman Rachel is appropriated into the hierarchized (inevitably to her detriment, as a female) patriarchal society, informed and reflected by its language—and its texts.

Rachel’s dissatisfaction with both language and books begins to manifest itself most strongly after her engagement to Terence. She disdains the blank mediocrity of her compatriots’ congratulatory letters—although she, too, commits the same transgression in responding to them, indicating the degree to which this previously mute but (at least potentially) free girl is now implicated in the very system she repudiates. She seems at first stricken with Terence’s descriptions of the novels he intends to write, only later to assert the primacy of music and her own frustrations that Terence’s interruptions collapse the structures she endeavors to build by means of a Bach fugue. The dichotomies illustrated in this passage in particular, especially in Rachel’s comparison of life to a shaft of sunlight and Terence’s rebuttal of feeling as solid as an oak rooted to the very bowels of the earth, represent a fundamental concern in Woolf’s oeuvre, to emblemize the coexistence of the two seemingly incompatible systems of reality—the immaterial and ineffable and the tangible and utterable. In his book *Between Language and Silence*, Howard Harper argues that *The Voyage Out* is an attempt “to explore various modes of awareness, in search of one—or of a synthesis, perhaps—that will be ultimately satisfying... [W]hat the narrative finally discovers... is an ‘immovable duality... [T]he work arises from the tensions between (these dichotomies)’” (31). While it is certainly true that this novel’s catalyst is the tension between these competing systems, and that this book sets the tenor for the oeuvre as a whole in its awareness and exploration of the duality, Woolf’s existential philosophy held strongly the belief that the boundaries between these two realities were extremely porous, the one always and inevitably penetrating, and being penetrated by, the other. Her concern as a writer, then, was not, as Harper seems to suggest, to posit a theory of a fixed and “immovable” duality, but to find a language capable of expressing an theory of existence that defies the conceptual logic of language—and textuality—as it existed before Woolf’s own writing transformed it. The metaphor of sunlight and oak trees will undergo an important evolution, as will be considered later, in the discussion of the narrative forms and symbolic economy of *Mrs. Dalloway*. What is most interesting in the present metaphor, however, is that, in this early novel, the incompatibility of the two systems leads inexorably to the death of the representative of one, Rachel. Because at this young

stage in her writing career Woolf cannot yet envision an alternative to the hegemony of traditional (and patriarchal, because standard discourse reflects the character of the society in which it is enacted) language and textuality, her heroine, rather than submit to the discursive regime, must exit the conflict entirely—forgoing all efforts toward a viable self-representation in exchange for the return to an all-embracing quiescence.

It is a mistake, however, to delimit the nature and functioning of the “sea” to which Rachel returns in death to a feminist reading. While there can be no question that one concern in *The Voyage Out*, as well as in the oeuvre as a whole, is the dissemination of a feminine language for the assertion of feminist projects (Woolf herself was devoted to such causes), Woolf’s complexity and comprehensiveness as a writer preclude her works from falling into the trap of the single-purposed polemic. Indeed, while Woolf insists that writing by women will necessarily be distinct from writing by men, and thus inevitably will address the by no means homogenous concerns of female authors (*Women and Writing*, 48-52), the woman writer’s primary responsibility, according to Woolf, is to her art, not to any political agenda. Woolf argues that the woman writer “is no longer pleading and protesting as she writes. We are approaching...the time when her writing will have little or no foreign influence to disturb it. She will be able to concentrate upon her vision without distraction” (48). Numerous critics, including Howard Harper, Sue Roe, and Jane Goldman, whose insights, as will be seen, have proven helpful to various other aspects of this discussion, have read the romance plot of *The Voyage Out* largely from such a feminist perspective, ascribing to Rachel’s death simultaneously a fatal overwhelming of female sexual desire and an extinction through exhaustion of patriarchal language.

While the sea here *does* signify Rachel’s escape from a stultifying patriarchal language—and from the marriage plot ascribed to her both within the literary canon of her time and in the society at large—that is far from its only function. As the ubiquitous metaphor for an underlying—and unifying—beingness, the source of the artist’s creation and reality’s manifestations, the image of dropping to the bottom of the sea indicates not simply an escape from patriarchal language in particular, but from language, an artificial construction, in general. Her death is a return to origins, as well as the reversal of the illusion of human discreteness. *The Voyage Out* is filled with the terror of aloneness, of the fragility and divisibility of loved ones, and, importantly, of the inadequacy of language to fill the gap which separates one human being from another. The omnipresent sea imagery ameliorates the characters’ terror of isolation even as it refutes the arrogance of presumed individuality. Rachel’s wish upon her death is for diffusion, dispersion, for a return to the truth of who she is—a mermaid, a dweller among shipwrecks and pearls, a wave in the undifferentiated sea. Her death symbolizes the artist’s retreat back to the source of the creative imagination—having, for a time, exhausted all conceivable means of expression. In this context, then, the reading of Milton’s *Comus*, because of its theme of rape and virginity, is frequently cited by critics, including those listed above, as evidence of a fatal sexual inertia or, conversely, erotic paranoia, also lends itself quite legitimately to be interpreted as the failure of language. Rachel, in her delirium, attempts to recount the poem’s lines, only to find that the “effort worried her because the adjectives persisted in getting in the wrong places” (342). While the feminist, psychosexual reading of this important passage unquestionably is a proper one, in a novel preoccupied with the failure of language,

such a reading must not displace an alternative interpretation of the scene as emblematic of the canon's inability to describe—or sustain—such a one as Rachel (and, by extension, Woolf).

Significantly, however, the typical death plot, as utilized in *The Voyage Out*, nevertheless does succeed in articulating Woolf's transcendental philosophies, though perhaps in ways more subtle than will be enacted in the revolutionary writing techniques of *Mrs. Dalloway*. Rachel, so like the artist in that both are creatures of the "sea," having sunk to the bottom of the ocean, for a time releases the language of the novel from meaningful signification in an almost metaphysical cathexis of the material and immaterial realms. The chapter following her death opens with the description of an audible respiration blanketing the colony and yet issuing from no corporeal source, while sunlight is said to gleam off black windows (368-369). Less surreal, but more overt in articulating Woolf's philosophical design, St. John Hirst returns from the hotel from the house of the dead and is immediately solaced by the indistinct voices of those surrounding him, by the sight of a chess game on a table and a basket full of yarn on the floor. The fact that Woolf chooses to end her novel not with the death of its heroine, but two chapters later, with the spiritual healing of Hirst by means immaterial—disembodied voices—and material—human possessions, illustrates Woolf's determination to achieve her literary objective using whatever textual methods available until a new mode of communication can be envisioned. In *Women and Writing*, Woolf argues: "To try the accepted forms, to discard the unfit, to create others which are more fitting, is a task that must be accomplished before there is freedom or achievement" (67).

In addition to utilizing the traditional death plot as a means of articulating the transcendental philosophy, *The Voyage Out* posits alternatives to constricting forms of traditional language. The Bach fugue mentioned above is only one instance in which music functions as a form of communication and unification among individuals. The most important of these scenes occurs during the party at the hotel. The text describes the revelry which takes place in the darkness of night—darkness functioning in this text (much more so than in *Mrs. Dalloway*, as will be discussed later) as the corollary to the sea, the agent which occludes distinction and engenders a primordial existence (e.g. the life of the jungle). In this scene, dawn comes before the party has ended. What had been beautiful, riotous, and joyful in the candle lit night is deemed by the revelers as grotesque and embarrassing in the light of morning. Their awareness of their disheveled appearance echoes the Biblical story of Adam and Eve's first cognizance of their nakedness, an indication of the pair's fallen state, which then resonates in this story with the imagery of the fall activated in Rachel's engagement scene. Rachel's music alone soothes this troubled spirit. Her piano playing calls her friends to her side, where they listen, spellbound and pacified, before dispersing for a contented sleep at the music's end. Susan's comment that the music is lovely, that it "seems to say all the things one can't say oneself" (170) resounds with implications for Woolf's metaphysical philosophy and the literary project in which she endeavored to articulate it. Conversely, the discouragement Rachel frequently encounters in regard to her music—in addition to Terence's interruptions, Helen, too, impedes Rachel's playing, asserting music's inferiority to the rationality of language—illustrates an inherent social resistance to that which is intangible and beyond words. Rachel's death, in addition to suggesting acquiescence in the face of a linguistic system incapable of expressing the truth of

Rachel's (and Woolf's) reality, also removes her from a social context unequipped to understand her. These oppressive relationships will be explored in greater detail in *Mrs. Dalloway*, particularly within the context of marriage, and indeed, the shifting of emphasis from the strictures of language to the strictures of society seems to suggest that as Woolf's own powers as a writer grew—her ability to articulate with integrity the truth of her unique life's philosophy—the more painfully acute became the constraints of the individual social role.

Darkness in *The Voyage Out*, as was touched upon above, functions in the symbolic economy of the text as another means through which Woolf attempts to articulate the omnipresence of a surrounding, generative, and unifying beingness. In "Modern Fiction," Woolf writes: "Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; but a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end" (qtd. *The Voyage Out*, 399). *The Voyage Out's* darkness reiterates the metaphor of the luminous halo. The expansion of human consciousness, in Woolf's writing, is little more than a push into this rich, generative unknown. The text's beautiful description of the colony by night emphasizes the immediacy of this pervasive, creative force, even as its occlusiveness, fittingly painted here as darkness by Woolf, renders it difficult if not impossible to conceptualize and articulate in traditional language. Woolf writes:

[T]igers...stags...and elephants coming down in the darkness to drink at pools...and the earth, robbed of detail more mysterious than the earth colored and divided by roads...For six hours this profound beauty existed, and then as the east grew whiter...the ground *swam* to the surface. (112, emphasis mine)

In this sense, darkness does not, at least in this novel, play a subordinate role to sunlight, as some feminist critics have claimed, nor does it necessarily function as a refutation of the traditional gender hierarchy of male as the sun god, and female as dark continent or moon goddess, her light being merely a reflection of the sun (Goldman, 16-18). Rather, darkness is neither quiescence nor vacuity—it is, instead, not only mysterious and fecund potentiality but also a restive, if hidden, plentitude. With this in mind, a scene involving Rachel's fiancé bears special consideration. On the evening following the party, Terence finds himself wildly traversing the jungle, unable to contain the emotions Rachel has engendered. In response, Terence frantically spouts a stream of words, including, significantly, the repetition of the phrase "about Rachel, about Rachel, about Rachel." This incantatory chant, leveled against a young girl whose relationship with language is an ambivalent one, is almost threatening in both intent and effect, seeming to endeavor to reign this ostensible sea-nymph into the realm of traditional language. Yet, in an effect very similar to what will occur in the jungle during their engagement, Terence's words quickly lose meaning and eventually subside into silence. In this instance, he is not silenced by the riotous profligacy of the jungle and its trees, but rather by the darkness, which "numbs him" to such an extent that he must physically "shake off" the effect before he can return home and reenter society once again. Woolf writes: "The night seemed immense and hospitable, and although it was so dark there seemed to be things moving down there in the harbor and movement out at sea. He gazed until the darkness numbed him" (191).

The silence which darkness provides plays an important role throughout the text

and in *Mrs. Dalloway* as well. In the former, the insistence seems to be upon those things which people *cannot* say, while in the latter, the preoccupation shifts to what people *do not* say. This distinction has important implications for the development of both narratives. While silence in the symbology of both texts signals suspension, the anticipation of an acceptable form of expression, silence in *The Voyage Out* functions more sinisterly in so far as it usually appears in the wholesale absence of an alternative means of communication—a lack which, indeed, ultimately takes the life of the heroine—whereas, much of the narrative force of *Mrs. Dalloway*, derives from the exploration of various alternative forms of communication, most obviously exemplified by the title character's parties, as will be discussed later.

In *The Voyage Out*, the text's most critical moments, those most directly imbricated in the fate of the heroine, coincide with an atmosphere of silence. The river excursion into the heart of the jungle is utterly bound in a strange rhetoric of silence. Words "flicker and die out;" they lose all meaning, and the voice of the jungle—in its chaos of trees and its malicious, chuckling monkeys—alone seems capable of expressive utterance. Not coincidentally, Terence and Rachel are described repeatedly in these scenes as having "dropped to the bottom of the sea". The engagement occurs in the midst of this oppressive silence. Woolf writes:

The silence was then broken by their voices which joined in tones of strange unfamiliar sound which formed no words... Sounds stood out from the background, making a bridge across their silence; they heard the swish of the trees and some beast croaking in a remote world. (283)

When the engagement comes, it wrings tears from Terence and leads Rachel to deem the "churning waters" she hears hateful and intrusive. In this hostile environment, which, as it has been discussed above, is a sort of re-enactment of the fall, Terence conjures the words which Rachel then parrots, signifying both his defiance of the silent sea and her relinquishing of agency to follow him in his defiance. Significantly, their engagement is sealed without the words having been spoken.

Though this passage certainly—and legitimately—subscribes itself to a feminist reading pertaining to the fatality of marriage to Rachel's project of self-creation, especially in relation to the analysis of marriage undertaken, as described above, in *Mrs. Dalloway*, perhaps nowhere in the text are the problematics of Woolf's literary project more crucial than in this scene, though evidence supporting this fact comes much later in the narrative, when Woolf asserts that the love between Rachel and Terence is "not the love of a man and a woman." Woolf writes: "Although they sat so close together, they had ceased to be little separate bodies; they had ceased to struggle and desire one another ... It might be love, but it was not the love of man for woman" (327). To Rachel, her engagement signifies an effort to overcome the sense of discreteness and isolation which renders language ineffectual and human unions pitifully fragile. The atmosphere of silence and of the insensibility of language in which Rachel's engagement takes place evokes, in Woolf's symbolic economy, the presence in the textual moment of some kind of creative impulse, an imminent attempt to manifest the immaterial. Thus Rachel's engagement suggests an attempt to enact in her married life the union of one human being with another in a paradoxical homage to and defiance of this metaphysical reality from which it is derived. This paradigm, like so many others in *The Voyage Out*, will be

expanded upon in *Mrs. Dalloway*, as Clarissa, whose parties are efforts to “combine and create” (not coincidentally, these are the precise terms also used to describe Rachel), to embody the intangible bonds which link human beings.

Rachel, as will be elaborated on in greater detail in the discussion of *Mrs. Dalloway*, also shares characteristics with the novel’s second protagonist, Septimus Warren Smith, in that the society in which both live mandates that these characters act as scapegoat figures. In Rachel’s instance, her fiancé is most strongly implicated in the narrative’s drive toward Rachel’s death. Significantly, Terence, the man with whom Rachel agrees to attempt this project of communion, ostensibly shares the same goals, but his interruption of Rachel’s music, his eagerness to return to London, and his habit of controlling Rachel’s speech reflect the perhaps unconscious hypocrisy of his assertions. Presumably loving the wild freedom of his fiancée, Terence’s ultimate affiliation is with the very system—social, linguistic, textual—that Rachel must die to escape.

The Voyage Out, Woolf’s first novel, already goes a long way toward achieving one of Woolf’s important writerly goals—the capturing of life in its minutest detail, painting in words the epiphanal moments buttressed by life’s everyday mediocrities. Yet Woolf’s project could not be a complete success until a re-envisioning of narrative form had taken place. At the time of *The Voyage Out*’s final publication, Woolf had not yet conceived of a method of fully metaphorizing the ideas she wished to convey. Despite the sea which permeates the text, which Woolf by this time has already to learned to use to suggest the strange amorphous unity inherent in her philosophy, her characters remain discrete, isolated units, her narrator visiting them systematically one person at a time—a limited presence moving methodically from one box-like hotel room to the next. An important indication of the limitation of the narrative voice occurs most strikingly in a passage at the beginning of the book. Woolf writes:

[T]he dreams were not confined to (Clarissa) indeed, but went from one brain to another. They all dreamt of each other that night, as was natural, considering how thin the partitions were between them, and how strangely they had been lifted off the earth to sit next each other in mid-ocean. (49)

This brief interlude suggests that Woolf at this moment was moving toward, but had not yet found a means adequate for an articulation her transcendental theory. Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that the subject of this passage, Clarissa Dalloway, should also be the heroine the novel in which Woolf authorial ambition was finally realized.

While the emblematic passages of *The Voyage Out* primarily pertain to the inadequacies of language to express the truth of a reality intuitively known yet painful to human beings by virtue of its very inexpressiveness, *Mrs. Dalloway*’s hallmark moments suggest a triumph of authorial invention; here, Woolf narrativizes her life philosophy with an admixture of the solemnity owed to such an august theory and joy in the metaphorization of the once unutterable. She writes:

It was unsatisfactory, they agreed, how little one knew people. But (Clarissa)...felt herself everywhere; not ‘here, here, here;’...but everywhere. She waved her hand going up Shaftesbury Avenue. She was all that. So that to know her, or anyone, one must seek out the people who completed them: even the

places. Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to, some woman in the street...even trees...[S]ince our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so momentary compared with the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to this person or that, or even haunting certain places after death. (*Mrs. Dalloway*, 153)

Perhaps even more critical to the assertion of Woolf's theory of life is what this explanation goes on to argue regarding human relationships—an issue unresolved in *The Voyage Out*. She writes: “You were given a sharp, acute, uncomfortable grain—the actual meeting; horribly painful as often as not; yet in absence ... it would flower out, open, shed its scent, let you touch, taste ... get the whole feel of it and understanding” (153). In one page, the complicated theory which agonized, and ultimately aborted, the text of *The Voyage Out*, finally gets articulated. More importantly, this articulation becomes possible because Woolf has at last conceived of a means of narrativizing it, utilizing Septimus' suicide, as will be discussed in further detail later, to engender in Clarissa the appreciation of the pregnant darkness enveloping the light of human consciousness and uniting each human soul in its ethereal embrace.

Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of *Mrs. Dalloway*, then, is not, as is most often cited, its brilliance in capturing the impressions, crises, and significations of a single day. What may be more important even than this is the realization of a new narrative technique, one which solves the problematics of storytelling inherent in *The Voyage Out* as discussed above. The very narrative technique of *Mrs. Dalloway* succeeds in suggesting Woolf's theory of a permeating, unifying beingness. This narrator glides like smoke—or sea waters or ocean breezes—through the consciousness not merely of the main characters but also through all those consciousnesses surrounding them, be they connected to one another only by a so-called “moment of space,” such as hearing the same chiming of Big Ben or seeing the same mysterious motorcade pass. The narrative voice often gives little indication as to whose consciousness is being addressed at any given moment, and indeed exhibits numerous instances in which a character's consciousness is scarcely implicated at all, the narration instead seemingly reflecting a sentience which could possibly be ascribed to some form of collective unconscious, the churning of some vast, unnameable sea.

The primary events within the text, especially as pertains to Clarissa and Septimus, themselves comment upon this narrative technique. When considered in light of *The Voyage Out*, it seems appropriate that *Mrs. Dalloway*'s Clarissa and Septimus be construed as the bifurcated double of Rachel. By splitting her, Woolf found a means to simultaneously accommodate the sacrifice needed to bridge the textual and linguistic gap between the incompatible systems that have been described above while also allowing her heroine to live. Clarissa, like Rachel, is a child of the sea. Her memories are filled with images of the beach at Bourton. As she stands on the sidewalk, she feels “out to sea, adrift, alone” (8), and when she makes her grand entrance at her party that evening, she does so wearing her “mermaid dress.” Unlike Rachel, however, and though at times herself longing for diffusion and dispersion, such as that experienced by Rachel at the end of her novel, Clarissa is not made to atone with her life for aspiring to surmount the breach between the two systems. Rather, Woolf assigns the role of the scapegoat to Septimus, Clarissa's double.

A World War I veteran and victim of shellshock, Septimus, like Rachel upon her

deathbed, is a drowned figure. The failures and brutalities of his civilization cast Septimus into the role of the redeemer. While Rachel cannot continue to live because she cannot articulate an alternative text to the one socially prescribed for her, Septimus dies because of an excess of language. Where *The Voyage Out* is concerned with silence in the presence of the ineffable, especially in relation to Rachel's engagement, *Mrs. Dalloway's* Septimus draws too many (chaotic) utterances from this undifferentiated sea, and in this aspect resembles Rachel in the *Comus* episode, confusing her adjectives and losing all semantic meaning as a prelude to her death. Septimus writes, or dictates to his wife, incessantly. At best, his words render him the object of ridicule (by the housekeeper), at worst they subject him to the treatments of Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw. Like Rachel, he is outside the acceptable parameters of language, not beneath, in silence as Rachel largely is, but above, as in the metaphor of the solitary traveler described in Peter's dream, pulling images from the sea and dropping them again to earth in the form of compassion, comprehension, and absolution (57). While Rachel defines herself as a mermaid, a creature indigenous to the watery world, Septimus perceives himself as a drowned sailor, fully human, unmoored from his "natural," social bearings by the horror of the war—itsself beyond language. He is the living dead, and as a walking corpse, he assumes the role of intermediary between the material and the immaterial (most readily exemplified by his hallucinations), his task is the task of the interpreter, articulating what cannot be spoken.

That Septimus' suicide occurs not from a despairing of life itself but because of the rigid social structure which has no place for him—again, like Rachel, whose death is in part a rejection of a language incapable of describing her. Woolf writes of Septimus' suicide:

There remained only the window...the tiresome, the troublesome, and rather melodramatic business of opening the window and throwing himself out. It was their idea of tragedy, not his ... He did not want to die. Life was good. The sun hot. Only human beings—what did *they* want? (149)

"Human nature" prescribes this death, not Septimus. Because Septimus, having journeyed in war beyond the ends of civilization, beyond the edges of what society deems "sane," becomes the prophet of an inverse form of religion, one whose scriptures, in addition to Septimus' ceaseless scribbles (on the backs of envelopes, etc.), come also to be represented in ideograms. Woolf describes them:

[L]ittle men and women...with wings...on their backs; circles traced round shillings and sixpences—the suns and stars; zigzagging precipices with mountaineers ascending roped together, exactly like knives and forks; sea pieces with little faces laughing out of what might perhaps be waves. (147)

These pictures encapsulate the core of the transcendental theory espoused by Woolf, but more importantly, because Septimus must choose to either die or, through the unspeakably cruel methods of the psychiatrist, Dr. Bradshaw, conform by submitting to the renunciation of belief in them, Woolf illustrates the gulf which separates post-war London from an appreciation of metaphysical truth. Indeed, the expanse is so wide, truth is labeled madness.

An interesting nexus seems to connect Septimus' insanity plot with the symbolic economy of *The Voyage Out*. During the trip up the Amazon, St. John Hirst equates the proliferation of trees with the madness of God (286). As has already been discussed, disembodied voices during this interlude assume a surreal significance while words lose all semantic meaning. Similarly, Septimus' first appearances coincide with his musings on trees and the nature of silence. Woolf writes:

A marvelous discovery indeed—that the human voice in certain atmospheric conditions...can quicken trees into life!...And the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his own body...when the branch stretched he, too, made that statement...(while) sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the spaces between them were as significant as the sounds...All taken together meant the birth of a new religion. (*Mrs. Dalloway*, 22-23)

Thus, Septimus' connection with symbols already playing a vital role in Woolf's economy from the writing of her first novel suggests that the character's import may be greater than one might at first perceive. The narrative voice in *Mrs. Dalloway* impartially records Septimus' hallucinations. Thus it is up to the judgment of the reader to discern whether his ranting is madness or prophecy. Septimus' link with emblems—in two separate novels—of a sentient, unifying and semi-divine causal force intimate that Woolf may have perceived the mad figure of the text not to be Septimus, but the society that murders him.

An important shift occurs in Woolf's symbolic economy between the writing of *The Voyage Out* and *Mrs. Dalloway*. Though still playing a role in the text (in particular, and significantly, in Septimus' hallucinations) the metaphorical role music plays in *The Voyage Out* as an instrument both for human unification and for "saying that which cannot usually be said" is assumed by the chiming of clocks in *Mrs. Dalloway*. The "leaden circles" which permeate the text mark a kind of meeting place for the diverse peoples whose consciousness the amorphous narrative voice alternately inhabits. This technique metaphorizes Woolf's insistence that all humanity is linked to some degree, even if it is only in sharing one particular moment in the earth's history. Elucidating and illustrating this temporal commonality seems to be an important component of Woolf's literary project.

Mrs. Dalloway's clocks, however, are not homogenous instruments serving identical purposes in the text's symbolic economy. Woolf draws important distinctions between the significations of one in comparison with another, once again suggesting the oeuvre's dominating theme of unity (all clocks) in plurality (Big Ben, Big Ben's secondary chimes, the Bells of St. Margaret's). While each of these instruments release from themselves the "leaden circles" which unite humanity in a particular "moment of space," they also, simultaneously, if contradictorily, portend diverse ideas. Big Ben, with its stately, imposing tone, compels its hearers through their day. It is the lawgiver, punctually and inexorably dividing time into discrete, identifiable units, with all the duties and obligations such divisions imply. Conversely, the chimes which follow Big Ben come carrying "odds and ends." This is the feminized counterpart to the patriarchal authority of its forerunner. These chimes' emphasis on the various trivialities of the day, of household chores and homely accouterments, following so closely as they do the infringement of the intangible in the chimes of Big Ben, mark a new refinement in

Woolf's metaphorical system. In this instance, the specific clocks, when taken as a whole, illustrate Woolf's assertion of the non-hierarchical coexistence of the immaterial beside the material as the critical fact of human reality. The teapots and picture frames which in *The Voyage Out* function as receptacles of personality no less significant than any transcendent, metaphysical conceptualization of the soul, have assumed new pliability in the use in *Mrs. Dalloway*'s clocks. At once solid, in their physical structure, and diffuse, in the ringing of the chimes; at once practical, assuring the proper functioning of the society, and ineffable, accomplishing this assurance by marking divisions of time, itself an abstract principle, *Mrs. Dalloway*'s clocks, and Woolf's various uses of them throughout the text represent a giant step toward a successful articulation of Woolf's complex transcendental theory.

While the clocks, thanks to their elasticity as a symbol and Woolf's great skill in manipulating this, serve numerous functions throughout the text, for the purposes of this paper, one function in particular needs to be emphasized here, and that is their use in representing human personality. In this text, Clarissa Dalloway herself is explicitly compared with the chimes of St. Margaret's. Indeed, in a moment of panic at the last striking of the bell, which Peter reads as Clarissa's death knell, the two are actually conflated. Woolf describes the bells of St. Margaret's as being "laden with moments," collecting impressions and experiences from those its music touches as a bee collects honey from a garden of flowers. Similarly, the bells also resemble the "perfect hostess, whose voice is reluctant to inflict her own individuality" (49). This reading of the bells of St. Margaret's inevitably leads to a reading of Clarissa herself. She is, of course, the consummate hostess, but the linking of Clarissa to the bell "laden with moments," asserts the importance of Clarissa's gift to the world. While Peter may repudiate it, the vast web of connections Woolf endeavors to illustrate in this text, ensures that no trivial deed, no insignificant action exists. Thus, the little "odds and ends" of which Clarissa is, like the bells of St. Margaret's, the master carry as great a significance in the living world as the imposing peal of Big Ben.

A further understanding of the significance of the clocks in *Mrs. Dalloway* comes when one charts the evolution of their place within Woolf's symbolic economy. Clocks, especially ticking clocks, play an important role in *The Voyage Out* as well. One of the most significant moments occurs in the first third of the text, when Rachel, sitting in her room, is lulled into a state of almost utter unconsciousness of self by the droning of a clock. She likens herself to the patch of light streaming in from her window and finds substantiality only in the furniture of the room. For a moment, she is awestruck with the strangeness of living, and escapes this terrifying sense of uncanniness only by the (relieved) acceptance of Terence's invitation to a picnic. Thus, from Woolf's earliest endeavors in her literary project, clocks are meant to suggest transcendent, diffusive component of personality, which corresponds to the wind or patches of sunlight, as well as the tangible and immovable, such as the heavy chair and oak table of Rachel's bedroom.

The passage quoted above also presages other elements which will be developed more fully in *Mrs. Dalloway*. The idea of the "mist" making the life which it surrounds brighter merely by its presence achieves full narrative treatment in Septimus' suicide and Clarissa's assessment of that act. When read in light of the Septimus text in *Mrs. Dalloway*, this brief narrative commentary helps to further a reading of Rachel as a

forerunner of Septimus, her story the as yet unarticulated plight of the scapegoat. Indeed, *The Voyage Out* ends not with Terence's cry for his dearly beloved, but with Hirst's contented drifting to sleep when, having left the villa, he returns to the bustling hotel and finds comfort in the material artifacts of daily life, in the indistinct voices of the living.

Another seed rests in this important passage which, in fact, will inform the entire plot structure of *Mrs. Dalloway*. An invitation to join a picnic interrupts Rachel's reverie, restoring her to the physical world of society. Her eagerness to accept the invitation, she claims, is due in part to the disconcerting sense of disembodiedness she feels only moments before. This, too, obtains to one of Clarissa's primary motivations as hostess. Like Septimus' death, which, in the language of this passage from *The Voyage Out*, makes life brighter for the mist surrounding it, Clarissa's parties are also a gift, a solace-giving excess, a manipulation of the material—of flowers, lovely dresses, even of a sort of pre-scripted hostess language rendered in the impersonal voice—that both girds her friends against the fear of the undifferentiated deep even as it clears a space for a degree of exploration of it. Clarissa's parties, like Rachel's music and Terence's writing, are an attempt to “combine and create” to bring together using every material weapon in her arsenal the corporeal bodies of her guests in order to achieve an incorporeal result. For, at one of Clarissa's parties, it is possible to “say what you couldn't say anyhow else, things that needed an effort; possible to go much deeper” (171).

Significantly, Clarissa the hostess, for a time must undergo an estrangement of personality similar to that experienced by Rachel and Septimus at the moment of their deaths. As she greets her guests, Clarissa “had this feeling of being something not herself, and that everyone was somehow unreal in one way; much more real in another” (171). Clarissa's reclaiming of herself, of her individuality, will come at its appointed moment. For the time being, however, she simply remains “hostess,” as impersonal and indistinct as the bells of Ste. Margaret's to which Peter compares her, as divested of self through this giving of a gift, as are Rachel and Septimus at the moment of their deaths. Yet because of this unrequested, but, in her society, urgently needed selfless act of giving, the guests, too, are transformed, their familiar material selves defamiliarized so that the inner essences may, at least to some degree in the physical world, shine through.

Virginia Woolf believed in the transcendence and ultimate unity of humanity, in the replete and conductive sea surrounding islands of human consciousness. Simultaneously, however, Woolf asserted a truth to be found in picture frames, in teapots and oak tables, in the material manifestations of reality. Above all, she disavowed any belief in the ultimate incompatibility of the two realms. What humanity lacked in its effort to conceptualize the truth was a language capable of expressing it. In *The Voyage Out*, Virginia Woolf explored the failures of language to enunciate metaphysical reality. In *Mrs. Dalloway*, she overcame them.

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Özet

Çaydanlıklar ve Aşkınlık: Virginia Woolf'un *Voyage Out* ve *Mrs. Dalloway* Eserlerinde Dilin İzini Sürmek

Günlüklerine bakılırsa, Virginia Woolf'un edebi projesi "romanı yeniden tasavvur etmek" (*Mrs. Dalloway*, vii), edebiyat dünyasını o vakte kadar meşgul etmiş olan önemli vakalar ve sıra dışı olayları değil, insanları birbirine gizli, çoğu zamanda şaşırtıcı, şekillerde birbirine bağlayan ve günlük hayatı açığa çıkaran psikolojik ayrıntılar ve maddesel ve metafizik gerçeklikleri merkezine alan yeni bir yazma biçimi inşa etmekte. Woolf'un ilk romanı, *Voyage Out* ile belki de en meşhur çalışması olan *Mrs. Dalloway*'ın karşılaştırılması, Woolf'un tam da umduğu gibi modern romanın görünüşünü ve ruhunu değiştirecek yeni bir edebi dil ve tekniğin gelişimine gereksinim duyan edebi projesinin hayata geçirilmesindeki karmaşıklıkları ortaya çıkartacaktır. Romanlarının farklı anlatı teknikleri, sembolleştirmeleri ve karakterleri Woolf'un, bir sanatçı olarak, kendi penceresinden bir hayat görüşünü dile getirebilecek yetide bir dilsel tutumluluk arayışının farklı rotalarını işaret etmektedir; öte yandan yazarlığın gelişimine dair diğer konular, özellikle de *Voyage Out* ta kendini gösteren bir dizi teknik sorunun *Mrs. Dalloway*'de düzeltilmesinde de görüldüğü gibi, Woolf'un yaratıcı projesinin başarısını tehdit eden mevcut edebi ve dilsel değerler dizilerinin etkilerinin ne dereceye kadar kırılacağını ve sınırlanacağını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu makale, Woolf'un, içinde maddesel dünyanın kaçınılmaz olarak yer bulduğu ve maddesel varlığı olmayan ve tanımlanamayanın maddesel olana yer açtığı metafizik dünya görüşünü ifade etmek üzere geliştirdiği sembolik tutumluluğu incelemektedir. Woolf'un birbirine bağlı ve ancak birlikte birbirini var eden maddesel ve madde ötesi dünyalardan oluşan bilinç düşüncesi, onu modern okuyucuların yalnızca gerçekçi romanı değil gerçekliğin doğasını algılayışını da sonsuza kadar değiştirecek yeni bir edebi değerler dizisi inşasına sürüklemiştir.

**The Grammar of Public Identity:
Performance in Eighteenth-Century Actor's Biography**

William Over

I

Donald Stauffer's study of eighteenth-century biography argued that the histrionic experience of the actor, the ability to play many roles and to handle dialogue easily, was a significant influence on the narrative development of life writing. Actors were generally less hesitant to express their private thoughts and emotions, and more adroit at presenting them to the reading public.¹ However, eighteenth-century stage personalities also felt the need to hide their inner lives from their readership. The autobiographic *An Apology for the Life of Colley Cibber* (1740) makes use of a lively mix of onstage and offstage performance techniques whereby the actor continually evades displaying his identity to the reader.

William Epstein notes that as the urge for greater individualism became manifest in various eighteenth-century social institutions, 18th century biographies discovered a successful way of reproducing a certain individual to the growing consumer market.² According to Epstein, the private life of the biographical subject is often merged with the biographer's own public identity, particularly in the case of those who wrote actor's life stories. The narrative of self-disclosure presented both the actor and the biographer with useful tools for self-defense and self-promotion. Rephrasing Epstein's definition, then, it can be said that the actor's biography, represented for example by *An Apology*, reproduced not one individual alone but rather rendered several performances of the biographical subject for purposes of self-promotion and social defense. This sort of writing deliberately promoted indeterminacy of personality for ends that protect quite as much as promote the individual subject.

In contrast to *An Apology*, Thomas Davies's *Memoirs of the Life of David Garrick* (1780), for example, seems to draw a consistent identity for its subject; however, by also intentionally conflating the accounts of the onstage and offstage performances of the actor much as Cibber does to construct an indeterminate identity, he still creates a scene of indeterminate identity with respect to who he is. By examining the stories of two 18th century actors, Cibber and Garrick, I hope to demonstrate that character portrayal was never so transparent that it simply "reflected an individual," as if such individuality or personality was photographically constructable. On the contrary, the biographies of Cibber and Garrick reveal that they were written for extrinsic purposes: namely, to protect the actor from public attack; to promote the theatre as a cultural institution charged with education; and, especially in the Garrick biography, to identify actors as public educators.

¹ Stauffer's chapter on the actor's influence in the development of biographical narrative recognized histrionic sensibilities but ignored role-playing as a conscious writer's strategy. See *The Art of Eighteenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 27-30.

² *Recognizing Biography* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 52.

Colley Cibber claimed that *An Apology* reproduced his own “Shape” offstage: “A Man who has passed above Forty Years of his Life upon a Theatre, where he has never appeared to be Himself, may have naturally excited the Curiosity of his Spectators to know what he really was, when in no body’s Shape but his own.”³ Cibber’s various reconstructions of himself in *An Apology* were based largely on a personal repertoire of popular stage roles. By deliberately projecting his best known stage characters, Cibber resisted social criticism. However, using the same tactic, he also created a Procrustean capability that enabled a wide social adaptation. Choosing from among his repertoire of fictional representations, Cibber mixed and matched his public identities to various social expectations, thus circumventing the stigmatic associations of class and profession that continued to plague actors throughout the century. Aware that the glamour associated with the symbolic space of the theatre would attract curious audiences eager to discover the private lives of public figures, *An Apology* offered a full mixture of offstage and onstage performances. But Cibber, along with dozens of other actors of varied fame is represented in scenes where the confusion of performer with the role he represents remains paramount. Knowing that his reading audiences, like his theatre audiences, tended to conflate the actor with the character, the public performer with the private individual, Cibber offers his readers compelling stage personalities who, though not always without fault, almost always uphold the status of their profession.

The growth of public debate on cultural, social, and political concerns throughout the eighteenth century may have presupposed a rational basis for public consensus. However, as Jurgen Habermas observes, “the fiction of a justice immanent in free commerce” equated “self-interested, property-owning private people with autonomous individuals per se.”⁴ Such possessive individualism casts the person, in C. B. Macpherson’s words, “neither as a moral whole, nor as a part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself.”⁵ In documenting the struggle of actors for greater “liberty” within their profession, Cibber offers his public rational arguments. However, he also continually refers to his own success at the box office, being financially “in favour” with audiences, a state that presents him as an autonomous individual, in Habermas’s sense. Consequently, the “rationality” of *An Apology* is largely based on box office success, not upon moral arguments. Cibber consistently connects personal and professional standards with the profitability of his art form, in contrast to his occasional, and rather perfunctory, references to moral standards. In fact both Cibber and Davies appeal to the public by promoting their subjects as successful enterprisers, the autonomous individuals of Habermas and Macpherson. By doing so Cibber and Davies ally the profit-making concerns of the individual actor with the ethos of the

³ *An Apology for the Life of Colley Cibber: With an Historical View of the Stage During His Own Time*, ed. B. R. S. Fone (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), 6. Hereafter all page references to this work will appear in the text.

⁴ Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 26, 36. On the expansion of the eighteenth-century theatregoing public see Oscar Brockett, *History of the Theatre* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1968), 290-91.

⁵ *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 3.

middle class in early capitalism.⁶ In this way, it would not be wrong to claim that eighteenth-century actors sought acceptance from the general public partly through the pursuit of their entrepreneurial goals.

II

For Aaron Hill, actors and actor-managers were not subjects for apologetics, much less were they autonomous individuals of property. Rather, they needed to be watched, trained, and supervised by a “public” outside the theatre. Hill sought to transform the stage into “Schools of Instruction.”⁷ In his two-penny serial *The Prompter* (1734-36), Hill regarded the theatre above all as a servant of that cause. His idea of “the Prompter as critic” would reduce the artistic freedom of the individual actor. Theatregoers were central because as enlightened citizens, responsive to rationality, they sought moral guidance and instruction through example from the performers. In fact Hill envisioned an aristocratic or royal patronage, a traditional sovereign authority that would endeavor by regulation to raise the standards of the theatre and even perhaps create a national school of instruction for actors (No. 136). With this plan, Hill was decidedly out of touch with political reality. Royal patronage in eighteenth-century Britain distanced itself from cultural undertakings. The Georgian dynasty remained in splendid isolation behind palace walls, its members only occasionally demanding performances of plays that caught their particular fancy.⁸ Moreover, England had no such tradition of enlightened regulation. Still, Hill’s call for a national institution of moral instruction supported a rationalist justification for the theatre that would have raised the status of that performance art by consciously promoting the Enlightenment aim of education.

In *The Prompter* series, Hill would replace the professional theatre position of the prompter, who guides the actors in their roles, with the theatre critic, who speaks for the anonymous audience of private individuals. Quoting the Roman social critic Cato, Hill marks the distinction between the private audience member and the public performer: “the post of honour is a private station” (No. 1). As an individual outside the theatre profession, the prompter-as-critic is a moral corrector of actors and actor-managers: “Therefore, when we daily see so many men act amiss, can we entertain any

⁶ I use the term “middle class” with the understanding that both the nature and extent of middle-class presence and awareness in eighteenth-century England have been subject to much recent debate. Harold Perkin and Peter Laslett argue that middle-class awareness was minimal, based on their studies of how social relations were represented. See Harold Perkin, *The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); and Peter Laslett, *The World We Have Lost: England Before the Industrial Age*, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1971). R. S. Neal and E. P. Thompson argue that class conflict was more evident and growing throughout the century. See R. S. Neal, *Class in English History 1680-1850* (Totowa, NY: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981), and E. P. Thompson, “Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?” *Social History*, 3 (1978), 122-65. My assumption in this article is that, whatever the extent of middle-class identification, class conflict was apparent, was felt by stage performers, and contributed to their strategizing efforts.

⁷ Aaron Hill, *The Prompter*, ed. William W. Appleton and Kalman A. Burnim (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1966), no. 42. Hereafter all references to this serial will appear in the text.

⁸ Thomas Davies, *Memoirs of the Life of David Garrick*, 2 vols., ed. Stephen Jones (London: 1808; New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969), 1:220. Hereafter all references to this work will appear in the text.

doubt that a good Prompter is wanting?" (No. 1). This manifesto was prominently displayed below the banner of *The Prompter's* first issue, 12 November, 1734, just under the Shakespearean statement: "All the World's a Stage, and the Men and Women, merely Players."⁹ Both sentences suggest an ambiguity between the theatre and the world. Does Hill refer only to actors onstage? Or only to actors in their private lives? Or to people in general who need the social correction afforded by a reformed theatre? The association of bad acting and playwriting with bad moral behavior in general becomes the premise of Hill's new conception of the theatre. Actors must be kept in their places, in front of the footlights, while the audience of private individuals determines the correct representations of themselves. In lieu of a traditional aristocratic overseer of the stage, the office most desirable for public improvement, the audience must assume that position by speaking for themselves in the public spheres of periodicals and coffee houses. But in fact Hill believed that individuals like himself were speaking for the audience when they correct those who "act amiss" before the public. By means of a triple substitution—Hill replacing the general audience replacing the aristocratic overseer replacing the theatre management—the emergent profession of theatre critic would gain social recognition. Artistic freedom is not the prerogative of the stage performer but of the theatre critic representing the ticket-holding patron. Such empowered individuals will prompt definitions of truth from the actor. Lacking artistic integrity, the theatre professional must assume a functionary role wherein respectability is achieved not through the personal charisma and career success of the particular performer, but instead through moral conformity.

Hill's notion of the theatre as a moral rather than a more narrowly defined cultural institution demanded that its performers become responsible educators who are accountable to the public at large, not merely to the patrons of the theatre. "The master of a theatre is a kind of general trustee, for the nation—He holds, in ward, the morals of a rising race of people" (No. 35). Hill's proposed national school for actors would be "academies of courage, good taste, and humanity;" moreover, actor-managers who refuse to recognize "the great and national end of a theatre" should somehow be replaced (No. 38). As models of professional training and discipline, actors also become moral exemplars, educators for a public intent on rational justifications for their public and private values. While Hill's redefinition empowers actors and actor-managers by making them moral regulators of society onstage, it also delimits them by assigning discretionary power to theatre critics alone. His formulation would task subsequent stage performers, who strove to become educators, but in their own right.

III

Written in the decade following Hill's serial, *An Apology* also connects the well-being of the theatre with the well-being of society. However, Cibber departs from Hill by emphasizing at once the glamor and respectability of stage performers, attributes that become linked with no apparent contradiction. As a bold expose of the early eighteenth-century theatre world, *An Apology* received grudging accolades from Cibber's enemies. Thus Alexander Pope responded, "Cibber himself is the honestest Man I know, who has writ a book of his *Confessions*, not so much to his credit as St. Augustine's, but full as

⁹ See the Facsimile of *The Prompter*, No. 1, page 1, Hill, xvi.

True and open. Never had Impudence and Vanity so faithful a Professor.”¹⁰ Cibber’s naughtiness and tolerant gregariousness impressed many of his contemporaries, who valued sociability and participation in the new public projection of middle-class domesticity.¹¹ Helene Koon’s profile of Cibber’s social behavior substitutes as a general description of the new phenomenon of non-aristocratic celebrity: “He was a music lover with a sensitive ear ... a social being who made a charming dinner companion, a gambler at White’s, a wit in the coffeehouse, a brainless fop in public, and a lover of good literature in private.”¹²

When the circumstances of supporting published writers changed from traditional aristocratic patronage to a system of capitalist publication and exchange, writing in general allowed for a welcomed disengagement from traditional social constraints, permitting a freedom to write according to individual sensibilities.¹³ However, for Cibber the biographer’s relative freedom to disengage from traditional institutional constraints was further enhanced by the actor’s ability to alter his or her public performance. For example, his own offstage employment of the Lord Foppington persona allowed him to cope with the animosity of others following his public success, a strategy he believed protected him and his family.¹⁴ Such deliberate biographical ambiguities reflect Cibber’s tensive relationship with the large and mostly anonymous public, who had acquired a certain power over the figures they observed in the theatre and discussed in the coffeehouses.

Throughout his long stage career, Cibber relied on several methods to conceal his private identity from a public still suspicious of the social status of actors, envious of their broadening fame, curious about the charges of immorality regularly made against them, but also accepting of actors as conscious role-players on- and offstage. *An Apology* documents many offstage strategies wherein Cibber deliberately role-plays before the public in order to obscure his private identity. For example, after quoting a long passage of critical verse that rails against him, Cibber announces that he wrote the piece himself, confessing, “I was capable of seeming to head the Poetical Cry then against me” merely in order “to gratify the merry Pique of my Friends” (33). This tactic of nonchalance and self-deprecation in the face of public attack remained among his most common affectations. It was based on the public’s familiarity with his foppish stage characters, who were comic and robustly foolish. Onstage, the mock-confessional manner and braggadocio of these characters disguised a serious defensiveness. By reproducing his comic figures in his offstage life, Cibber distanced himself from public

¹⁰ Alexander Pope, *Correspondence*, ed. George Sherburn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 13 January 1743.

¹¹ John Mullan, for example, observes of Laurence Sterne’s journals and correspondence, “sociability is founded on delicacy of sentiment, on the rush of feeling, on an appreciation of what is ‘affection.’” *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 7; see also 11-12.

¹² Koon, *Colley Cibber* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 86.

¹³ See Michael McKeon, “Writer as Hero: Novelistic Prefigurations and the Emergence of Literary Biography,” in *Contesting the Subject: Essays in the Postmodern Theory and Practice of Biography and Biographical Criticism*, ed. William H. Epstein (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1991), 22.

¹⁴ See Koon, 73, 83-84.

reaction to personal disclosures. Hence the public gaze faced a hall of mirrors instead of a fixed target. Critics and spectators found that any one of Cibber's multiple identities would not last beyond the next public display, as the performer changed characters to keep ahead of his detractors. In another instance, the glee with which Cibber demonstrates how he has been throughout his life "the same cold Candidate for Fame," confessing that he was and still remains the anxious aspirant of fame and fortune, reveals Cibber's exploitation of his audience's penchant for conflating the actor's onstage and offstage identities (33).

Cibber's self-criticism was primarily defensive, since he perceived his public detractors as many and influential. Contemporary critical reaction to his autobiography often challenged the presumptuousness of its enthusiastic role-playing. For example the anonymous author of *The Laureat: or, the right side of Colley Cibber* (1740), wrote that Cibber's posturing showed only "self-sufficient Folley."¹⁵ In *Joseph Andrews*, Henry Fielding commented that Cibber "lived such a life only in order to write it."¹⁶ Thus most critics missed, or ignored, the defensive basis of his conscious role-playing.

Cibber is often more transparent about his motivations when he refers to the social status of other actors. Bothered at least as much by the vestiges of aristocratic prerogatives as by the anonymous power of the box office, Cibber offers numerous examples of actors who suffer from class prejudices. In one example, a woman of high standing is denied a stage career by her class-conscious family. Cibber responds candidly: "You may imagine we cou'd not be so blind to our Interest as to make an honourable Family our necessary Enemy" (47). In another example, an actress is heckled during her performance by a "military gentleman" from an upper box after she ignored his solicitations. She remains in character during the play, but he throws objects at her in subsequent performances. Eventually the heckler fights a duel with a backstage gentleman who comes to the actress's defense. Cibber ends the example with cautionary advice for women performers: "A Woman, even upon the Stage, may sometimes think it necessary not to throw off [being a Prude]" (47-49). Considering this example, Cibber complains that "young People of Sense, (though of low Fortune)" are discouraged from theatre careers by the behavior of spectators (50). However, Cibber's advice for such "Distresses" places ultimate responsibility on the actor: onstage performers must keep an "Unruffled Temper," never allowing the audience to force them out of character. Such behavior will discourage audience disrespect "and perhaps warm the generous Spectator into a Partiality in his Favour." This advice applies to the performer's behavior offstage as well (52). Accordingly, Cibber's solution to these instances of class antagonism is to modify the behavior of the less privileged (women and actors in general) rather than the privileged (upper-class spectators).

In fact *An Apology* often functions as an actor's manual of good behavior wherein examples of audience contempt for performers are juxtaposed with advice to actors on how to act on- and offstage. In contrast to Hill's ideal of a royal overseer of the theatre who appears as a kind of philosopher king correcting audience taste, Cibber circumvents the issue of official regulation of the theatre by stressing instead the unalterable taste of the paying spectators, who always demand low-quality dramatic fare

¹⁵ Quoted in Leonard Ashley, *Colley Cibber* (Boston: Twayne, 1989), 99.

¹⁶ *Joseph Andrews* (New York: Norton, 1958), 4.

and regularly insult performers. Cibber's notion of reform depends on the capacity of actors to fashion and control their own public and private performances along the lines of social conformity. This perspective parallels Hill, since Cibber places responsibility for social conformity upon members of his profession while assuming that their audiences will define standards of behavior for themselves. From this perspective the customer is always right, and the box office is endowed as the chief arbiter of aesthetic and moral truth. Moreover, since his audience is almost always represented in the autobiography by aristocratic individuals and families who can both threaten and protect the theatre as a social institution, Cibber's perspective reinforces upper-class values.

Although Cibber occasionally accedes to the argument that the theatre should uplift its audiences through critical reflection, in fact he commonly equates artistic success with the "Favour of the audience" (152). Cibber agrees with Jeremy Collier's proposition that theatre is both a visual and an audial art form, therefore more seductive than literature (157, 161). Nevertheless, his allusions to a possible reformation of the theatre include only a vague reference to "Support for the Stage," and a brief outburst for "Reformation ... to mend that vulgar Taste" of the audiences. In contrast to Hill, Cibber carefully states his opposition to official regulation (199). His frequent outcries against public criticism of actors—"Is it more use to the Publick, to know their Errors, than their Perfections?" (268)—are motivated by concern for personal reputations rather than systemic artistic reform. Since the professional and economic freedom of actors is imperiled by the vicissitudes of the box office and the contumely of its most powerful upper-class arbiters, theatre practitioners must have sufficient "Liberty" from unfair audience demands, from audience encroachments upon the private lives of actors, and from the selection of plays by patrons. This freedom Cibber extends to the economic welfare of his "Day-labouring Actors," who in one instance were deprived of payment by an agreement to close all theatres for one day in order to guarantee a largely aristocratic opera audience (233-35). Such illustrations reveal Cibber's strong aversion to class privilege as it threatened the social status of the theatre professional and the laboring rights of performers. However, Cibber never considers means to reverse the dynamic of class power in the audience/performer relationship. Audiences have the "taste" and therefore the originative power, and so actors must defend their individual reputations against their inevitable objectification as public performers. Thus Cibber's stress on the power of the aristocratic box office, like Hill's notion of the aristocratic overseer, was socially conservative and ignored innovative conceptions of the theatre.

Cibber was quite aware of the potential power of his profession to define the boundaries of cultural identity. For example, he relates how King George was so impressed by his cast's performance of Shakespeare's *Henry VIII* that a courtier quipped the monarch might replace all his court officials with stage actors (300). Cibber later expands the anecdote with a lengthy comparison of passionate rivalries between actors and rivalries between royal courtiers throughout history (304). He redefines a theatre where stage performers are raised above their actual social status and the stage expands to a universal political institution. "I have so often had occasion to compare the State of the Stage to the State of a Nation, that I yet feel a Reluctancy to drop the Comparison" (301). The public's habitual conflation of actor and role allowed Cibber to associate the acting profession with roles of higher social privilege, endowing them with a status they lacked in actuality. This association was brief but frequent in *The Apology*,

expressing Cibber's underlying wish for a more culturally empowered theatre institution.

Cibber reminds readers of his own hard-won status as a successful professional in a vocation where social status remained tenuous throughout the century:

If ... I have shewn, through what continued Difficulties, and Discouragements I myself made my way up the Hill of Preferment; he may justly call it, too strong a Glare of my Vanity; I am afraid he is in the right; but I pretend not to be one of those chaste Authors, that know how to write without it. (303)

The braggadocio style is moderated by moments of calculated modesty: "One tolerable Talent, in an Individual, is enough to preserve him, from being good for nothing; and if that was laid to my Charge, as an Actor, I have in this Light too, less to complain of, than to be thankful for" (312). Cibber's self-promotion develops as an actor's game of multiple identities that displays a capacity to avoid social fixity. Throughout his long stage career, Cibber managed to traverse a thin line between ridicule and respectability. While demonstrating an ability to evade social categorization, he could not end public suspicion, nor could his profession so easily resolve its own uncertain social status.

IV

The two generations separating Cibber's account of the theatre from Thomas Davies's biography cover a period of major change in public perception of the London stage. The most striking change in *Memoirs of the Life of David Garrick* is the assumption, though held precariously at times, of social respectability. Davies, an actor who changed careers to become an important London publisher, and his wife, the actress Susanna Yarrow Davies, were widely known as models of respectability in the theatre.¹⁷ The *Memoirs* possesses as much vitality as Cibber's account of theatre life; at the same time, it shows much less defensiveness, less posturing for public approval, and far less personal display. Although Davies occasionally acknowledges the "limited station" of the acting profession, he portrays Garrick as a stage figure who in every way exudes "order, decency and decorum" (1:44, 148-49). Running a patent theatre like a well-regulated business, Garrick projected a level-headed respectability to the public: "While the leading players of Covent Garden were wrangling among themselves, the manager of Drury Lane [Garrick] pursued his business unremittingly" (1:146).

Where *An Apology* often assumes a tone of defensive assertiveness, Davies presents Garrick as easy-going and even compliant. Such non-threatening, confident qualities assured his popularity among the London nobility (1:43). While he reveals a keen awareness of his successful public image, Garrick's social attitude remains extremely circumspect and reserved, in contrast to the voluble defensiveness of Cibber. He consciously avoids argumentation in cultivated society, often to the point of innocuousness. Like Cibber, Garrick possesses an actor's capacity for anticipating public perceptions of his private life: "Indeed, the guarding against distant ridicule, and warding off apprehended censure, was a favorite peculiarity of Mr. Garrick through life" (1:197). According to Davies, Garrick's *An Essay on Acting* was written "to attack himself ironically, to blunt, if not prevent, the remarks of others (1:198). Its defensive

¹⁷ James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, 6 vols., ed. George Birkbeck Hill and L. F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 2:391.

strategy of self-deprecation before the public closely parallels Cibber's behavior. Assuming a mask of irony became a performance device for both actors throughout their stage careers. Both would use self-criticism as a preemptive tactic, knowing that their audiences would likely accept such intentional role-playing as a common offstage characteristic of the acting profession. By anticipating public criticism to appropriate it, they often succeeded in avoiding further attack. Self-critical performance became a successful self-defense for both men.

Davies's detailed account of a pamphlet war demonstrates that Garrick and other eighteenth-century actors were still vulnerable to public scrutiny. Davies reminds his readers that audiences were the performers' anonymous patrons and themselves "their servants" (1:87-88). However, moving beyond such guarded statements, the *Memoirs* establishes Garrick as a public educator, even more, as an important and innovative contributor to social formation. As such, his new public persona represented what Habermas calls a "new form of bourgeois representation."¹⁸ Two specific developments famously credited to Garrick helped actors and actor-managers achieve a higher degree of social status. The first was the introduction of a new acting style, one more "natural," subtle and detailed in characterization. The second was the successful association of Shakespeare as patriotic and cultural icon with the public identity of David Garrick.¹⁹

Davies's deft treatment of these two identities promoted his subject as harbinger of the new verisimilitude in theatre performance and also as revivalist of national culture, represented above all by the figure of Shakespeare. Garrick sought to perform Shakespeare "unaltered," consciously redefining the playwright on the London stage. Later, Garrick organized the first Stratford Festival. With these career undertakings, he redefined the actor as educator for a public intent on rationalistic self-justification. To the extent that actors expanded their eighteenth-century repertory of performances to become social regulators and educators, they transcended the limitations of their onstage identities. No longer passive impersonators of social ideals, English actors beginning with Garrick would set out to become new, confident prompters of the public. Reversing Aaron Hill's earlier mandate of prompter-as-critic, Garrick as the new actor-educator instructed the public from his own script of social identity. Actors could now define their social identities in a new way, by offering their moral and aesthetic judgments on playwrights and plays rather than by imitating characters from the pages of prompt books; as theatre professionals they now became public individuals of authority. Garrick brought Hill's private "place of honour" to the theatre performer. Transposing Hill's Schools of Instruction for actors, he would instruct by means of the actor, affording greater social status to the public performer.

Garrick became the public educator in a more explicit way when he assumed responsibility for giving lectures on Shakespearean dramaturgy from the Drury Lane stage. Reversing Hill's mandate once again, Garrick the actor now prompted the spectator on matters of taste within a pedagogical form. These prescriptive mini-lectures "criticized the various palates of the public for theatrical representation, and compared the wine of Shakespeare to a bottle of brisk Champaign" (1:311). Reflecting the

¹⁸ Habermas, 37.

¹⁹ Garrick's specific management of the Shakespeare Jubilee is assessed by Martha Winburn England, *Garrick's Jubilee* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964).

eighteenth-century pursuit of rationalist justifications for social institutions, the stage lectures enhanced Garrick's reputation as an important definer of cultural identity.

Garrick alone is associated throughout the *Memoirs* with the development of the new acting style.²⁰ Davies considers this an entirely new artistic achievement, a supersessionist movement wherein "nature" and "simplicity" replace the traditional exaggeration, mechanistic externality, and stereotypical gesturing of previous eighteenth-century character portrayal: "Garrick shone forth like a theatrical Newton; he threw new light on elocution and action; he banished ranting, bombast, and grimace; and restored nature, ease, simplicity, and genuine humour" (1:44). He describes his subject as possessing a complementary identity both on- and offstage. Although Davies also conflates public and private identities, Garrick's stature remains consistent throughout the *Memoirs*. Whereas Cibber's biography presents multiple identities of the subject for defensive reasons, Garrick's persona possesses an integrative performance where public and private identities merge into the dedicated stage professional, embodying enlightenment ideals—a theatrical Newton.

Garrick's attention to truth and simplicity in theatrical performance, his new acting and directing style, assimilates with an offstage attention to "ease, simplicity, and genuine humour" in business practice and social deportment. Davies quotes in its entirety the Samuel Johnson prologue for Garrick's opening of the Drury Lane Theatre, which champions Garrick's stagecraft as a new turn towards "Nature": "Tis yours this night to bid the reign commence / Of rescu'd Nature, and reviving Sense." Davies's comment on this speech strongly associates Garrick's subsequent management of the Drury Lane acting company and his offstage conduct in general with the emergent value of middle-class diligence: "He was so accomplished himself in all the external behavior, as well as in the more valuable talents of his profession, that his example was greatly conducive to that regularity which he laboured to establish" (1:147-48). Actor, director, educator, theatre manager, and offstage role model for actors form a single persona. For Davies, Garrick succeeds in "reviving Sense" in the theatre by embodying the middle-class aims of consistency and disciplined work.

Garrick's lifelong efforts to associate his own public identity with Shakespeare as national icon are recorded by Davies, who demonstrates the unassailability of this association by including public criticism of it in his biography. For example, Garrick's promotion of Shakespeare along with other revered playwrights of the nation is critiqued for its over-obvious profit motive and for dampening dramatic innovations that "give no encouragement to new compositions": "There is no drawback on the profit of the night in old plays" (1:269). Davies presents no rebuttal to these specific charges, confidently allowing his subject's reputation for professional integrity to stand as a given. He also includes Oliver Goldsmith's quote depicting the soul of Shakespeare greeting a resurrected Garrick in heaven before all other famous personages (2:164-65). Throughout the appendix, Davies quotes at length selected eulogies to Garrick, most of which associate Shakespeare in some way with Garrick: "Though the proud dome and sculptur'd form declare / Immortal Shakespeare they peculiar care (2:454); "While here

²⁰ Macklin helped Garrick with certain roles early in his career. See William Cooke, *Memoirs of Charles Macklin* (London: 1804), 107. Macklin preceded Garrick in the development of more "natural" roles.

to Shakespeare Garrick pays / His tributary thanks and praise" (2:455); "When Shakespeare died, he left behind / A mortal of an equal mind. / When Garrick play'd, he liv'd again" (2:462). The appendix also includes details of the funeral celebration at Westminster Abbey, where Garrick achieves final respectability by being buried "near to the monument of Shakespeare" (2:486). In these eulogies Garrick becomes a sort of secular saint bringing the Enlightenment values of truth and discipline to the nation.

The *Memoirs* further identifies Shakespeare and Garrick with modest language and behavior, in contrast to what he describes as the embroidered dramaturgy of "gentlemen authors" such as Jonson, and Beaumont and Fletcher (2:328-29). By stressing plainness and modesty, Davies lends Garrick's new acting style a middle-class ethos. He quotes in full Goldsmith's eulogy to Garrick wherein the actor's onstage performance embodies the plain truth as prescriptive ideal. His acting was "natural, simple, affecting," bourgeois ideals through which the plain truth revealed the heart. Honest striving replaced established aristocratic privilege, and plain manners substituted for the elaborations of upper-class deportment. Barely disguised in Davies's account is an attack on aristocratic hegemony, even as it sought to render his biographical subject non-threatening to upper-class privilege.

For Leigh Hunt, "Garrick's refusal to use theatre for political purposes aided him in his ability to concentrate on areas of private, subjective, and emotionally intense experience which he discovered in his characters."²¹ However, in the *Memoirs*, Garrick extends his onstage apolitical strategy to his private life by cultivating an offstage reputation for non-threatening conformity. Davies himself had affinity for such an undertaking, since he was persuaded by Samuel Johnson to write Garrick's life in order to extricate his own family from social disgrace and to save his publishing career from financial ruin. Such virtues that Davies attributes to Garrick—hard work, discipline, and moral steadiness—he desperately sought for himself as a former actor and publisher on the brink of failure. Garrick becomes the redeemer of a nostalgic truth lost since Elizabethan days in order to recast the acting profession as public educator, an identity that assured higher social status for its practitioners. Stage performers will now demonstrate the virtues of successful theatre managers, that is, of successful property owners and patriotic national figures.

Cibber's lifelong attempt to disengage from traditional social constraints and to resist social labeling had been in response to the precarious status of the acting profession in the first half of the century. For Davies, in contrast, the verisimilitude of Garrick's new acting style associated with the new respectability of the actor's private life. Whereas the caprice, sarcasm, and braggadocio of Cibber's public personae revealed an actor seeking to evade social stigma through deceptive means, Garrick's perceived consistency, dependability, and solidity brought him to the center of social respectability. Instead of manipulating public perception to escape social definition, the actor sought to rise to the high position of cultural definer through the intentional projection of a fixed (hence reliable) public image.

²¹ Garrick Claims the Stage: Acting as Social Emblems in Eighteenth Century England (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 148.

V

Writing on the age of representation, William Egginton refers to Lacan's notion of the split subject, one who views the self objectively in response to modern notions of representation. Egginton's subject is the theatregoer of the Spanish Golden Age, but his summary of the spectator's epistemic situation may apply quite as much to the eighteenth-century English theatre performer and spectator:

Spectators become, themselves, microcosms of the theatre, acting roles for internal and external audiences, and thereby developing techniques of self-representation that would serve, on the one hand, to help integrate them into a new system of political organization while, on the other hand, to produce a sort of "breathing space," a gap between the role played and the *subject* playing it that would guarantee that the subject never becomes fully subsumed by the role.²²

Concealment allows the citizen-spectator to transcend deterministic models of subjectivity introduced by the modern nation-state.

[Theatre spectators] are in an inherently conflictual relation with the social order; they may succumb to society's fictions and ideals, but they must construct grand fantasies to do so, which will always be in danger of dissolving. And as much as the symbolic order tries to claim them, to make them its own, there will always be some part that remains unclaimed, concealed from view.²³

Audience members respond to the ideological enticements of the roles represented onstage by using evasive means of internal and external fantasization. The urge of gentlemen spectators to sit on the English stage in open view of other audience members is an overt example of the internalization of role-playing and the theatricalization of everyday life. Garrick's famous banning of such spectators from the stage instances the actor's contribution to the tense circumstances of the split subject. Stage actors also felt the need for "breathing spaces." In the role of actor-as-public educator, Garrick successfully defended his profession from the incursions of upper-class theatre patrons and reconfirmed the actor's space both literally and figuratively.

The stage actor had always lived in the ambivalent state of both object of desire and social outcast. In Egginton's words,

The actor was the living, breathing conduit for the spectator's desires and identifications, existing in a relation of excess or surplus to the already-existing web of social relations: he or she could represent any and all roles within the set, but for that very reason had to be excluded from the set. In brief, the actor was a symptom of the social body.²⁴

²² Egginton, "An Epistemology of the Stage: Theatricality and Subjectivity in Early Modern Spain," in *New Literary History* 27 (Summer 1996): 410.

²³ *Ibid.*, 411.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 401.

However, the actor-as-educator managed to reenter the social set of eighteenth-century England, making actors no longer symptoms of the social body but instead important and recognized contributors to it. If the theatre spectator could become an actor in the theatricalization of everyday life, so too the actor had options through which she or he could transcend assigned roles. The eighteenth-century actor was able with facility to embroider, repair, transform, deny, and even criticize her or his own offstage identity, as we have seen. While Cibber undertook offstage transformations defensively and erratically, Garrick and Davies developed consistent strategies for social transformation, much less so for self-defense. By aligning the professions of actor and public educator, they extended the power of the actor offstage. By becoming a celebrated public educator, Garrick transcended the objectification of the onstage performer. Not solely a signifier representing another signifier, Garrick became recognized as one who could stand outside his traditional assignment as stage role-player. By doing so he moved to the center of national life. No longer excluded as a stage performer from privileged spheres, he became an arbiter of national taste and creator of symbolic forms, a new role that was as prescriptive and authoritative as it was mimetic. The result confirmed middle-class control of national culture, just as it gave a new status and identity to the theatre profession.

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Özet

Halk Kimliğinin Dilbilgisi: On Sekizinci Yüzyıl Aktörlerin Yaşam Öykülerinde Gösteri

Aktörler, bir yaşam bilimi olan yeni Aydınlanma değerlerinin sahnedeki temsilleri aracılığı ile toplumsal bir statü kazanırlar; daha ileri düzeydeki bir statüyü ise gerek sahnede gerekse de sahne dışında halk eğitimleri olmalarıyla elde ederler. Aktör, nispeten kendini savunan bir tarzdan (Cibber) daha özgüvenli bir iddiacılıkla (Aaron Hill, John Hill, Charles Macklin), hem orta sınıf değerlerine şekil veren hem de milli kültürün muhafızı olarak kabul edilen ulusal bir figür (Garrick) olmaya doğru hareket etmiştir. Sahne oyuncularını, Aydınlanma hedefleri doğrultusundaki yeni milliyetçilik bağlamında toplumsal imtiyaz ve saygınlık kazandı. Oyuncular, bir yandan fedakârlık sebepleri tasarlarlarken, diğer yandan rol yapmanın temel belirsizliklerini kullanarak savunmacı ve nefesine hizmet eden bir halk tiplemesi geliştirdiler.

**Envisioning the Metaphysical Middle:
A New Way of Seeing Probes the Heart of *Middlemarch***

Brian D. Reed

One of the most interesting characteristics of George Eliot's *Middlemarch* is the way it re-imagines virtue in an age of scientific discovery, providing a fresh model for leading a morally centered and meaningful life in a world where religious ideology was being replaced by scientific rationality. What Eliot proposes is a new heuristic that could still reject previous illusions without denying the human capacity to imagine the “subtle actions inaccessible by any sort of lens” (149), and in this manner, mediate the dilemma of morality in a way that scientific communities or religious hierarchies alone could not.

Reading the visible signs while interpreting the invisible realms of the body became a point of disagreement and dissension between physicians and religious leaders in the nineteenth century. Both camps struggled with the concept of the invisible world and its relationship to knowledge and faith. John Henry Cardinal Newman may have stated the church's position most clearly when he said “Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof ... I would rather be bound to defend the reasonableness of assuming that Christianity is true, than to demonstrate a moral governance from the Physical world” (Tamworth 114). As Newman points out, the very terms of the scientific method are at odds with this philosophy of the divine, leaving a segment of the academic Victorian community who had metaphysical yearnings without a satisfactory outlet. This conflict between science's role as investigative researcher of “the protoplasm of life” (in Huxley's terms) and its subsequent role as caretaker for Victorians' social well being, helped to fuel the paradigm that science and religion were irreconcilable. Yet, in *Middlemarch*, George Eliot is able to expose the nature of being and knowing in the time of the Darwinian scientific explosion that rectifies the rift between science and religion. Indeed, she provides a model of unity and meaning in her uniquely scientific “study of provincial life” that shows how a “moral governance from the physical world” is indeed possible. In other words, *Middlemarch* shows how both faith and a commitment to the possibility of immortality can flourish in the nineteenth-century epistemology of scientific thinking.

Previous to the late eighteenth century, English communities had been primarily interested in securing gentlemen doctors. Being considerate of the patient's need for privacy, and having a gracious demeanor (especially when making diagnoses) was of paramount importance if a doctor was to be successful; therefore, the structures of science bent to the demands of the patient, and the ministering of medicine became as much a performance as a diagnosis. Other than Lydgate, the doctors in *Middlemarch* are cut from this old cloth, and because of this, are strikingly ineffective in their treatments. Physicians like Dr. Sprague and Dr. Minchin, the *Middlemarch* favorites, are in fact playing a game where “disease in general was called by some bad name, and treated accordingly without shilly-shally - as if, for some example, it were called insurrection,

which must not be fired on with blank-cartridge, but have its blood drawn at once” (129). Diagnosis for these doctors has little to do with science. With the medical profession in provincial England mired in this state, it is no wonder Lydgate travels to Paris and Edinburgh to receive the knowledge he needs to become a visionary. Thus, he shifts his perspective in a way that allows him to break free of the historical bonds of tradition, and attempt something new. Eliot relates:

most of us who turn to any subject we love remember some morning or evening hour when we got on a high stool to reach down an untried volume, or sat with parted lips listening to a new talker, or for the very lack of books began to listen to the voices within, as the first traceable beginnings of our love. (129)

It is this open-mindedness that presents Lydgate with the tools needed to reconstruct the stagnant philosophies on hand.

Likewise, Lydgate, as an outsider, brings fresh knowledge and insight into the community. He is a unique character for his time, as Lawrence Rothfield explains in *Vital Signs*, “the progressive doctor in Victorian novels before *Middlemarch* is most often depicted as a quasi-religious model of feeling” (87). Thus, moving beyond the likes of Dickens and Gaskell, Eliot creates a doctor rife with scientific discipline who isn't overtly sentimental or as Rothfield further explains, whose “distinguishing characteristic as a physician is not his compassion ... but the degree to which Eliot specifies and valorizes his intellectual activity - the sense he conveys that, to put it bluntly, he knows what he is doing” (87). As a creative scientific artist, and as an isolated being, Lydgate has the God-like detachment which allows him the visual positioning to make meaningful connections.

Called with the same religious metaphor and fervor that we would expect of someone entering the priesthood, Lydgate looks in an old dingy volume and opens the page to Anatomy:

... and the first passage that drew his eyes was on the valves of the heart. He was not much acquainted with valves of any sort, but he knew that valvae were folding doors, and through this crevice came a sudden light startling him with his first vivid notion of finely adjusted mechanism in the human frame. (130)

Here Lydgate's practice sounds strikingly like that of a clergyman. Indeed, Eliot continues the religious imagery writing “the moment of vocation had come, and before he got down from his chair, the world was made new to him by a presentment of endless processes filling the vast spaces ...”(130-131). A classic model of Christian conversion, Eliot riddles Lydgate's vocational calling with religious metaphor, but Lydgate is called to another kind of priesthood. He is reborn not in Christ, but enlightened by science.

As a man with a mission, Lydgate envisions medical reform for the Middlemarch profession. He is a prophet for institutional change. Although practicing in a small town in the 1830's, Lydgate, as a true visionary, espouses theories of the great doctors that will come forty years after him. In preparation for writing about Lydgate, Eliot scours recent medical journals containing the most up-to-date information on cholera, the distinctions between typhus and typhoid, the progression of heart disease, and the state

of medical reform in England. By setting the story in the past, Eliot can make Lydgate prophetically way ahead of his time. Believing physicians should not make profits from the sale of drugs, he calls for a combining of the fields of physician, surgeon, and apothecary to improve diagnosis and therapy. Lydgate also feels it is better to do nothing than to do something wrong, and believes giving unnecessary drugs or bleeding patients to satisfy their want of treatment is abominable. Like a true reformer, Lydgate wants to “raise the profession” (82) and states “I should not care ... if I did not believe that better methods were to be found” (112).

In Eliot's heuristic, Lydgate embodies the metaphoric struggle between science and religion for the invisible unclaimed center of the body, and *Middlemarch* further bonds science to religion using more religious metaphors as descriptors of Lydgate's scientific research. Eliot explains that Lydgate's “scientific interest soon took the form of a professional enthusiasm: he had a youthful belief in his bread-winning work” (131), and later she describes him like an evangelical gathering souls. Eliot relates, “He meant to be a unit who would make a certain amount of difference towards that spreading change which would one day tell appreciably upon the averages” (132). But while Eliot highlights Lydgate's calling and his stance as a visionary reformer, she also makes clear that the problem is not just a matter of substituting a new religion of science for an old theology.

Eliot's religious tropes highlight the Victorian anxiety about the gap that exists between the scientific and religious. They make an interesting underpinning for Lydgate's feelings that advancement in medicine had little or nothing to do with theological dogma or metaphysical speculation. Lydgate's insistence that internal medicine would advance through objective observation and biological research rather than through philosophical ponderings seems to echo the feelings of those (like Darwin) who will follow him. In her essay “Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming,” Eliot further expounds on the troubled relationship between science and religion:

Fatally powerful as religious systems have been, human nature is stronger and wider than religious systems, and though dogmas may hamper, they cannot absolutely repress its growth: build walls round the living tree as you will, the bricks and mortar have by and by to give way before the slow and sure operation of the sap. (120)

The basic means for gaining information for Lydgate is through his own scopic positioning. In *Somatic Fictions* Athena Vrettos explains “Lydgate's model of scientific perception, which is so often echoed in the narrator's 'optic' metaphors, is legitimized as the dominant critical stance for realism” (110). Certainly, vision figures heavily in nineteenth-century thought where reality is formed by seeing and being seen. Miriam Bailin extends the idea in *The Sickroom in Victorian Fiction* by explaining “the sickroom for Eliot offers, under the rubric of domestic realism, a vision of absolute clarity, of perfect integrity of motive and deed, and even a kind of epistemological certainty” (110), and so it is not surprising that it is through the eyes of Lydgate that we attempt to find meaning. But Eliot chooses to fret over Lydgate's, and therefore scientific realism's, authoritative stance as the harbinger of truth. In the world of perception, everything is not conclusive.

One way Lydgate gathers information is by probing bodies, not penetrating them. While some cases provide “a beautiful example of disease with all its phases seen in clear delineation” (410), other cases need more creative modes of gathering information. By reading bodily secretions and examining the body's surface, Lydgate is able to make many of his diagnoses. This does not mean that Lydgate is not interested in what resides under the skin. Through the character of the Parisian actress Laure, Eliot shows just how interested Lydgate is in plunging into the mysterious interworkings of bodies. We know that “Lydgate was in love with this actress,” as if he were awestruck “as a man is in love with a woman whom he never expects to speak to” (137), but only admires from a distance. Peter Logan finds Lydgate's visual fascination with this awesome actress to be “an emblem of penetration to which Lydgate repeatedly returns” (180). After experimenting on animal bodies in the school laboratory, “and not being able to elicit the facts he needed,” it is indeed revealing that Lydgate takes refuge in the performance of an actress “whose part it was to stab her lover” (137). Logan responds “this idealized image of the woman who succeeds where he fails rejuvenates his [Lydgate's] flagging spirits” (180); furthermore, it seems as long as this image remains idealized or imaginary, Lydgate can benefit from his theatrical experience. But when the realistic boundary is crossed, and the body of Laure's actor husband is pierced, Lydgate's scientific pilgrimage is compromised. As Logan explains:

The body's life - which is the source of the body's meaning to the physician, who seeks to preserve it - depends absolutely upon the boundary's integrity. But paradoxically, that same boundary prevents the physician from knowing that meaning, for the skin bars him from access to the body's interior, where the meaning resides. Thus, although the work of medicine requires the penetration of the body's surface, the goal of medicine is to preserve the very surface that prevents this penetration. (181-182)

Lydgate chooses to respect this boundary, and conducts his experiments by viewing mostly what is outside the body.

While Lydgate is not willing to cross this threshold into the interior at the expense of the flesh, he is also not willing to remain completely at the surface of the body. We are told that Lydgate wants to “pierce the obscurity of those minute processes which prepare human misery and joy, those invisible thoroughfares which are the first lurking places of anguish” (150), but this doesn't seem possible if Lydgate is to remain on the exterior. This inability to see what lays beneath the scope of mortal sight is a problem that must have plagued many Victorian physicians. Lydgate can't abide by the tradition of the old medical doctors of Middlemarch who look only at the surface appearance of the body and give treatments according to the patient's wants. While this positioning seems to keep their patients happy, and allows the doctors to keep their economic status, the reality is that this kind of treatment is only a surface performance. Lydgate delves much deeper.

By using modern medical tools, Lydgate can listen to the invisible reverberations on the inside of the patient, but these new tools, such as the microscope and stethoscope, present a new dilemma for the scopic and audile scientist. As they continue to reveal mysterious or hidden worlds (and highlight the fallibility of the senses) these tools of enhancement unveil a cosmos of even more minute configurations. If our

hearing and seeing or our modes of receiving information were heightened by even more powerful lenses and mechanical magnifications, we are left to wonder if we would not have ever continuing levels of interpretation. Eliot responds: "If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence" (178). Indeed, we might go mad before we discover where the quest for meaningful connections end.

Matters are complicated by Lydgate's failure to make good use of his modern tools. Whatever image he is able to get into focus is in reality his own mental interpretation of data keyed to fit into his own predescribed paradigm. Rothfield explains:

nowhere is the relative unimportance of technological advances to scientific perception more patent than in the very case that Eliot presents through Lydgate ... that of pathological anatomy and the development of cell theory. For although Lydgate, unlike Bichat (as Eliot tells us), eagerly uses a microscope, he still fails to see the cells that are certainly present as optical images. (95)

Of course, since this is not information that will help Lydgate's own theory, and would require a whole new way of thinking, Lydgate is blind to what would have been valuable discoveries, a characteristic that has tragic consequences for both his career and marriage, and which points toward his final ineffectiveness.

The question *Middlemarch* poses then, through Lydgate, is how we can know anything with certainty when we as humans are not objective beings. How can we create an epistemology when the self is a flawed instrument? As the abilities of sight are enhanced by instruments and lenses, the evidence mounts that the eye is an uncertain organ; furthermore, the eye is not just a passive receiver. Human eyes are constructing their own truths, filling their own gaps, and making their own meanings when transferring images to the brain; therefore, relying on just the authority of the visual to make the real can prove disastrous. This is why Lydgate refuses to read the signs he gets from Rosamond and why the weak-eyed Dorothea is partially to blame for her inability to see the problems evident in her marriage to Casaubon. Flawed human components distort what truth there is and often see only what they want to see.

Thankfully, Lydgate is able to use the vision he does have to some positive ends. Understanding "that living bodies, fundamentally considered, are not associations of organs which can be understood by studying them first apart, and then as it were federally; but must be regarded as consisting of certain primary webs, or tissues, out of which the various organs - brain, heart, lungs, and so on - are compacted" (134), Lydgate makes important advances when he realizes that structure itself doesn't provide the entire picture. Like Mr. Brooke says, "Life isn't cast in a mould - not cut out by rule and line, and that sort of thing" (35), and so a new way of seeing is needed. Peter Logan, in *Nerves and Narratives* states "rather than embracing or deploying the fixed medical concept of the body, George Eliot portrays medicine as engaged in a business of conceiving bodies, and thus questions the basic structures of medical knowledge itself" (5).

George Eliot's concern moves far beyond identifying only the significance of the body and what it means to exist. She probes the difficulties in knowing. Logan states:

Rather than embracing the medical story of the body, *Middlemarch* represents medicine's uncertain relationship with bodies as objects of knowledge. Thus, this novel is less concerned with representing the meaning of the body than with representing the problems involved in knowing that meaning. She does this by shifting her focus from the body to the doctor and telling the story of him telling the story of the body. (171)

Likewise, scientific boundaries in this text are not very rigid. What science is and what it is not, is not clearly defined, and ways of knowing seem open to interpretation.

The scientific community of which Lydgate is a part espouses that all claims should be supported up with scopic evidence, but in *Middlemarch* the connections are made by visionaries who are able to transcend the purely objective and use their imagination. Scientific imagination is startlingly aligned with religious imagination as both have the same moments of speculation, epiphany, and wonder. As Gillian Beer tells us in *Darwin's Plots*, "Most major scientific theories rebuff common sense. They call on evidence beyond the reach of our senses and overturn the observable world. They disturb assumed relationships and shift what has been substantial into metaphor" (3). This seems to be the pattern that Lydgate is following. As Logan claims, "It is because Lydgate, unlike the older practitioners, is able to transcend these empirical limits," through using the scientific imagination, that he is capable of "escaping the distortion of immediate experience to recognize the real presence of a deeper set of unapparent relations" (185). Sally Shuttleworth in *George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science* furthers the thought writing "Theories of organic interdependence now replaced those of free association, and interest in dynamic historical processes supplanted earlier preoccupation with quantitative measurement ..." (3). As Eliot herself says in "Leaves From a Note-Book,":

How triumphant opinions originally spread - how institutions arose - what were the conditions of great inventions, discoveries, or theoretic conceptions - what circumstances affecting individual lots are attendant on the decay of long-established systems, - all these grand elements of history require the illumination of special imaginative treatment. (218)

In essence, in order to develop a unified whole, doctors needed to imagine relationships that exist beyond visual boundaries.

It is interesting to note that the readers of *Middlemarch* are performing the same task of discovering hidden relationships in which Lydgate is engrossed. Indeed, George Eliot has her readers mirror the imaginative scientific pattern of discovery as they read her complex novel that houses elaborate characters like Lydgate (who through his marriage is connected to almost everyone in *Middlemarch*). The multiple points of view and separate individual scopic positions of the characters in *Middlemarch* create the possibility of multiple scopic positions for its readers and demands interpretation just like the complex physical world demands some ordering of significances from its scientific observers. This act of interpretation, of reading others, is the very force which drives the novel, and drives us to read it. By hypothesizing about what is seen and heard (as I am doing here), the reader, like Lydgate and the other major characters, is invited to envision connections between the parts that compose the narrative, the pieces that

compose the community, and the bodies that compose the society. The quest is for a way of envisioning the whole that will incorporate each part. Thus, like Lydgate himself, we the reader are searching for the “homogeneous origin of all the tissues” (414) that will link everything into a comprehensible and meaningful whole. Of course there is a common interest between the reader and scientist for receiving objective data, but the fascinating comparison that Eliot underscores is the necessity for imaginative creation.

Lydgate sees the scientific study of the human body as more than just about observation and classification, and he employs creativity when he continues to pursue knowledge and when he formulates ideas. Science isn't just about recording and cataloguing what is known or observable, but it is concerned with shedding imaginative light on the hidden connections beneath the dark surface that will illuminate the underlying order of things. Considering the specific differences between typhus and typhoid, Lydgate emphasizes the need for imagination when constructing a complete theory: “Fever had obscure conditions, and gave him that delightful labour of the imagination which is not mere arbitrariness, but the exercise of disciplined power - combining and constructing with the clearest eye for probabilities and the fullest obedience to knowledge” (149). With the light of imaginative vision, Lydgate can piece together the shreds of meaning he observes, and comprehend, diagnose, and educate the fragmented society around him. The scientific imagination, in this manner, provides the means of revealing unity and becomes the glue that holds the visuals together.

In other words, the nineteenth-century scientific community as a whole, and Lydgate in particular, were actively searching for a new definition of the invisible world. What in the past had been a transcendent space filled with souls, angels, and God, the unseeable cosmos was now emerging, in new scientific terminology, as a structured world of ether and energy waves. Gillian Beer, in “Authentic Tidings of Invisible Things: Vision and the Invisible in the Later Nineteenth Century,” explains how “the invisible, instead of being placidly held just beyond the scope of sight, was newly understood as an energetic system out of which fitfully emerges that which is visible” (85). Lydgate's hope for a single connective tissue is reflected in the rest of the nineteenth-century scientific community who were also looking for a means of unity. Just like the invisible world to the religious mind, which housed the territory where the human and divine might meet, to the scientific community the invisible world became a place where unexplained phenomenon might be clarified. This doesn't compromise Lydgate's vision, which is profoundly material and not ethereal. He doesn't, nor obviously does Eliot herself, see an evidence of a higher being projected from the wonderment which is the invisible. Indeed, for Lydgate the most useful visions or insights are still those which are grounded squarely in the material realm.

Yet, by putting his imaginative vision to use, Lydgate hopes to compassionately relieve human misery. As a moral human being, he is interested in bettering society by using himself as the vehicle for advancement. One means of achieving success in this role for Lydgate is by examining the causes of death, breaking them down into their components, and reorganizing them into a meaningful single theory, a web, or a primal tissue which will allow him to recompose the fragments into an overpowering unity and a way of cheating death. This is a man who “was capable of performing the most astonishing cures, and rescuing people altogether given up by other practitioners,” and

who had an amazing “power of resuscitating persons as good as dead” (402). In a sense, success for Lydgate is a means of transcendence, a genuine form of salvation, and a way of “bringing people back from the brink of death” (408). He has a belief that his research is serving a higher purpose, and he is indeed saving lives.

If virtue and morality are tied to the production of happiness, as John Stuart Mill proposes in “Utilitarianism,” then certainly Lydgate is one of the most moral characters in the novel. But Mill's statement “that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end” (43), seems more reflective of Rosamond's selfish egoism than Lydgate's career. In fact, unlike his peers, Lydgate's ambition is not centered just in economic gain. At first blush, he appears to be selfless. He has moral purpose in his work, and is “saved from the hardening effects” of his craft “by the abundant kindness of his heart and his belief that human life might be made better” (139). Even so, his purpose is only somewhat altruistic. We are told that “his ardor was absorbed in love of his work and in the ambition of making his life recognized as a factor in the better life of mankind - like the other heroes of science” (150), and the importance of being recognized should not be overlooked. Lydgate's aim to go beyond Bichat by finding a single “primitive tissue” is about formulating his own identity and securing his position in history in the “grandest profession in the world” (417).

Lydgate is part of a vocational pattern that shows his commitment to work. Upon arrival in Middlemarch, we are assured he intends not to marry “until he had trodden out a good clear path for himself away from the broadroad which was quite ready made” (84). Later, while talking about his visionary commitment, Lydgate remarks to Bulstode “I hope I shall have nothing to do with clerical disputes ... The path I have chosen is to work well within my own profession” (114). Lydgate's “path” is none other than that of the adventurer wishing for his name to be recorded in history. The image of Lydgate the explorer presents a means for making a historical impact that delineates the essence of immortality, a theme Eliot reflects upon when writing the discovery of “The New World”:

Perhaps that was a more cheerful time for observers and theorizers than the present; we are apt to think it the finest era of the world when America was beginning to be discovered, when a bold sailor, even if he were wrecked, might alight on a new Kingdom; and about 1829 the dark territories of Pathology were a fine America for a spirited young adventurer. Lydgate was ambitious above all to contribute towards enlarging the scientific, rational basis of his profession. (134)

Lydgate's exploration of the new territories of science, “tracked in that outer darkness through long pathways of necessary sequence” (149), could likewise lead to his making a historical impact.

In *Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel*, U.C. Knoepfelmacher reads this spirit of Lydgate's to achieve on a somewhat different level, but the sense of transcendence may be the same. Knoepfelmacher states “Lydgate's confident belief in 'the facts of the human frame' is but an expression of his faith in scientific progress,” and proposes that “Lydgate looks ahead with unflinching self-assurance” (77). This seems to reflect on Farebrother's concern that “Eros has degenerated ... and now he brings back chaos” which is answered assuredly by Lydgate's “But a better order will

begin soon after” (317). Lydgate's faith in a brighter future is full of hope for his own redemption in a society that could appreciate his vision. Alan Mintz, in *George Eliot and the Novel of Vocation*, highlights this feeling of hope and transcendence through vocation saying, “the modern era will see men judged by the works, beyond land and children, they leave behind them. No longer merely composing struggle for livelihood, work has been transformed into an impassioned struggle to change the world” (57). Immortality in *Middlemarch* for Lydgate, in the same way, is comprised of coming up with a theory that lasts or making social changes that will have long term impact and will place him solidly in the history of scientific progress, by doing “good small work for *Middlemarch*, and great work for the world” (135).

It is the combination of the objective science with the subjective imagination that allows there to be a faith in the future. The “unflinching self-assurance” that Knoepfmacher sees emanating from Lydgate exemplifies the connection of these two important threads of thought. The blending the creative imagination with the positivist philosophy of science provides the materials needed for professional immortality. Greatness is enabled by maintaining this balance, a feat which Lydgate is not able to completely accomplish, but which provides hope for the future.

George Eliot's conviction that science can provide the structure to fill the gaps opened by waning religious beliefs, is a driving force behind both Lydgate and *Middlemarch*. By using religious metaphor, highlighting the scientific imagination, showing how an ethical center can still exist, and delineating a means for immortality and transcendence through progress, Eliot balances the moral and imaginative essence of the old church with the spirit of the new science.

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Özet

Fizikötesi Arayeri Tasarlamak: *Middlemarch*'ın Kalbini İnceleyen Yeni Bir Görme Biçimi

On dokuzuncu yüzyıl entelektüelleri için en cezbedici mücadele konusu, yeni akılcılık ve bilimsel keşif çağında, erdem olgusunu nasıl tanımlayacakları idi. *Middlemarch*'ta, George Eliot, erdem ve bilimin alanlarını sınırlayan ve bunların görülen aykırılıklarını uzlaştıran yeni bir deneme yanılma yöntemi önerir. Doğrusu, dini metafor kullanarak, bilimsel hayal gücünü vurgulayarak, etik merkezin nasıl hala var olabildiğini göstererek ve bilimsel ilerleme yoluyla ölümsüzlük ve aşkıncılık için bir yol tasvir ederek, *Middlemarch*'ta, Eliot, ahlak ve hayal gücüne dair eski kilise özünü ve bir önceki yanılışmaları yalanlamadan, insan kapasitesinin "her hangi bir lens aracılığı ile ulaşılabilen zeki ve incelikli faaliyeti" olarak tanımlanan hayal etme edimini, yeni bilimin ruhu ile dengeler (149). Eliot'ın deneme yanılma yönteminde, Lydgate görünmeyen ve sahipsiz bedenin merkezi için verilen bilim ve din arasındaki mecazi savaşı temsil eder.

**The (Re)Vision of History in Faulkner's *Light in August*:
Hightower, Tennyson, and Shakespeare**

David Ruiter

In Faulkner's *Light in August*, Gail Hightower spends twenty-five years reading from his dog-eared Tennyson; then, one day his reading is put off by the "dramatist" Byron Bunch, and Hightower is forced back into human relationship by serving as midwife to the birth of Lena Grove's son.¹ He responds to this re-entry into community by thinking, "Life comes to the old man yet," and by subsequently putting aside his long-favored Tennyson and picking up *Henry IV*. Critics have noted that this literary switch suggests that Hightower is giving up his role as a passive spectator in life and adopting a more honorable position as constructive participant. However, the change in reading material indicates more than just the reverend's break away from sedentary stasis into active participation in human relationship; the last the reader hears from or about Hightower, in the novel's penultimate chapter, focuses almost entirely on a revision of his own historical preoccupations and a reconsideration of his place in a history of self that suddenly includes a present and a possible future. That is, having been wholly dominated by a vision of the idealized past for most of his life, Hightower ultimately rewrites his personal history to include access to the "Now, now" of his own existence, and his revised reading list marks this change in perspective. In this respect, the change in Hightower's reading material indicates his movement away from Tennyson's elegiac vision of the past, and towards Shakespeare's vision of still-unfolding, still-negotiated views of past, present, and future.

Immediately as readers are introduced to Gail Hightower, they are brought into a sense of his personal experience of history. The narrator observes:

The house, the study, is dark behind him, and he is waiting for that instant when all light has failed out of the sky and it would be night save for that faint light which daygranaried leaf and grass blade reluctant suspire, making still a little light on earth though night itself has come. *Now, soon*, he thinks, *soon, now* He does not say even to himself: "There remains something yet of honor and pride, of life." (60, sic)

This passage, repeated with little variation throughout the novel, depicts Hightower in suspension, waiting for the moment when the past will imaginatively burst on the scene, as he sits and gazes out at the former Main street of Jefferson from his study window. Watching, watchful, intensely stimulated but otherwise totally inert, he waits for his personal history, in the form of his dead grandfather, to come galloping to him, to show him the significance of itself and, therefore, of himself. In this respect, the narrator also suggests that Hightower was "born about thirty years after the only day he seemed to have ever lived in—that day his grandfather was shot from the galloping horse--" (62)

¹ I would like to thank the American Modern/Postmodern scholar Ezra Cappell for his thoughtful consideration of and insights into the ideas found in this essay.

and that “the seed which his grandfather had transmitted to him had been on the horse too that night and had been killed too and time had stopped there and then for the seed and nothing had happened in time since, not even him” (64). As Robert A. Martin says, “Hightower, instead of using his father and grandfather’s lives as models to provide a direction for his own life, becomes so absorbed in the past that all his energies are focused in it. As a consequence, he can neither contribute to the present nor face the future” (283). The reverend participates only as a spectator in the past, but lacks even such a limited claim to participation in the present.

This obsession with the past costs Hightower nearly everything—his wife, his church, much if not all of his religious devotion, and, with the possible exception of Byron Bunch, all meaningful human relationship. His limited contact with humanity is extraordinarily passive: he writes checks to the Memphis institution for women (he includes a letter only when the amount of the check changes) and speaks with Byron only when the mill worker appears stumbling on the doorstep. In fact, Hightower believes, in respect to his present life and relationship with others: “I have bought immunity. [...] I paid for it. I didn’t quibble about the price. No man can say that. I just wanted peace; I paid them their price without quibbling” (310). By dedicating himself solely to the past, to the world that was, he believes he has purchased a vaccine against relationships present and future.

This belief is fortified by Hightower’s steady intellectual diet.

He turns from the window. One wall of the study is lined with books. He pauses before them, seeking, until he finds the one which he wants. It is Tennyson. It is dogeared. He has had it ever since the seminary. He sits beneath the lamp and opens it. It does not take long. Soon the fine galloping language, the gutless swooning full of sapless trees and dehydrated lusts begins to swim smooth and swift and peaceful. It is better than praying without having to bother to think aloud. It is like listening in a cathedral to a eunuch chanting in a language which he does not even need to not understand. (318)

Tennyson becomes an artistic, galloping echo of Hightower’s own historical vision: “fine,” but also “gutless,” “sapless” and “dehydrated”; “peaceful,” but without thinking; ritual, but without meaning. The poetry becomes procedure, almost a meditation, inducing sleep: “Upon the swell of his paunch, where the white shirt (it is a clean and fresh one now) balloons out of the worn black trousers, an open book lies face down. Upon the book Hightower’s hands are folded, peaceful, benignant, almost pontifical” (363). At least to his own mind, the aging reverend tidies up his disturbed thinking, his soiled degeneration, not to mention his shirt, with a quick scrub and rinse session with Tennyson.

The sarcasm here, directed at both Hightower and Tennyson, is the narrator’s.² One might argue about whether the idea is to make Hightower appear all the more ossified through his preference for Tennyson, or to witness Tennyson being made negligible through his nearly lifeless audience. Either way, and even for the reader who sees far more substance in Tennyson’s work than does the narrator of *Light in August*,

² For the complicated narration in *Light in August*, see Ineke Bockting’s essay, listed in the Works Cited.

the point is relatively clear. Hightower dwells obsessively on an unrealistic and nostalgic vision of the past, and, in fact, spends most of his life in suspension—having to occasionally set foot in the “actual world” of the present for groceries or stumbling visitors, but otherwise staying distinctly out of the present through reading, sleeping, and otherwise dreaming and fantasizing backwards about “a world where reality did not exist” (473). The same sort of critique might be applied, fairly or not, to many of Tennyson’s best known works, such as *In Memoriam*, *Idylls of the King*, or, as Mario D’Avanzo precisely demonstrates, *The Lady of Shalott* and *Maud*; that is, these works, like Hightower’s own historic vision, might be said to contain marginal contact with the actual present coupled with an apparent obsession with an unrealistic version of the past.

Tennyson scholars have often dealt with similar criticisms of the poet’s work. Robert Pattison, in the book *Tennyson and Tradition*, attempts to undo what he sees as the following general perception: “Critics have been too ready to find in Tennyson’s poetry only the weight of the tradition, the cursed and not the blessed aspect of cultural memory” (2). Likewise, W. David Shaw, in the book *Tennyson’s Style*, says that Tennyson shows himself as a “poet who has brooded on ruin, who echoes the protesting cry of Heraclites, heard down the ages: ‘All things give way: nothing remains’” (74). On this issue, the headnote to the Tennyson section of the most recent (7th) edition of the *Norton Anthology of English Literature* is possibly the most impressive, stating of the poet:

He had the country dweller’s awareness of traditional roots and a sense of the past. It is appropriate that his best poems are about the past, not about the present or future. Even in his childhood, Tennyson said that “‘the words far, far away’ had always a strange charm for me”; he was haunted by what he called “the passion of the past.” The past became his great theme, whether it be his own past (as in *In the Valley of Caerteretz*), his country’s past (as in *The Idylls of the King*), the past of humankind, the past of the world itself. [...] Tennyson is the first major writer to express this awareness of the vast extent of geological time that has haunted human consciousness since Victorian scientists exposed the history of the earth’s crust. In his more usual vein, however, it is the recorded past of humankind that inspires him [...]. (1201)

This critical passage is itself firmly fixated on Tennyson’s fascination with the past, a dominant concept in the poet’s work that is readily apparent to more readers than just Faulkner’s narrator in *Light in August*. In fact, the above passage, with little modification, is almost wholly applicable to an analysis of Gail Hightower: “awareness of traditional roots and a sense of the past,” “about the past, not the present or future,” the “past became his great theme,” etc. Of course, what becomes art for Tennyson becomes paralyzing psychosis for Hightower, but it is not difficult to understand how the reverend feels nourished and comforted by the poet’s words.

Hightower’s present has indeed given way to the past and its ruin, and what remains of the preacher’s life is, in really quite Shakespearean terms, nothing; still, much as with Shakespeare’s *King Lear*, the reader, fool-like, must question whether this self-proclaimed old man can make any “use” of this “nothing” (1.4.128). And indeed he does; that is, Hightower delivers the baby, thanks to the shuffling but nonetheless

insistent persuasion of Byron Bunch, who suggests time and again that Hightower's presence in the present is required. Indeed, Hightower's "dead life in the actual world" is radically transformed (366). In fact, after delivering Lena's baby, he notes to himself, "I ought to feel worse than I do" and suddenly thinks, "I showed them! [...] Life comes to the old man yet, while they get there too late" (404). With this realization, the narrator observes that Hightower

moves like a man with a purpose now, who for twentyfive years has been doing nothing at all between the time to wake and the time to sleep again. Neither is the book which he now chooses the Tennyson: this time also he chooses food for a man. It is Henry IV and he goes out into the back yard and lies down in the sagging deck chair beneath the mulberry tree, plumping solidly and heavily into it. (405, sic)

The reader is not told exactly how far he makes it into Shakespeare's text, though he does, as before, fall asleep. Still, there is a difference now, because he falls asleep not to escape the present, but because of his active exertions in the present. And when he wakes, it is not into carefully maintained seclusion, but into the world of relationship, as he returns to the cabin to check on Lena and the baby (407).

And his perspective on the past has been notably altered. In his clumsy attempt to reassure the unflappable Lena, he says, regarding the significance of her own past, which has led to the present, critical situation, "No. Not this. This does not matter. This is not anything yet. It all depends on what you do with it, afterward. With yourself. With others." (411) "This" is clearly the baby, physically, but also as a living representation of Lena's past, at least as Hightower sees it. The suggestion here is that the past is itself still alterable, depending upon how things work out in the present or even the future. Lena's past is alterable, the meaning still to be determined, based on her own deeds and her relationship with others; and, of course, if Hightower can see the possibility for Lena to write and revise her past by her actions in the present and future, then he may, having now re-entered into active relationship with others, still have time to rewrite his own history.

Following these events, Hightower quickly finds himself in the center of, or hosting actually, another cataclysmic moment, when Joe Christmas bursts into his house in an apparent attempt to find sanctuary from his pursuers. Again, Hightower chooses to participate in the present moment, attempting to save Joe, despite having received a violent beating from him. His effort, of course, fails miserably against the culturally coded machinery of Percy Grimm. Nonetheless, the moment grandly represents the new Hightower, yanked out of the high tower of his study overlooking the street, and into relationship with his community.

Up to this point in the story of Hightower, Mario D'Avanzo provides a very precise critique, demonstrating that the shift in the reverend's reading material represents a concurrent shift away from a sort of dreamy, nostalgic isolation and into active involvement in the life of the community. D'Avanzo states, "Comparing the texts of Tennyson's poems and *Light in August*, we can conclude that Tennyson is both an important influence on Faulkner's language and characterization, and also marks the degrees of Hightower's progress from death-in-life to participation in life" (71). Furthermore, D'Avanzo concludes his essay saying that the parallel shifts in reading

material and life participation result from the reverend's move towards the virtues found in Shakespeare's drama, namely "responsibility, high purpose and action. It is Hightower's new canon" (71). There is no doubt that Hightower experiences a revolutionary change in behavior, and the change is both meaningful and, so far as the text demonstrates, lasting. Moreover, Hightower's shift from Tennyson to Shakespeare coincides precisely with his change of behavior.

However, there is a bit more to the novel and to the story of Hightower, and this, once again, is not so much staked in community participation, but in isolated, historical reflection. The novel's penultimate chapter, which Joris Duytschaever calls "the most important one" in terms of the reverend's character (105), is devoted to Hightower's mind, and it considers, in a sort of intellectual biography, how he came to embrace a nearly life-long historical perspective that left him living in the world after the time for his living, and dying, has already passed. In these pages, the narrator explains that the young Hightower "grew to manhood among phantoms, and side by side with a ghost" (473). Near the end of his story and, some would say, his life,³ as he reflects, bloody-headed, on his personal history, he again concludes "that my only salvation must be to return to the place to die where my life had already ceased before it began" (478). This is all the familiar, elegiac nostalgia—the death of the best of times, the stagnation in these the worst of times. In this mood, he remembers thinking:

"Listen. God must call me to Jefferson because my life died there, was shot from the saddle of a galloping horse in a Jefferson street one night twenty years before it was ever born." [...] When he believed that he had heard the call [to the ministry] it seemed to him that he could see his future, his life, intact and on all sides complete and inviolable, like a classic and serene vase where the spirit could be born anew sheltered from the harsh gale of living and die so, peacefully, with only the far sound of the circumvented wind, with scarce even a handful of rotting dust to be disposed of. That was what the word seminary meant: quiet and safe walls within which the hampered and garmentworried spirit could learn anew serenity to contemplate without horror or alarm its own nakedness. (478)

In other words, the seminary, and his life then and since, had been designed to leave nothing, to create nothing, to exist in contemplation of a more perfect, albeit dusty, past, away from a chaotic present and the likely even more chaotic future.

However, Hightower's mind continues, in an attempt to puzzle out the recent change of life strategy:

'But there are more things in heaven and earth too than truth,' he thinks, paraphrases, quietly, not quizzical, not humorous; not unquizzical and not humorless too. Sitting in the failing dusk, his head in its white bandage looming bigger and more ghostly than ever, he thinks, 'More things indeed', thinking how ingenuity was apparently given man in order that he may supply himself in crises with shapes and sounds with which to guard himself from truth. He had at least one thing to not repent: that he had not made the mistake of telling the elders what he had planned to say. He had not needed to live in the seminary a year

³ See Robert L. Feldman for a reading of Hightower's death (360).

before he learned better than that. And more, worse: that with the learning of it, instead of losing something he had gained, had escaped from something. And that that gain had colored the very face and shape of love. (479)

This thinking leads him to remorse over his treatment of his wife, which in turn allows him, finally, to see her face in the circle of faces, his own eventually among them, as they quietly chastise him for using her as an instrument in his own selfish plan (488-90). He believed that it was his right to dedicate his life to a vision of the past, so long as he did not hurt anyone else, but of course he has hurt his wife. He sweats “like blood” and realizes, “Then if this is so, if I am the instrument of her despair and death, then I am in turn instrument of someone outside myself” (491). With this understanding, he finally realizes that “it can be now Now” (492).

As the above passage indicates, Hightower has apparently read more Shakespeare than just *Henry IV*; in addition, this inclination towards the plays, and away from the poetry of Tennyson, now signifies more than the move from isolation to community, or even from elegiac passivity to dramatic action. It is indeed the move from the past as the present, to the present as locus of past, present, and future. That is, here, in the last section of the novel that deals with Hightower, we see the aging preacher once again in his study, contemplating the past, but this time the result is different: instead of merely dreaming of a past history that gallops into his presence, he is currently in the process of formulating, or configuring, or reconfiguring, his personal history, a history of the present, a “now Now.”

The issue in Hightower’s life, after the birth of Lena’s baby and the death of Joe Christmas, becomes the change from the preacher’s Tennysonian vision of history—elegiac and nostalgic, even idealist, as Hightower sees it—to a more Shakespearean vision of history, especially as expressed in the *Henry IV* plays. D’Avanzo, as already stated, sees this new, Shakespearean vision of history as focused on “responsibility, high purpose, and action” (71). However, it is improbable that these provide a truly representative set of the values expressed in the *Henry IV* plays—and if they do, they still need to be addressed side by side with other clearly valuable assets, such as wit, deceit, and sack-swilling;⁴ more pertinent to the focus of this essay, the plays’ historical vision is arguably less about a defined set of values than it is about an active process of historical rewriting.

At this point, it may be important to realize that while Hightower sees a nostalgic vision in the works of Tennyson, it is much less likely that such a sense could be easily derived from his reading of the *Henry IV* plays. Certainly, *Henry IV* and *Hotspur* and *Justice Shallow* all have wistful historical visions from time to time, but these perspectives are all radically undermined: Henry’s prophesied fate to die in Jerusalem is only ironically realized in that he dies in a room called “Jerusalem;” *Hotspur*’s purring about “that sweet lovely rose” Richard is delivered to the wrong audience—

⁴ Others have provided different arguments for Hightower’s choice of Shakespeare. Doreen Fowler, for instance, providing a Lacanian/Freudian reading, states of the reverend, “He has assumed the responsibility of separating the child from the maternal body; he has acted as a representative of the Father or phallus, that which stands for the father. Fittingly, then, after the delivery, when he returns home and settles down with a book, he chooses *Henry IV*, ‘food for a man’ (405)” (145).

Northumberland and Worcester, Richard's usurpers--and left unacknowledged (1.3.175); Shallow's fantasy of the good, old, chimes-at-midnight days is roughly exposed by Falstaff's exclamation, "Lord, Lord, how subject we old men are to this vice of lying!" (3.2.302-303). These Shakespearean "historian[s] of the heart"--a tag Longfellow once applied to Tennyson (Clark 7)--end up succeeded, killed, and/or deceived at the hands of those who, as Ronald R. MacDonald says of Hal, are set apart by a "refusal to sink into nostalgia and sentimentality" (86). In the *Henry IV* plays, the nostalgic view of history does not play well.

Kiernan Ryan takes up this issue of the historical vision of the *Henry IV* plays by assuming that "these history plays not only speak to us of what our world once was, but also challenge us to confront what it remains and what it has yet to become" (101); and this, in terms of Hightower's personal history, is just what he is confronted with in his last moments in *Light in August*. That is, as Hightower tries to match his day's experiences--the birth of the baby, the failed intervention on behalf of Joe--with his devotion to a version of things rooted firmly in a period before his own birth, he is faced with a difficult task that requires him to acknowledge that the events of the past are only part of his history, a fragment of the story of Gail Hightower. In addition, this fragment from the past is itself subject to massive re-evaluation, both determined and yet to be determined by the intellectual and active events of the present and future. Likewise, as Ryan reads through the two parts of *Henry IV*, he comes to the conclusion that "History, it is plain, is not simply what happened, but what gets made, misconstrued, disputed, and remodeled" (113). Hightower makes a glorious picture of his grandfathered past, misconstrues it as his death-in-life present, and disputes it by coming to "life" with the birth of Lena's son.

Following his participation in the birth, it is the remodeling that Hightower takes up, the remodeling of an historical vision that has now become inadequate to his personal narrative. He is no longer a child of ghosts, born after the time of his living, but is, instead, a member of the "now, Now". What that means is complex and at times disorienting, needing to take into account a past, present, and even future that will unceasingly be at work each upon the other, just as elsewhere in Faulkner Quentin Compson's future academic success will rewrite the story, the history, of the sale of Benji's pasture. In Hightower's case, the present day's events are rewriting his past; for example, he comes to question how--if he can "live" now, and even live heroically--this changes his responsibility for his wife's destruction. In Ryan's terms, Hightower is experiencing a Shakespearean, historical situation where the "fixity of the past surrenders to the flickering supposition that all might have been otherwise, that the chronicles could quite plausibly have been obliged to tell another tale" (113). The reverend's remorse for his past behavior immediately becomes somehow curative, allowing him finally to truly see his wife's face, among the halo of faces, itself a remodeled space. And it is not only the past that is remodeled; it is also the future, for as Hightower says to Lena, the past by itself doesn't matter, it is what one does with it. It is how one writes and rewrites it.

In conclusion, the aim of this essay is not to prove that the Shakespearean historical vision, as seen in the *Henry IV* plays, trumps the Tennysonian vision, even if that appears to be Gail Hightower's perspective. Rather, the issue ultimately has to do with historical authorship, and it must be remembered that only when Hightower begins

to pen his own history, by serving as midwife to Lena, does he even consider turning towards Shakespeare for support. On the surface, this reading choice might, at least at the moment of his decision for *Henry IV*, be seen as a typical selection for the past-bound preacher, but it is not. Instead, what Gail Hightower and Kiernan Ryan find in *Henry IV* is support for an ongoing historical process and the debunking of a critical “notion of literature as the incurably anterior expression of an extinct reality” which Hightower has found in the works of Tennyson, and Ryan finds in works of both “old and newer forms of historicist criticism” (Ryan 121). These views, says Ryan, “evinced a chronic aversion to the conjecture that works like *1* and *2 Henry IV* might be drawn as much towards a future beyond our own apprehension as back to their points of origin in the past” (122). Indeed, Hightower, as he gazes into the birth of the present, the halo of the future, and even the cavalry of the past, appears drawn to just such an historical vision, constantly remodeled and of his own making. Therefore, Hightower reads Shakespeare as Dan Ford reads Faulkner, as an author who “developed a durational view of time, and wanted to create in his fiction a present which seemed to contain both the past and the future” (318). More profoundly, Ihab Hassan understands Faulkner’s vision as “something more than personal nostalgia or historical retrogression [...] it may be our only portion of the infinite” (11). If the “infinite” can be conceived as a coming together of past, present, and future, the true experience of the “now Now,” then Hightower’s rewriting of his own history, supported by his reading of Shakespeare’s historical vision, is indeed his experience of the infinite, of living both with and well beyond his personal past, even if only briefly.

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Özet

Faulkner'in *Light in August* Eserinde Tarihe (Yeniden) Bakış: Hightower, Tennyson, ve Shakespeare

Faulkner'in *Light in August* eserinde, Gail Hightower sayfalarının köşeleri kıvrılarak işaretlenmiş Tennyson'unu okuyarak yirmibeş yıl geçirmiştir; bir gün okumaları "oyun yazarı" Byron Bunch tarafından kesilir ve Hightower Lena Grove'un oğlunun doğumunda ebelik yaparak insanlarla yeniden ilişki kurmaya zorlanır. O ise toplum hayatına bu yeniden girişe tepkisini "Hayat bu yaşlı adama henüz geliyor" diye düşünerek ve hemen ardından da uzun zamandır elinden düşürmediği Tennyson'u bir kenara bırakıp V. Henry'yi alarak gösterir. Eleştirmenler bu edebi değişimi, Hightower'ın yaşamda üstlendiği pasif izleyici rolünü terk edip yapıcı bir katılımcı olarak daha saygıdeğer bir konumu benimsemesi şeklinde yorumlamışlardır. Ne var ki, okuduğu metinlerdeki bu değişiklik bu din adamının insan ilişkilerinde durağan eylemsizlikten aktif katılıma geçişinden çok daha fazlasını ifade etmektedir. Okuyucunun Hightower ile ilgili en son duyduğu, kitabın son bölümünden bir önceki bölümde, neredeyse yalnızca onun tarihe dair düşünceleri ve şimdiki zamanı ve olası bir geleceği de içeren bir benlik tarihinde kendi yerine dair düşüncelerinin gözden geçirilmesi üzerine yoğunlaşmıştır. Başka bir deyişle, yaşamının büyük kısmında idealize edilmiş bir geçmiş hayalinin tamamı ile etkisi altında kaldıktan sonra, Hightower, kendi kişisel tarihini öz varlığının "şimdi, şu an"ını da dahil edecek şekilde yeniden yazar ve yeniden gözden geçirdiği okuma listesi bakış açısındaki bu değişimi belirginleştirir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Hightower'ın okuduğu metinlerdeki bu değişim Tennyson'un ağıt dolu geçmiş anlayışından Shakespeare'in hala tam olarak çözülmemiş, üzerinde bir uzlaşmaya varılmamış geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek anlayışına doğru yönelişini ortaya koymaktadır.

**Work that Body:
The Illusion of the Attainable Body in Celebrity Exercise Videos**

Vanessa Russell

The History of the Celebrity Exercise Video

It was a celebrity who popularized the concept of the exercise video, celebrated its first best seller and consequently established the market.¹ Although she did not invent the medium, Jane Fonda, with her *Workout* series of 1982 to 1987, validated exercise videos and established the celebrity as a health connoisseur with an achievable body for every female body.

From the beginning, exercise videos have been largely coded as a feminine activity because of its “domestic” nature, where exercise is performed in the home, and because of aerobics exercise’s dance background. This article argues that a close reading of exercise videos reveals that, in fact, exercise videos view the female body through a masculine lens, even if men themselves are largely excluded from the traditionally female space. To reflect this gender marketing, I refer to viewers by female pronouns.

Fonda’s success saw a glut of celebrities and professional exercisers produce their own exercise videos. US Fitness consultants such as Denise Austin and Kathy Smith became “cottage industries” (Fitzpatrick, “Exercise Video Market Gets Fit” 1997, 68), while Richard Simmons, a former fat person, achieved success with his ebullience and use of “fat” exercisers.

Over the next five years, from 1988 to 1992, it seemed that nearly every celebrity produced his or her own exercise video. During this period, the bodies in exercise videos demonstrated an even narrower model of achievability. Supermodels, actors and, most tellingly, Barbie, paraded their bodies as emulative icons for their largely female consumers.

In the early nineties, celebrities were replaced by fitness professionals who in turn became celebrities. The fitness professionals’ bodies evidenced the grueling spot training of the latest discovery: body sculpting. By individualizing muscles then tightening them through repetitive exercises, the female home viewer was made to believe that she could also conceivably “sculpt” her body into the shape of her instructor. This marked a new homogenous instructor’s body—super fit, tanned, with highly developed muscles—and its means of sustainability was work.

By 1995, the exercise-video market was over-saturated and was desperately awaiting the arrival of a new and dynamic “craze” (Fitzpatrick, “Getting Exercise Back on Track” 1995, 78). In the US in 1998, Billy Blanks produced his *Tae-Bo* series, an energetic, grueling Thai-boxing-based workout that promoted strength through a community of sweaty, pumped-up bodies.

¹ Although the term “exercise videos” is itself now almost obsolete with the advent of DVDs, I continue to use the term in deference to the history of the form.

From 2000 to the present, the cyclical nature of the exercise video market has favored calmer, new-age videos in a backlash to *Tae-Bo*'s heavy high-impact workout. The gentle stretching of the Pilates method and yoga promotes flexibility and meditation as a holistic melding of body and mind.² As a result of the popularity of yoga and Pilates, celebrities such as Jane Fonda and Denise Austin have adjusted their exercise routines from being aerobics-based to being yoga and Pilates-based.

Presently, the emerging trend is dance fitness exercise DVDs which feature the dance instructors of pop singers such as Britney Spears and Beyoncé Knowles reproducing the dance moves that keep the celebrities in lean, dancer's shape.³ As yet these celebrities have not produced their own exercise videos, but consumers continue to sustain the US\$4 billion a year exercise and diet industry (Sepos 2002, 77) by following the celebrities' exercise routines. The ideal is to attain a similar body to the celebrities' simply by exercising in front of the same celebrity instructor.

The exercise videos selected for this study—from over 500 that are produced in the United States each year (Losano and Risch 2001, 113)—encompass the history of exercise videos rather than targeting a specific era. The selection ranges from 1985 to the current day and includes a variety of instructors, including celebrities, well-known fitness advisers, former fat people and specialists from the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. This wide range enables a cohesive study to be made of the body of work, rather than of individualized parts, an approach which parodies the tactics of exercise videos, while providing a rounded examination of the field's continuing tropes together with its innovations and deviations.

“Look and Feel Your Best”

The word aerobic means “in the presence of oxygen”: thus an aerobic workout is one that uses an increased heart rate to oxygenate the blood and distribute “oxygen-rich” (Franks, Howley and Iyriboz 1999, 68) blood to the muscles. An oxygenated body, according to exercise scientists, produces regulated metabolism, reduced body fat, lowered blood pressure, maintained bone density, better sleep and improved digestion (McDonald and Hodgdon 1991, 13).

Yet the internal bodily benefits of aerobic exercise are rarely conveyed on the covers or within celebrity exercise videos. To first focus on the covers of the exercise videos, aerobic exercise is depicted as a way to improve the exterior of the body, in particular, to lose weight and to tone “flagging” muscles.⁴ Other stated rewards include strengthened muscles, increased flexibility, firmness, and endurance.⁵

² For example, see Pilates Institute of Australasia, *Pilates for Beginners*, VHS, Pilates Institute of Australasia, Australia, 1999.

³ See LaVelle Smith Jr, *Bodylicious: The Ultimate Dance Workout*, DVD, Universal Pictures Video, United States, 2004, Andy Instone, *Phat Moves*, DVD, Firefly Entertainment, United States, 2004.

⁴ See Aussie Fit, *Aussie Fit: Getting Started*, VHS, B M International, Australia, 1994.

⁵ In particular see the covers of Billy Blanks, *Tae-Bo: Advanced*, VHS, Ventura, United States, 1998, Cher, *CherFitness: Body Confidence*, VHS, Isis Productions, United States, 1992, Cindy Crawford, *Shape Your Body Workout*, VHS, GoodTimes Home Video, United States, 1992, Dan Issacson, “Hollywood's New Workout: Firmer Chest and Back,” (United States: Hughes Leisure Group, 1991), vol, Elle MacPherson, *Sports Illustrated Super Shape-up Program: Stretch and*

The focus on the exterior of the body is symptomatic of the modification of bodily ideals that began in the 1920s (Seid 1989; Stearns 1997; Bordo 1993). Significantly, the 1920s also saw the beginning of societal changes effected by the suffragette movement, a link that later feminist writers correlate (Bordo; Seid; Wolf 1991). Feminist writers, such as Naomi Wolf, consider that the time-consuming and exhausting “counterimage” (Wolf 17) of extreme thinness was inscribed onto the bodies of women to dampen the spirit of equality and prevent women from toppling male-dominated society.

The image of a woman who has successfully conquered her body through exercise sustains the patriarchal binary system of man/woman, culture/nature and mind/body that positions woman as the unruly body. Of these binary oppositions Susan Bordo writes: “The body is the negative term, and if woman is the body, then women are that negativity, whatever it may be” (Bordo 5). The triumphant exercise-video instructor, posed on the front cover of an exercise video, has tamed her wild female body and reinforced the notion that such taming is a success.

The front cover of an exercise video customarily exhibits the instructor’s body—the instructor being a celebrity or celebrity fitness instructor—as a visible signifier of success through exercise. This space reinforces the hegemony of the attainability of the “desirable” body and consequently reinforces the idea that obesity is self-imposed and that every female body is remediable. The “desirable” body is not one that belongs to the everyday woman—where reality observes that fifty per cent of the female population are US size fourteen and over (Tebbel 2000, 125)—but one that is hyper-real, constructed from hard work or natural genetics (or both).

The professional exerciser instructor—a gym instructor or aerobics champion—has submitted his or her body to rigorous training, comparable to that of a professional athlete, enabling him or her to earn a living by exercising.⁶ The celebrity instructor—typically female, long and lean—is successful either in film or modeling because of her conformity to the slender ideal: a reality for only one per cent of the female population (Tebbel 58). Within the tropes of the exercise video these bodies are normalized and appear achievable for every woman.

A physical and symbolic turning over of the video to read the back cover thwarts the viewer’s expectations while simultaneously encouraging them. The copy is written to obscure the skepticism that the viewer may have about attaining the same body as shown on the front—*I know I will not end up with Elle MacPherson’s body, even if I do the exercises on this video every day for forty years*—but the tension of expectations remain. After all, ninety-eight per cent of diets fail, (Tebbel 58) but don’t all dieters believe they will be part of the two per cent that succeeds?

Much of the copy on the exercise video’s back cover is written in the “voice” of the instructor. In the case of the celebrity, the copy has a signature underneath to validate its veracity. The copy skirts around the issue of the viewer’s attainment of an

Strengthen with Elle MacPherson, VHS, The Time Inc. Magazine Company, United States, 1989, Pilates Institute of Australasia, *Pilates for Beginners*, Richard Simmons, *Sweatin’ to the Oldies*, VHS, Warners Home Video, United States, 1988.

⁶ Although the majority of exercise-video instructors are female, a significant minority are male, so I use the somewhat unwieldy but inclusive “his or her” pronouns.

approximation of the instructor's body by endorsing the view that the video will build the viewer up to "your" peak performance.

Cher's 1991 exercise video, *A New Attitude*, demonstrates the evasion of guaranteed transformation. In the voice of Cher, the copy reads: "I do this program myself, every day and I know that it works . . . I know that if you make this commitment to exercise you too will look and feel your best" (Cher, *A New Attitude*). The concession of "your best" is a heavy modification when compared to the promise of achieving the perfection of the instructor's body.⁷

The viewer is seduced into the belief that with hard work and commitment, bodily excellence will be attained that will mirror the instructor on the front cover. At this point, the viewer has worked hard in committing (although perhaps not entirely) to the video cover's promise of inclusion into the idealized world of physical fitness together with a concurrent wish to avoid the marginalization of the unruly untuned.

All this, and an exercise video has not yet been placed inside the video machine.

Getting Underneath the Covers

While watching an exercise video, the viewer is confronted with an image of the instructor as a mirror to the viewer's own corporeality. The instructor is positioned as a mirror image of the viewer, an image to emulate, both in relation to the aerobics routine and to her bodily representation. The instructor often makes this relationship overt. In 1986's *A Week with Raquel*, *Raquel Welsh* opens her workout by purring, "Let me be your mirror image, when I move to the left that means you'll be moving to the right" (Welsh).

Elizabeth Kagan and Margaret Morse, the two earliest exegesis of exercise videos, explore the mirror relationship between viewer and instructor. They argue that the mirrored image of the perfect instructor causes the viewer to identify more with the instructor than with the flawed physicality of her own body. They write:

This mirror relationship inaugurates a dual space linking cultural representation with the body of the viewer. In this case, the reflection determines the real, rather than vice versa, for participants attempt to embody the image of a unifying ideal in the mirror or screen in their own real or three-dimensional space (Kagan and Morse 1988, 169–70).

For Kagan and Morse, the viewer is disembodied from the experience of her own movement because she is ensconced within the mirrored reality of the instructor (Kagan and Morse 171). Thus, "the priority of the ideal and seen body over the felt body is established" (Kagan and Morse 170). The viewer's own physicality is sublimated, due to the desire to appropriate the look of the instructor, a desire which is reinforced by societal forces but which is ultimately illusory. Kagan and Morse use Lacan's conceptualization of the mirror relation to establish the "imaginary" nature of the image: "This visual ideal is 'imaginary,' in a Lacanian sense, and in that it is more slender and muscularly defined than the body of the average American female" (Kagan and Morse 170).

⁷ Unless, of course, the thought of mutating into a replica of Cher is a terrifying one.

Lacan's mirror-stage uses the figure of the developing child who first learns through a mirror that he or she is a separated being—body and image—and discovers that the image is illusory. The image becomes a site for fantasy, an imaginary place to perceive premature mastery over the body, and is therefore a space for what Lacan terms “fragmented desire” (Lacan 1991, 79 and 148). He writes:

The body as fragmented desire seeking itself out, and the body as ideal self, are projected on the side of the subject as fragmented body, while it sees the other as perfect body. For the subject, a fragmented body is an image essentially dismemberable from its body (Lacan 148).

However, the perfect body of the instructor remains fragmented by the viewer because it is almost always unachievable solely by the means suggested within the video (Losano and Risch 123). Mastery is not realized and instead the mirror reflects the deep and pervasive power structures of a community that enforces normativity by the configuration of health as a moral issue, and where a dispensation of the power of surveillance is given to every viewer.

The Masculine Gaze of the Health Ethic

The success of exercise videos capitalizes on the invasive “health ethic” that seized the 1980s and continues, intensified, to the present day. “Healthism,” or the belief that health is the sole responsibility of the individual, causes a “fat” person to be blamed for unhealthy life choices (Lawrence and Germov 1999, 59–60). Mark Lawrence and John Germov write that the politicization of health is policed by the ideologies of food consumption:

Such a view represents a pathologized and reductionist approach to health promotion and food consumption. The likely outcome is that the individual will be blamed for any diet-related illness, since the mode of prevention “simply” becomes a matter of food consumption choices (Lawrence and Germov 60).

By entwining the two meanings of the word “consumption”—to eat and to spend—the food a person chooses to buy and eat identifies the social codes of bodily conformity. Judith Williams writes that identification with the objects one consumes provides a basis for identity: “Instead of feeling identified by what they produce, people are made to identify themselves with what they consume” (Williams 1993, 59). Consumers are defined by their purchases and become one with the images contained within them. Accordingly, products are divided into those that are “good” for the body and those that are “bad,” and a pervasive collective gaze enforces compliance with what is often a fluid method of categorization.

Appropriating Foucault's concept of the Panopticon, (Foucault 1977, 195–228) the person who chooses to eat “badly” or to not complete “good” exercise, is haunted by a sense of surveillance and judgment by an unseen central authority. The central power of surveillance is the gaze that regulates, permeated evenly throughout society with an “aim to strengthen the social forces” (Foucault 208), by producing healthy, and therefore efficient, bodies. This is endorsed through what Roberta Pollack Seid terms the “pervasiveness of the weight-loss imperative” (Seid 15), which is promoted through

society's authorities in health, medicine, government, religion, media and education. Eventually, internalization of the imperative causes privacy to be lost so that even within the home, the gaze seeps through its walls. Sharlene Hesse-Biber writes that in regard to diet and exercise, this process "became so self-sustaining, so internalized that no reinforcement was necessary" (Hesse-Biber 1996, 28).

The Panopticon is within, fed by images of perfect bodies and hints of how to achieve them, reinforcing its controlling dilemma every time its limits are overstepped. The gaze works to produce docile bodies, particularly docile female bodies, causing feminist theorists to posit that the invasive gaze is male.

Barbara Brook masculinizes the controlling panoptical gaze, stating: "The habitual way in which women are taught to look at ourselves and each other is through a kind of masculine lens" (Brook 1994, 54). Moya Lloyd converts this argument into Foucauldian terms by arguing that the power of the male gaze is not repressive, but rather productive and is everywhere and therefore internalized (Lloyd 1996, 92).

The Brook model of the masculine surveillant gaze is evident within exercise videos where the (overwhelmingly male) directors frequently shoot their (overwhelmingly female) exercisers from overhead. Traditionally in film theory, an overhead shot has a distancing effect and implies the presence of a surveillant eavesdropper (Crisp 1993, 11 and 74). The viewer of an exercise video is forced to adopt the viewpoint of the observing male eye and separate from the image.

The Lloyd model of the internalized male gaze is shown through the recurring soft-porn shots of celebrity exercisers. The celebrity body is segmented through close and intimate close-ups and the celebrity is made into objects of heterosexual desire. A example is the familiar exercise-video shot of the female in a servile position on her knees, head bent over her knees and, as in the example of former-*Neighbours* actor, Kimberley Davies, in her 1995 *Your Body's Callin'* exercise video, the insistent focus is on her cleavage (Davies).

Together, both the Brook and Lloyd models demonstrate the objectification of the female body within exercise videos through the masculinized gaze; a gaze that runs counter to the video's objectives of promoting solidarity with the instructor.

The Instructors are Really Here for Me

Antonia Losano and Brenda A. Risch, recent theorists of exercise videos, argue that the power relations of the exercise video are a construction of the instructor and are aimed at producing a submissive viewer. The instructors use "directive discourse" (Losano and Risch 121) to explicate their dominant position, principally by denying the materiality of the video medium and pretending that they can see their audience.

Without exception, the instructors talk to the camera and bolster their imagined audience's egos with encouraging words such as, "Good job!", "Great work!", and, "You're looking excellent!" This embodies the panoptical view, where the viewer is placed in unending surveillance, as Foucault writes, "like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible" (Foucault 200). The force of the panoptical gaze, used through the directive discourse of the instructor, places the power of surveillance into language. Although directive discourse supports the precepts of larger societal surveillance, in the space of an exercise video it works against the visual hegemony of the instructor's body.

The most invasive, yet ineffectual, form of directive discourse occurs when the instructors' move from generalized encouragement to feigning individualized observation. Towards the end of his strenuous 1998 *Tae-Bo* workout, instructor Billy Blanks points to the television camera and says: "Remember I told you, I'm watching you one hundred per cent of the time; one hundred per cent of the time I'm giving you all my heart, all my love, because I want to see you reach your goal" (Blanks). At this point, Blanks has failed to concede that he can only use words to encourage the viewer and can't materially support or witness the improvements his program may be making, or indeed, any slackening of the viewer's enthusiasm. Language is ineffectual in controlling the body when combined with an unseeing gaze; here panoptical surveillance only succeeds when the viewer retains the belief that the gaze is constant and real.

Returning to the image of the instructor as a mirror, like all mirror relationships, the viewer holds the ultimate power of surveillance, particularly when relying on language. While the instructor can only pretend to see into the exerciser's room, the viewer can visually, and imaginatively, enter the instructor's space. Once the video is released to the public, the instructor is unable to control his or her representations and the viewer can rebel against the invasive ploys used by the video to posit their material existence as imaginary. Admittedly, the choices are limited, and mainly consist of fast-forwarding or pressing the mute button (Losano and Risch 121), but rebellion does open up a foothold where the instructor's dominance can be undermined.

This is Foucault's Panopticon reversed, if only for a moment, where the prisoners take over the prison and scrutinize the warders. However, the structure of the prison remains, as do the pervasive structures that empower exercise with the means to convince women to conform to an ideal or to be "all be like one another" (Foucault 182).

The Community of Exercisers

Losano and Risch argue that any viewer rebellion is short lived because of the viewer's ultimate need to belong to the community of exercisers, and to not depose the imperative of thinness: "To successfully identify with the community of thinness presented in the video she must accept the instructor's directive discourse" (Losano and Risch 121).

The community of exercisers depicted within the videos recreates the "group belonging" (Brabazon 2000, 109) of an actual exercise class and promotes identification with the exercisers, while at the same time reinforcing the viewer's isolation. Susan Willis writes: "The exercise class creates an opportunity for women to develop themselves in community with other women. Such opportunities are absolutely negated when exercise is channeled by the media into private living rooms" (Willis 1990, 7).

Richard Simmons's 1988 exercise video, *Sweatin' to the Oldies* (Simmons) promotes the sense of an accepting community, which collapses when the viewer realizes her solitude. The video features Simmons with nineteen exercisers varying from the very fat to the very fit. The sense of community within the group is exceptionally high, as shown when the demonstrative group interact and smile with each other as they exercise. The viewer could indeed feel that the video delivered on the advertised promise on its front cover that "exercise was never so much fun!" During the cool

down, the group form a circle and join hands and if the viewer follows the actions of the group, as instructed, she is left with arms outstretched into an abyss, miming holding the hands of this wonderful but absent community.

Despite exercise videos offering the viewer a chance to participate in a community of like-minded exercisers, each video can produce one of three images of extreme bodily docility that works to alienate the viewer. Alienation from the community causes the weakening of the collective power that enforces thinness, and thus works against the power structures inherent in exercise videos. The three alienating effects most commonly used in exercise videos are: 1) the exerciser as a human medical specimen; 2) the marginalized low-impact exerciser; and, 3) the ridiculed male as an aerobic misnomer.

Foucault defines a docile body as one that “may be subjected, used, transformed and improved,” (Foucault 136) and within the three alienating effects each of these qualities are interrogated. The human medical specimen is a body used as a fragmented site that embodies some perceived improvement; the low impact body is tolerated providing it works towards transformation; while the male is subjected to the ridicule of being a paradigm of incompetence in a “woman’s” sphere. All three bodies share the interiorized qualities of muteness and subservient docility.

The Human Medical Specimen

The human medical specimen is a recurring image throughout the history of exercise videos. It occurs when an instructor points out the active muscle groups on a prone, mute (and most often female) body. This mute body resembles an automaton, a physical specimen of the body that passively displays the exercise’s effects to the viewer. The body is fragmented into a two-dimensional site where isolated muscular exercise dissects it into individualized body parts.

In the group of videos selected, the role of “specimen” was always performed by a younger woman, and the instructor was always played by an older—and shorter—male. The only exception was Cher’s *A New Attitude*, where the instructor was female, but masculinized through her highly developed muscle mass.

Pilates for Beginners, released in 1999, features instructor Allan Menezes together with two floor-bound exercisers who demonstrate the program’s stretches (Pilates Institute of Australasia). Menezes strolls around the two exercisers, one male, one female, and directs them to assume the positions of the routine. He talks directly to the viewer, while leaning over the specimen body of the female exerciser, and points and touches her muscles as they are utilized in the exercise. The female does not respond to his dissections and mechanically continues her stretches.

The Low-Impact Exerciser

In aerobic terms, the phrase, “low impact” refers to an exercise routine that reduces the stress that exercise places on the joints (Gudrun 2000, 54). Within exercise videos, the low-impact body is ostensibly placed to ease beginners into aerobics by demonstrating the least stressful method of performing the movements. In video reality, these exercisers are marginalized, often placed out of shot, and feature a person who rarely speaks or expresses emotion. The tension is heightened by the contradiction between the instructor’s mirrored body with his or her encouragement to the low impact

exerciser. The instructor is not performing the low-impact option, and has not achieved fitness by taking “the easier option” (Halliwell 2001) and therefore any verbal encouragement is largely overridden by the power of the image.

Disparaging language is occasionally used to further the negligibility of the low-impact exerciser. This most often occurs in celebrity exercise videos where the celebrity is herself instructed by a fitness professional. Perhaps to exert authority over “their” video, some celebrities—in particular, Cher and Halliwell—attempt to outperform their instructors and consequently verbally belittle the low-impact exerciser.

A minor, though insidious, example is demonstrated in an exchange between Halliwell and her yoga instructor, Katy Appleton, in 2001’s *GeriYoga*. Appleton tells the audience, “If you want the gentler option look at Tina [the low impact exerciser].” Halliwell interrupts her by saying, “And if you want the hardcore, look at Geri” (Halliwell). Such comments (repeated over and over as the viewer repeats the program) serve to indoctrinate the viewer and brand the low-impact exerciser with the stigma of underachievement. The viewer is then placed in a conundrum where she wants to safely learn the techniques of the program but also wants to build the same body as the celebrity.

The falsity of the claim that the viewer’s body can be transformed into an approximation of the celebrity’s by these exercises alone is exposed, and introduces the concept of what Willis terms “body rivalry” (Willis 7).

Occasionally, the tension between the image of the ideal body and the language of the instructor results in the overt bullying of the low-impact exerciser. The most striking example is in Cher’s 1991 video, *A New Attitude*, (Cher, *A New Attitude*) where Cher openly rebukes the low-impact exerciser. Unlike the happy community of Simmons’s video, no member of this class looks even remotely pleased to be exercising, but the low-impact exerciser, Dori Sanchez, looks particularly miserable.⁸ Sanchez is often cut out of shot and is dressed in a black leotard with a semi-sheer skirt. She has the fit body of a dancer, but the dress makes her appear dowdier than the others, particularly compared to Cher who is wearing a corset-like Gothic outfit complete with fishnet stockings. A close-up of Sanchez reveals her grimacing until Cher glances at her and says, “Dori’s making me laugh because she’s such a sour puss.” The next shot shows Sanchez smiling, but by the end of the strenuous routine Cher has herself stopped making inappropriate comments and is long-faced and exhausted.

Cher’s regulatory surveillance denies the community a sense of togetherness, and promotes a group of rival individuals trying to surpass each other. Willis writes that body rivalry is produced in aerobics communities: “Women compare, but do not share themselves with others. They see themselves as bodies. They scrutinize their lines and curves and they check out who’s wearing the hottest leotard” (Willis 7). Willis believes that body rivalry is a feature of men’s exercise (Willis 7). Refining Willis’s gendered argument, the rivalry thus produced as a feature of women’s exercise can be seen as a result of the appropriated male gaze and consequent masculinization of what has been positioned as a traditionally “feminine” activity.

⁸ The low-impact exerciser in Cher’s *A New Attitude* video is Dori Sanchez who appears as the instructor in Cher’s second exercise video, *Body Confidence*. Cher, *Body Confidence*. In *Body Confidence*, Cher refers to Sanchez as “the best dancer I know”, who makes the workout “fun” then Cher bows in supplication to Sanchez.

The Male as Low Impact Stooge

The males in exercise videos are often treated as figures of fun. Aerobics has traditionally been coded as a female sport because of its non-traditional masculine elements of dance and movement. Tara Brabazon writes that such segregation provides a powerfully feminine space: "As most of us work in male-dominated environments, aerobics can offer feminine space, a (transitory) movement away from men and masculinity" (Brabazon 102–3).

However, Jean Grimshaw disputes the assertion that aerobic exercise is a largely female activity and writes that the number of men exercising in aerobics is considerable (Grimshaw 1999, 107). She then stereotypes male exercisers and gives them the same bumbling male traits that originally marginalized them:

Men are ill at ease, inhibited in their movements, and above all stiff and rigid; they often find it very hard to engage in the kinds of co-coordinated or flowing movements which characterize parts of an aerobics class (Grimshaw 107).

In the 1998 Aussie Fit video, *Great Buns* (Aussie Fit, *Aussie Fit: Great Buns*), Grimshaw's conceptualization of the awkward male aerobic exerciser is transferred into a universal site of ridicule and laughter. There is one male in the group of five exercisers and he is placed at the rear of the studio, mute and fiercely concentrating. The struggles of female emancipation are reversed as Steve, the token male, works doubly hard to be accepted into the female community, only to be denigrated. The instructor says: "Remember, you can always take a march out. Steve's always marching out." At this the four female exercisers laugh. The instructor then continues, "See it's always us women, we're always doing the squats." On careful analysis of the video, Steve stops the least and does not complain, but he has committed the crime of transgressing into the female zone.

Exercising Power

The continuing success of exercise videos (and now, increasingly, exercise DVDs) points to the pervasiveness of the ideal of the attainable celebrity body. This is particularly improbable in the case of celebrities who have been publicly revealed as having undergone repeated plastic surgery, or continuing eating disorders. Yet, celebrities' consumer power reinforces the contemporary emulative bodily ideal, fed by a strictured female population responding to the images of an unattainable image.

Ultimately, while the latest exercise-video icons rise and fall, the basis of the industry remains: the non-celebrity body is remediable when given access to the right tools. The exercise industry will keep creating these tools providing that woman is constructed as an unruly body that must be tamed through time-consuming and repetitive exercises. A concerted exercise of power is needed to eject the invasive imperative of bodily transformation from the internalized surveillance—and video and DVD machines—of the female population.

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Özet

Çalıştır O Vücudu: Ünlülerin Egzersiz Videolarındaki Erişilebilir Vücut Yanılsaması

Egzersiz videoları, öğreticinin vücudunu, gözle görülür bir egzersiz başarı göstergesi olarak sergiler. Öğretici ünlü bir insan olduğunda, egzersiz videolarının tüketilmesinin arkasında yatan itici güç bu ünlü vücudun egzersiz yoluyla elde edilebileceği inancıdır. Bu şekilde, ünlü kişilerin vücutları, her kadın tarafından elde edilebilecek insani boyutlara indirgenmiş olur. Fakat bu videolarda, aynı zamanda, “elde edilebilir” görünümü yabancılaştırmak amacıyla karşıt imgeler de sergilenir. Ünlü öğretici, izleyicinin kendini kendinden çok izlediği ünlü kişi ile özdeşleştirdiği, göz yanılta Lakancı bir ayna haline gelir. Bu ayna imgesi, öğreticinin, Foucault'nun terimi olan, her şeyi gören objektifle gözetlemeyi bir anda tersine çeviren “direktifler veren söylem” kullanması ile bozulur. Egzersiz videolarının üç yabancılaşma etkisinin yanında—sessiz bir temsil olarak beden; başaramayan bedeninin marjinleştirilmesi ve kadına ait geleneksel bir mekânda erkek bedeninin sergilenmesi—kadın bedenini erkek bakışıyla göstermeleri de söz konusudur. Tüm bu faktörler, egzersiz videolarının görünüşteki ünlü vücudunun erişilebilirliğini teşvik etme iddiaları ile aykırı düşmesine neden olur.

Pamela Andrews and Ann Bond:
Pamela as a Legal Fiction

Graham St. John Stott

There are two Pamelas in Samuel Richardson's first novel:¹ the assertive maidservant defending her virtue and insisting on her rights in Volume 1; the passive wife deferring to her husband's will in Volume 2. Ironically, Pamela's freedom of expression, her willingness in the letters and journal entries of the first volume to challenge upper-class values leads not only to the recognition of her merit, and her marriage, but also to her loss of voice. As Ferguson notes, Pamela's acceptance of Mr B is "a kind of self-annihilation" (99; cf. Newton 37, and Pamela's reflection in the continuation of the novel [1741, Everyman ed. 2:87]: "The English, the plain English, of the politest address, is,—"I am now, dear Madam, your humble servant: pray be so good as to let me be your master"). In Sir William Blackstone's well-known formulation, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything ..." (1: 442). It has, however, been harder to define what Pamela's voice was. As it has long been recognized, there are suppressions in her narrative that suggest design, not artlessness (Auerbach 62), and it would clearly be a mistake to see her earlier writing as naïve, unregulated self-expression.

Most studies of the novel have presumed that Pamela was primarily concerned with marriage, and represented herself in a way that would increase her value to Mr B. In what follows I suggest an alternative explanation: that Pamela's writing is not so much shaped by a desire for upward mobility (what Auerbach calls a desire "to gain ... identity through the assumption of gentility") as by her (potential) status in law. My thesis is simply put. Inasmuch as Pamela's letters home very soon become an account of attempted and resisted rape, what she says and does—and writes—is influenced by what might advisedly be admitted in court were the attempts to succeed. This is not, I hasten to add, because Pamela plans to prosecute Mr B were he to rape her (rather disappointingly for modern readers, she presumes that she and her parents are powerless in the face of upper-class villainy [130]), but because legal discourse determined how she would represent her honesty and her resistance.² I begin therefore by outlining the kinds of evidence that contributed to a successful prosecution of rape in 1740 (as revealed by the outcomes of cases tried at the Old Bailey in the decade before *Pamela's* publication), and then apply this model to Pamela's self-representation in the first volume of the novel. Finally, I suggest how Richardson might have come to think the law relevant to Pamela's situation. Although rape within the household generally

¹ *Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded* (1740); I use Peter Sabor's edition.

² Swann is helpful on the general overlap between eighteenth-century fiction and the law; more generally, Coetzee sees a kinship between the realistic novel and the law brief (227). Neither addresses the interface in question.

attracted so little legal attention in the eighteenth century that Roy Porter has ventured the comment that “the bedding of servant girls by their masters, under conditions in which the maid’s ‘no’ carried no weight ... never resulted in court cases” (221), Porter exaggerates. The prosecution brought by Ann Bond against Colonel Francis Charteris would have provided Richardson with the precedent he needed.

1. The law.

“It is true,” Sir Matthew Hale wrote in 1670, in what was to be the key guide to law in Richardson’s day, “rape is most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent” (1:635). This difficulty—to some extent unavoidable in any legal system, as long as the possibility of false accusation is conceded—was significantly increased in the eighteenth century. Because there was no provision for damages to be awarded, it was legitimate for the prosecutor to compound the offence: that is, to agree, in exchange for monetary compensation, not to press charges (Friedman; King 89-93).³ We can see the beginnings of the process of negotiation in a 1739 letter to “L—l H—y, Esq; in Garden-Court, in the Temple,” seeking reparation for “an Outrage of the blackest Dye” on Ann Keate, “[I]f you will make any Overtures you may,” Keate’s lawyer writes; “if not I shall proceed” (*Old Bailey Proceedings Online* t17370907-44). Mr H—y refused to make overtures, and denied any culpability, but others with a less robust conscience (or fainter memories of what had happened) did not, and in at least one case in my sample, the victim proceeded to law because the accused did not make the compensation promised (t17390221-31).

Such a system was of course open to abuse, and juries in rape trials, already predisposed to believe the testimony of the accused—in part because rape was a capital crime, in part because juries were male. (Evident male bias leads Grundy to suggest that the conduct of rape trials was “specifically designed to protect those accused”: 255; cf. Hale 1:633, and Simpson, “Blackmail Myth” 129-32.) Naturally juries would be even more reluctant to bring in a verdict of guilty if there was evidence that the case had been got up to extract payment, and no less naturally, the defense capitalized on this reluctance. Thus they stressed that there were reasons to suspect John May had got up the charge of rape laid against his employer in 1734, as May owed him seven and a half guineas. One of the witnesses remembered asking May “what he meant by beginning such a Prosecution as might take away his Master’s Life.” “No, I don’t design that,” May was reported to have explained; “... if it should come to that, I would not appear” (t17340710-33). Or again, in the case against Alexander Reytown four years before, the defense made much of testimony that the prosecutrix had been heard to say that “if [Reytown] did not give her 30 Guineas, she would work him, and lead him a dance” (t17301204-23). And in the 1737 trial of Thomas Trout for the rape of Anne Finch (t17371207-46), it was crucial to Trout’s case that a witness could report that “Mr Finch told him it should be the worse for Mr Trout, because he refus’d to lend him five

³ For the suggestion that that seeking compensation and “making-up” was a cultural preference of lower class women (challenged by Edelstein 384), see Simpson, “Blackmail Myth” 116-17.

Guineas,” and another deposed that “Mr Finch told him he wonder’d the Prisoner did not come to make the Matter up.”

Of course, the truth could be on either side. Just as prosecutions could be got up, so witnesses could be paid for. My point is not that there were no grounds for thinking that Mr H—y should have felt obliged to come to a settlement, or that Anne Finch’s charges were false; it is simply to note that juries were inevitably conscious of the possibility of false accusations, and in capital cases this possibility predisposed them to distrust anything but the strongest evidence. This, ideally, was corroborative testimony from those who saw or heard what happened, such as that of Margaret Crouch in the 1735 trial of John Whitney—one of a group of around twenty drunken men that seemed set upon assaulting any woman they met. Crouch could report that she saw Whitney knock Margaret Maccullough down; that “she saw him pull his Breeches down, and saw him actually upon her; and that she knows him very well; that he lives in Castle-street, and that she heard him say, Take a Colly-flower Stalk and — the Bitch to death” (t17350911-56). Whitney was found guilty, and sentenced to death.

Needless to say, such testimony was not as common as the courts would have liked, and in its absence, for Hale—and eighteenth-century juries—there were five criteria to be used in determining guilt. The victim (1) should be “of good fame,” (2) should have “presently discovered the offence and made pursuit after the offender,” and (3) “shewd circumstances and signs of the injury.” In addition, (4) the place where the attack took place should have been “remote from people, inhabitants or passengers” (the presumption here being that otherwise the victim’s cries would be heard, and passers-by would have intervened); and (5) the offender should have “fled for it” (1: 633). The last two criteria were not always insisted upon. The first three were.

The first criterion assumed that in the absence of eyewitness evidence confirming the story, the victim’s reputation for probity had to be taken into account. Courts would therefore not convict in the face of testimony that the prosecutrix was untrustworthy or—in an ominous twist which can already be seen in the 1730s (and which would become normative in 1765 [Blackstone 4:213])—that she was reputed to be immoral. It would therefore be enough to ruin a woman’s case if she could be thought to have made sexual references in her conversation—as when a witness said of the 14 year-old Mary Edwards that “the Girl talked very impudently, and told the Prisoner he should not lie with her,” and another “gave [Edwards] the Character of being very pert” (t17390607-41)—and testimony of extra-material sexual experience on the part of the victim would be absolutely fatal to the prosecution’s chances. In the trial of William Cunnington for the rape of the 12 year-old Ann Williams, testimony that “the Girl used to lie out o’ nights frequently in Drury Lane, and Covent Garden, and that she told [witnesses], Gentlemen used to give her 6d. and a Dram” led to Cunnington’s acquittal (t17380906-26).

Immediate complaint (the second of the five criteria) was thought important because it was feared that accusations could be invented, and a similar presumption that witnesses lied underlay the third criterion—the need for unambiguous medical evidence of sexual assault. What was looked for was evidence of violent congress—the “some small Damage, but not a great deal” reported in the medical examination of Mary Edwards not being persuasive (t17350522-20)—supplemented in the courtroom with testimony that there had been an emission. In the trial of John Collier, in 1730,

Elizabeth Jones was asked, for example: “How it was at last?” “There was Wet within,” she replied (t17301014-36). Reading between the lines, Sarah Evans was asked the same. “[A]s I sat in an Elbow Leather-Chair, he first meddled with me with his Fingers, and I fell upon the Ground. He then took me up in his Arms, and set me in the Chair again, and then put my legs over his, and — into — half an Hour — Yes.”

The fourth criterion was that the victim had resisted all of the assailant’s actions. In the Collier trail, Jones’ good character was unchallenged and Collier’s violence was undoubted (there was even testimony from a passer-by “that he did hear several shrieks” at the time of the attack, though he could not see anyone in the fading light). Further, “There were several Evidences, who were Neighbours, depos’d, That the Prosecutor came to a Neighbour’s House at Hillendon under a very great Disorder, complaining of her being dragged into the Lane, and abused by the Prisoner, who all gave her the Character of a modest sober Girl.” However, there was doubt about the core of her testimony: her clothes had not been muddy, despite the fact that it had been raining until 3 o’clock in the afternoon “and Kingston-Lane [was] a very dirty Lane.” Jones brought witnesses to say that despite the rain the lane had been passable, and “that there were rising places in it that were dry,” but the doubt raised by her mud-free clothes lost her the case.

2. The narrative.

From the time she realizes the threat posed by Mr B, Pamela is conscious of her need for witnesses to her movements (56), and is determined to keep a record of what happens to justify her conduct to her parents and herself. “You know what I writ. . .,” she will reflect, addressing her father in her journal; “and if you, and my mother, and my own heart acquit me, what care I?” (204). However, in order to acquit herself before the jury of her conscience (and the judgment of her parents), and to lay the blame where it belonged, Pamela must do more than simply record what occurs. She must—as in a court of law—establish her reputation for virtue, show that she immediately complained of Mr B’s offense, provide evidence of physical resistance, and, if there are people are within hearing, alert them by her cries.

Pamela’s insistence upon her virtue is perhaps too well known to need comment. “I cannot be patient, I cannot be passive, when my virtue is at stake!” she tells Mr B (249). However, her need to present herself as virtuous must go beyond simple declarations of how important her virtue is to her. Before she returns to Brandon Hall by her own choice (in Volume 2), Pamela must not allow the reader to construe Mr B’s moves as anything other than unwelcome. She must avoid the suspicion that her master’s violence could be seen as an unfortunate but incidental accompaniment of a consensual sexual act. Rape, Catherine McKinnon has written of contemporary law, “is a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime when it looks like sex” (172). It was the same in Richardson’s day, and therefore politic for Pamela only to admit to emotions more complicated than outrage and fear when the crisis has passed. To do otherwise would be to provide readers with the opportunity to rationalize Mr B’s conduct.

This is not to suggest that Pamela lies or equivocates when she denies knowing the moment when she fell in love. There is nothing in itself improbable in her claim, “I know not *how* [love] came, nor *when* it began; but crept, crept it has, like a thief, upon me” (283). But until it is clear that Mr B has changed, her initial, belated recognition of

the signs of love could not have been confessed without compromising the claim that he *had* attempted rape.

Neither can Pamela admit to doing anything that might have encouraged her would-be lover. When Elizabeth London awoke to find William West in her bed “she immediately in a great Fright got out of Bed, and cry’d out, and rais’d her Neighbours” (t17300704-62), but her sense of outrage counted for nothing when she took West to court, for witnesses reported that she had previously flirted with her attacker, “chucking him under the Chin, and calling him dear Billy.” Pamela was hardly in the position to chuck Mr B under the chin, and indeed there is no evidence that she ever wanted to commit such *lèse majesté*—but she is nevertheless perpetually concerned to avoid actions that would look like flirting: that would look “too free both *in me*, and *to him*” (79). Men servants in a household, warned the anonymous author of *A Present for a Servant-Maid* (1743), are “apt to take liberties on the least encouragement”; maintaining a distance was essential, therefore, lest “suffer[ing] them to toy or romp with you, will embolden them, perhaps to actions unbecoming modesty, and the least rebuff provoke them to use you ill” (Hill, *Anthology* 234). Such advice would be harder to follow when the one taking liberties was in a position of power, but if she were to be thought above suspicion Pamela had to try. Rebuked by the housekeeper for her criticism of Mr B, Pamela replies that “It is very difficult for a servant to keep her distance to her master, when his master departs from his dignity to her” (67, cf. 55, 78). Her response puts Mr B in his place, and her letter recording her words puts on record her insistence upon maintaining social and physical distance.

Needless to say, Pamela’s letters and journal, usually written immediately following the events they describe, meet the requirement that there be an immediate report of an assault (criterion 2); however, they also provide—by their refusal to take any other explanation for Mr B’s conduct seriously—evidence that she resisted him from the start (criterion 3). Although Pamela will endeavor in Volume 2 to see Mr B’s actions from his point of view, in the first volume her writings only allow us to see them as inexcusable assaults. While she is a prisoner and rape is still a possibility, Pamela dare not attribute any complexity to Mr B’s emotions. Merely recognizing that he had feelings other than lust would open her to the charge of encouraging him. It is therefore only *after* she returns to Brandon Hall that Mr B’s rationalization of his conduct can be entertained. Only then, like the unfortunate Edward Richards, whose pursuit of Ann Caplin a century before had involved every imaginable strategy from gifts to attempted rape (secretly entering her house, hiding till she was in bed and jumping in beside her), could Mr B be allowed to have acted out of love (302; Walker 16; Newton 37; cf. the way in which, in *The Life and Adventures of the Lady Lucy* [1726, reprinted 1739], the young nobleman who enters Arminda’s bedroom and bed while she is sleeping, is supposed to have been “enamoured ... to Distraction”—Aubin 2:161). Prior to her acceptance of Mr B, at a time when her letters and journal might be necessary to provide the evidence—written to the moment—that could substantiate accusations of rape, Pamela cannot risk entertaining the idea that her master’s assaults were merely a lover’s miscalculations.

Later, married, it is different, and in Richardson’s second novel (*Clarissa; or, The History of a Young Lady* [1747-48]), Lovelace expects that he will be able to take advantage of this process of reinterpretation. He “expects his act of force against an

unwilling other to transform her into a willing one, and thereby retrospectively to nullify its own meaning and subvert it into simple seduction” (Grundy 263). He is, of course, disappointed, for Clarissa will not rewrite her history. In *Pamela*, as noted, the nullification does take place, but it follows marriage, not rape (Pamela thus has some reason to tell her story in the light of its happy ending); prior to then she can risk obscuring the fact that, as she remembered in the sequel, her courtship consisted of violence on Mr B’s part and “fear and trembling” on hers (Everyman ed. 2: 86).

The same fear of weakening her case underpins Pamela’s denial that she benefited from the attentions she received. She tries to return everything she has been given by Mr B, no matter how legitimately received as a member of his household (110-11), lest her accepting them be interpreted as an invitation to dalliance. (“Be cautious in accepting from [men] either presents or treats, lest in return they should expect you to indulge them in greater freedoms,” wrote Thomas Broughton in 1746—Hill, *Anthology* 235). It is only later, when Pamela has agreed to marry Mr B, that the gifts he made need not be viewed with suspicion, but can be gladly accepted and used (335).

It is even possible that this thinking contributed to Pamela’s horror at the idea of a sham marriage—a somewhat illogical reaction, given that such a marriage would have had legal force. In 1740, still some thirteen years before the passage of the Hardwicke Marriage Act, a ceremony following the wording of the *Book of Common Prayer* and made in the presence of witnesses would have been binding. Mr B was fooling himself to think that, having gone through a form of marriage he could “confirm or abrogate [the ceremony] as [he] pleased” (305), for vows made before witnesses in the present tense (*per verba de praesenti*) could not be revoked. As Henry Swinburne noted, in his *A Treatise of Spousals, or Matrimonial Contracts* (1686), spousals *de praesenti* are “in truth and substance very Matrimony, and therefore perpetually indissoluble, except for Adultery” (qtd. O’Connell 82; cf. Stone 30; Gillis 21, 97-98). What leads Mr B to abandon his plan is his realization that a sham marriage would not have stood muster in Chancery (305). “The common Law does not esteem a Couple who are betroth’d or espos’d ... by Words of present Time, to be so Man and Wife, as to give either Party any Interest or Property in the other’s Lands or Goods, or to legitimate their issue” (T. Salmon, *A Critical Essay Concerning Marriage* (1724), qtd. Outhwaite 35). In this context it is significant that Pamela was primarily troubled by Mr B’s intentions in marrying her, not the legitimacy of the marriage per se (262). When she does marry Mr B, she is not at all concerned that the license is illegally obtained. (Mr B did not appear before the issuer of the license, and there were no witnesses to the consent of her parents.) By then the relationship is both one wished for by Mr B and consents to by her.

The fourth and last key element in Pamela’s defense is that she resisted her attacker both vocally and visibly.⁴ As it happens, the fact of resistance would have been the most difficult of the five to establish. Someone so unfeminine as to fight off her assailant could be suspected of being unfeminine enough to have invited sexual attention (Walker 8-9; resistance, Grundy notes, was routinely interpreted as “sexual

⁴ The fifth criterion, that Mr B shows signs of guilt is allowed for [251], and indeed is of importance to Pamela’s case. It is his guilt and embarrassment that make Pamela believable in the face of Mr B’s ridicule. However, although, important, this factor cannot be crucial to Pamela’s case before there is an actual rape.

involvement or collusion” [263]). Though Pamela can safely report that when Mr B. tried to kiss her she “struggled against him” (63, cf. 225-26), that is as far as descriptions of *her* use of force can go without inviting questions as to her femininity. She must scream, of course (241), but once the household was alerted a strategy of passive resistance—of fainting away—was better for her self-representation than continuing to struggle. Such a strategy placed the burden of accusation elsewhere (64, 96, 242; for strategic fainting, see Coburn 346). Although Harol has linked Pamela’s dependence on others for the assurance when she recovers from her faints that she is still “honest” to the doubtful epistemological status of virginity itself, in my reading it is more important that it would have freed Pamela—in the worst case—from any suspicion of fabricating the charge or of encouraging the offense.⁵ An unconscious rape victim can hardly be supposed to be complicit in the crime.

3. The precedent.

Though Pamela will necessarily sometimes passively endure Mr B’s embraces as an almost inevitable consequence of her position in his household (90, 172), there is no reason to suppose that she enjoyed his attentions when they began. To suppose otherwise, to suspect that she welcomed her master’s advances, and only fails to mention this because by expressing her desire she would compromise the market value of her “chaste self-representation” (Roulston 7) is to be unnecessarily cynical. To assume that Pamela used her charms (and her virtue) in order to trap Mr B and gain status through marriage is to presume that a 15 year-old would have had her mind set on matrimony from the beginning of the story, and was counterplotting all the while Mr B was trying to set her up as his mistress. I find that unlikely.

Pamela is, of course, old enough at the start of the novel to be sexually active. The age of consent at the time was 12 for girls (effectively reduced to 10 in cases of sexual assault: Simpson, “Vulnerability” 184), and as the evidence heard at the Old Bailey suggests by age 15 sexual activity would certainly be thought unremarkable (cf. Sabor 107; *The Ladies Dispensatory* [1739] qtd. Lawrence 67; Laslett 226-27; Henderson 21-22). “[A] Wench of Fourteen,” one observer of English life reported at the time, “fancys herself as fit for a man, and ripe for Joy, as a woman of Five and Twenty” (Father Poussin, *Pretty Doings in a Protestant Nation* [1734], qtd. Henderson 13). However, though eighteenth-century readers would have thought Pamela quite old enough to be the subject of Mr B’s interest,⁶ this does not mean that Pamela’s mind would have run to marriage when her master fondled her. When Pamela tells Mr B, “I

⁵ Jane Miller similarly concludes that Clarissa, who *is* raped, must be “beyond charges of either complaisance or resistance at the time of the rape, and that she be disqualified as a witness to it” (30).

⁶ Initially at 13 (505, cf. 103—in the first edition Mr B’s interest in Pamela began less than five years after the emigration of Sally Godfrey, his former mistress, and his child by Godfrey is between six and seven years old). As the qualification that his initial interest presumed her advance “to maturity” was not in the 1740 text, this chronology raises troublesome questions. If Godfrey had stayed in England, maintained by Mr B, would he have remained faithful, or would he still have been attracted by the 13 year-old maidservant that Pamela was? Indeed, would Mr B be attracted to some other pre-adolescent girl, three years into his marriage to Pamela? For the contemporary context—the trade in young girls as young as 10—see Johnstone 1:140.

want no husband,” her aside for the benefits of her parents (“I thought I would a little dissemble” [118]) should not be supposed to have particular reference to him. Though she assumed that she would marry at some point, she thought herself too young to want a husband then (183, 188). The mean age at first marriage for men in eighteenth-century England was around 25 years; that for women, about two years less (Laslett 218, 222, 228). In other words, though Mr B *is* of an age for marrying, Pamela is seven or eight years short of the age when we might expect her to be looking for a husband.

Further, when her time came Pamela would have expected to marry someone from her class, not to marry out of it. (We should note her awkwardness at the thought of marrying Mr Williams [183, 188], and her parents’ consciousness of class differences [198].) Even those who flirted with their masters knew that their future lay in the village, not at the hall, as we can tell from the experience of L—l H—y. He was maudlin when he encountered Ann Keate, because his girl had jilted him “and used [him] ill” by marrying “his Plow-Fellow.” To be sure, master-servant marriages did occur. “This has been a lucky season for low people’s marrying,” the Earl of Egremont noted his diary in 1745, as he catalogued a series of such liaisons (qtd. Lawrence 18). But, as his words suggest, such marriages were unusual. The Joe Miller story of the beggar-woman and the lord that was in circulation at the time tells us the same. The woman, passing in the street a lord who had married three wives that had all been his servants, made him a curtsy and wished him a long life, for “if you do but live long enough, we shall all be Ladies in Time” (*Joe Miller’s Jests* [1739], #65, qtd. Paulson, *Popular and Polite Art* 74-75). Given its improbability, it is unlikely that Pamela would have taken the idea of marriage seriously and acted on that basis, particularly since Mr B.’s opening move in his campaign of seduction (“I will make a gentlewoman of you, if you be obliging,” 55) explicitly excluded that possibility.

Besides, as marriage was something Pamela would expect to be some years in the future there is nothing improbable in Pamela’s sense of outrage at her master’s conduct. Although sexual experience was common by age 15, we need not suppose that it was universal by that age and there are no reasons to disbelieve that a maidservant could desire to be honest. Despite the confidence of the anonymous author of *Critical Remarks on Sir Charles Grandison, Clarissa, and Pamela* (1754) that Pamela was “a pert little minx whom any man of common sense or address might have had on his own terms in a week or fortnight” (Kreissman 53), it was not necessarily so. As one of Swift’s correspondents noted in 1733, “if a man must do wrong, he should aim a little higher than the enjoyment of a kitchen-maid, that he finds obstinately virtuous,” for neither predatory masters nor obstinately virtuous maids were all that remarkable (Williams 4:173; cf. Trumbach, *Egalitarian Family* 149; Stone 243; Hill, *Servants* 62).

Nevertheless, though virtue and resistance were not improbable, they would not have been automatically presumed. It was only logical, therefore, that in constructing a tale of virtue rewarded Richardson would have wanted to have Pamela’s account of Mr B.’s conduct meet evidentiary requirements—especially since there was a precedent for a maidservant doing so.⁷ Despite Porter’s affirmation, there *were* prosecutions for

⁷ Pierce comments on Pamela’s concern for “tangible, fixed, examinable testimony” (12), and the way in which this testimony is challenged by other parties (24), without associating it with the law.

master-servant rape, and Richardson would certainly have known of the most famous of them—the trial of Colonel Francis Charteris on charges brought by his maidservant Anne Bond. Late in October 1729, using the services of an intermediary, Charteris engaged Bond as a domestic servant, and immediately following her arrival in his household began to make advances. Bond ignored them, but when after three days she realized the identity of her employer (who was notorious as a rake), she asked to be released. Charteris refused to let her go and set his other servants to watch her to prevent her escape; then, on the morning of the fourth day, he attacked and raped her. Bond took the case to law and won a conviction, turning down the offer of a very large sum to abandon the case (Simpson, “Popular Perception” 3-7).

Richardson could not have *not* known about the Charteris case. The idea that the unsupported testimony of a maidservant could lead to the conviction of someone as rich and powerful as Charteris fascinated London, and when Charteris received a royal pardon the opposition press was up in arms (the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Walpole, was supposed to have intervened on the condemned man’s behalf). If only as printer of the *Daily Journal*, Richardson would have fully aware of the public outrage: the *Journal* carried the story as it unfolded, and advertised a series of publications satirizing Charteris’ career as “Rape Master General of Great Britain” (Paulson, *Hogarth* 1:373). However, Richardson would not just have had the case brought to his attention through the *Journal*. He would have recognized Charteris is the man in the doorway in the first print of Hogarth’s 1732 series “The Harlot’s Progress.” The Progress was a work that, as a contemporary observed “captivated the Minds of ... persons of all ranks & conditions from the greatest quality to the meanest” (Paulson, *Hogarth* 1:248, 2:306; cf. 1:306 for Hogarth’s advertisement for the series being reprinted in the *Daily Journal*.)

We can see debts to the Progress in *Pamela* on the textual level. Mrs Jewkes, the housekeeper at Brandon Hall (where Pamela is held a prisoner for a month and a half), is modeled on the procuress in the first plate. Like Hogarth’s figure, Mrs Jewkes is “a broad, squat, pury, fat thing. ... Her nose is flat and crooked, and her brows grow down over her eyes; a dead spiteful, grey, goggling eye, to be sure she has. And her face is flat and broad; and as to colour, looks like as if it had been pickled a month in saltpetre ...” (152). Further, Richardson seems to have had the Harlot in mind in his conclusion to the first edition of the novel. There, thinking of “the poor deluded female, who ... has given up her honour, and yielded to the allurements of her designing lover,” he contrasts the alternatives of repentance and continuation in sin. The consequences of the latter—“filthy diseases, ... an untimely death; and, too probably, ... everlasting perdition”—are a summary of the Harlot’s fate. Elsewhere, the contrast is put even more briefly: “[S]hould not a gentleman prefer an honest servant to a guilty harlot?” Pamela tellingly reflects (158). However, the importance of the Progress is more than a matter of specific details in the novel’s text. It lies in Hogarth’s explicit depiction of Charteris, and implicit reference to Bond.

Moll Hackabout, Hogarth’s Harlot, is a merchant’s mistress by the second plate of the series, and therefore hardly Anne Bond’s sister in resisting assault; but Moll is nevertheless representative of a servant girl’s status as potential victim.⁸ Almost certainly we should image her coming to her new profession after passing through an

⁸ This follows the interpretation of Quennell 92-3, rather than that of Paulson.

intermediate stage of domestic service. This after all was the scenario in a 1712 piece of Steele's for the *Spectator* (one of Hogarth's sources); was the story used in 1748 to cover Fanny Hill's traces in Cleland's *Memoirs of a Lady of Pleasure* (49); and was the experience of Isabella Cranston, who "was decoyed under the pretence of being hired into service" to the house of a Mrs Jolly, and there seduced by Colonel Charteris some six years before he raped Anne Bond (Trumbach, "Modern Prostitution" 77). It was also, as we have seen, the story of Bond herself. If we suppose that this had been Richardson's interpretation of the transition between the first two plates of the Progress—an interpretation that would explain his proposal that Hogarth illustrate the 1742 edition of the novel (Eaves and Kimpel 127, 188)⁹—he could not have missed the way the series pointed back to Bond, Moll's antitype, the domestic servant who said "no" to her master, and refused to accept his exercise of sexual power as the final word.

To note this is not, of course, to arrive at a complete account of Richardson's novel. My reading by-passes such important questions as Pamela's articulation of her faith, and the embodiment of her worth. It ignores the contribution of epistolary form to the novel's effect, and the question of transgendered authorship. But it does point to the logic underlying Pamela's self-representation. Bond's appeal to the law would have provided Richardson with the way to structure Pamela's account of her ordeal—and to confront Mr B assured her own personal worth. Pamela's self-confidence has heretofore been traced to Locke (Kibbie 562), and Locke's importance for the novel can certainly be allowed. In his *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) he had explicitly applied the idea that "every Man has a *Property* in his own *Person*" (2 §27) to the relationship between master and servant. There is no justification, Locke had explained, whereby "he that has more strength" can, simply by virtue of this strength, "seize upon a weaker, [and] master him to his obedience." Any acceptance of subject status was contractually based (1 §43), and "the Man [the servant] thus submits to, can pretend to no more Power over him, than he has consented to, upon Compact" (2 §173; cf. 2 §85). Nevertheless, the idea that a master's sexual aggression upon a servant transgressed this compact went beyond what might have been learned from Locke, and for this Richardson would have turned to the precedent of Charteris' trial. To advance the idea of property in one's self through the voice of a servant, and insist that the unsupported testimony of a maidservant faced with rape should be listened to, he needed the example of Ann Bond.

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⁹ Possibly Richardson was responding to what Paulson calls the "mixture of pity, tenderness and prurience" in the series (*Hogarth* 1:238), qualities also to be found in the novel, but I see the proposal following instead from a recognition that the series had captured the dangers of service. Castle compares Clarissa's progress to that of the Harlot (59), but does not note the series' relevance to *Pamela*.

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Özet

Pamela Andrews ve Ann Bond: Meşru bir Kurmaca Olarak Pamela

Samuel Richardson'un 1740'ta yazdığı romanı *Pamela or Virtue Rewarded*'daki Pamela karakterinin öz-temsiline, onun değerini Bay B'nin gözünde yükseltmek amacıyla zekice tasarlanmış olduğu düşünülür, fakat bu öz-temsille ilgili asıl açıklama, Pamela'nın çektiği acıların sebebini ortaya koyması ve erdemi için diretmesi, onun tecavüz ceza davasında nelerin kabul edilmesi gerektiğinin farkında olması ile şekil bulmuştur şeklinde olmalıdır.

Bu makale Pamela'nın anlatısını romanın basımından 10 yıl önceki dönemde Old Bailey'de duyulan tecavüz davalarının bağlamına yerleştirir ve özellikle 1730 Albay Charteris'in hizmetçisi Ann Bond'a tecavüz etme davasına dikkati çeker. Charteris'in davası; Charteris'in kendisi Richardson'un bildiği konusunda emin olabildiğimiz bir eser olan Hogarth'ın "Harlot'ın Yükselmesi" (1732) serisinin ilk resminde görüntülenirken; The Daily Journal (Richardson basımcılığını yapmıştır) da dâhil olmak üzere basında geniş yer almıştır.

Bu bağlamda, Pamela'nın mektupları ve günlük defterindeki ört pas etme ve bastırmalar utangaçlık göstergesi olarak algılanmamalıdır, hikâyesinin yasal delil kurallarına uyması için basitleştirilmesi olarak görülmelidir. Bu kurallar, Sir Matthew Hale tarafından 1670'de tanımlanmıştır ve tecavüz öncesi hiçbir yakınlaşmayı mümkün kılmamaktadır: adli kovuşturma davalının açık ya da kapalı bir şekilde teşvik edilmesi konusunda hiçbir şüpheye yer vermemelidir. Bu sebeple, sadece romanın ikinci sayısında, Brandon Hall'a dönüşünü takiben, tecavüz tehlikesi geçtikten sonra Pamela efendisinin ona olan ilgisini itiraf eder ve Bay B'nin duygularının karmaşıklığını kabul eder.

**Ideological Ambivalence in the Early Female Gothic Tradition:
Ann Radcliffe's *The Mysteries of Udolpho***

María del Mar Ramón Torrijos

Since the origins of the genre, the Gothic tradition has been seen as closely linked to women's experiences in its attempt to explore different aspects of female sensibility and subjectivity within a specific sociological, psychological and economic context. A large number of novels were written by women, avidly consumed by female readers; and the novels themselves have articulated a feminine experience of life by dealing with issues such as women's identity, sexuality and social position while offering "the opportunity to see literature and the world through the eyes of a woman" (Fleener 15). Ann Radcliffe in the 1790s laid the foundation for the narrative trajectory that has persisted into the contemporary literary Gothic as the Female Gothic Tradition and that has sought to illustrate the Gothic narrative's potentiality to deal with issues of writing and reading as a woman.

Whether some Gothic novels can be considered 'female' Gothic novels or 'feminist' Gothic novels is still a matter of considerable debate. In this respect a clarification of these terms may be important. A distinction could be made between 'female Gothic novels' (novels written by women), 'feminine' (women-centred novel, women as the narrator in the text) and 'feminist Gothic novels' (gender-constructed novels). *The Mysteries of Udolpho* can be considered as being a gender-constructed novel. However, critics like Michelle Massé and Ann Williams (1994) do not place the Gothic in the context of a specifically female literary tradition. From a different perspective Norton (2000) warns about the potential risk of "falling into sexist stereotypes about women being best at portraying emotions while men are best at recounting action," although he certainly underlines that "a feminist awareness is undoubtedly fruitful for analysing the Gothic."

Since Ellen Moers coined the term *Female Gothic* in her fundamental book *Literary Women* in 1976, much attention has focused on work by female authors within the literary Gothic tradition. Before the rise of this new criticism which highlights a special relationship between female issues and the Gothic genre, the traditional masculinization of the literary canon had relegated Gothic writings by women to the periphery of the genre. Many critics regarded much of the work written by male writers as "high Gothic," dismissing the work by female authors in Gothic narrative as less serious, despite the essential role that women have played in the development of the genre as readers, characters and pioneer writers. Addressing the inception of the genre, some critics, like Robert Hume, prioritize Lewis's work over Radcliffe's work and another critic, David Punter considers the Gothic a male-centered genre with its focus on male characters rather than on female ones: "The villain was always the most complex and interesting character in Gothic fiction ... " (9). Robert Platzner and Lowry Nelson also prioritized the male Gothic tradition over the female gothic and the villain over the heroine; and Leslie Fielder, when confronting both characters, gives preeminence to the male one: "The fully developed Gothic centers not in the heroine

(the persecuted principle of salvation) but in the villain (the persecuting principle of damnation)" (109).

The marginal position attributed to Female Gothic has been corrected by important and stimulating academic criticism which in the last decades has focused upon the connection of the Gothic with women's experiences within a specific sociological, psychological and economic context. Eminent critics such as Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, Coral Ann Howells, Mary Poovey, Diane Long Hoeveler and Kate Ferguson Ellis have explored the special relationship between women and the Gothic tradition making feminist criticism one of the most significant directions in recent Gothic criticism. As Fred Botting states: "A challenge to, or interrogation of, forms of fiction dominated by patriarchal assumptions, Gothic novels have been reassessed as part of a wider feminist critical movement that recovers suppressed or marginalized writing by women and addresses issues of female experience, sexual oppression and difference" (19).

Feminist critical approaches to the Gothic have not been univocal; different critics have emphasized different aspects of female sensibility and subjectivity. Some critics have related the Female Gothic to the struggle of women against their prescribed role in a patriarchal society, depicting the frustration and rage of the women writers (DeLamotte, Fleenor, Poovey). Others have considered the Female Gothic tradition to be a "a coded system whereby women authors covertly communicated to other women—their largely female reading audience—their ambivalent rejection of and outward complicity with the dominant sexual ideologies of their culture" (Hoeveler 5). Still other critics have underlined the connection between Gothic fiction and the unconscious and have moved in the direction of considering the Gothic as a "psychosocial therapy" (Clemens 1) in terms of sexual maturation and sexual repression. As criticism develops, psychoanalytic critical models that considered the Female Gothic as a textual dream of unconscious and collective psyches gives way to more materialistic directions in terms of social, political and economic issues. Other critical studies seek to define female experience through comparison with male experience in the male Gothic tradition, trying to relate not only to the "gendered" construction of the Gothic heroine but also the similarly "gendered" construct of the Gothic hero (Behr 12). Clemens' position is particularly relevant especially when she argues that an interdisciplinary approach would be necessary to deal with all the complexities that lie at the heart of the Gothic, particularly "one which brings together two disciplinary orientations that are often assumed to be antithetical: psychology and sociopolitical history" (11).

Tracing the story of this genre from its inception which dates back to the eighteenth century work of Ann Radcliffe, to its more recent manifestations in popular literature and film, it can be seen that this kind of fiction has evolved according to the cultural and political shifts that have occurred during the last two centuries. Since the popular and "conservative" Gothic during its first incarnation, the genre has undergone several transformations before developing the more sophisticated Gothic forms in the latter decades. These later manifestations of Gothic forms of feminine fiction have received more complex and varied labels such as "neo-gothicism," "feminist Gothicism," or "postmodern gothicism" in their contact with the most relevant cultural and aesthetic movements of recent times -feminism and postmodernism- and undoubtedly reflect the high vitality of the Gothic today.

Despite radical transformations of the genre and the multiple forms and perspectives that the Female Gothic can adopt, some elements of plot have remained constant. The early Female Gothic usually portrays a heroine who is incessantly hunted by a villainous patriarchal figure within an enclosed space. This plot can be found in the very beginning of the genre in 1794, with Ann Radcliffe's *The Mysteries of Udolpho*, where Radcliffe creates the prototypical Gothic heroine in Emily St. Aubert, the virtuous young woman who suffers repeated pursuit and entrapment at the hands of the ruthless Marquis Montoni. This early prototypical Gothic setting, found at the early stages of the Female Literary Tradition and focused on the heroine, the villain and the menacing domestic space is, certainly, not so different from the plot and setting that appears in many recent Gothic works, as we deduce from the description that Joanna Russ offers about the conventions which inform much of the modern Gothic:

Here are the elements: To a large, lonely, usually brooding *House* (always named) comes a *Heroine* who is young, orphaned, unloved, and lonely. She is shy and inexperienced. She is attractive, sometimes even beautiful, but she does not know it. Sometimes she has spent ten years nursing a dying mother; sometimes she has (or has had) a wicked stepmother, a bad aunt, a demanding and selfish mother (usually deceased by the time the story opens) or an ineffectual, absent, or (usually) long-dead father, whom she loves. The House is set in exotic, vivid and/or isolated *Country*. The Heroine, whose reaction to people and places tends toward emotional extremes, either loves or hates the House, usually both. (32)

Repetition is, in fact, at the core of the Gothic in terms of settings, proceedings, characters and images. For Miles, "the very durability of this female gothic plot suggested its importance" explaining later that "it was durable, because it arose from experience deeply embedded in the culture, from a nexus of desires at once excited and denied by a patriarchal order" (132). As DeLamotte suggests "repetition is not an incidental formal element in Gothic romance, but a key means by which its essential elements are created" (94), resembling the claustrophobic social, economical and psychological situation of a woman's real life at that time.

The claustrophobic atmosphere becomes central to the narrative through the description of the threatening and oppressive world that the castle represents for the heroine. The structure of the novel contributes to highlight this sense of oppression and danger that *Udolpho* implies. *The Mysteries of Udolpho* exhibits a circular structure beginning with Emily's idyllic life in a rural chateau in southern France and ending with Emily living happily in La Vallee with the hero Valancourt, in domestic harmony again. Between these two positive parameters the novel focuses on the dark world of *Udolpho*. *Udolpho* appears as a dark, unpredictable and menacing world in contrast with the light, harmony, and happiness of Emily's first family home:

The dread of what she might be going to encounter was now excessive, that it sometimes threatened her senses ... So romantic and improbable, indeed, did her present situation appear to Emily herself, particularly when she compared it with the repose and beauty of her early days, that there were moments, where she

could have almost believed herself the victim of frightful visions, glaring upon a disordered fancy. (MU 3: 94)

Radcliffe begins describing Udolpho as a place of tyrannical power where the heroine is trapped and exposed to imprisonment and sexual vulnerability. Upon arriving at Udolpho, the unforgettable impression that Emily retains from her visual contemplation of the castle anticipates the dreadful nightmare that it will become for her. The castle first appears, exuding magnificence and splendor, causing extraordinary emotional impact on Emily:

As she gazed, the light died away on its walls, leaving a melancholy purple tint, which spread deeper, as the thin vapour crept up the mountain, while the battlements above were still tipped with splendour. From those too, the rays soon faded, and the whole edifice was invested with the solemn duskiness of evening. Silent, lonely and sublime, it seemed to stand the sovereign of the scene, and to frown defiance on all, who dared to invade its solitary reign. As the twilight deepened, its features become more awful in obscurity, and Emily continued to gaze, till its clustering towers were alone seen rising over the tops of the woods, beneath whose thick shade the carriages soon after began to ascend. (MU 2: 97-98)

The powerful vision of the castle is accentuated when Emily, abandoned to her imagination, projects her own fears onto the image of the castle: “The extent and darkness of these tall woods awakened terrific images in her mind, and she almost expected to see banditti start up from under the trees” (MU 2: 98). The deepest emotional response is produced in Emily when Montoni breaks the silence to point out the castle and confirms that the impressive castle, Udolpho, belongs to him: “‘There,’ said Montoni, speaking for the first time in several hours, is ‘Udolpho.’ Emily gazed with melancholy awe upon the castle, which she understood to be Montoni’s” (MU 2: 97). From this very moment, Montoni, the cruel villain of the story appears closely connected to the castle. Udolpho is under Montoni’s reign and Emily starts to perceive it as the symbol of masculine power, an oppressive space entirely under male control.

Inside Udolpho the Gothic heroine suffers all sorts of real and imaginary terrors. The identification of the castle as a centre of danger and peril becomes clearer to Emily when she learns of “terrific reports of what was passing at the castle; of riots, quarrels and of carousals more alarming than either” (MU 3: 144). Emily is haunted by spirits, strange music, concealed crimes, terrifying noises, locked rooms and many other encounters with the supernatural and the horrific. By presenting the dangers inside the home Radcliffe places the menace inside the proper space for women implying that domestic space is not always a protective space for a woman. Emily’s dramatic situation of isolation accentuates her most inner worries. In one of her more dreadful moments, when Emily fears sexual assault by a group of banditti, she is terrified by both the threatening reality around her and her internal, personal world:

Emily now breathed with difficulty, and could scarcely support herself. When first she saw these men, their appearance and their connection with Montoni had been sufficient to impress her with distrust: but now, when one of them had

betrayed himself to be a murdered, and she saw herself, at the approach of night, under his guidance, among wild and solitary mountains, and going she scarcely knew whither, the most agonizing terror seized her, which was the less supportable from the necessity she found herself under of concealing all symptoms of it from her companions. (MU 3: 92)

The physical structure of the castle empowers the sense of menace that Udolpho poses for the heroine. It is full of physical obstacles, hidden passages, locked rooms, which cut the heroine off from the outside world and leave her trapped in a mysterious and menacing world. The massive walls that surround the castle, the huge gate that Emily finds at the entrance of the castle, and other doors and walls that the heroine finds at the end of the labyrinthine corridors make Emily identify the castle with the prison that keeps her from the world.

The house as a menacing space for women stands as a metaphor of women's experience inside male-dominated structures. One of the staples of the Gothic involves the presence of boundaries and frontiers, either literal or metaphorical ones (DeLamotte 26-28). These Gothic images of borders can be read not only as physical barriers which keep women inside their proper domestic space but also, metaphorically, as the boundaries representing the social norms that prevented women's participation in the wider world. As DeLamotte suggests, the terrors that Emily experiences inside these frontiers point not only to the heroine's anxieties derived from her situation of isolation and entrapment, but also her fears evoke the anxiety that women experience towards the border between the outside world and their inner world, the line that determines how the social condition of women was understood. DeLamotte underlines the arbitrariness of these both fictional and real barriers and their implications for women's life:

The female protagonists of Gothic romance do experience these barriers as "seemingly arbitrary," but it is suggestive that the particular quality of the arbitrariness consists in the injustice of their sudden, perverse appearances in a world in which the heroine would otherwise be quite content. The strong affect associated with these barriers—a pierce sense of injustice—points to the fact that their apparent arbitrariness masks a set of causes too dangerous for Gothicists to contemplate directly. In the plot the barriers are experienced as arbitrary, but what they represent in reality is a set of boundaries that have an all-too-specific origin in the social and economic institutions of patriarchy and their psychological consequences for women. (27)

The situation of captivity suffered by the heroine in the Female Gothic novel resembles the woman's marginalized place in the patriarchal organization which conditioned women's lives in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In fact, this period, the heyday of Gothic romance was also a time during which woman's place in society was becoming a matter of increasing debate, and as Howells suggests, a number of writers sought to explore and clarify the issue. In this sense, the Gothic novel would be a quest into the irrational side of the human identity displaying feminine emotional responses to real and difficult problems:

Gothic fiction is a literature full of curiosity, doubt and anxiety, and at this distance in time we can see working through it the same subversive forces that produced the French Revolution, the Marquis de Sade and the Romantic poets. The trouble was that the Gothic novelists didn't know what to do with their feelings of frustration and rebelliousness (...); all they knew was that they were dissatisfied and anxious. This fiction is both exploratory and fearful. (Howells 6)

Despite Emily's imaginary and real fears, nothing in fact will happen to her. However, there is an omnipresent feeling of danger which is real to both Emily and the readers, and which works as a subtle warning for women implying that the house is not always an idyllic space for the woman. In the same way that the heroine is a prisoner inside a confined space, women are trapped inside social and economical structures and they should be aware of all the potential dangers that can arise from their defenseless position. The heroine's lack of control over her own situation is certainly her major source of terror, and these inner feelings find their expression in the nightmarish dreams that take place within the metaphorical barriers of the Gothic house. Significantly, the Gothic novel is often based on a network of distorted images as the expression of real emotional problems and moral conflicts for women; in its attempts to explore women's diurnal world, it conveys the message not in a straight way but masked by disguises, as DeLamotte comments:

But the disguise itself makes the point: women's Gothic shows women suffering from institutions they feel to be profoundly alien to them and their concerns. And those institutions were all too contemporaneous with the lives of the women who wrote and read Gothic romance in the 1790s and early 1800s: the patriarchal family, the patriarchal marriage, and a patriarchal class, legal, educational, and economic system. (152)

However, the heroine doesn't resign herself to her literal and metaphorical prison. Radcliffe underlines the menacing world of Udolpho but allows her heroine to transcend her own defenseless and fragility. The ambivalence of the novel starts when Emily, the heroine with no power against the villain, instead of trying to keep herself safe from him, decides to explore unknown territories inside the castle. Despite the potential danger of being assaulted by Montoni, Emily does not remain in her room at night but, on the contrary, tries to find her aunt who has been locked in another chamber of the castle by Montoni. She also can not help exploring the chamber she was locked in to perceive "a dark curtain, which descending from the ceiling to the floor, was drawn along the whole side of the chamber" (MU 3: 15). Although she is terrified by what she may find at the other side, she eventually succumbs to the fascinating power of the unknown:

The appearance of this curtain struck her, and she paused to gaze upon it, in wonder and apprehension. It seemed to conceal a recess of the chamber; she wishes, yet dreaded, to lift it, and to discover what it veiled ... suddenly conjecturing, that it concealed the body of her murdered aunt, she seized it, in a fit of desperation, and drew it aside. Beyond, appeared a corpse, stretched on a kind of low couch, which was crimsoned with human blood, as was the floor

beneath. The features, deformed by death, were ghastly and horrible, and more than one livid wound appeared in the face. Emily, bending over the body, gazed, for a moment, with an eager, frenzied eye; (MU 3: 15)

Radcliffe presents an ambivalent portrait of her heroine. Apparently, the heroine is portrayed as a combination of defenselessness, innocence, docility and silence. She is a sentimental and virtuous young lady continuously depicted as the idealization of the feminine principle, not only in her physical appearance “having the same elegant symmetry of form, the same delicacy of features, and the same blue eyes, full of tender sweetness” (MU 1: 12) but also in her personality and manners, possessing an “uncommon delicacy of mind, warm affections, and ready benevolence.” (MU 1: 11) According to these descriptions, Emily exemplifies the paradigm of womanhood as it was understood at that time, as Mary Jacobus states: “the boundaries of woman situate woman in her social role as dependent, protected by father, lover, husband, without sexual desire, suffering and above of all silent.” (198)

However, in addition to underlining her fragile sensitivity and her defenseless situation and apart from all the “proper” feminine qualities that Radcliffe builds in Emily, she adds one striking feature: her curiosity. Emily’s curiosity can be ambivalent in that it may suggest escape into unknown worlds but can also be read as subversive if these dangerous spaces appear to be more pleasurable for the heroine than her domestic space. All of this brings us to note how Radcliffe links every situation of terror to a sense of fascination: “But a terror of this nature, as it occupies and expands the mind, and elevates it to high expectation, is purely sublime, and leads us, by a kind of fascination, to see even the object, from which we appear to shrink” (MU 2: 127).

Along with her sense of curiosity, further evidence that Emily’s docility is only seeming resides in the fact that she uses her imagination to challenge the conventionality of the idea of womanhood. According to these conventional middle-class domestic values which relegated women to a passive role, a reference to sexual feminine feelings is considered inappropriate both in real life and in fiction. Radcliffe as a woman writer literally can not afford to openly imply feminine sexuality in her writing, so she opts for building a female heroine whose personality tends towards emotionalism and takes advantage of this tendency to depict Emily’s fantasies, many of them closely connected with sexual desire. In fact, Emily’s only defect seems to be her excessive sensibility and imagination which she is advised to abandon for her own sake. According to her father’s advice, she should “strengthen her mind; to enure her to habits of self-command; to teach her to reject the first impulse of her feelings and to look, with cool examination ...” (MU 1: 11).

Consequently, on some occasions Radcliffe timidly points to her heroine’s passionate nature but she is obliged to disregard these feelings afterwards, making Emily acknowledge the value of the common sense and rationality. While emphasizing the importance of reason and prudence, the woman writer gives her heroine the opportunity to play imaginative games of irrational and contradictory impulses. Since Emily is a prisoner, the only activity she can complete is to exercise her imagination and it is through her mental activity, that the heroine transgresses the conventional images of womanhood, projecting images with sexual resonance. Accordingly, some passages of the novel suggest that Emily is both attracted and repelled by the villain. Emily fears Montoni but seems to be fascinated by his presence from their first encounter:

This Signor Montoni has an air of conscious superiority, animated by spirit, and strengthened by talents, to which every person seemed involuntarily to yield; the quickness of his perceptions was strikingly expressed on his countenance, yet that countenance could submit implicitly to occasion; and, more than once in this day, the triumph of art over nature might have been discerned in it. His visage was long, and rather narrow, yet he was called handsome; and it was, perhaps, the spirit and vigor of his soul, sparkling through his features, that triumphed for him. (MU 1: 172)

On another occasion Emily shows toward this enigmatic figure an irrational attraction that she cannot explain: "Emily felt admiration, but ... it was mixed with a degree of fear she know not exactly wherefore" (MU 1: 172). In another fundamental scene, Sister Agnes, the mad nun who also lives in Udolpho, accuses Emily of being a victim of passion: "You are young, you are innocent! I mean you are yet innocent of any great crime! But you have passions in you heart, -scorpions; they sleep now-beware how you awaken them!- they will sting you, even unto death" (4: 93). In this crucial passage, Radcliffe offers hints which reveal Emily's passionate nature, but the woman writer hides herself behind a character who has lost her reason in order to make this accusation. Thus, under the protection of her insanity, Sister Agnes can freely blame Emily of passion and other inappropriate feelings making her feel very disturbed. In another passage it is the woman writer who condemns these irrational feelings: "Her suffering, though deep, partook of the gentle character of her mind: hers was a silent anguish, weeping, yet enduring; not the wild energy of passion, inflaming imagination, bearing down the barriers of reason and living in a world of its own" (MU 2: 235).

Radcliffe deliberately creates situations of uncertainty in which feminine sexual impulses are stated but they are not overtly recognized. With this strategy the woman writer goes beyond the constraints of conventionality and moral patterns, allowing her heroine to create her own fantasies connected with sexual feelings while protecting her under the respectable facade of being a virtuous lady. Coral Ann Howell describes these moments connected with sexual desire as "moments of aberration" or "eccentric moments", considering them "our moments of keenest pleasure in Radcliffean novels, the moments when the convention split, showing us the false limits which the sentimental narrative imposes" (152).

Radcliffe immediately silences these uncomfortable feelings and juxtaposes these subversive images to others which highlight the apparent passivity of the heroine and which help to create the overall conventional impression that the novel suggests. Thus, although the protagonist survives her days of persecution and eventually finds rewards for her virtue and fortitude in a happy marriage, she is not allowed to carry out any kind of action. As Joanna Russ suggests, Gothic novels deal with the heroine's suffering because she has nothing else to do (p. 40). In fact, Emily's escape from Udolpho happens by chance and she feels surprised: "They passed, without interruption, the dreadful gates and took the road that led down among the woods...Emily was so much astonished by this sudden departure that she scarcely dared to believe herself awake" (MU 3: 153).

These imaginative devices on the part of the heroine which suggest escape constitute one of the narrative devices that Radcliffe uses to imply that the heroine may not be as passive as she seems to be. Another device deals with the moral superiority of

the gothic heroine over the villain which will allow her to survive physically and economically. By underlining her docility and at the same time making her subtly powerful, Radcliffe employs another strategy in order to allow her heroine to fight against the villain. In her defenseless situation, the heroine only has her own intuition to guide her. Her only recourse is to rely on the efficacy of virtue and in the help of Providence. Somehow she manages to abandon the male dominated world of Udolpho with her mind, body and heritage intact. Her triumph is the culmination of something that has prevailed through much of the novel, her spiritual power which makes her superior to the patriarchal figure.

As DeLamotte suggests, this spiritual force is the heroine's "conscious worth" which many times acts as a physical barrier between heroine and villain. Thus, in an encounter with Montoni, Emily leaves filled with "sacred pride" (MU 3: 59), and she keeps a silence born of "the consciousness of having deserved praise, instead of censure" (MU 3: 155). For that reason, Providence is an ally of this conscious virtue, imbuing Emily with spiritual power which acts as a self-defense in order to protect her, thus conveying a message of praise for her silence and patience. In this way, the fact that the villain has more physical power, but the heroine is morally stronger is emphasized.

As Hoeveler notes, the apparent passivity and docility of the heroine is part of an ideology of female power which acts through a pretended weakness. This power performs hidden under the cover of "professional femininity" (xviii), which Hoeveler describes as "a cultivated pose, a masquerade of docility, wise passiveness and tightly controlled emotions" (xv). Hoeveler refers to this ideology as "gothic feminism"¹ and considers it the key difference between the eternal Feminine which occurs with masculine writers and the feminine principle that stands in the Female Gothic novel:

Whereas the ideology of the Eternal Feminine that dominated the writing of the male Romantic canonical poets demanded female submission, economic disenfranchisement of woman, and social conformity to their prescribed domestic roles, the female gothic novel depicted its young female heroines as anything but entrapped, passive and docile. Or to be more precise, the female gothic novel represented women who ostensibly appear to be conforming to their acceptable roles within the patriarchy but who actually subvert the father's power at every possible occasion and then retreat to studied postures of conformity whenever they risk exposure to public censure. (5)

In this way Radcliffe portrays a passive heroine but makes her covertly powerful, adding value to the feminine principle of existence, while destroying the masculine world. Certainly Emily articulates the feminine ideal because as a character, she is more of an abstract principle than a round character. She does not show development

¹ Hoeveler sees a connection between "gothic feminism" and the contemporary notion "victim feminism" to which Naomi Wolf refers in her book *Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How It Will Change the 21st century* (New York: Random House, 1993). For Hoeveler the ideology of "victim feminism" (the notion that women earn superior social and moral rights in society by positioning themselves as innocent victims of an oppressive patriarchal society) cannot be understood separately from their origins in the female gothic novel tradition (xi-3).

throughout the novel. On the contrary, her state of mind does not change according to the main detail which governs the prototypical Gothic heroine as it described by Clemens:

. . . the female figures fleeing through dark passages and hiding or being imprisoned in the underground vaults of Gothic castles and monasteries generally emerge at some climatic point in the story to reveal the full extent of their creative or destructive powers. Rather than appearing as fully rounded characters, these figures function as manifestations of the feminine principle in life, . . . (8)

By endowing her heroine her own hidden values, for use as an invisible tool against the evil forces Radcliffe is emphasizing the feminine sphere, but she is underlining the contradiction between this female idolization and women's defenseless situation at the time. The ambivalence of the novel, stepping forward and backward with respect to the transgression of conventional images of womanhood, works as a warning for women of the dark side to the idealization of the feminine sphere. Howells refers to the idealization and repression of women as being illustrative of both sides of the ideal of womanhood ideal at the time: "to be angelic and robed in white is only the romantic side of eighteenth-century convention, the other side of which is the condemnation of woman to a passive role in which she can be sacrificed by society for sexual and economic interests" (11).

The discussion as to whether the Female Gothic tradition is, at its core, authentically subversive or predominantly conservative has still not been concluded. Some critics argue that the early Gothic novels, rather than questioning the reigning ideology, actually reinforce the social and political structures which informed patriarchal capitalism. But certainly, Gothic novels such as *The Mysteries of Udolpho* contain elements which challenge the prevailing ideology that condemned women to a marginalized position. The triumph of the heroine at the end of the novel, where, on leaving Udolpho, she is in a satisfactory physical and economical condition, seems to underscore the victory of good over evil, reinforcing feminine values of silence, innocence and acceptance. From this perspective, the novel appears to affirm conventional middle-class domestic values and some critics have signaled its aim to educate female readers at the time and catalogued the novel as "morally conservative."

However, the novel can also be seen as subversively questioning the position of women within a patriarchal society. Women writers could not openly demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the situation women found themselves in so they protested through subtle strategies within their texts. Thus, in *The Mysteries of Udolpho*, while Radcliffe allows her heroine to return to conventionality, she alternately also depicts her in a relentless struggle against all that the castle represents. Radcliffe presents the castle as the centre of tyrannical power, but Emily nevertheless rebels against this male power at every occasion she can with an active-passive strategy. As the apparently docile and passive heroine adopts an active role, she uses her imagination to constantly picture escape routes which emerge as an expression of female independence. In addition, Radcliffe depicts a passive heroine who also possesses an unconscious worth, a tactic which works as a weapon for defeating the malevolence of the villain. As Radcliffe is bound to follow eighteenth century social and moral manners, through the use of these textual strategies she inevitably places the novel in an uncertain position between the

acceptance of conventional eighteenth-century values and an attack on the patriarchal culture.

The ambivalence of *The Mysteries of Udolpho* finds its expression in the way that both, conventionality and subversion interact to interrogate patriarchal values. The heroine's passive role, reinforced by the conservative happy ending of the novel implies the triumph of virtue while underlining late-eighteenth-century domesticity. Yet beyond its conventional surface, the novel presents a heroine subtly fighting to subvert masculine power. Thus, through continuous images implying sexual desire, the defenseless heroine challenges the frontiers of her physical and metaphorical prison, and subverts the house as a protective space for women. Through the gendered construction of her Gothic heroine, Radcliffe is questioning the patriarchal values which relegated women to an insignificant position and is challenging the ideal of womanhood at the time while illustrating the potentiality of the Gothic to deal with issues of female experience, sexual oppression and difference.

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Özet

Eski Gotik Kadın Geleneğinde İdeolojik Kararsızlık: Ann Radcliffe'in *The Mysteries of Udolpho* Adlı Eseri

Bu makale, geç dönem Onsekizinci Yüzyıl kadın yazarların kurgusal dünyalar yaratarak kadının ataerkil toplumdaki koşullarını sergileme yöntemlerinin izini sürmek amacıyla Radcliffe'in *The Mysteries of Udolpho* adlı romanı üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu romanın nasıl kadını dışta bırakan bir pozisyona indirgeyen on sekizinci yüzyıl kalıplarını izler gibi görüldüğünü ve aynı zamanda nasıl yaygınlaşan ideolojiye bazı belli unsurlarla ve anlatı stratejileri ile meydan okuduğunu araştıracağım. Bu egemen ideolojiyi sorgulayan unsurlar, ataerkil kabulleri ters yüz ederek sorgulayan kadın yazar tarafından yazılmış cinsiyet verilmiş bir meydan okuma olarak okunabilir.

Romanın kararsızlığı, geleneklere bağlılık ve sapma gibi konuların ataerkil değerleri sorgulamak için birbirleriyle etkileşmesi ile açıklanabilir. Kadın kahramanın edilgen rolü ki bu rol romanın geleneksel mutlu sonu ile desteklenmektedir, geç dönem on sekizinci yüzyıl evcimenliğinin altını çizirken namus ve faziletin zaferine işaret eder. Kaldı ki, geleneksel dış görünüşünün ötesinde roman, etken ve edilgen stratejisi bağlamında erkek iktidarına karşı savaşıyor bir kadın kahraman sunar. Kurtuluşu ve cinsel arzuları çağırıştıran kesintisiz imgeler aracılığı ile savunmasız kadın kahraman, fiziksel ve fizikötesi hapisanesinin sınırlarına meydan okur ve evin bir kadın için koruyucu bir alan olduğu olgusunu yıkar. Gotik kadın kahramanın cinsiyet kazandırılarak kurgulanmasıyla, Radcliffe; kadının tecrübesini, cinsel baskısını ve farklılığını ele alırken Gotik'in kapasitesini ortaya koyar ve aynı zamanda ideal olan kadınlık tanımına da meydan okur.

**Negotiating Identity in African American Autobiography:
Lorene Cary's *Black Ice* and
Shirlee Taylor Haizlip's *The Sweeter the Juice***

Maria Susana Vega-González

Through their autobiographies, *Black Ice* (1991) and *The Sweeter the Juice* (1994), Lorene Cary and Shirlee Taylor Haizlip continue the tradition of African-American autobiography written by women in the United States, dealing with issues of identity formation, which come to the foreground in the autobiographical act. While Haizlip's purpose in writing her autobiography is to search for a part of her family and, in the process, "close the circle of [her] existence" (14), Cary aims to assert her new-found identity: "I began writing about St. Paul's School when I stopped thinking of my prep-school experience as an aberration from the common run of black life in America" (6). Explorations of race and identity and the questions related to received notions of authenticity bring these two works into the consistently problematic arena of the construction of racial identity. Through their autobiographies, the authors find themselves straddling two identities, living between the black side and the white side of their African Americanness. This feeling, which Werner Sollors describes as an "acute sense of doubleness" (249) is positively asserted and reinstated in an act of conscious reclamation of "their racial selves in their American lives," or, as Nellie McKay puts it, "to claim [their] American identity in its entirety, a unity denied black people in the United States for generations" (104).

Such claim coincides with what Gloria Anzaldúa has insightfully termed "the mestiza consciousness" which implies the crossing of borders and the ensuing creation of a synthesis between the opposed aspects of the ethnic self. Thus, the "new mestiza"

has discovered that she can't hold concepts or ideas in rigid boundaries. The borders and walls that are supposed to keep the undesirable ideas out are entrenched habits and patterns of behavior [. . .] She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode--nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else. (79)

Cary's and Haizlip's autobiographies not only deal with issues of border crossing between the white and black worlds and the dangers implied in it, but the reflective accounts of their past lives enable the writers to delineate their own positionality within the ethnic diversity of the United States. Both life accounts are highly marked by the dividing line between blacks and whites. And as members of the black community, Haizlip and Cary are supposed to stay on the side where they belong. The legacy of a mixed-race family of whites, blacks and Indians determines Haizlip's description of herself:

I am a black woman, but many of you would never know it [. . .] My skin is as light as that of an average white person. The skin of my sisters and brother is as light as, if not lighter than, mine. But we have lived as, worked as and mostly

married black people. Our psyches, souls and sensibilities are black. Sociologists would say we have been “socialized” as black people. Yet our lives have been deeply colored by our absence of deep color. (13)

Despite her own definition as a black woman, Haizlip is aware of her straddling of two worlds and of her location in an in-between space where, because of her light skin colour, she is not considered white enough to be a member of the white society nor black enough to belong to the black community. Likewise, color marks, albeit negatively, Cary's statement of her self: “In the aftermath of *Black Is Beautiful*, I began to feel black and blue, big and black, black and ugly. Had they done that to me? Had somebody else? Had I let them? Could I stop the feelings? Or hide them?” (5). In their autobiographical journeys, both Cary and Haizlip will stipulate the parameters of blackness for them, experiencing a gradual evolution in their understanding of their ethnic identity.

Haizlip's ancestral family constitutes a true “quilt of melanin patches” (Haizlip 14) alluded to by Irish, Black and Native American family members. Since her adolescence we get glimpses of the special pride young Haizlip takes in her cultural heritage, which she even wants to imprint on her very name. Named Shirlee by her mother “after the reigning child star, Shirley Temple” (19), she would later on decide to drop the “y” and use an “e” instead, to differentiate her name “from all those other Shirley Temples” (19). Likewise, she expresses the particular pleasure she finds in bearing a middle name, Anne, taken from her Native American paternal great grandmother and which implies a significant gesture of individuation. This early consciousness of her ethnic identity will however encounter the devastating effects of assimilation in her mother's family. Abandoned by her widowed father, Haizlip's mother, Margaret, is raised by relatives and friends, such as the eccentric Mama Mitt, who would try to keep her apart from “anyone darker than herself” but who, nonetheless, would become a “mother figure for Margaret for more than ten years, as she travelled from childhood to womanhood” (85, 86). Margaret's darker skin and her choice to “remain black” initiate a dramatic trajectory of displacement from her family, which undoubtedly leaves an indelible imprint on her. Bereft of a real family, Margaret hankers after a reunion with her beloved assimilated sister Grace. In the light of this unfortunate family story, Shirlee Taylor Haizlip takes it upon herself to search for that missing part of her family, to fill in the gaps of that multicolored quilt and make her mother's dream come true. As a matter of fact, *The Sweeter the Juice* narrates the author's efforts to make that encounter between her mother and her assimilated aunt possible:

My search for the missing part of my family has been with me consciously and unconsciously all my life. I inherited it, I absorbed it by osmosis. This need, this pain, of my mother's became mine. Her loss and rejection gave shape to my development. It touched me in ways I am yet unable to fathom. As my mother approached her eightieth birthday, I made a conscious decision to use whatever means possible to find her family. (33)

Haizlip's identification with her mother illustrates a broader identification with many other African-Americans who lack a familial past because of the rifts created by assimilation into the white society and culture. In order to enjoy the socio-economic benefits of the white society, Margaret's family crosses the dividing racial line, eschewing and rejecting any possible contact with whatever is related to blackness, Margaret included. Indeed, Haizlip's

search for her mother's sister arises from a "primeval need to know" (14) and is also connected to her inner search for the historical, social and personal circumstances that determined the identification process of her ancestors and ultimately of herself. As Alice Walker would put it, searching for her mother's garden, Haizlip finds her own (243):

Mysteries of color have encased my family for five generations. Putting together the bits and pieces of my past creates a quilt of melanin patches shading from dark to light, red to brown, tan to pink. There are ragged edges and missing segments. I dream I will find some of myself in those holes and gaps. I need to finish the quilt, wearing it smooth until its edges feel soft to my touch, blending its clashing colors to my own notion of harmony. Only then can I store it away in a safe place, taking it out every once in a while to look at. (14)

The "holes" and "gaps" in Haizlip's "quilt of melanin patches" function as a trope for the internal fragmentation that skin color signifies in her family and in herself. Like Haizlip, Cary's assertion that she began writing *Black Ice* when she "stopped thinking of [her] prep-school experience as an aberration from the common run of black life in America" (6) reveals a change in her perceptions of the color line and what it means to trespass into "the other's" terrain. Her attending the elitist white school of St. Paul's creates in her a turmoil of mixed feelings; a profound sense of self-hatred, guilt and remorse invade her on account of her two-year stay at a traditionally white school. One of the concerns Cary shows is towards the rest of the black community, the members of which might not have had the opportunity she had to attend such a privileged school. But, on the other hand, the fear of an unrelenting assimilation lurks amidst her troubled thoughts, her aloneness and her alienation from both whites and blacks. It is not by chance, thus, that she echoes James Baldwin's words on the risks encountered when falling prey to and internalizing white people's gaze of blacks: "'I was as isolated from Negroes as I was from whites,' James Baldwin wrote (in a book lent to me by Mr. Lederer, a Jewish teacher at St. Paul's), 'which is what happens when a Negro begins, at bottom, to believe what white people say about him'" (78). And Cary is certainly aware that assimilation into white society would increase her alienation and estrangement from the black community. The fear of assimilation determines Cary's view of her experience at St. Paul's as an aberration and an act of treason towards her race. We can therefore state that Cary's (pre)conception of the ethnic self is a dualistic essentialist one, where you are either an advocate or a traitor, as she herself puts it when commenting on the first black teacher at St. Paul's: "I remember watching him walk with other board members and trying to deduce from his gait and the way he inclined his head whether the small man with the tiny eyes was traitor or advocate" (6).

If Lorene Cary is wary of her new environment because of the risk of assimilation it entails, Shirlee Taylor Haizlip strongly criticizes the assimilation experienced by the maternal side of her family, especially that of her "whitened" aunt Grace:

Some of my elders who approved of their crossover explained to me that they could be more successful as white people [. . .] be happier. Their light skins would give them the privileges, status and entitlements of white people, a state of grace that clearly meant more to them than their connections to the black community. But at what cost, I wondered. What did such distancing and denial of

one's self as well as of an entire group of people do to the mind and the soul?
(71-72)

It is precisely because of the negation and erasure of part of one's self which stems from assimilation that Haizlip, like Cary, is not willing to "shed" her black skin and the black part of her identity, despite the benefits that would involve. On the other hand, the clear-cut division between the two races, black and white, is questioned by Haizlip, who more and more becomes aware of and reasserts her ambivalent ethnic identity. The importance assigned to skin color turns sometimes into a constructed fallacy, as Haizlip shows:

From bitter experience, black people have always understood that color and race are exquisitely arbitrary. White people in America take their whiteness for granted. But if we adhere to traditional notions of race, many of them are not white. Nor are all black people black. The heritage of this country and all of its people is mixed. A subtext of this story is, What is white? What is black? What is race? (34)

Claiming the purity and authenticity of a particular race in such a diversified country as the United States entails the risk of lapsing into a dangerous essentialism. As Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has argued, race should not be considered in terms of "a fixed essence" or a thing (402-03). As such, race does not exist, but it is determined by a series of cultural interactions as those which occurred in the United States throughout its history. Or, as Michael Awkward puts it, "regardless of our origins, neither we nor the artists whose work we examine exist as reflections of untainted "whiteness," "blackness," "asianness," "maleness," "gaiety," or "femaleness" (14). As both Haizlip and Cary expose in their autobiographies, they are the product of a cultural and ethnic criss-crossing which does away with traditional notions of authenticity, producing ethnic identities that are "unstable, agonised, and in constant flux" (Loomba 178).

The enduring effects of assimilation and rejection remain in Margaret's mind and heart and condition her construction of her own identity, since "[b]ecause she had been abandoned by her white family, she perceived herself to be darker than she was" (94). Nonetheless, Haizlip's mother is adamant about standing up to her black ethnicity, choosing to marry "the dark son of an even darker Baptist minister" (97-98). Her mother's pain is passed on to her daughter, whose thirst for vengeance even invades her dreams, which turn into nightmares. Like her mother, Haizlip is intent on publicly adhering to her black self, as shown by her symbolic act of wearing an Afro wig in a *Times* photograph just "to make a visual as well as verbal statement" (210). Fraught with the heavy weight passed on to her from her mother, Haizlip is further disappointed during her stay in the United States Virgin Islands. Despite the black presence in the government, schools, and many businesses which were black-owned or black-run in the islands, she and her husband "learned to [their] dismay that even in the Islands white was the race of choice" (216). This chosen ethnicity by "consent," in Werner Sollors' terms, leads Haizlip to the conclusion that it is not easy to "put people into carefully delineated categories" as her life in the Islands had completely altered her "perspective on race, majority and color" (224).¹

¹ We borrow the terms "consent" and "descent" from Werner Sollors's groundbreaking book *Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture*, who uses these terms to distinguish

Not only does Haizlip acknowledge the importance of skin color and its “loaded” signification, but she also uses it as a trope to deal with both the white and the black aspects, yet never renouncing of her ethnic identity. This is why when she is asked by a journalist about the issue of passing due to her light skin, she answers,

I told him that I had no need to, but that I certainly could not control the perceptions or assumptions other people might have. My color, I said, had allowed me to sit on top of and look over both sides of the high wall that separates the black and white experiences. And yes, that has been an advantage in the revelation of the ark secrets people have in their white souls. (238)

Rather than passing for white, Haizlip advocates the idea of integration her father had instilled in her. In the same light, *Black Ice* also revolves around the need to integrate--rather than assimilate--into white society. Furthermore, in the integration of the diverse aspects of the ethnic self resides the true self-consciousness of the Black American, harking back to W. E. B. Du Bois's theory of double consciousness. According to W. E. B. Du Bois, the African-American person is torn between two opposing sides of the self, one marked by the image whites have of blacks and another one determined by blacks' own image of themselves. In a society dominated by whites, there is for African-Americans a “sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity [...] two warring ideals in one dark body [...]” (3). Such internal tension is also produced by the duality implied in the very term African-American and the simultaneous allegiances to what is African and to what is American.

Haizlip's wish to reunite the two sisters finally comes true after a difficult and long search which even requires the assistance of a private detective. What she encounters in her aunt, however, is not a black person who has become white, but a white person who does not even have “conscious memories of her colored years. In fact she had no colored memories at all” (250): “Grace was indeed white. She could not give up being white, nor could she tear down the alabaster walls she had built around her life. She would be content to see us as often as we might like to visit, as long as no one in her circle knew who or what we were” (252). Thus, Grace's case represents an example of assimilation into the white world as well as an example of racial identity determined by consent rather than descent.

Cary's fears of assimilation are thus repeated in Haizlip since its drawbacks outweigh its benefits: “I do not understand how those who cloaked their lives carried on for so long, even if they did become the Other. I cannot imagine what it must have been like to hide behind a hundred veils for a lifetime. For me the toll is far too great” (252). Grace's is certainly a kind of assimilation understood as “homogenization,” as total detachment from the black race, a hiding behind the veil at the cost of one's identity. As Sollors contends, “the old antithesis between ethnicity and modernism was often flawed by a one-dimensional view of the power of cultural diffusion, of assimilation as homogenization,” concluding that “perhaps ethnic scholars ought to develop as much joy in syncretism as

between those relations of “blood or nature” (descent) and those of “law or marriage” (consent) (6). For our purposes here, we use “consent” for chosen--rather than given--relationships with a particular race, irrespective of the existence of marriage.

they have found in purity and authenticity in the past” (Sollors 245, 246). After all, what is authenticity but another constructed concept useful to simplify categorizations and divisions which can also easily lead to the “othering” of a whole race. Salman Rushdie makes the point when he argues that “‘authenticity’ is the respectable child of old-fashioned exoticism. It demands that sources, forms, style, language and symbol all derive from a supposedly unbroken and homogeneous tradition” (qtd. in Piper 17).

Cary and Haizlip advocate neither an assimilationist approach nor a purely Afrocentric one. Rather, both authors seem to coincide in their integrationist approach where black and white can coexist harmoniously, “refusing the boundaries which assign [them] exclusively to one place or the other” (Anderson 107), as is revealed in their autobiographies. Thus, they advocate the inclusion--rather than the exclusion--of the different but not opposing selves of the African-American person. Like Anzaldúa's new *mestiza*, Cary and Haizlip move away from fixed patterns toward a whole, inclusive perspective (Anzaldúa 79). As bell hooks states, quoting Paulo Freire,

Integration with one's context, as distinguished from adaptation, is a distinctly human activity. Integration results from the capacity to adapt oneself to reality plus the critical capacity to make choices and transform that reality [. . .]

The integrated person is person as Subject. In contrast, the adaptive person is person as object, adaptation representing at most a weak form of self defense [. . .] Adaptation is behavior characteristic of the animal sphere; exhibited by man, it is symptomatic of his dehumanization. (Hooks 67)

Likewise, it is integration, rather than adaptation, that Haizlip defends, as she stands up to the integrationist ideas received from her father.

My father, though deeply and vocally proud of his race, was nonetheless a staunch integrationist. He passed that mantle on to me [...] It gets harder and harder for me to honor my father's dream and the reality of my mother's life. But I know my parents will not let me leave that mantel behind, even if I drag it for a while. My father's words and the measure of my mother's life will assure that I pick it up and try again. (238-39).

By the end of their autobiographical journeys, Cary's and Haizlip's views on race have considerably developed into a new consciousness of the enriching multiplicity of the African-American self and of the legitimacy of ambivalence. In their search for a self-definition of their ethnicity, both writers dismiss preconceived notions of purity and authenticity and ultimately welcome the white and the black aspects of their selfhood. Cary's view of her experience at white St. Paul's as an act of aberration and an act of treason towards her black community triggers the realization that race is not about being either a traitor or an advocate but, rather, it is a question of developing what Gloria Anzaldúa terms “a tolerance for ambiguity” (79) or, in Betty Bergland's words, “a concept of the self that is pluralist, multidimensional, multifaceted” (133). Without refusing to acknowledge the writers' inherited culture and ethnicity through “descent” (Sollors 6) these autobiographies call for a necessary “consent” (Sollors 6) to reconcile that black legacy with the white sociological context in which African-Americans live in the United States.

Hence, the “strife” between the two souls of the African-American person, as Du Bois put it (3), will no longer be a strife but a dialogic coexistence, a readiness to accept differences and even contradictions within oneself. In this sense, *Black Ice* and *The Sweeter the Juice* are related to Bergland’s reference to ethnic autobiographies as apt sites for “the multiplicity of subject-positions that constitute a single agent” (157). As Bergland suggests, “a theory of the subject in autobiography must posit the existence of multiple and contradictory subjectivities as the effect of multiple discourses at a particular historical moment” (161), rather than a pure ethnic subject, who must necessarily adhere either to one side or to the other.

At the end of their autobiographies, these two authors define themselves in similar terms, as “ambivalent” and “crossover,” welcoming the richness enclosed within such condition. Going back to St. Paul’s School years later to work first as a teacher and then as a trustee is an act fraught with special implications for Lorene Cary:

It is like admitting who I am. I came here, and I went away changed. I’ve been fighting that for a long time, to no purpose. I am a crossover artist, you know, like those jazz musicians who do pop albums, too [...] I used to hate those musicians for that [...] because they were no longer pure. Well, I didn’t leave here pure. This is who I am [...] I wondered whether ‘crossover’ was the word I wanted. Did it convey enough tension? Or did it sound like dying a cultural death [...] (233)

Likewise, Shirlee Taylor Haizlip reconsiders her definition as a black woman and redefines herself as a “mixed race” person, born out of and heiress to a complex mixture of cultures and races. The final meeting with her assimilated aunt makes her realize that Grace and her family have actually “become white” (266), dismantling fixed notions of race and color. Although she clearly expresses her disagreement with this voluntary erasure of one’s race, she ultimately becomes more understanding, her final statement being one of ambivalence and sympathy--not condonation--toward her assimilated family, instead of one of condemnation.

All in all, I have grown a great deal less certain about the vagaries of race and know that I am ambivalent about its implications. But I am comfortable with that ambivalence, for it keeps my doors and windows open [. . .] If asked, I would probably now describe myself as a person of mixed race rather than as black, although I know I will never lose my black feelings. My journey has made me more cautious in labeling or pigeonholing others as well. And I have more sympathy for those who made the choices to leave the black part of their lives behind. In my eagerness to condemn, I had never looked too closely at the circumstances that provoked such decisions. (267)

Preserving racial and cultural differences within the diversity of the United States is one defining trait of multiculturalism. However, this multicultural diversity should be also inclusive of an empowering hybridization present in those who experience contending allegiances to two or more ethnic groups. As Karen Piper aptly argues, “preserving an enforceable difference [...] that refuses to recognize hybridity leads to an oppressive environment and a ‘deafened’ history” (22). The membership in the African-American

community should never preclude the interaction with the white community, thus giving rise to a cultural exchange that works in both directions—take, for instance, Cary’s decision to include in a traditionally white male syllabus works by African-American writers, such as Frederick Douglass’ slave narrative.

Therefore, the delimitations of concepts such as “race,” “authenticity” and “purity” can be melted as easily as ice into the flux of changing identities which are constantly in progress and in the process of constructing themselves. All in all, these autobiographies render the popular African-American proverb “the Blacker the berry, the sweeter the juice” (Smitherman 61) inappropriate, to say the least. By evoking this saying in the title of her work, Haizlip on the one hand claims her African-American ethnicity while, on the other, the exclusion of the first part of the proverb hints at a possible revision of it to allow for that “comfortable ambivalence” (Haizlip 267) encountered in a hinge position between two races. In the same light, by stressing the metaphor of ice in the title, Lorene Cary conjures up the fluidity of the boundaries delimited by race and thus claims the liberty to move in that slippery in-betweenness without being accused of having stepped out of her black skin, that is, without creating a halo of intraracial discrimination around her. By deconstructing received notions of race based on physical appearance and essentialist perspectives, Cary argues that skin color should not be an imprisoning cage, that “that fine, fine membrane[...] was meant to hold in my blood, not bind up my soul” (237), a statement which has been put forward by Lisa Kennedy as follows:

[...] will we become slaves to the collective body? Forced always to speak for it and to its needs? And scared to death that if we don’t, we won’t be allowed to say anything; or if we misrepresent it for the sake of ourselves we will be expelled, we will not exist? We will be “Toms,” or “house Negroes,” or “not black,” when clearly we remain in our skins.” (109)

Dealing with the potential imprisoning effects of skin color that Cary refers to, she includes in her autobiography a childhood story about a woman who steps out of her skin at night to fly around while her husband sleeps. When he finds out about his wife’s outings, the husband rubs salt on the inside part of her skin so that when the wife returns she cannot go back into it because of the intense pain which makes her scream out loud: “Skin, skin, ya na know me?” (130). As her autobiographical journey reaches its end, however, Cary revises that story and reinvests it with new meaning; now the flying woman does not fear her skin as it now welcomes her back. Venturing into the white world without experiencing a feeling of treason and shame any longer, Cary resembles the flying woman in the revised story; her advocacy of a multiple, hybrid and inclusive self does not preclude her embrace of her black skin. In *The Sweeter the Juice*, Haizlip too celebrates inclusiveness and hybridity, which surely “keeps [her] doors and windows open [...]” (267) to fly freely around the multiplicity of her ethnic self. Thus, she embraces the concept of identification as an open-ended process whereby she continuously (re)creates herself.

Throughout their autobiographies, Cary and Haizlip reflect upon and revise contested notions of racial identity as experienced by themselves. Their initial (pre)conceived notions of race as a clear-cut concept free of ambiguities develops into a more flexible, open perspective whereby race is also determined by ambivalence and shared allegiances. In this sense, both writers adhere to Gloria Anzaldúa’s theory of the “new mestiza consciousness,” which advocates the presence of ambiguity and

contradictions in the process of identity-formation, which must necessarily go through “a massive uprooting of dualistic thinking in the individual and collective consciousness” (Anzaldúa 80). The process of identification must not be reduced to just being either black or white but it must entail a continuous, open negotiation between both aspects. Finally, W. E. B. Du Bois’ concept of “double consciousness” has, therefore, been revisited and revised in these two autobiographies. From a definition of this expression as a true “strife” between two “warring ideals,” Cary and Haizlip move towards a new consciousness that reconciles those contending sides into a “comfortable ambivalence” that enables the hyphenated ethnic self to skate smoothly over the racial ice-rink of the United States.

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Özet**Afro Amerikan Otobiyografisinde Kimlik Pazarlığı:
Lorene Cary'nin *Black Ice* ve
Shirlee Taylor Haizlip'in *The Sweeter the Juice* Adlı Eserleri**

Black Ice (1991) ve *The Sweeter the Juice* (1994) adlı otobiyografilerinde Lorene Cary and Shirlee Taylor Haizlip Afrikalı-Amerikan kimliğinin oluşturulması sürecindeki ırksal kimliğin çekişmeli olgularının keşfine çıkarlar ve yeniden ele alırlar. Bu gibi yeniden ele alıp düzeltmelerle, asimilasyon, sahihlik ve siyah ve beyaz arasındaki ayıran sınırı geçme gibi sorunsallarla ilgilenirler. Bu makale, başlangıçtaki bükülemez, kesin çizgilerle ayrılan ve kuvvetle ten rengi ile belirlenen ırksal kimlik kavramından daha açık ve belirsizlik ve kararsızlığa yer veren esnek perspektife dek uzanan evrimin izini sürerek sözü geçen yazarların kendi kimlikleri üzerindeki pazarlıklarını çözümlenmeyi amaçlar. W. E. B. Du Bois'nın "çifte bilinçlilik" kavramı ve Gloria Anzaldúa'nın "yeni mestiza bilinçliliği" teorisi, Cary ve Haizlip'in otobiyografilerinin incelenmesinde dayandırılacak teorik temeller olarak uygulanacaktır.

A Journey Through the Labyrinth of Distorted Images: Arthur Mervyn's Quest for Knowledge.

Anna Wawrzyniak

His garb was plain, careless, and denoted rusticity: His aspect was simple and ingenuous, and his decayed visage still retained traces of uncommon, but manlike beauty. He had all the appearances of mere youth, unspoiled by luxury and uninured to misfortune. I scarcely ever beheld an object which laid so powerful and sudden a claim to my affection and succour. (Brown 6)

This introductory description of Arthur Mervyn, given by doctor Stevens who is from the very beginning, as the passage shows, prepossessed in the protagonist's favor (Brown 14), is particularly significant in that it already emphasizes the role of appearances in the story as well as their power to seduce reason. Stevens, a man, as it seems, of discernment, is nonetheless easily convinced of Arthur's virtue, and "disposed to put a more favorable construction on Mervyn's behavior" merely on the basis of his new friend's countenance and "the uniform complacency and rectitude of his deportment for the period during which [he] had witnessed it" (Brown 14), which was, at the moment of utterance, a very short period of time however, and, consequently, could have bred illusion. Whether Stevens was deluded by appearances or not is irrelevant at this point; it is the fact of encountering the first *reflection* of Mervyn, possibly distorted, in the long and intricate labyrinth of mirrors created by Charles Brockden Brown in *Arthur Mervyn*, that we are concerned with.

Even before Arthur begins narrating his "simple tale" (Brown 15), as he calls the labyrinthine story, the reader is already confronted with another image of the protagonist; a friend of Stevens, "by name Wortley" (Brown 11), comes with a visit and chances upon Mervyn whom he recognizes as an accomplice of a notorious fraud, Thomas Welbeck. Wortley's impression of Mervyn, is nevertheless based not so much on facts, as on assumptions and appearances; he scarcely knew Arthur; apart from their short meeting in Wortley's house, his acquaintance with the youth was limited to the knowledge that he lived with Welbeck and accompanied the latter on the night of his disappearance. In his words, Mervyn is a "young villain ... well instructed in his lesson," and he advises Stevens to terminate Arthur's stay at his lodgings as quickly as possible (Brown 11). In order to vindicate himself, Arthur commences the report of his adventures, and thus, presents his own image to the readers, or, to be more precise, a few images. He begins by relating the events that induced him to leave his "natal soil" and head for Philadelphia, and provides likewise a sketch of his personality, main characteristics of which would be (in his representation) ignorance, curiosity and frailty.

It should perhaps be mentioned at this juncture that Mervyn's journey to the city is simultaneously a wandering through a labyrinth of distorted images as well as a quest for knowledge. For the very combination of such a quest with a mazelike structure of the world surrounding him, the quest may be legitimately assumed to be unsuccessful, particularly when one takes into account the fact that the labyrinth is one of mirrors, in which, by definition, things that appear are never the things themselves. It can be argued

that the way Arthur is perceived by other characters is analogous to *his* perception of the reality surrounding him, and the appearances which mislead others, likewise deceive the protagonist.

Essentially, it is not only the surrounding reality in *Mervyn* that is subject to misrepresentation but the eponymous hero as well. The first two mentioned reflections of Mervyn are strikingly discrepant, therefore it can be safely inferred that one of them must be distorted; significantly, neither of them seems to be based on something else than mere appearances. The high frequency word in the romance, “appearances,” is interwoven into the fabric of the text in all possible configurations, sometimes even unexpectedly, when treated as if it were synonymous to “facts” which one can reasonably expect to be rather opposite in meaning.

Moreover, the word “appearances” is predominantly used in plural form, which is very singular, to paraphrase Borges here, since it stresses the moment of deception in them; even though one would expect that what one sees *is* actually the *manifestation* of a thing, and its nature can consequently be inferred on the basis of the perception of the phenomenon, the conclusion here must be drawn that judging from what one sees is necessarily defective and delusive.

That such inferences are erroneous is not actually surprising in the world of Arthur Mervyn (*Arthur Mervyn*), since, as it has been noted, the omnipresent appearances are effected by the presence of mirrors. The most evident mirror is always the eye of an observer and his reflecting consciousness (on the higher level it is the mind of the reader). The second-order mirror is the palpable looking glass; and, lastly, there are portraits which, if exhibiting powerful resemblance to the original, are analogous to specular reflections.

To begin with portraits, the case of Arthur is extremely singular in that he was never the original from which either of the two pictures in the text had been drawn. The first portrait is that of Clavering, a young man who was “discovered one morning in the orchard with many marks of insanity upon him” and whose “air and dress bespoke some elevation of rank and fortune” (Brown 28). According to Mervyn’s mother, there was “a very powerful resemblance between his countenance and [Mervyn’s]” (Brown 30), which is later confirmed by Mervyn himself in the first mirror scene. After the first encounter with Welbeck, and already at his home, Mervyn is told to dress appropriately and is offered a large collection of clothes, “all in the French style,” to choose from. After having dressed, bearing all the while Clavering’s style of dress in mind, Arthur “surveys [himself] in the mirror” and says: “I could scarcely forbear looking back to see whether the image in the glass, so well proportioned, so gallant, and so graceful, did not belong to another. I could scarcely recognize any lineaments of my own” (Brown 51).

This scene is interestingly paralleled by another in which Arthur gazes upon a picture of yet another youth, Vincentio Lodi:

My glances ... shortly lighted on a miniature portrait that hung near. I scrutinized it with eagerness. It was impossible to overlook its resemblance to my own visage. This was so great that, for a moment, I imagined myself to have been the original from which it had been drawn. This flattering conception yielded place to a belief merely of similitude between me and the genuine original. (Brown 82)

As can be seen, Mervyn's appearance is "reflected" literally in both pictures of Clavering and Lodi, as well as in a casual mirror. Astonishingly, however, all of those images are in some way distorted – neither of the portraits is actually his own while the genuine reflection in the mirror deludes him for the moment into thinking that it is an image of somebody else.

Since even Arthur has, if only momentary, doubts as to his identity and speculates that "identity itself frequently depends upon a casual likeness or an old nurse's imposture" (Brown 57-8) it is hardly surprising that others are simply perplexed about him. Not only is his appearance misleading, but also his deportment is extremely ambiguous in certain situations. One such example has already been mentioned – Mervyn accompanied Welbeck on the night of the latter's escape. Arthur later clarifies the situation while telling the story, yet, this little instance is only a drop in the ocean of equivocalness in which Mervyn is immersed.

For instance, being of "inquisitive temper" he was always "eager after knowledge" (Brown 64), and virtually craving "a key to unlock an extensive cabinet of secrets" (Brown 77-8), which resulted in his walking into places uninvited and with "little ceremony" (Brown 355), or peering through windows without being observed. Such proclivity in Mervyn rather indisposed his new acquaintances to put faith in his pure intentions and virtuous motives which he zealously proclaimed. Consequently, what we learn from Arthur himself, and having prevalently only his words to support him (together with Stevens's will to believe them), is widely different from what "appearances" suggest.

As has been mentioned before, the word is ambiguously used in the romance. For instance, what if not bare facts are represented when we hear Mervyn report his burial of Susan Hadwin in an orchard between a potato field and a melon-patch, without any ceremony whatsoever, without even the presence of Susan's sister, Eliza? Mervyn himself seemingly realizes the awkwardness of the situation:

In this spot I had hastily determined to dig the grave of Susan. The grave was dug. All that I desired was a cavity of sufficient dimensions to receive her. This being made, I returned to the house, lifted the corpse in my arms, and bore it to the spot. Caleb seated in the kitchen, and Eliza asleep in her chamber, were wholly unapprised of my motions. The grave was covered, the spade repositied under the shed, and my seat by the kitchen fire resumed in a time apparently too short for so solemn and momentous a transaction. (Brown 281)

When Eliza found out the truth she was justly offended and accused Mervyn of "treating her sister's sacred remains with barbarous indifference and rudeness" (Brown 282); though finally, reduced to tears and emotionally exhausted, she turned to Arthur as to the only friend in the world she was left with. It is legitimate to claim however, that since Arthur's mellifluous speech and pleasant appearance were able to win sympathy of others before, Eliza is likewise "won," particularly as a woman, for Mervyn is an extremely good looking youth.

Similarly, Stevens's opinion of Mervyn was formed on the basis of Mervyn's looks and his eloquence as the following passage shows:

A smooth exterior, a show of virtue, and a specious tale, are, a thousand times, exhibited in human intercourse by craft and subtlety. Motives are endlessly varied, while actions continue the same; and an acute penetration may not find it hard to select and arrange motives, suited to exempt from censure any action that an human being can commit. Had I heard Mervyn's story from another, or read it in a book, I might perhaps, have found it possible to suspect the truth; but as long as the impression, made by his tones, gestures and looks, remained in my memory, this suspicion was impossible. Wickedness may sometimes be ambiguous, its mask may puzzle the observer; our judgement may be made to falter and fluctuate, but the face of Mervyn is the index of an honest mind. Calm or vehement, doubting or confident, it is full of benevolence and candor. He that listens to his words may question their truth, but he that looks upon his countenance when speaking, cannot withhold his faith. (Brown 229)

This somewhat lengthy passage is crucial to the understanding of the idea of mirror in this paper. As everyone will agree, the basic and manifest characteristic, as well as function, of a mirror is to reflect. A mirror can reflect only the seen, that is, gestures, movements and physical objects in general. There is no possibility for a regular looking glass to show anything but appearance(s), hence neither ulterior motives, nor unconscious stimuli are copied on the specular surface. Parallel to it is, arguably, a reflecting consciousness of the subject in Brown's romance as well. Stevens realizes well the possibilities of deception, and yet, his consciousness cannot but reflect and store such an image of Mervyn as can be capable of mirror only, hence he is readily convinced by Arthur's gestures and face, even when confronted with a wholly dissimilar picture of Mervyn, and one that seems well justified – Mrs. Althorpe's portrait of the protagonist.

Mrs. Althorpe, “a sensible and candid woman” (Brown 230) according to Stevens, or a narrow-minded, “dimwitted and vicious country bumpkin” according to Patrick Brancaccio (23-4), is a former neighbor of the Mervyn family. As James Russo writes, “there is a major discrepancy between the portrait of Arthur Mervyn that we receive from Mrs. Althorpe and that purveyed to us through Stevens” (Russo 385). Although we learn from Mervyn, through Stevens, that he is uneducated and extremely ignorant, Arthur surprises the reader regularly by either the knowledge of Shakespeare, or, most remarkably, of Latin, which knowledge he professes to have profound enough to enable him to translate from Italian into English, though he is not familiar with the former language and wants to achieve his aim by simply “intuiting the similarities between the Tuscan tongues” (Russo 385-6). Moreover, as Russo demonstrates, “[during] the course of the novel he demonstrates particular knowledge of world geography and the history of the English Royal House of Stuart” (Russo 385).

Such, however, is not Mrs. Althorpe's idea of Arthur Mervyn; she believes him to be illiterate, indolent as well as ill-mannered, and claims that “[some] people supposed him to be half an idiot, or, at least, not to be right in his mind”; she then concludes that “his conduct was so very perverse and singular, that [she did] not wonder at those who accounted for it in this way” (Brown 232). Furthermore, her opinion of Arthur's general conduct is far from being favorable; he is accused of having been an undutiful, inconsiderate and self-centered son who ordered his father about and was likewise “charged with being instrumental in making” Betty Lawrence, his future

stepmother, a prostitute. Moreover, his “inhuman treatment of his father” (Brown 236), as Mrs. Althorpe maintains, eventuated in stealing his parent’s money and a horse on the day of his leaving the village, which completes Mrs. Althorpe’s portrait of Arthur.

This picture of Mervyn may be accurate or not, but the fact that a single person can be misrepresented to such an extreme awakens the reader’s curiosity as to the possible source of those distortions. Most naturally, the critics essay primarily to remove ambiguity from the text either by arguing that Arthur is innocent and virtuous or that he is a “chameleon of convenient vice,” and since the text offers an abundance of details for both tendencies, the results are prevalently convincing. It does not follow, however, that the critics do not admit the existence of ambiguity in the text, for it is quite impossible to be blind to its presence; it is simply the predilection for explanation and clarification, the always present and positive in itself desire for knowledge; and knowledge, naturally, demands clarity.

James Russo, to present the most radical example of an attempt at disambiguation, declares that “the novel’s central thematic concern” is the “ambiguity of vice and virtue”; yet he simultaneously refuses to believe that Brown “would choose to *emphasize* the inconsistency in the character of Arthur Mervyn” (386). Mervyn’s tales repeatedly shocked the critic’s belief and in order to extricate himself from the textual maze of the romance he proposed an interpretation which makes Mervyn an arch-villain, Welbeck his pawn, and all other characters his victims, especially all the mentioned seduced women. Most importantly, Mervyn is not really Mervyn at all, but Clavering, a ruthless impostor who happened to know Arthur in the past.

The images of Arthur/Clavering on one hand, and the virtuous and innocent Mervyn of Kenneth Bernard on the other, are clearly polarized, which is paralleled in the text by the contrasting pictures of Mervyn presented by Mrs. Althorpe and Stevens, with both intra and extratextual various modifications of those extremes in between.

This curious performance of the text can be perhaps described as a mirror-effect since such a proliferation of images different from one another can only be expected in presence of several mirrors, particularly in a labyrinth of mirrors, where almost each glass is made in such a way as to reflect a distorted image (convex and concave mirrors) and also, in other cases, to multiply it and, consequently, disorient a bystander who is not able to differentiate between the real person and that person’s reflection.

Numerous images-reflections of Arthur Mervyn make it likewise impossible to discern the “real” Arthur among them. One of the various images presented to the reader is that of a pursuer of truth. Mervyn is conspicuously desirous of gaining knowledge and experience, and he is aided in attaining his aim both by his mental abilities and tremendous curiosity. His quest for knowledge is not successful however, since the mirrors which are responsible for disorienting the observer are particularly applicable to a person who seems to be located in the very center of the labyrinth of mirrors. Mervyn is not able, though perceptive and inquisitive, to judge *not* from what he sees, that is from appearances, hence he is as susceptible to make mistakes as everybody else in the text.

Mervyn’s boundless, though not demonic, curiosity (McCracken xvii) has already been mentioned *en passant*. Led by a constitutional “thirst of knowledge” (Brown 293) he was both eagerly observing and habitually contemplating, or in his own words, “conjecturing the causes of appearances” (Brown 61). In a manner of Godwin’s

Caleb Williams, he was particularly tempted to unmask and uncover what was purposely veiled. As Caleb says:

To do what is forbidden always has its charms, because we have an indistinct apprehension of something arbitrary and tyrannical in the prohibition. ... I remember the stern reprimand I had received, and his terrible looks; and the recollection gave a kind of tingling sensation, not altogether unallied to enjoyment. The farther I advanced, the more the sensation was irresistible. I seemed to myself perpetually upon the brink of being countermined, and perpetually roused to guard my designs. The more impenetrable Mr. Falkland was determined to be, the more uncontrollable was my curiosity. (Godwin 107-8)

Similarly, Mervyn remarks: “[the] influence of prohibitions and an appearance of disguise in awakening curiosity, are well known. My mind fastened upon the idea of this room with an unusual degree of intentness” (Brown 81). Yet, Mervyn was not interested in others’ secrets only, though they never failed to excite his curiosity; he was fundamentally occupied with gaining experience and knowledge generally.

As Kenneth Bernard writes, “[Mervyn] yearns for direct experience. He sees several years of travel and mingling in all classes, a period of privation, hardship and danger, as an ‘apprenticeship to fortitude and wisdom’. He will not be satisfied with Eliza and her inheritance because no experience and knowledge come with them” (Bernard 453). His connection with Welbeck he considers fortunate in that it gave him a lesson in human nature, and in a similar vein he regards all his distressing adventures. Moreover, he seems to adopt a scientific attitude at times such as he exhibits in case of Betty Lawrence:

I am not sorry that I fell into company with that girl. Her intercourse has instructed me in what some would think impossible to be attained by one who had never haunted the impure recesses of licentiousness in a city. The knowledge, which residence in this town for ten years gave her audacious and inquisitive spirit, she imparted to me. Her character ... was open to my study, and I studied it. I watched her while she practiced all her tricks and blandishments, just as I regarded a similar deportment in the *animal salax ignavumque* who inhabits the sty. (Brown 345-6)

Significantly enough, Mervyn’s interest in Betty is productive exactly of the most incriminating charges made against him, based as they were on their relationship, but Arthur’s thirst of knowledge is evidently stronger than his wish for good reputation. Even more telling is the following passage:

As to me my thought was busy in a thousand ways. I sometimes gazed at my *four* companions, and endeavored to discern the differences and samenesses between them. I took an exact account of the features, proportions, looks, and gestures of the monkey, the Congolese, and the Creole-Gaul. I compared them together and examined them apart. I looked at them in a thousand different points of view, and pursued, untired and unsatiated, those trains of reflections which began at each change of tone, feature, and attitude.

I marked the country as it successively arose before me, and found endless employment in examining the shape and substance of the fence, the barn and the cottage, the aspect of earth and heaven. How great are the pleasures of health and of mental activity. (Brown 370-1; Brown's italics)

The fragment shows clearly that Mervyn's mental activity resembles that of a critic and an interpreter, or in other words, a pursuer of knowledge. For such a keen and passionate observer, everything that surrounds him is a potential object of study; yet it is hardly possible for Mervyn to escape the mirror-effect mentioned previously, since he is virtually placed in the very center of the labyrinth of mirrors. Were he located outside it, there would be no such multitude of his images and no such distortions.

Interestingly, his progress frequently takes on a form of wandering through a maze. In Mervyn's tale streets are "intricate," he loses himself "in the maze of rocks and dells," "[finds himself] bewildered among fields and fences" (Brown 134), or gets "entangled among boats" (Brown 114). Mervyn is also quite frequently forced to *disentangle* or *extricate* himself from complicated situations, as when, for instance, it occurs to him for the first time that it would be judicious to quit Welbeck's house.

Most importantly however, Mervyn is continuously beguiled by appearances; at one point he asserts that he is "born to be deceived" (Brown 320) and, indeed, his adventures repeatedly confirm this statement. At the beginning of his first stay in the city he falls prey to Wallace's trick and is led into a couple's bedchamber convinced that it belonged to Wallace – Susan Hadwin's fiancé, as it later turns out. After he manages to leave the house safely, he encounters Welbeck whom he initially regards with respect and admiration, or in Mervyn's own words, "with emotions of veneration and awe" (Brown 52). Similarly, he believes at first that Clemenza Lodi is a virtuous, innocent young lady, perhaps Welbeck's daughter. In both cases, however, he is bitterly disappointed. Having seen Welbeck leave Clemenza's room at night he ultimately comes to a conclusion that Welbeck is depraved, while the "charms of this angelic woman were tarnished and withered. [He] had formerly surveyed her as a precious and perfect monument, but now it was a scene of ruin and blast" (Brown 76). Afterwards he successively learns that Welbeck is a liar, a fraud, and a murderer.

The ease with which Arthur is deceived is due to the fact that, as he himself claims, he is "prone ... to rely upon confessions and confide in appearances" (Brown 62); the characteristic seemingly shared with other people as well:

There was no difficulty in persuading the world that Welbeck was a personage of opulence and rank. My birth and previous adventures it was proper to conceal. The facility with which mankind are misled in their estimate of characters, their proneness to multiply inferences and conjectures will not be readily conceived by one destitute of my experience. My sudden appearance on the stage, my stately reserve, my splendid habitation and my circumspect deportment were sufficient to intitle me to homage. (Brown 95)

As can be easily perceived, the misleading appearances enumerated by Welbeck are not remotely distant in character to those which guide Stevens in his estimate of Arthur. Actually, Mervyn's propensity to give credence to appearances is much greater than Stevens's due to the youth's inexperience. Nevertheless, it is the same reflexive

consciousness of the subject that is eventually responsible for the distorted view of reality. At certain point, when Mervyn wants to refute the accusations leveled against him by Mrs. Althorpe, he states that "men must judge from what they see" (Brown 340) and therefore he cannot blame them for having drawn conclusions such as they did, though he simultaneously insists that those inferences were "misconceptions."

Judging from what one sees, however, is nothing more it seems, than looking into a mirror of one's own mind, and it has already been noted, that this rather unavoidable operation results in no uniform picture of reality, since there are as many mirrors as there are observers. Mervyn's quest for knowledge can therefore be regarded as failure since he can only reflect and *interpret* reality – not *know* it.

The peculiarity of Brown's text however, does not solely lie in making the reality puzzling for his characters, but also in his successful endeavor to likewise amaze the reader. James Russo, for instance, declares that "it is [a] truly intricate narrative which confounds and challenges the twentieth-century reader" (Russo 381); Kenneth Bernard says that it is "the most sprawling and chaotic of his works, and because of this little read and less understood. The chief reason for this is the peculiar organization of the book: a series of tales within tales, so frequent as to befuddle the reader, and without chronological pattern." Interestingly, he also calls the text a "maze" on the same page (Bernard 441).

If the analogy is correct, then the informed reader should be aware that reflecting on Brown's romance may be as productive of distorted images of the text's reality as is Mervyn's defective perception of the world around him. Not only Brown's textual mirrors prove an obstacle on the way to knowledge, but also, it seems, the very method of obtaining that knowledge – reflection and interpretation. Hence, the specular and reflective mind of a critic cannot but perceive Arthur Mervyn in a somewhat disfigured manner, and the interpretations of his character vary so significantly. Possibly, Brown wanted to thus demonstrate a certain impossibility of gaining true knowledge of the reality in general, as long as one endeavors to *interpret* it, knowledge and interpretation being mutually exclusive: a correct interpretation means an adequate interpretation, and as such, it practically nears cognition which, by definition, excludes interpretation. In Brown's world of misleading appearances, however, only reflection and interpretation are possible, both to Mervyn's and the reader's a-mazement.

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Özet

**Tahrif Edilmiş İmgeler Labirentinde Bir Seyahat:
Arthur Mervyn'in Bilgiye Yolculuğu**

C.B. Brown, diğer romanslarında olduğu gibi Arthur Mervyn'de de duyuşsal algılar yolu ile kesin bilgiye ulaşma ihtimali üzerine kafa yoruyor. Öykü kurgusundaki karmaşıklıklar, hikâye içinde hikâyeler ve bolca, çoğunlukla da, tahrif edilmiş aynalar/yansımalar ve Arthur Mervyn'de de sık sık karşımıza çıkan "görüntüler" in sayıca çokluğu şeklinde kendini gösteren metnin labirente benzeyen yapısı okuyucuyu daha önceden bahsi geçen ihtimalden şüphelenmeye iter.

Bu makale, bizleri, (eleştirmenin zihnini bir ayna olarak ele aldığımızda) metindeki yansımanın metnin gerçekliğine dair tahrif edilmiş imgelerle karşılaştırılabilecek derecede belirsizlikler (Mervyn'in etrafındaki dünyaya dair kırık dökük algılamalarını) üretebileceği sonucuna ulaştıran ayna/portre imgesinin kullanımı üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Muhtemelen, Brown bu yolla, (bilgi ve yorumun birbirini desteklediğini ve şahsa özel olduğunu düşünerek) yorumlamaya çalıştıkça, genel anlamda gerçekliğe dair hakiki bilginin elde edilmesinin kesin bir imkânsızlığını ortaya koymak istemiştir. Doğru bir yorum yeterli bir yorum anlamına gelir ve öyle oldukça, pratikte, tanım itibarı ile yorumu dışlayan biliş haline yaklaşmaktadır. Halbuki, Brown'un insanı yanlış yönlendiren görüntülerinin dünyasında, hem Mervyn'i hem de okuyucuyu şaşırtacak derecede, yalnızca yansıma ve yorum mümkündür.

Manipulation or Marginalization? An Analysis of the Identity of Pinter's Ruth

Liu Yan

Pinter's *The Homecoming*, regarded as "the most enigmatic work of art since the Mona Lisa" (Carpenter 489), has received "responses that ranged [range] from bafflement to outrage" (Warner 340) ever since its first performance in London in 1965. The central problem that causes diversified opinions is boiled down to one issue: why does Ruth, the only female character on stage, choose to remain in her husband's family as a mother/whore figure for a family of men whereas her husband Teddy seems to respond to her decision with acquiescence? Many critics hold that Ruth finally gains control over the family. Michael Billington reads the play as a story of "Ruth's triumph and ultimate empowerment" because she is "a shrewd manipulator" (171). Martin Esslin observes that at the end of the play it is Ruth who "rules the household" and the homecoming is that of Ruth as a mother figure (154). Steven H. Gale figures out that "Ruth is the strongest" in the power struggle (154). James R. Hollis (103) and Bert O. States (150) share a similar view, and so does Victor L. Cahn who argues that this power of Ruth comes from her "skill at manipulating men sexually" (68). Marc Silverstein believes that Ruth is an emblem of "matriarchal power within a culture that constructs Woman as a sign of powerlessness and abjection" (1). Anita R. Osherow can see that Ruth "gains a certain amount of freedom and vitality" when the curtain falls (431). However, my reading from the feminist perspective reveals that the portrayal of Ruth follows the traditional patriarchal ideology based on the degradation of womanhood/motherhood. Apart from the identities of mother and whore, Ruth is unable to assume any other individual identity of her own although her voice does seem to possess a kind of strength that has never been found in the previous female characters of Pinter. The difference between Ruth and all other women/mothers is that Ruth sees through male trick and willingly takes the role that the men expect her to take. Nonetheless, she cannot escape the fate of being commercialized, hence an object of marginalization.

The marginalization and objectification of woman as shown in the example of Ruth is represented in the following aspects.

1. Ruth is an object of male (mis)representation.

Ruth is judged and evaluated by men. She is portrayed through the (mis)representation of men. As a result, we are not very sure of what kind of a person she really is. What the men describe and how they describe bear strong personal feelings of the narrators. French feminist Hélène Cixous argues that a woman's image is formulated and constructed by man. She maintains that it is man who helps define woman. She contends that "man *makes*, he makes (up) his woman ... he makes her image for her" (46-47). Another French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray shares a similar view. She argues that a woman is a "currency symbol," ready "to be made into a product" by men (*An Ethics* 114). Since man possesses the power to speak and to

represent, he gives woman an image that is based on his idealization of women in general. This idealization means that man *makes* woman out of his own needs and upon male expectations. The situation delineated in the ideas of Cixous and Irigaray naturally goes for the character of Ruth although she does appear on stage and is able to display her character to the audience. However, what we learn from Ruth herself is those objective facts, such as whether she is a mother or not and how many children she has with Teddy. It still depends on the man to give an evaluation of her performance as wife/mother. In her case, it is Teddy who offers such an account. When Max gives Ruth a piece of compliment, "... you're a charming woman," Ruth tries to rectify him by saying that she was "different" when she met Teddy years ago. However, Teddy quickly stops her and insists, "No, you weren't. You were the same." A moment later Teddy gives the following account of their life in the US:

TEDDY. She's a great help to me over there. She's a wonderful wife and mother. She's a very popular woman. She's got lots of friends. It's a great life, at the University ... you know ... it's a very good life. We've got a lovely house ... we've got all ... we've got everything we want. It's a very stimulating environment.

Pause.

My department ... is highly successful.

Pause.

We've got three boys, you know. (II, 66)¹

In these descriptions, we learn how Ruth behaves as a wife/mother only through Teddy's judgment. While Teddy relates their life in the US, Ruth herself is forbidden to speak. Since Ruth herself never provides any information concerning her marriage, her identity as wife/mother is purely constructed out of Teddy's descriptions that do not seem to apply to Ruth only. The descriptions can be applied to any good woman because the delineation is stereotypical of an ideal woman figure in the imagination of a man. It is also important to notice that Teddy pauses several times in this short narration. The pauses show the tentativeness of the speaker who is likely making things up. How can we believe in such a speaker? But whom else can we believe in? Cixous says, "[s]he [a woman] is given images that don't belong to her, and she forces herself, as we've all done, to resemble them" (47). Luce Irigaray also contends, "... as mirrors of and for man, women more or less unwittingly come to represent the danger of a disappropriation of masculine power: the phallic mirage" (*This Sex* 188). In their analysis, a woman is given an image by man. Man defines woman with characteristics that are associated with the archetypal roles of an ideal woman. A woman is expected to model her behavior on these characteristics. Therefore, a woman becomes a mirror of male values. She is no longer herself. She is idealized and misrepresented in male discourse. The image of Ruth is thus constructed by the men in the family.

Not only does man evaluate a woman's worth and performance, but he also makes arbitrary decisions about women's situation and offers blank compliments to

¹ All quotations from *The Homecoming* in this paper are taken from Harold Pinter's *Complete Works*, vol. 3 (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1978). Hereafter only the act numbers and page numbers are provided in the text.

them. On the night when Ruth first meets Lenny, Lenny wants to take away the glass from Ruth because he believes, “You’ve consumed quite enough, in my opinion” (I, 49). In *his* opinion. Isn’t it ridiculous? He does not care about whether Ruth has really had enough, but he makes an assumption about her situation and further tries to force his opinion onto her. Max, too, makes arbitrary assumptions about women. When he first meets Ruth, he assumes that she is a prostitute. “Who asked you to bring tarts in here?” he asks Teddy (I, 57). Max makes assumptions about Ruth’s identity before he really knows who she is. When Teddy tells him that Ruth is his wife and they have been married for six years, Max still insists on his presumption. “I’ve never had a whore under this roof before. Ever since your mother died” (I, 58). Max is unwilling to abandon his presumption about Ruth although Teddy has explained her relationship with him to his father. Later, Max gives compliments to Ruth. He believes that “she’s an intelligent and sympathetic woman” (II, 67). He also tells Teddy that “she’s a lovely girl. A beautiful woman. And a mother too” (II, 75-76). Obviously Max creates the image of a woman out of his own needs and imagination. This further proves Cixous’ theory that man makes the image of woman for her (46). In other words, man’s ability to manipulate discourse banishes woman to a marginalized position. A woman does not have the power either to declare her needs or to defend herself against man’s distorted descriptions. The female only exists in the “illusion” of man. She is misrepresented and misinterpreted in the masculine discourse. Such is the case with Pinter’s Ruth.

2. Ruth is an object of power exchange among men.

A woman is an object of power exchange among men, which constitutes another important aspect of objectification. A woman’s relationship with men is decided according to her value which is especially represented through her body. On explaining why *men* are not objects of exchange, Irigaray argues,

It is because women’s bodies—through their use, consumption, and circulation—provide for the condition making social life and culture possible, although they remain an unknown “infrastructure” of the elaboration of that social life and culture. (*This Sex* 171)

She further contends, “*Woman thus has value only in that she can be exchanged*” (176). In the example of Ruth, we see the same principle working.

It is Max who first puts forward the idea that they should keep Ruth in the family. Later he realizes that they cannot simply have her without paying her: “We’d have to pay her, of course” (II, 86). At this very moment, the men in the family treat Ruth as if she were a piece of property that can be bought and sold at the market. Lenny later suggests that he take her up to Greek Street where “she can earn the money herself” (II, 88). Then, they discuss how many hours they should allow her to work every day and what kind of people they should arrange for her to entertain. At last, they suggest that Teddy, as their representative in America, should bring some cards back to the US to distribute to various parties. Max becomes hilarious at the idea that they are now talking the matter “in international terms” (II, 90). These men are making arrangement for Ruth’s life on the basis of the value of her body. They are *selling Ruth* without her acknowledgment. They are selling her in exchange for other things they need—the company of a maternal figure in the house, the sexual pleasure some of them

may obtain from her, and the sharing of the housework. They are talking about this arrangement as if it were an important business. Irigaray contends, "The society ... is based upon the exchange of women" (*This Sex* 170). She believes that the body of a woman bears value in the exchange process and she analyzes in detail how this works for man:

... in order to be able to incorporate itself into a mirror of value, it is necessary that the work itself reflect only its property of human labor: that the body of a commodity be nothing more than the materialization of an abstract human labor. (179)

It is very clear that Ruth becomes an object to assist men to participate in the exchange process. The men, on the other hand, seem to take this for granted. The whole process of making arrangement for Ruth to sell her body as a prostitute in return for some benefits they can share comes very naturally to them. The men have never become so eloquent and intelligent and cooperative. On other occasions, they treat each other with detached coldness and alienation, with hostility and hatred, with no sympathy or understanding.²² Only on the matter of commercializing women do they work together unanimously. It can be imagined that after Ruth remains, she "will be used and [finally] used up" by these men (Fendt 50).

M. W. Rowe believes that Lenny's view of women "as commodities to be manipulated and suffer violence" is an idea to which Ruth "can genuinely respond" (202). And Ruth herself "shares his commercialized and manipulative view of sex" (201) when she relates to Lenny her life as a prostitute before going to America. When she later joins the men's discussion of her arranged prostitution, Ruth seems to forcefully bargain with the men concerning her working and living conditions. Chiefly based on this unusual behavior, some critics draw the conclusion that Ruth is a truly independent female character as quoted at the beginning of the paper. However, Ruth's bargaining with the men cannot be taken too optimistically as a sign of female control over the situation. I would agree with Deborah A. Sarbin who argues that Ruth's power is "paradoxical" because "she never fits into the discourse, but acts upon it from the outside" (40). In the play we do find places where Ruth argues and even gives orders to men. This marks Ruth's difference from other female characters before her whose words do not carry much weight and who stay outside the symbolic order.

Three places are especially worthy of our attention. The first occasion is when Lenny wants to take away Ruth's glass. Faced with Lenny's assumption, Ruth shows an unusual determination not to be judged and manipulated by man. She wants to decide her own affairs. Simon Trussler contends, "Her [Ruth's] first meeting with Lenny ...

² For the hostility between the male members in the family, please see M. W. Rowe, "Pinter's Freudian *Homecoming*," *Essays in Criticism* 41.3 (July 1991): 198. For the theme of alienation, please see John M. Warner, "The Epistemological Quest in Pinter's *The Homecoming*," *Contemporary Literature* 11.3 (Summer 1970): 341-342. For the themes of nonrecognition and violence, please see Elin Diamond, *Pinter's Comic Play* (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1985), 157; and Bert O. States, "Pinter's *Homecoming*: The Shock of Nonrecognition," in Arthur F. Ganz, ed., *Pinter: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), 147-160.

shows how consummately well she can *use* words when she wishes—whether the words are her own or, by holding her peace, she is letting Lenny lose himself in a verbal maze of his own making” (125). The second place is when Ruth issues orders to the brothers the next day. She tells them that she would like to have a drink and asks Lenny to “get it.” She also orders Joey to put off the record (II, 76). Lenny and Joey finally do as she decrees. The third occasion comes at the climactic moment when the men in the family are commercializing Ruth who later joins in and declares her own requirement. She bargains and argues with the men. She disagrees with them and insists that the original outlay should be regarded as “a capital investment”. At last she makes it clear, “All aspects of the agreement and conditions of employment would have to be clarified to our mutual satisfaction before we finalized the contract”, to which Lenny agrees (II, 93). Ruth does seem to possess certain intellectual capacities that cannot be found in many other female characters before her. Her bargaining shows that she is familiar with the transaction process and the legal terminologies involved (Sakellaridou 113).

However, as Deborah A. Sarbin points out, “... even her [Ruth’s] demands for particular living conditions do not shift the real balance of power onto her” because she is after all the object of men’s exchange (38). I would agree with Sarbin and view Ruth’s situation on three levels. Firstly, Ruth does attempt to assert her individuality and to seek independence. Her speech displays a strong will and determination to participate in men’s business and to safeguard her own interests. Her decision to remain in this new family reveals her effort to escape the bondage of the traditional patriarchal ideology. She is fed up with the dull and monotonous life as the wife of an intellectual and mother of three innocent children. She does not want to continue her life within the pattern established by patriarchal values. She needs excitement and change. She needs a space to control her own life. Secondly, Ruth actively participates in the commercialization process because she is able to see through the issue and directly comes to the ultimate point. Unlike other female characters who are involved in the exchange process without knowing it themselves, Ruth knows it well and faces it directly. Lastly, it is clear that Ruth still cannot escape the stereotypical role patriarchy imposes on a woman. Her pursuit of individuality and independence brings her to the business of prostitution which is equally degrading and humiliating as her other feminine roles and which is also based on the exchange value of a woman’s body. The role of the mother as well as that of the prostitute are the social roles imposed on a woman by men in patriarchal society (Irigaray, *This Sex* 186). The mother and the prostitute differ in the sense that their bodies mean different things to men. They are the same in the sense that it is their bodies that bear value in the male imagination. In neither of these roles, woman has “any right to her own pleasure” (187). After analyzing the specific meanings of a woman’s body to men, Irigaray comes to the following conclusion: “Her value-invested form amounts to what man inscribes in and on its matter: that is, her body ...” (187) Irigaray’s analysis is based on the premise that a woman is a commodity that can be exchanged between men for the sake of power. For a woman to participate in society, it is necessary that she submit her body to the judgment of men. Therefore, in the male imagination, a woman should serve as a mother, a prostitute, a virgin, any role that can satisfy men’s needs for power exchange and men’s various desires. In the same way, no matter what role Ruth assumes, she is after all an object in men’s power exchange.

3. Ruth is an object of male desires.

Male desires are not limited to sexual desires, but also include desires for maternity, companionship and a comfortable life that a woman is able to provide. Ruth remains a perfect example of an object of male desires. She tells Lenny that she used to be “a model for the body” before she married Teddy (II, 73), a profession that is understood as prostitution. Then she becomes the wife of Teddy and gives birth to three children. Now that she comes to this new family, she is again reduced to the dual role of mother/whore, shared among the three brothers. She “yields to these [male] desires without putting up any resistance” (Esslin 156). Ruth’s decision to stay in the family at the end of the play shows her surrender to male desires and her willingness to satisfy their desires. Ronald Knowles believes that Ruth serves different roles for men: she is “a whore for Lenny, for Max she is a lover and for Joey a mother” (120). Approaching the play from the psychoanalytic perspective, Martin Esslin argues that the final tableau is “the culmination of their [the sons’] Oedipal dreams”: “their mother, young and beautiful, has become available to them as a sexual partner, as a ‘whore’, while the defeated father grovels on the floor pleading for some scraps of her sexual favours” (154-155).

Like many other women, Ruth can only find value in being a wife, a mother, or a whore because these are the roles with which a man endows a woman in patriarchal society. As Irigaray argues, “woman serves as reflection, as image of and for man [*sic*], but lacks specific qualities of her own” (*This Sex* 187). The idea of “mirror” was first put forward by Jacques Lacan (4). In Lacan’s theory, this mirror stage falls to the boy when he is between six and eighteen months. During this time, the boy begins to see his own image in the mirror, see his body as a totality, a *Gestalt*, and identifies with it. Bice Benvenuto and Roger Kennedy further explain this by saying, “This image is the first organized form in which the individual identifies himself, so the ego takes its form from, and is formed by, the organizing and constitutive qualities of this image” (55). When she develops Lacan’s concept of the mirror and argues that woman has become the mirror of man, Irigaray contends that woman remains a “reflection” of man’s desires, a mirror image of man’s aspirations. While serving as the mirror for man, the woman herself does not have specific qualities of her own because after all she is only an illusionary image for man rather than a solid existence on her own. Therefore, Ruth’s future in this family of men who need her for different purposes remains ambiguous. Her position as the object of male gaze is especially highlighted by the last tableau in which Joey kneels beside her, Max begs for her favor, and Lenny stands by and watches. Instead of suggesting that Ruth dominates the family, the scene seems to suggest “a passing on of the role of dominant male from Teddy to Lenny” whereas “Ruth is still the observed, placed by the gaze of the male” (Sarbin 41).³ Drew Milne also notices, “Ruth’s acquiescence as the working mother, sexual provider and prostitute for a group of sadistic and misogynist men might fulfill the wishes of this profoundly dysfunctional ‘family’” (205). If Ruth remains in the family only to find out

³ Katherine Burkman reads the play by probing the religious meaning impregnated in it. She suggests that the play parallels the ancient rite of the sacrifice of the ritual king and the mating of the fertility goddess with the new conqueror (108). Please also see Vera M. Jiji, “Pinter’s Four Dimensional House: *The Homecoming*,” *Modern Drama* 17.4 (Dec. 1974): 433; and Gene Fendt, “A Medieval Reading of Pinter’s *Homecoming*,” *Literature and Theology* 8.1 (March 1994): 56.

that she is to satisfy the different needs of these men, we can hardly say that she is able to assert her individuality. With men sharing cigars (I, 28; II, 61), a primary symbol of the phallus and a metaphor for Logos and hence authority, Ruth will remain an outsider in the male discourse and the male order. Her position is ultimately that of an Other.

Sakellaridou observes that Ruth possesses "a compact personality, synthesising all the aspects of the female principle, the mother, the wife and the whore" (111). It is true that Ruth successfully gains certain autonomy in her verbal confrontation with men because she is able to safeguard her own interests to a certain extent. Unfortunately, the dual role of mother/whore that she finally accepts is the archetypal roles that man expects a woman to take in patriarchal society. Ruth can hardly obtain much individuality within these social roles since in these roles, Ruth is objectified by men, satisfies male desires, and remains outside the male order. Ruth's experience certainly reveals a woman's attempt to assert her own individuality and to search for her own identity, but she fails to escape from the stereotypical role that patriarchy endows on a woman. Since the patriarchal culture judges a woman from the masculine point of view, the feminine does not possess an independent set of characteristics that marks them as feminine. Irigaray maintains that "'femininity' is a role, an image, a value, imposed upon women by male systems of representation. In this masquerade of femininity, the woman loses herself, and loses herself by playing on her femininity" (*This Sex* 84). In the analysis of the feminists, man possesses the power to regulate speech and order. Since they judge everything with masculine values, women's identity is decided by male standards. In a society regulated by male-oriented principles, women naturally can only assume an identity in relation to men's interests. In such a role that is based on the degradation of womanhood/motherhood and a role that functions on the basis of power exchange between men, Ruth can hardly succeed in finding a true identity of her own.

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Özet

Manipülasyon mu Marjinleştirme mi? Pinter'in *Ruth* Adlı Eseri Üzerine Bir Çözümleme

Pinter'in *The Homecoming* adlı eseri, "Mona Lisa'dan bu yana en gizemli sanat eseri" olarak kabul edilir (Carpenter 489). Farklı görüşlere neden olan asıl sorun bir tek soruda odaklanır: Neden sahnedeki tek kadın karakter olan Ruth, kocası olan Teddy'nin haklarını ihlal ettiğini kabul etmiş bir şekilde gitmesine boyun eğecek gibi görünmesine rağmen sadece erkeklerden oluşan bir ailede anne/fahişe figürü olarak kocasının evinde

kalmayı seçer? Birçok eleştirmen Ruth'un sonunda ailenin kontrolünü eline geçirdiği savına tutunur. Buna göre, onun ailedeki erkeklerin beklentisine uygun rolleri üstlenme kararını vermesi bireyselliğini ortaya koyabildiğini gösterir. Hâlbuki benim feminist perspektiften okumam, Ruth'un portresinin kadınlık ve annelik rollerinin düşürülmesi temeline dayanan geleneksel ataerkil ideolojiyi takip ettiğini ortaya koyar. Pinter'ın daha önceki kadın karakterlerinde hiç görülmeyen bir durum olan Ruth'un sesinde bir çeşit güç ve dayanıklılık olmasına rağmen, Ruth kendine anne ve fahişe kimliklerinin ötesinde başka bir bireysel kimlik geliştiremez. Bu makale Ruth örneğinde olduğu gibi kadının nesnelleştirilmesini çözümlemektedir. Sözü geçen nesnelleştirme şu durumlarla sunulmaktadır: Öncelikle, Ruth erkekler tarafından yargılanır ve değerlendirilir; ikinci olarak, erkekler arasında bir değiş tokuş nesnesidir ve erkeklerle olan ilişkisi bedeninin değeri ile orantılı olarak kurulur ve son olarak Ruth, annelik, arkadaşlık, rahat bir yaşam gibi cinsel olmakla sınırlı kalmayan erkek arzularının nesnesidir. Bu çözümleme aracılığı ile bu makalenin yazarı Ruth'un bireysel kimliğinin şüpheli olduğunu ileri sürmektedir.

Rhetorical Investigations: Studies in Ordinary Language Criticism

Walter Jost

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Reviewed by Şebnem Toplu

Walter Jost, Professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of *Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman* (1989) and co-editor of several books, most recently *A Companion to Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism* (Blackwell, 2004). In his accomplished and unique book, *Rhetorical Investigations*, Jost unites rhetoric and its effective role in literary-philosophical analysis in various ways and re-examines the poetry of Robert Frost through this perspective. Jost uses rhetoric as a common ground bridging contradictions between philosophy and literature. To reach this complicated goal, he draws chiefly on the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, along with Kant, Heidegger, Kenneth Burke and many others, comparing their arguments with the views of contemporary literary critics. As to why he chooses Robert Frost particularly, Jost states in his introduction that Frost's poems present him with an occasion to rethink the nexus of questions about the everyday and ordinary, language, experience, common sense, judgment and exemplarity; to question the assumptions about the grammatical and rhetorical possibilities of literary criticism; and to reexamine what he takes to be underappreciated resources for criticism to be found in the traditions of rhetoric, hermeneutic phenomenology, pragmatism, and so-called ordinary language philosophy and criticism (4). As to why and how he combines his philosophical and literary discussions with Frost, he asserts that his work makes no attempt to explore systematically the Frost oeuvre; thus "this study must not be taken as complete or full in one ordinary sense" (5). Rather, Jost highlights that his selection of Frost's poems depends on what Wittgenstein calls "perspicuous representations" of Frost's own rhetorical and philosophical methods to enable others to go on with their own investigations of Frost and other writers, in prose and poetry (5). Exemplifying Frost's poetry and rhetoric comprises word and thought, image and idea, speech and reason, imagination and discursive invention practiced on common places, "topoi", turning or troping them toward the novel circumstances of people's changing interests, and the judgment of such inventions, seeing them as more or less useful or true for some community (63). In this way his book is intended to work by "teaching by example, not by doctrine" (5). Therefore, as a whole Jost claims that his book might be considered a contribution to the indeterminate area of studies that Ezra Pound alluded to as "logopoetics", Angus Fletcher as "noetics", Gary Saul Morson, Carly Emerson and others as "prosaics," and that Kenneth Dauber and Jost himself elsewhere have called "ordinary language criticism" (8).

For the reasons indicated above, *Rhetorical Investigations* is divided into two books: Book I, *Rhetoric: An Advanced Primer* and Book II, *Four Beginnings for a Book on Robert Frost*. Since the book is also subtitled *Studies in Ordinary Language Criticism*, the four chapters comprising Book I consider several distinctions regarding ordinary language

in and out of literature. Book II on the other hand features four of Robert Frost's poems: "The Death of the Hired man", "West-Running Brook", "Snow" and "Home Burial," each serving the purposes of highlighting the abstract discussions of the first part. In a complicated way, although *Rhetorical Investigations* is separated as Book I and II, the numbers of the chapters follow the numerical sequence allocating four chapters in each book. Consequently, Jost proposes that each chapter of Book I is intended as a possible way of going on with a chapter in Book II correlated with it, though the sequence is not strictly linear. That is, he proposes that Chapter 1 can be read with the last chapter, 8; 2 with 5, 3 with 6, and 4 with 7. As he explains, Book I chapter 1 attempts to gather a community from which it can draw the words to go on, chapter 2 selects from and organizes those words as "windows and doorways" into Frost's poetry, chapter 3 "roughs out a house around them", chapter 4 is a preliminary hearing or audition of the claims made thus far for the everyday and ordinary, for rhetorical investigations, and for Robert Frost. In Book II, chapter 5 is a lesson in how the life of a farming couple, of lyric poetry, of a culture's language, gets renewed by being reinvented. Chapter 6 asks what we mean by (human) life as temporal. Chapter 7 mediates on time and proof as matters, in good measure, of timing. And the final chapter 8 comes to "grief in its own ambivalent desire to dissent from, and to reconvene senses of, community" (23).

Primarily, Jost distinguishes "ordinary language" from language that is "not ordinary" in the section titled as "Dialectic as Dialogue: The Order of the Ordinary". Claiming that "language that is not ordinary" is used absolutely or metaphysically in traditional ways or, in the shadow of metaphysics, used "skeptically in fairly radical ways", Jost argues that its alleged meaning has no actual use as ordinary language does. Moreover, following Wittgenstein he distinguishes "standard" uses, the "primary" meanings of ordinary words in specific contexts of use, from "non-standard" uses and their "secondary" meanings. Thus, for example, standard use of language ranges from "everyday" pursuits like shopping, going to work, etc. to the "noneveryday" uses, which are more specialized and engage complex matters of fact in the world (such as "performing a biological experiment, or measuring planetary motions" and so on). On the other hand, Jost suggests that forms of nonstandard speech vary from uses of language in religious ceremonies to "grammatical" uses of language displayed in literary works, in philosophy and literary criticism, and so on.

Moreover, Jost claims that the "language of everyday life," "the usage approved by the sense of the community," and "the common practice, custom and speech of mankind" were conceived differently during the times of Greek polis and Roman Republic, from the way we commonly conceive them now, namely as fearful clings to popular beliefs and conventions, or as settled dispositions toward fixed concepts (63). Therefore, among many fascinating points, Jost argues that topical invention allows Frost to organize perception not to defamiliarize the ordinary but to "recommunalize" a precarious everyday threatened by preromantic empiricism, romantic subjectivism, modernist irony, poststructuralist idealism and skepticisms (93).

The book reveals that rhetorical invention enlarges our awareness of indeterminate issues by selectively bringing forward terms and premises, images, tropes and narratives of persuasive appeal, effectively addressing the conjectural question whether or how something appears to be the case to some interested party. In this sense, many Frost poems aim at involving the reader in retrieving, interpreting the data of his or her existence as

“formed experience,” as structures that function to increase our purchase on quotidian life, however vaguely or roughly defined, by functioning as topical instrumentalities or models of identificatory invention and judgment. Jost argues that Frost underwrites high modernist, epiphanic “poetry of experience” in favor of what Jost calls “epideictic” (109) poetry of process or movement, exploring the domestic, everyday, and ordinary in ways followed by later poets from W.H. Auden to Robert Lowell to Charles Bernstein.

The book does not have a determinate conclusion, since the discussions are not intended to terminate. For a conclusion of my own to this review, I’d like to point out that Robert Frost’s “low modernist poetry” presented by Walter Jost is very different from most narratives of modernism, since he finds a “scene of instruction” through them. Jost’s highly complicated, yet very effective analysis and synthesis proves that the book is accessible to Frost scholars, providing them with a background of complicated literary and philosophical discussions. The book is also invaluable to scholars interested in rhetorical investigations, who may regard Frost as a model supplying them with a sound example. Readers are thus given a double opportunity to choose for themselves. For more general readers, the book, though complicated in its arguments as well as its structuring, offers not convenient methods or simple answers to questions of meaning in literature, but rather important provocations to investigations of their own. In short, the book is a meticulous study, produced by a work of long years. I recommend it highly.